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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy  
and Jeffery Klaehn
If you’re not careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people 
who are being oppressed, and loving the people who are doing the 
oppressing.
 –Malcolm X
The propaganda system allows the U.S. leadership to commit crimes 
without limit and with no suggestion of misbehaviour or criminality.
 –Edward S. Herman
The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit 
the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within 
that spectrum.
 –Noam Chomsky
Often, ‘freedom of expression’ is mistaken with ‘freedom of pressur-
ing’… It is no longer necessary for the ends to justify the means since 
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2 The Propaganda Model Today
the means, the means of communication – the mass media – justify the 
ends of a power system that imposes its values on a global scale … [The] 
many are being held incommunicado by the few.
 –Eduardo Galeano
1. Reception of the Propaganda Model
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky first proposed their ‘propaganda model’ 
(PM hereafter) of media operations in Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media in 1988.1 Since then, the PM has seen noteworthy 
modifications2 and has attracted significant scholarly attention from around the 
world.3 While the individual elements of the propaganda system (or ‘filters’) iden-
tified by the PM (ownership, advertising, sources, flak and anti-communism) 
had previously been the focus of much scholarly attention, their systematisation 
in a model, empirical corroboration and historisation have made the PM a useful 
tool for media analysis across cultural and geographical boundaries.
Despite the wealth of scholarly research Herman and Chomsky’s work has set 
into motion over the past decades, the PM has been subjected to marginalisa-
tion;4 poorly informed critiques;5 and misrepresentations.6 Interestingly, while 
the PM enables researchers to form discerning predictions as regards corporate 
media performance, Herman and Chomsky had further predicted that the PM 
itself would meet with such marginalisation and contempt.
In current theoretical and empirical studies of mass media performance, 
uses of the PM continue, nonetheless, to yield important insights into the 
workings of political and economic power in society, due in large measure to 
the model’s considerable explanatory power. Its appeal also appears to come 
from the simplicity with which it may be used to investigate and elucidate 
how dominant institutional forces in society shape mass media performance. 
By illuminating ways in which power structures and privileged actors rou-
tinely impact patterns of media behaviour, the PM serves as a highly effective 
means of clarifying how dominant systems of propaganda and manipulation 
can affect capitalist societies, characterised by the increasing control of demo-
cratic institutions by financial and political-State forces to the detriment of the 
general population.
In academic contexts currently marked by the de-politicisation of Cultural 
and Media/Communication Studies,7 this collection aims to introduce read-
ers to the PM, to present cutting-edge research demonstrating the model’s 
general validity and to critically update, expand, and refine it.8 To these ends, 
we have brought together international researchers to analyse the continuities 
and new developments in media environments throughout various regions of 
the world. This volume, thus, endeavours to serve as a benchmark text for any-
one interested in the PM, including students, scholars and researchers, con-
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cerned citizens, social, political and media activists as well as policy makers 
across a range of disciplines, such as communication/media studies, sociol-
ogy, political science/international relations, peace/war studies and political 
economy. While this collection is aimed primarily at a particular audience, it 
is also constructed in a way that remains widely accessible to a more general 
readership concerned about the influence of propaganda on the public mind 
and the mechanisms through which the power elites exert control over society 
through media.
The volume locates these latest studies on media systems within the wider 
body of work already built on the PM so as to contextualise, refine, clarify and 
improve the model’s utility and validity. By bringing together a number of lead-
ing scholars on the PM at an international level, we strive to give greater shape 
to a school of thought rooted in Herman and Chomsky’s original work, which 
has seen various developments throughout the years via theoretical reflection 
and application to specific case studies. An example of the development of PM 
scholarship, and predecessor of this volume, is the work undertaken by Klaehn, 
which focused on the model’s theoretical, methodological, applied, and practi-
cal dimensions.9
2. The Propaganda Model and the Political Economy of Media
The political economy approach and institutional analysis of the mass media 
that the PM follows is embedded in the tradition of radical mass media criti-
cism.10 The PM connects directly with the US tradition of critical, empirical 
studies11 and draws upon previous research on the historical evolution of the 
media, including in the UK.12 The PM shares with Marxian analysis the materi-
alist criticism of domination and of the power structures that affect the media, 
as well as a historical perspective. However, Herman and Chomsky did not 
specifically position the PM within the Marxian scholarship of media and com-
munication. The original conceptualisation of the model differs from Marxian 
analyses that specifically focus on contradictions affecting the media and the 
possibilities of journalism to contribute to social justice.13 Instead, the book 
Manufacturing Consent emphasised the key dimensions of elite power that 
restrict media performance and drastically reduce the possibilities of promot-
ing egalitarian change. However, the PM is also attentive to divisions among 
the elites and the emergence of strong social movements to explain the open-
ing of the range of opinion in the media. Moreover, this volume shows that PM 
scholarship is also analysing the role played by journalists and professionalism, 
the changes that digital technologies are prompting, national contexts, and the 
influence of audiences and media activism on news production.
The PM perspective coincides with Marxian analysis of the media as part of 
a wider capitalist system oriented toward profit maximisation and the inces-
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sant accumulation of capital in increasingly oligopolistic contexts. The PM 
understands media structures and contents, thus, to be shaped by corporate-
State powers and oriented toward the production of profits and the reproduc-
tion of class societies. Therefore, the PM would not apply to nations, societies, 
and communities where alternative forms of organisation and values appear. 
In so-called ‘communist’ states of the present (and past) while capital doesn’t 
(and didn’t) rise above the authority and power of the decision-making central 
authority, obvious social and economic inequities and inequalities appeared, and 
these gaps necessitated the use of various forms of consent and compliance with 
the system. However, these propaganda systems differ from Western systems of 
propaganda because the dictatorial State plays the central role in determining 
media contents, there is prior censorship and physical repression of dissidents, 
and the media opinion is much more monolithic.
The PM clearly does not apply to societies where the manufacture of con-
sent isn’t necessary for the maintenance of a capitalist order that generates and 
maintains inequality, inequity, and oppression. The earliest kibbutz of Israel, 
for example, approximated most closely societies in which the manufacture of 
consent was subsumed by the high value its members placed upon common 
goals. Today, peace journalism and communication for conflict resolution pro-
vide a different perspective for journalistic practice. Alternative media outlets 
based on workers’ cooperatives and reader-supported news provide informa-
tion which differs significantly from mainstream contents. For example, Amy 
Goodman of Democracy Now! was the only journalist who covered the first 
protests of indigenous people against the construction of the pipeline in their 
lands in North Dakota. She was disciplined through serious flak as she faced 
riot charges that were, ultimately, rejected by the judge. Alternative forms of 
communication are also being practiced by indigenous peoples throughout 
Latin America through community media that promote values of living in 
common, social justice, mutual understanding and harmony with nature. For 
example, communication based on the cosmovision and practice of Sumak 
Kawsay (Good Living) appeals to harmony between individuals, individuals 
with society, and both with nature as part of the same totality.
3. The (Ideal) Democratic and Egalitarian Role of the Media
At a time when grassroots movements and emerging political forces are aiming 
to intervene in the privatized media sphere and eventually transform it, a neces-
sary step before any meaningful change can be achieved is a better understand-
ing of the functioning and functions of media, i.e. how and why mass media 
contribute to the (re)production of the existing order with its unjust class struc-
ture, its increasing inequalities and inequities, the manifest reality of perpetual 
war, the structural limitations to rights and freedoms, and the accelerated ero-
sion of democratic institutions that societies are witnessing across the globe.
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As so many of the perceptions that people gather of events unfolding from 
place to place around the world are developed through vicarious experiences 
manufactured by media systems, their centrality to the configuration of our 
minds and worldviews cannot be understated. This mediating function permits 
populations to be in touch with real and fictional universes of reference and to 
(re)orient their attitudes and behaviours according to symbolic imaginaries and 
images that serve to mould their cognitive and emotional frameworks. While 
the PM does not offer a specific method of measuring precisely the quantitative 
emotional impact media have on the public mind, one underlying assumption is 
that, even as resistance to media influence is quite common, the systems of prop-
aganda in place have historically tended to play a significant role in achieving in 
the public both conformity and consensus across sites of social conflict. Accord-
ingly, mass media have traditionally been expected to perform a fundamental 
democratic function in the control of powerful institutions and in the develop-
ment of a rational, deliberative and pluralistic public sphere14—and certainly 
more so in today’s hyper-mediated societies. In an ideal society, media would, by 
performing their fourth and fifth-estate function, act as instruments used for citi-
zen empowerment and as the primary citizen watchdog over the ruling powers.
Instead of deploying power over citizens to cultivate their views on issues cen-
tral to their individual and collective lives, traditions born of the Enlightenment 
and of the working-class struggle have called for media systems that foster citi-
zens’ capacity to engage in critical thinking and contribute consciously to their 
own social awareness and emancipation. Media systems freed from external 
pressures and constraints would, thus, feed the very freedom of thought neces-
sary for the democratic functioning of societies. Historically, democratic media 
have been developed and continue to be employed as useful tools for resistance 
and social change, especially through the so-called ‘new’ or alternative media, 
though they appear mostly ineffective in counteracting the current hegemony 
held by the mainstream media. A political economy approach suggests that it 
is not possible to develop a genuine public sphere in conditions established by 
already existing capitalist influence. Therefore, the possibility of creating demo-
cratic and egalitarian media systems lies to a great extent in sweeping transfor-
mations that circumvent the influence of the filters identified by the PM, as well 
as the dismantling of other oppressive social and political structures.
4. Propaganda and Power
Next to the ideal conception of media performance, the opposite perspective 
has been defended and put into practice by state and corporate elites. Already 
Aristotle developed a systematic analysis of rhetoric as the art of persuasion, 
arguing that rhetoric had often been used to manipulate emotions, hide cru-
cial facts, and seek to convince the other party of ideas and concepts con-
trary to their own interests, but which could also be developed into modes 
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of  persuasion based upon philosophical knowledge for enlightenment and the 
common good.15 In the early sixteenth century, Niccolò Machiavelli understood 
(and practiced) clearly how power operates as a social relation and depends, to 
an important extent, on the development of ideological instruments for the 
control of one group over another.16
One of the first intellectuals to develop an in-depth analysis of the role of 
communication, sociology and ‘publicity’ in (emerging) industrial societies was 
Auguste Comte.17 The French sociologist broke with humanist-Enlightenment 
social knowledge that conceived progress as human development and happiness 
as self-realisation to identify them with industrial productivity and security based 
upon obedience. In the Comtian dystopia, the ‘spiritual power’ (the media, educa-
tion, publicists, social science) of the ruling elites would become fundamental so 
that the societal, ‘changes that are inevitable [would] seem desirable to those who 
will [invariably] suffer the misery, fatigue, illness, and unhappiness that are the 
unavoidable costs of progress.’18 Comte’s positivist sociology, or ‘social physics’, 
sought to abandon the idea of developing knowledge based on ethical principles 
in favour of allegedly value-free knowledge that would be better suited to defin-
ing and organising the nascent industrial society. An exact knowledge of society 
would allow objective social action, i.e. action adapted to the needs of the eco-
nomic system for techno-industrial development, irrespective of human values 
or its convenience for the majority of the population. For Comte, the public mind 
needed to be readapted to the developing demands of industrial capitalism in a 
manner that would make the people’s brain a mirror image of the external order. 
Thus, there would no longer be sufficient time or space for men and women to 
contemplate the possibilities of social change based upon shared human values, 
but merely the manufactured need for them to attend, against their own interests, 
to the new capitalist system, its perpetual maintenance, and the new alliance of 
the industrial bourgeoisie with the Restored monarchies.
In the same vein, the transition to an industrial system that generated great 
suffering in the US was guided long ago by a State-Corporate nexus promoted 
by those who Jefferson labelled the Aristocrats, i.e. the elite sectors of society that 
distrust and fear the common people (pejoratively referred to as the ‘rabble’ or 
the ‘mob’) and aim to constrain its power and transfer it to the dominant classes.19 
Needless to say that they succeeded in imposing their designs on the Democrats, 
who had viewed the people as the safest depository of the public interest and the 
legitimate safeguard of democracy against corruption and abuses of power by 
government and corporate institutions.20 Propaganda and miseducation would 
serve as the principal tools in re-engineering the desires and tastes of a largely 
rural, self-organised and cooperative population and presenting to it a specific 
form of industrialisation centred around a system of wage-labour promoted by 
the aristocratic State, bankers, and other corporate leaders.
In the early twentieth century, the Italian militant communist Antonio Gram-
sci contended that any social order and dominant historical bloc relies not only 
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on violence and coercion, but also on the production of cultural hegemony, 
which leads to the attachment of the subordinate classes to the worldview and 
interests of the dominant classes.21 A very similar line of thought was developed 
by several founders of media and Communication Studies in the United States, 
such as Edward Bernays, George Creel, Walter Lippmann, Paul Lazarsfeld and 
Harold Lasswell: a sophisticated system of propaganda was needed to persuade 
the masses to comply with the interests of the dominant classes.22 In turn, their 
theories provided the intellectual and historical foundation upon which Her-
man and Chomsky constructed the propaganda model. As is well known, 
the  title of the book in which the authors originally propound the propa-
ganda model, Manufacturing Consent, references a passage in Lippmann’s  classic 
work  on public opinion and propaganda. From a positivist-behaviourist-
functionalist perspective, these founding figures offered elaborated theories 
for alternative terms of the ‘engineering of consent’, ‘crystallisation of public 
opinion’, ‘management of the public mind’, or ‘public relations’. In their view, 
regarding the governance of society, since there remain many fundamen-
tal issues evidently too important and complicated to be left in the hands of 
what they saw as the ignorant masses, the ruling classes would need effective 
ideological and axiological tools to maintain their dominance in an increas-
ingly complex world that might otherwise see the widespread emergence of 
movements toward genuine social justice. Elemental to these conceptual tools 
were Sigmund Freud’s theories of psychoanalysis, which would serve to hasten 
public consent to new behaviours (e.g. consumerism and indebtedness), to the 
establishment of repressive policies (e.g. curbing workers’ rights) and to deci-
sions the population did not originally desire (e.g. war).
According to Chomsky, the underlying position of the social engineering 
perspectives is synthesised in the idea that ‘propaganda is to a democracy what 
the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state,’23 i.e. with the transition from absolutist 
and dictatorial systems to formally democratic and mass-consumerist socie-
ties, the use of violence for the control of the population ceases to be legitimate 
and thus ideological means of domination must be devised and deployed. The 
great victory for the masses that saw the establishment of democracy could, 
in effect, be counteracted by enlarging the distance between the people and 
their elected representatives through media manipulation. As Machiavelli had 
already shown, the institutions in charge of exercising power are not usually 
the great safeguard of the general interests as it is widely claimed, but they, 
instead, function in favour of special interests.24 That is, representative institu-
tions today operate to satisfy the interests of the political and state elites, which, 
in turn, work in symbiosis with the financial and economic elites, who exercise 
tighter controls over the economy and government policy-making. In Lipp-
mann’s words, a ‘spectator democracy,’25 instead of a democracy of informed 
and engaged participants, has widely developed through the production of 
redundant misinformation, the development of a culture of fear (‘Danger! 
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Danger!, shouts the dangerous’, as Galeano ironised) and an overabundance 
of trivial entertainment framed within elite perspectives—all of which work in 
concert to frustrate the efforts of the general public to make full sense of the 
wider world of which they are members, the position they occupy, and the real 
possibilities available to those who seek to organise for social change.
With the hijacking of democracy by state and financial powers that started in 
the 1970s-80s, there is an ongoing trend of upward transference of wealth, intensi-
fication of inequality, and reduction of social and human rights. This trend is also 
clearly reflected in the increasing concentration of mass media ownership, which 
has come with the demise of an historically egalitarian distribution of media 
power which any democracy naturally requires for its proper functioning. We 
can observe the results at present in the appearance of an ever-widening chasm 
between the majority of the population and the political and economic elites.
These gaps have certainly not gone unnoticed. Alongside the movements 
of resistance that develop against this kind of domination exerted by the rul-
ing classes there have also been significant responses brought to that resist-
ance by the elites. A paradigmatic example of such a response can be found in 
the strategic development of an international organisation of neoliberal elites. 
Founded by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Trilateral Com-
mission produced its first significant analysis of the ‘democratic surge’ of the 
1960s, which provoked, ‘a reassertion of the primacy of equality as a goal in 
social, economic, and political life’ and ‘a general challenge to existing systems 
of authority, public and private,’ including, hierarchy and wealth. The commis-
sion’s inaugural analysis outlined in The Crisis of Democracy 26 casts the problem 
as an ‘excess of democracy,’ which prescribes ‘a greater degree of moderation in 
democracy’ both at the social and media levels.27 This moderation would entail 
the reaffirmation of anti-democratic principles and the marginalisation of the 
ideas propagated during the 1960s, which ‘only frustrate the purposes of those 
institutions.’28 In synthesis, the solution would be to establish ‘desirable limits 
to the indefinite extension of political democracy.’29 The political and economic 
powers should, thus, employ their influence to control the type of communica-
tion and education provided to citizens so as to reduce their capacity to engage 
in egalitarian and democratic social change.
According to the propaganda perspective, the threat for the power elites 
posed by an educated and informed populace can be counteracted without 
overt coercion that would seem unacceptable in a democracy. This is the reason 
that media work to manage the fiction of promoting plural debates and even 
of being critical of established powers. But this strategy allows only for lively 
debate within very narrow boundaries that do not question the overall oppres-
sive structure of contemporary societies and marginalise critical-emancipatory 
views. And, very often, debates only reflect the tactical divisions among the 
different sectors of the elite that want their views to be heard and disseminated 
(e.g. Watergate).30 Moreover, spaces for more freedom of thought and critical 
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comment can occasionally be found—even as they tend to be closed in a short 
period of time—when the media face important contradictions, including 
widespread citizen mobilisation opposing certain government activities (like 
launching a preventive war against a defenceless nation) and pressuring for 
more reliable information.31
5. Social and Media Structures and Contents
The most effective way to control the media is, thus, not through direct control 
in fascist or Soviet-style, totalitarian systems. Instead, the media are subject to 
less visible, market and political mechanisms that tend to filter the information 
that is fit to print in a non-conspiratorial way—even as agency of concrete peo-
ple is fundamental. This book explains the mechanisms through which struc-
tures of wealth and corporate-State power filter media production, exclude 
many critical journalists, and limit the democratic possibilities of mediated 
communication. Moreover, it identifies the relations between the structural 
conditions within which the media operate and the contents they elaborate for 
both elite and mass consumption.
The systematic analysis proposed by the PM, thus, enables us to assay media 
systems at two interrelated levels. At one level, the filters allow for identify-
ing the economic, political and ideological conditions of media production 
in milieus marked by a powerful alliance between capital and political-State 
forces. These filters and relations explain why the media perform a propagan-
distic role oriented toward the reproduction of the existing capitalist, warmon-
gering socio-political order as well as the tactical changes in the system that are 
required for its further continuity and expansion. At the same time, the PM 
allows for the rigorous study of how the mainstream media undertake this role 
through content and discourse analysis of the products they deliver to the audi-
ence. We employ this comprehensive approach to systematically expose and 
explain the central role played by the media in contemporary societies marked 
by increasing instability, chaos and inequality promoted by the dominant pow-
ers at both national and global levels. The collection is, therefore, theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded.
Moreover, while this volume considers new developments in media environ-
ments marked by rapid shifts in technology, it also analyses contemporary case 
studies of international relevance in a period of worldwide, structural domi-
nance of global media moguls.32 We begin with the recognition that the advent 
of the internet—as has occurred during preceding technological  revolutions—
has been underpinned by techno-centric, techno-utopian, and technocratic 
discourses that marginalise human values and social relations in their analysis 
of the significance of new media, propagating the fiction that technological 
advancements in and of themselves engender social and economic utopias.33 
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Accordingly, the emergence of the internet would naturally lead to an historical 
period marked by human connectivity, intercultural understanding, democra-
tization, equality, peace, and economic development. However, an historical 
perspective allows for observing the evolution of the internet from its origins 
as a collaborative tool for the free exchange of information and ideas within 
an increasingly commodified space now dominated by corporations in search 
of profit that together with State forces have established a system of massive 
surveillance, violation of intimacy, and elite influence. The humanist utopia 
of fostering cooperation and mutual understanding in platforms free from 
commercial and State control is, thus, giving way to the development of what 
increasingly appears to be a dystopia in which members of the global village are 
unified by the centralising forces of the market in close alliance with the State. 
The internet is, thus, being shaped by the intentional actions of elite actors as 
online citizen social interactions are managed by the algorithms of digital com-
munications that are far from neutral.34 A critical, political economy approach 
to the study of new media is, therefore, required for concerned citizens to 
understand how the internet is shaped by much larger structures that limit 
their possibilities to engage in positive socio-political change and contribute 
to the accumulation of capital and the achievement of self-interested political 
goals.35
At the same time, explorations of the transformative potential inherent in 
digital media and their uses by citizens in popular movements have become 
necessary. Such analysis must acknowledge that after decades of propaganda 
conditioning and the increase of oppressive material realities and living con-
ditions, the majority of social uses made of the internet are oriented toward 
the continued maintenance of prevailing inequities in power relations between 
different actors. As Morozov has exposed, one can readily observe important 
incongruities between the expected uses of new communication technologies 
as posited by commercial, State and pseudo-intellectual agents and their actual 
uses.36 In this vein, McChesney has noted a contradiction that can be located 
in the proliferation of techno-communicative capacities for social change and 
a widely de-politicised and de-mobilised citizenry, whose frustration and 
anger with the existing social order and their deteriorated living conditions are 
increasingly susceptible to exploitation by populist neo-authoritarian forces.37
However, the emergence of new social and political movements has also 
demonstrated an important capacity to influence the digital media sphere by 
combining grassroots organisation efforts and social mobilisation in the public 
squares and the streets with creative and innovative, communicative produc-
tion in online social networks—even if notable influence has been temporary 
and susceptible to being assimilated by the system. Even though elite actors 
currently maintain hegemony on the internet, digital media can be understood 
as sites of ongoing struggle and contradiction within the framework of the 
power relations that affect digital media in processes marked by both control 
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and resistance. It is in this sustained tension between forces and counter-forces 
at both the social and communicative levels that new digital media can be 
explored as ‘spaces of hope’38—digital spaces that ought to work in comple-
mentary ways with social action on the ground if real and meaningful change 
is to be achieved.
We employ the PM not only in the context of the rise of digital media, but 
within the development of new threats to democracy, to the general public, 
and even to the human species posed by global war, nuclear weapons, climate 
change, mass surveillance, the advent of populist neo-authoritarian forces, and 
other related challenges. Accordingly, we also focus on the media’s portrayal of 
emerging social and political movements developing and aiming to counteract 
the impositions posed by global capitalism, neoliberalism, and so-called poli-
cies of austerity.
The collection we have assembled explores how the PM can be applied to 
analysis not only of contemporary media markets within the United States, but 
also more importantly beyond the market and media outlets initially examined 
by Herman and Chomsky. Uniquely, the book features an important underly-
ing aim, which is to understand the PM’s generalisability across varied media 
systems and products, cultures and national boundaries, including the UK, 
Germany, Canada, Spain, and Latin America, analysing media performance 
within their respective context and assessing the utility of the PM to explain 
observed phenomena peculiar to specific media systems.
6. Functions of ‘Liberal’ Media
While Manufacturing Consent was famous after its appearance for featuring 
Herman and Chomsky’s critical analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of 
certain key historical events, Todd Gitlin suggests in a recent Times obituary 
(November 21, 2017), where he had been interviewed by a Times journalist, 
that the PM emerges from a Manichean view of the world.39 In another obituary 
(November 16, 2017) to Herman, Gitlin observes that, ‘the whole approach to 
[Manufacturing Consent] is deeply simplistic,’—as if to intimate that the elegant 
simplicity of a model disqualifies it from serious consideration.40 Crucially, Git-
lin’s claim is noteworthy for its misinterpretation—‘if you think that the New 
York Times is Pravda, which is … what [Herman and Chomsky are] saying’—as 
well as its over-simplification—‘then what vocabulary do you have left for Fox 
News?’ What the PM encourages and allows anyone to do is to investigate these 
important differences between so-called ‘liberal’ newspapers such as The New 
York Times and (ultra-) ‘conservative’ outlets such as Fox News. Contrary to 
Gitlin’s claim, the PM holds that even as media systems are oriented toward the 
reproduction of capitalist societies, they do not function in a homogeneous or 
monolithic way.
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For PM scholars engaged in describing and analysing this system, however, 
one central function observed of the liberal corporate media is the necessity 
of acceptable limitation placed upon left-leaning opinion, especially in terms 
of the dimensions and depth of social transformation. While feigning favour 
for social equality, the so-called ‘liberal media’ evade and ignore the need for 
fundamental transformations in the economic system. (Ultra)conservative 
commentators at work in corporate news manufacturing entities respond by 
reproducing audacious (and ironic) claims when they criticise mainstream 
media as being liberal—i.e. too socially progressive. What continued to fas-
cinate Edward Herman was, ‘how the conservative critics of the media who 
allege that the media are liberal have a tendency to ignore ownership. They sort 
of pretend that the media are controlled by Dan Rather and Peter Jennings and 
these people down at the bottom of the power hierarchy in the media.’41 Rela-
tions of ownership continue to be fundamental both in the media and in the 
broader social system, but they are hardly questioned in the media—whether 
conservative or liberal.
The liberal media are also attentive to issues of gender and racial equality, but 
inattentive to representing the interests of the working class.42 They embrace sex-
ual diversity but promote its commodification and categorical separation from 
class equality, which is required for the real materialisation of sexual diversity.
In the words of Nancy Fraser, liberal media have adopted the position of 
‘progressive neoliberalism.’43 Blithely coexisting in this oxymoronic milieu has 
been possible in the USA, Frazer notes, because of the late alliance of multicul-
turalist and pro-diversity social justice movements with the corporate forces 
of cognitive capitalism (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, Hollywood, the liberal 
media…)—an alliance which has been mediated by, reproduced, and materi-
alised in the drone- warfare figures of the Clintons and the Obamas. The limi-
tations of such approaches are represented in media support for corporatised 
versions of  feminism. Instead of working to disassemble dominant patriarchal 
social relations and the inequitable distribution of power, corporate feminism 
favours women’s struggles for power while ignoring the long-existing hierar-
chical  corporate and political structures.
Progressive neoliberalism uses diversity, with its positive connotations, as a 
strategic marketing tool for creating vacuous images of the corporate cool— the 
icons of a new ‘cosmopolitan’ age in which broader societal economic inequality 
and cultural imperialism continue to rise. While such a self-image of diversity is 
used as a self-legitimising strategy in terms of its public face and internal ration-
alisations, the liberal media watchdogs have left militarism and imperial expan-
sion unchecked while uncritically supporting so-called ‘free trade agreements’ 
that grant even more power to economic globalist elites. Furthermore, as so-
called liberal media have abandoned peace journalism, they have failed to exam-
ine the structural and cultural causes of violence as well as contemplate and offer 
possible solutions for peace-building and conflict resolution across cultures.44
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Liberal media establish the limits of economic discourse by featuring and 
promoting neo-Keynesian economists such as Krugman and Stiglitz while 
paying scant attention to the importance of workers’ cooperatives and Marx-
ist economics. There is surely a significant difference between the systematic 
denial of climate change in ultra-conservative media on one hand and reports 
of liberal media based on empirical facts and alarming images on the other. But 
the problem with liberal media is that climate change is scarcely ever connected 
to capitalism, consumerism, extractivism, or their externalities, so these media 
ignore or fail to explore possible post-capitalist alternatives. Liberal media, col-
onised by neoliberal ideology, act as a governor that wields tight control over 
the definitions of key terms and concepts and, thus, prevents the public from 
imagining alternative social or economic realities.45
Crucially, liberal media ignore important analysis of the oligarchic super-
structure of the media system itself and the negative consequences on journal-
ism that critical scholars have already identified.46 Media owners and adver-
tisers are content to commodify social movements and diversity only insofar 
as their packaging produces real profits. A range of ideologically acceptable 
sources is presented to signify plurality and diversity of opinion—so long as 
they maintain a refusal to question the corporate system itself. Sources and 
journalists who work outside of the boundaries of this framework are framed 
as radicals. The ideology of corporate diversity disregards the intersections of 
class with gender, race and sexuality and leaves little room for critiques of free- 
market capitalism and for socialism. The possibility of nationalising, for exam-
ple, key sectors of the economy is hardly considered.
Having fully embraced the neoliberal agenda and its attendant austerity 
policies, the liberal media display little regard for ‘the losers of globalisation’, 
namely, the industrial working class or the exploited workers clinging to a life 
of slave wages. Instead of analysing in-depth why Trump’s fake populist appeals 
to the working class have been successful and what key roles these appeals have 
played, the liberal media have turned to ridicule and parody rather than to 
offer anything of substance to voters seeking potentially viable alternatives. 
Moreover, perhaps because of the conspicuous absence of a thoughtful alterna-
tive narrative, liberal media enable Trump to set the agenda in the public dis-
course while diverting Main Street attention away from the long-overdue need 
to enact reforms in the pro-Wall Street political landscape.
Liberal media outlets include alternative reporting by critical journalists and 
intellectuals which are demanded by critical news consumers. Even as their 
reports play a fundamentally important role in keeping concerned citizens 
informed, such journalists represent a minority in newsrooms. Their appear-
ance and effort might  influence the development of their public star power 
(celebrity), but their minority position indicates that they are meaningless 
tokens used with pre-determined futility to challenge the general pro- corporate 
approach to reporting in liberal media. Engaging in the charade, liberal media 
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conjure up the necessary illusions of plurality while neglecting potential trans-
formations of the overall corporate structure that establishes the editorial line 
with its important influence on key decisions. Even as it is always better to fea-
ture more diversity, to adopt Marcuse’s term, the media use diversity as a form 
of ‘repressive tolerance:’[8] a few drops of alternative views easily diluted by the 
structural conditions of a vast mass media ocean.
In sum, liberal media function under the conscious or unconscious sway of 
progressive neoliberal ideology, which serves as a form of self-legitimisation 
and self-gratification. Perhaps the greatest achievement realised in contempo-
rary liberal media has been the re-engineering of liberalism itself, its positive 
connotations, and the narrowing, even further, of the range of thinking, speak-
ing, and writing in progressive ways that challenge the hegemonic order. Seeing 
these alterations will provide readers of this volume insights into the rebrand-
ing of the left and how this insidious process has led substantially to the crisis 
of progressive politics and what this means for the working classes, the margin-
alised and the dispossessed.
7. Organisation of the Book
This volume features four major divisions. Part I addresses the theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of the Propaganda Model. It begins with an inter-
view with Edward Herman on the model itself, its place within academia, its 
usefulness to analysts and practitioners across disciplines, and its applicability 
to understanding both traditional and digital modes of media performance and 
output. Authors in this section of the volume discuss the functional utility as 
well as the ongoing marginalisation of the Propaganda Model within academic 
journalism studies, its consequences to professional practices, and the ration-
alisations that journalists make in reporting. Authors explore questions of how 
journalists are socialised within institutional cultures, how Journalism Studies 
have systematically avoided subjecting journalistic practices to analysis that 
could expose structural power inequalities. The section extends methodological 
considerations of the Propaganda Model from corporate media performance to 
the actual propaganda apparatus that shape the information environment.
Part II reflects on propaganda as a concept and practice within new mediated 
digital communications systems and interfaces. Authors apply the elements of 
the Propaganda Model to corporate media as components of a larger System 
of social and ideological influence and coercion. They examine the character-
istics and possibilities of digital activism in connection to physical activism for 
challenging the prevailing political order, as well as the responses they have 
received. Power relations, popular resistance, and concepts of democracy are 
carefully examined in the behaviour and language used by elites to guard the 
System against attacks.
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Part III features applications of the Propaganda Model to forms of media and 
content not previously analysed within this theoretical framework. It presents 
analysis and arguments for expanding the scope of the model to include the 
entertainment industry through the analysis of television, professional sports, 
Hollywood movies and videogames. Quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are also presented for analysis of empirical evidence of political con-
tent in entertainment products. Authors argue that the PM with a broadened 
analytical range of media remains to be a strong conceptual tool for explaining 
and predicting media performance.
Finally, Part IV presents case studies of corporate media and reporting prac-
tices as reflections of elite power. Authors investigate the institutional struc-
turing of the media environment, its ideological influences and market con-
straints, its pro-capitalism and pro-militarism bent, and its performance in 
moulding, predicting, and controlling the behaviour of the masses. Authors 
examine how the Propaganda Model helps unfold the contradictions of policies 
and practices seen in massive public expenditures during periods of forced eco-
nomic austerity, in imperialist activities cast as humanitarian and human rights 
interventions, and in the limitations placed on the public debate surrounding 
nuclear deterrence.
In the concluding section, the editors pull together the plurality of theoretical 
and empirical studies presented in the collection to measure the validity of the 
three main hypotheses of the PM. We identify the fundamental dimensions of 
the PM, the key modifications and expansions that are suggested—such as the 
inclusion of new filters—and the model’s value for conducting research in differ-
ent geographical contexts and media systems and products. In this conclusion, 
as in the rest of the book, we seek to contribute to elucidating the functioning 
and functions of the media in contemporary societies hoping that systematic 
knowledge about media structures and contents will further promote reflection 
among media practitioners, students and scholars as well as within broader sec-
tors society. If our analysis is correct and the media engage in the production of 
diverse forms of symbolic violence, it becomes apparent that broad movements 
for the deep transformation of the media systems are required—movements 
which to be successful, of course, require wider transformations in the social 
and political order, especially regarding its class structure.
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PART I
Theoretical and  
Methodological Considerations

CHAPTER 2
Interview with Edward S. Herman:  
Ideological Hegemony in Contemporary 
Societies
Jeffery Klaehn, Joan Pedro-Carañana, Matthew Alford 
and Yigal Godler
1. Has social control always been naturalised?
In modern societies, surely. People with wealth and political and social power 
want to protect and expand their interests, and this requires command over the 
means of communication that will allow these privileges to be sustained and 
grow. The growth of inequality enlarges the need and ability to dominate the 
flow of information and inculcate proper values.
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2. The PM is concerned with the question of how ideological 
power and material power intersect and reinforce one another and 
assumes interrelations between state, corporate capitalism and the 
corporate media. How does academia factor into the equation, 
with regard to the dialectic between ideology and power?
Academia is an important institutional segment of information and ideology 
production and dissemination. As such, it has always been controlled by and in 
service to elite interests. But because of its functions in teaching and research 
it is granted a degree of independence beyond that accorded workers in profit-
making and governmental bodies. However, this independence is limited by 
fund-raising imperatives and the pressures to conform to conventional wis-
dom. As the propaganda model departs from the conventional wisdom that 
the mainstream media (MSM) are not a part of the power structure but are 
independent servants of the general public, not the elite, the PM will not be 
favoured by the general run of academics. Some hard evidence on this point 
was provided by Andrew Mullen in a 2010 study which reviewed the perfor-
mance of ten communications and media journals in Europe and North Amer-
ica for the years 1988 through 2007, and which found that only 79 of 3,053 
articles (2.6 per cent) even mentioned the PM, a majority of these only citing it 
without discussion.1
3. Would you characterise the PM as being grounded in a 
democratic approach specifically oriented toward public 
 relevance?
Yes. It assumes that high relevance will attach to a model that shows the MSM 
to be an arm of the elite, and on crucial issues to be serving elite interests rather 
than those of the general public. On some of these issues, such as ‘free trade’ 
agreements (really investor-rights-expansion agreements) polls have regularly 
showed the public hostile but the MSM dependably supportive of such agree-
ments in accord with elite preferences. The PM helps explain why. 
4. The PM was originally designed to focus on elite, agenda-
setting newspapers in the United States. How useful is the 
model in terms of studying patterns of media performance in 
non-US countries?
It should be useful where basic structural conditions fit the model, as that of 
the United States does. That is, where they have a dominantly private owner-
Interview with Edward S. Herman: Ideological Hegemony in Contemporary Societies  23
ship economy, a mainly commercial media depending heavily on advertising, 
and substantial inequality. Global trends have tended to strengthen the neces-
sary conditions, and the model has been shown to hold quite well in Britain, 
Germany and other countries. 
5. How does the model position television and the internet in 
relation to social and political change?
TV was well entrenched in 1988, and its development was perfectly compat-
ible with the workings of the PM (perhaps most notable was the importance 
of advertising as the funding source). The growth of the internet seemed to 
hold forth the promise of a more democratic media, but, as it has evolved, 
a remarkable and rapid concentration of effective platforms has come into 
existence, with Google and Facebook on top, capturing a very large fraction 
of advertising revenue and patronage by the general public.2 These are not 
news organisations, and how their monopoly power will eventually work out 
as regards the journalism function is unclear, but they are very much adver-
tising based, and they have already shown great deference to the wishes of 
power entities like the CIA, NSA, FBI and State Department. Thus, the like-
lihood that they will serve the public interest as a democratic force seems 
extremely slim.
6. In what ways can media foster indifference and how does 
this serve power?
They can foster indifference by systematically failing to provide information 
and perspectives that address the public’s concerns and ultimately showing the 
public that they are not on the public’s side and that what the public may want 
is not attainable. The MSM do a better job of amusing and otherwise entertain-
ing than dealing credibly with substantive issues. This will help leave the status 
quo unthreatened. 
7. How is fear used to achieve ideological hegemony, in  
your view?
It focuses attention on an approved target, diverting the public from real prob-
lems that the elite is not prepared to address. Back in 1904, Thorstein Veblen 
featured the value of a warlike policy in ‘directing the popular interest to other, 
nobler, institutionally less hazardous matters than the unequal distribution of 
wealth and of creature comforts.’3
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8. What does the PM have to say about the media coverage of 
Trump’s election campaign and first months as President?
The MSM clearly favoured Hillary Clinton, but many of the elite were pleased 
with Trump’s anti-regulatory and tax ‘reform’ plans. They also gave Trump a 
great deal of free media space because his demagoguery resonated with large 
numbers and playing him up raised media audience sizes. Since the election 
the MSM have been much more hostile to him and have teamed with the Dem-
ocrats in creating a Russo-phobic environment, in good part to squelch any 
attempt on his part to soften policy on confronting Russia and keeping the war 
party happy and profitable. This all fits nicely into the PM framework.
9. How would you reply to a critic who suggests that the PM’s 
explanatory filters are simply an arbitrary list of possible 
causes for the declawing of media?
The filters are all tied to institutions and processes that experience and evi-
dence show decisively influence media choices, and that are embodied in the 
five named elements of the PM.
10. If ‘flak’ requires conscious activity, how can it be 
 considered a ‘filter’?
Media decisions entail conscious activity, so that the conscious effort of protest-
ers to influence those decisions does not seem incompatible with filtering.
11. So, do you think the PM is still a useful tool to analyse the 
media in the twenty-first century?
Yes, certainly in the short and medium term, with the commercial media and the 
power of advertising increasing in strength almost everywhere. The longer-term 
outlook is hazier with the threat of nuclear and climate-based disaster, the growth 
of inequality and the possibility of severe social disruption and greater centralisa-
tion of political power, militarism, and a new era and new forms of fascism.
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CHAPTER 3
What the Propaganda Model Can Learn 
from the Sociology of Journalism
Jesse Owen Hearns-Branaman
1. Introduction
This chapter will attempt to resolve one of the major conflicts surrounding 
Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model (PM). This conflict is the result of 
the political-economic focus of the model, achieved by leaving out considera-
tion of journalists themselves. I argue that incorporating sociological theory 
about journalism, specifically professionalism, self-censorship, and secondary 
socialisation, will better enhance the PM’s explanatory power and help address 
concerns about its limitations. Such sociological aspects function as ‘filters’ in a 
similar way to the five described in the PM and are, in fact, implied heavily in 
the PM, especially in the sourcing and ideology filters.
This analysis will hearken back to advice given in the 1970s, that ‘any socio-
logical analysis of the ways in which the mass media operate as ideological agen-
cies which fails to pay serious attention to the economic determinants framing 
production is bound to be partial.’1 We might state the opposite as well, that any 
political-economic analysis which ‘fails to pay serious attention’ to sociologi-
cal aspects of news production is ‘partial.’ The flow must go both ways; neither 
approach can offer rounded and robust explanations in isolation.
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Historically speaking, ‘industry self-regulation assumed the form of profes-
sional journalism’ in the early twentieth century, relying on the notion that 
‘journalists would learn to sublimate their own values’ so that the audience 
‘could trust what they read and not worry about who owned or worked on 
the newspaper,’ and thus ‘press concentration would become a moot issue.’2 
Professional ethical standards for journalists are intimately tied to the politi-
cal economy of the press, acting as a smoke screen for the economic interests 
of the owners. Professionalism and journalistic socialisation are therefore the 
consequences of media concentration, not the cures for it, and must be viewed 
in this context, not as a separate, neutral element serving only to give ‘objective’ 
news. McChesney’s main points to support this are very PM-related; sourcing 
patterns and the reliance on official sources, the ‘avoidance of contextualisation’ 
outside of the elite debate on issues, and the avoidance of critical examination 
of big businesses, instead focusing on entertainment, crime, and government.3
Before going more fully into professionalism and socialisation, I will describe 
the ways in which ambiguity about the role of journalists in political-economic 
analysis such as the PM occurs. I will then elaborate on research into profession-
alism and secondary socialisation. This will then be applied to critiques that the 
PM is a ‘conspiracy theory’ in order to show how such sociological research will 
bolster, not refute, the findings of the PM and related political-economic research.
2. PM and Journalists
One point of criticism for the PM comes from its lack of consideration of the 
sociology of journalists.4 That is to say, its analysis is of the political-economic 
roots of news media organisations and the subsequent texts produced, not the 
practices of journalists. As Klaehn notes, the PM ‘is not concerned to analyse 
practical, organisational, or mundane aspects of newsroom work’ because 
‘deliberate intent (‘conspiracy’) and unconscious hegemony (‘professional ide-
ology’) are for the most part unknowable and unmeasurable.’5 The purpose of 
the PM is to measure what can be measured, the texts the journalists write, 
because it is impossible to differentiate between the conscious and unconscious 
drives behind journalists’ activities. It also extends from Chomsky’s own per-
spective on the role of journalists within the news media industry: ‘this analy-
sis tends to downplay the role of individuals: they’re just replaceable parts.’6 
The argument is, therefore, that it is a waste of time to analyse these ‘replace-
able parts’ of a machine. The reason the machine was made, what the machine 
makes, the political and economic context in which the machine operates, all 
of these elements are what can and should be examined.
This exclusion leads to several different criticisms. Comeforo, for example, 
argues that the PM has two incompatible points of view when describing the 
activeness and agency of journalists. It casts them as being too active when in fact 
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they are passive.7 Journalistic routines, the hierarchy of the newsroom and influ-
ence of the editor, the news company’s organisational culture, the sourcing pat-
terns for their information, and other elements outside of the journalists’ control 
are far more important and influential than active subversion by or the inherent 
subjectivity of the journalists. At the same time, Comeforo argues that the PM 
casts them as too passive when in fact they are often very active and have a large 
measure of control. This includes journalists’ maintenance of relationships with 
politicians and suppression of stories to maintain these relationships, and also 
examples of the CIA infiltrating newsrooms to actively spread disinformation.8
This duality is, however, not a problem only of the PM itself but of Jour-
nalism Studies in general, and perhaps is an underlying dialectic that grounds 
journalism. Blumler and Gurevitch previously noted as much, that journalists 
have control over some areas and not others and thereby have to negotiate and 
adapt depending on the circumstances.9 Journalists can be very active about, 
for example, finding ‘alternative’ sources of information, or can passively relay 
the same old elite perspectives, as long as it remains in the realm of legitimate 
debate about that specific topic.
Responding to a similar critique made by Lang and Lang,10 Herman and 
Chomsky reply:
We believe that our focus on media performance as opposed to journal-
ists’ thoughts and practices is fully justified. If a reporter deals entirely 
differently with an election supported by his or her government and one 
opposed by it, we do not feel that it is urgent to try to find out what goes 
on in that reporter’s (or the editor’s) head in following this dichotomous 
agenda; those facts speak for themselves and the reporter’s explanations 
and rationalisations are of far lesser interest.11
However, as Thompson points out, ‘there is plenty of empirical evidence from 
sociological studies of media organisations available to support the proposition 
that the various filters can and do shape news content.’12 The PM’s study itself 
only uses a mixed qualitative and quantitative content analysis to produce evi-
dence of the different treatment that American media gives to the government’s 
official enemies, and this data could not have been gathered sociologically.
It is, thus, not fair to hastily dismiss the findings of the PM because they 
did not conduct interviews with journalists or do focus groups or use other 
sociological methods. That was simply not the purpose of the PM. However, 
my argument is that that the inclusion of such sociological research on news 
media professionals would not refute the PM and can, in fact, greatly assist in 
the robustness of the model.
Counter to Herman and Chomsky’s rejection of sociological methods,13 I argue 
that including research gathered through interviews with journalists and ethno-
graphic work does not simply give the journalists’ ‘rationalisations’ for their work. 
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This is a very narrow interpretation of what vigorous sociological research does. 
Much like the content analysis of the original PM, the surface-level expressions 
of these professionals cannot be taken at face value. As this discourse is a result of 
the system in which the journalists operate, their talk must be viewed in this way.
Linguists, such as Potter and Wetherell, argue that consistency in a discourse 
could indicate the same ‘function’ of language in that ‘two people may put their 
discourse together in the same way because they are doing the same thing 
with it.’14 Similarly, Fairclough argues that ‘institutions construct their ideo-
logical and discoursal subjects’ in that ‘they impose ideological and discoursal 
constraints upon them as a condition for qualifying them as subjects.’15 Thus, 
we can say that if journalists give a more or less unified take on certain issues 
this does not mean that they all agree or ‘believe’ this position is true; it means 
that they are required, as members of the institution of journalism, to produce 
the same discourse. Thus, the ‘rationalisations’ their discourse provides are 
not useless; they indicate the ways in which they have been socialised into the 
journalistic discourse. If a journalist says, for example, that they are not under 
the influence of their owners or advertisers, this assertion does not necessarily 
mean that they are not under such influence but that, instead, admitting to that 
influence is not permissible within journalistic discourse.
Others have argued that ‘it is social and economic interests which are embod-
ied by the institutions created and operated by real humans which provide the 
link between the economic and the ideological.’16 This link is missing from the 
PM and inclusion of the talk of professionals embedded in the journalistic dis-
course can only further enlighten how the political economy and ideology of 
the news media is linked.
3. Journalistic Professionalism
Journalism as a profession is a notion that is not covered well in the PM. Yet 
research about professionalism in general gives a lot of support to PM’s the-
sis. Professionalism has a conflicting relationship with ‘democracy’ because it 
involves ‘formal’ or ‘elite’ knowledge which is ‘not open to the active participa-
tion of all’ and could be ‘seen as a threat to democracy.’17 While this is talking 
about professions in general, it seems even more suitable to journalism. Medi-
cal professionals, for example, possess ‘formal’ and ‘elite’ knowledge, yet they 
are not considered to be an integral aspect of democratic forms of governance. 
Journalism, on the other hand, is intimately connected with democratic pro-
cesses to a degree surpassing all other professions, except perhaps politics and 
public service jobs to the extent that they can be considered professions.
Additionally, a major aspect of the growth of professions was ‘its traditional 
connotations of disinterested dedication and learning provided political legiti-
mation.’18 Such ‘disinterested dedication’ is also a hallmark of professional jour-
nalism, implicating such important journalistic concepts of ethical behaviour, 
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objectivity and a corresponding lack of subjectivity, and standardised routines 
and practices.
Speaking of journalism as a profession, Deuze argues that ‘ideology can 
be seen as a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular group, includ-
ing – but not limited to – the general process of the production of meanings 
and ideas (within that group).’19 It is thus ‘possible to speak of a dominant 
occupational ideology of journalism,’ one that is still open to interpretation 
and different usage, but it still based on ‘a collection of values, strategies and 
formal codes’ which are ‘shared most widely’ in the journalistic field.20 The 
critique of the PM as a conspiracy theory, as will be discussed later, would 
then need to apply to all such professions. While fringe groups would see 
the medical field as a conspiracy, such a critique is not sustainable. Doctors, 
surgeons, nurses, etc., certainly have a ‘system of beliefs’ and hopefully have 
a ‘disinterested dedication’ to their profession. Medical professionals are part 
of an institutional structure that operates more or less uniformly and with 
the same results in the same way as journalism, thus describing the political-
economic structure of journalism in such a manner is highly consistent with 
that of other professions.
Bourdieu criticised political-economic approaches in general, arguing that 
‘to understand what happens in journalism, it is not sufficient to know who 
finances the publications, who the advertisers are, who pays for the advertising 
[…] and so on,’21 such as what the PM does. He argues that ‘what is produced 
in the world of journalism cannot be understood unless one conceptualises 
this microcosm as such and endeavours to understand the effects that the peo-
ple engaged in this microcosm exert on one another,’22 that is, the interactions 
within the field of journalism. The latter does not disprove the former, it can 
only help support it. An ‘individual’s predispositions, assumptions, judge-
ments, and behaviours are the result of a long-term process of socialisation, 
most importantly in the family, and secondarily, via primary, secondary, and 
professional education.’23 Hand in hand with professionalism is the secondary 
process of socialisation that occurs when journalists enter the profession, a pro-
cess that will now be discussed in further detail.
4. Socialisation of Journalists
[M]ost of the people at the [New York] Times who make it to be corre-
spondent or editor or whatever tend to be either very obedient or very 
cynical. The obedient ones have adapted – they’ve internalized the val-
ues and believe what they’re saying.24
While primary socialisation takes place during childhood, at home with input 
from parents and immediate family, secondary socialisation occurs outside the 
first close-knit group we spend time with.25 This includes, initially, school and 
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other social activities. When we enter the workplace, secondary socialisation 
continues to occur throughout our careers.
As Shoemaker and Reese note, this happens through a process of filtering 
out people unsuitable for the job: ‘Because they strive to be taken seriously, 
reporters are vulnerable to pressure to conform. If they start saying things that 
diverge from the common wisdom, they are noticed. Editors may doubt their 
credibility and wonder if they can be trusted – it’s safer to hew to the common 
wisdom.’26 Hiring, firing, promotions, demotions, prestigious and non-prestig-
ious assignments, all of these factors contribute to the secondary socialisation 
of journalists, as well as all other professions.
One example of socialisation comes from Gans’ study conducted via news-
room ethnography, which examined television and magazine journalism in the 
1970s.27 He argues this is expressed through self-censorship or ‘anticipatory 
avoidance’ in which ‘journalists are restrained from straying into subjects and 
ideas that could generate pressure, even if their own inclinations, as profes-
sionals or individuals, do not often encourage them to stray in the first place.’28 
These rules for performance are learnt both through education and on the job, 
although the latter is ultimately more important.
This occurs at two levels, conscious and unconscious. While journalists 
define self-censorship as ‘the conscious response to anticipated pressure from 
non-journalists,’ it can also be ‘unconscious, in which case journalists may not 
be aware they are responding to pressure.’29 The consequence of this is, how-
ever, that it becomes hard for researchers to distinguish between conscious and 
unconscious choices made by media professionals, and it is nearly impossible 
for media professionals themselves to distinguish, let alone relay that informa-
tion to researchers. For example, ‘[s]urrender to pressure is viewed as an act of 
cowardice and a sign of powerlessness, and those who must surrender are loath 
to discuss it.’30 Even if a journalist is consciously bowing to pressure, they are 
unlikely to reveal it to researchers.
This indicates why Herman and Chomsky are reluctant to consider primary 
sociological research on journalists, due to the limits of certain versions of that 
method into gaining insight into journalists’ thoughts and performance. Yet 
they still give plenty of hypothetical examples of socialisation and self-censor-
ship and implicitly rely on it to deal with the notion of individual journalists’ 
performance.
For example, the ‘learned and understood limits of subject matter, tone, bal-
ance and the like’ are what teach journalists how to self-censor.31 As Chomsky 
notes, ‘The general subservience of the media to the state propaganda system 
does not result from direct government order, threats or coercion, centralized 
decisions, and other devices characteristic of totalitarian states, but from a 
complex interplay of more subtle factors.’32 These ‘subtle factors’ include sec-
ondary socialisation, professionalism, and self-censorship, as discussed above. 
Chomsky gives a detailed hypothetical example of this:
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Suppose that as a reporter you start going outside of vested interests. 
You will find, first of all, that the level of evidence that’s required is far 
higher. You don’t need verification when you go to vested interests, 
they’re self-verifying. Like, if you report an atrocity carried out by guer-
rillas, all you need is one hearsay witness. You talk about torture carried 
out by an American military officer, you’re going to need videotapes. 
[…] if a journalist quoted an unnamed ‘high U.S. government official,’ 
that suffices as evidence. What if they were to quote some dissident, or 
some official from a foreign government that’s an enemy? Well, they’d 
have to start digging, and backing it up, and the reporter would have to 
have mountains of evidence, and expect to pick up a ton of flack, and 
maybe lose their job, and so on. With factors of that kind, it’s predictable 
which way they’re going to go.33
We, thus, can see the direct connection between socialisation via ‘flak’ and the 
potential to ‘lose their job’ and the effect of those processes on the selection of 
sources, framing of events, and the sphere of legitimate consensus.
Chomsky often connects this process to ideological control in society in gen-
eral and the specific expression of that on journalism
[I]f you’re, say, a young person in college, or in journalism, or for that 
matter a fourth grader, and you have too much of an independent mind, 
there’s a whole variety of devices that will be used to deflect you from 
that error – and that if you can’t be controlled, to marginalize or just 
eliminate you […] If you’re a young journalist and you’re pursing sto-
ries that the people at the managerial level above you understand, either 
intuitively or explicitly, are not to be pursued, you can be sent off to 
work at the Police Desk, and advised that you don’t have ‘proper stand-
ards of objectivity’ […]34
The institutional necessity for professionalism and the practice of socialisation 
of journalists can explain why the ‘media’ perform the way they do. This pro-
vides a better basis for a defence of the PM against attacks that it is a conspiracy 
theory.
5. Institutional Ideology vs Conspiracy Theory
As Herman puts it, the PM is ‘a model of media behaviour and performance, 
not of media effects,’35 yet this metonymic use of ‘media’ creates additional 
ambiguities. Removing the separation between journalists as individuals and 
journalists as inculcated in the news media system is necessary for the PM’s 
fundamental thesis. The result, however, leaves the PM open to charges that 
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it is nothing more than a conspiracy theory. How can an international system 
which consists of millions of individuals, the ‘media,’ act in a consistent manner 
without being directed by a single hand?
This leads to another critique of the PM and why, unfairly, it is difficult for 
it to be accepted in the mainstream debates about media performance. Lester 
points out that many institutions in the USA ‘teach that the press and news media 
generally are our check on the abuses of power, assuring a continuing adversar-
ial relationship between the governed and the governors and between the “little 
guy” […] and big business.’36 Because the PM takes a position highly contrary 
to this, it automatically faces an uphill battle to make its point. If the media is 
not free and independent, it must mean that there is a conspiracy between the 
government, media organisations, and journalists for some ulterior motive.
Chomsky, of course strongly refutes this: ‘With equal logic, one could argue 
that an analyst of General Motors who concludes that its managers try to maxi-
mize profits (instead of selflessly labouring to satisfy the needs of the public) is 
adopting a conspiracy theory.’37 The news media live and die by remaining prof-
itable, more so now than in the 1980s when the PM was conceived. As the PM 
highlights the ways in which this effort to remain profitable leads to practices 
which structurally filter out a lot of potential media content, this is conceptually 
the same as the way General Motors or any other company would make efforts 
to increase their profitability.
Corner responds to Chomsky’s defence, arguing that ‘few managers at Gen-
eral Motors would find it at all surprising or disturbing that their corporate 
system worked with such an imperative, however much they might want to 
understate the social harm caused,’ while ‘media managers, editors and jour-
nalists will strongly disagree that their efforts are essentially in the service of 
the rich and powerful and systematically against democratic values.’38 In other 
words, Corner is stating that the PM assumes there must be a great deal of self-
delusion amongst news media professionals for them not to view their business 
the same way car manufacturers do so. There must be many mechanisms in 
place to fool journalists into doing the opposite of what they want to do. A 
criticism of Corner’s criticism of Chomsky’s defence would be that it does not 
really matter if news media professionals agree or disagree with a certain char-
acterisation of their job, the evidence points that way and so it is that way we 
must follow. As discussed above, their talk indicates more their expression of an 
institutional discourse than their ‘real’ thoughts and feelings.
A better example to counter Corner and defend the PM would be to point 
out that, for example, assembly-line workers at a factory would not talk about 
their work contributing to climate change and pollution. They simply focus on 
their next task at hand and not on the larger damage done to the environment 
from the carbon emissions their vehicles produce. Similarly, potential man-
agers at a car company who worried about such issues would never success-
fully climb to the top of the business ladder; their concerns for the environ-
ment over the profitability of the company would preclude them from being 
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 promoted over those without such qualms. In a similar way, the socialisation 
processes at news organisations filter out troublesome journalists who never 
rise to being editors.
Herman notes that the PM ‘suggest[s] that the mainstream media, as elite 
institutions, commonly frame news and allow debate only within the param-
eters of elite perspectives.’39 However, Herman does not elaborate on how 
‘media,’ an abstract noun implicating not just ‘institutions’ but those who work 
within those institutions, frame events. To say that ‘media frame news’ is con-
ceptually the same as saying ‘plants grow’ or ‘the sun shines’? Why not say that 
‘journalists frame news’? That would implicate specific journalistic actors and 
imbue them alone with the power to frame, and thus be highly inaccurate. 
Plants grow because those plants that do not grow die and thus cannot perpetu-
ate their genome; journalists that do not frame events ‘within the parameters 
of elite perspectives’ are eventually socialised out of journalism and, thus, are 
no longer journalists. Asserting the position that ‘media frame news’ seems 
to remove the actions of the journalists themselves when those institutionally 
approved actions are what make them part of the mainstream media.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the weaknesses within the PM for dealing with the 
performance of individual journalists. The inclusion of sociological research on 
journalists is fully compatible with the PM’s argument. Unlike others’ critiques, 
examining the discourse of journalists themselves does not refute the PM; in 
fact, it can more fully explain media performance. Journalists have to adhere 
to professional standards and face secondary socialisation when they enter the 
workplace. This, perhaps, gives the appearance of an ugly and anti-normative 
‘conspiracy,’ yet from many different angles, this is the basic institutional func-
tioning of the news media.
I do not wish to present the newspaper industry as deliberately and 
cynically working […] to disseminate official ideology for commercial 
gain; to mystify the actions and the motive of government and industry; 
and to discredit opponents and silence the majority. Though these are 
indeed the goals and effects of the media, they need not be consciously 
formulated and strategically planned, because their implementation 
takes place automatically.40
Even critical linguists such as Fowler make this basic argument. It is not a mat-
ter of conspiracy among journalists, editors, ownership, and outside businesses 
to present non-capitalist ideas in an inevitably negative light; it is the way the 
system has been designed by those capitalist media owners to legitimate capi-
talism, again done through professionalism and secondary socialisation.
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Future research from both political-economic and sociological or linguistic 
perspectives should better incorporate each other’s perspectives. For example, 
my earlier research involved linguistic analysis of media texts to show how for-
eign policy positions are replicated in the coverage of the Iran nuclear ‘crisis.’41 
This involved an analysis of the transitivity of verbs used by American, British, 
Iranian, and Chinese news texts to illustrate how the PM’s concept of ‘official 
enemies,’ a notion inculcated in the socialisation of journalists, are expressed. 
For example:
American and British media [the New York Times and the Guardian] 
de-emphasize Western (United States, Israel, European Union) mate-
rial actions while strongly emphasizing Iranian ones, while Fars and the 
Tehran Times underplay Iran’s material actions but strongly emphasize 
those of Western countries.42
Additionally, my study on applying the PM to Chinese media included soci-
ological research on journalists in China.43 This helped show how differing 
political-economic structures are expressed in the discourse of the respective 
journalists.
By better incorporating a diversity of research, political-economic studies 
in line with the PM will further bolster their important critical implications. 
Sociological and linguistic research, similarly, need to feature a firmer political-
economic grounding from studies like the PM. This will help give an increased 
critical edge by connecting how those media structures affect the discourse and 
practice of journalists.
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CHAPTER 4
Journalism Studies’ Systematic Pursuit 
of Irrelevance : How Research Emphases 
Sabotage Critiques of Corporate-Run  
News Media
Yigal Godler
1. Introduction
A sociological truism is that institutional structure always has some social con-
sequences. Consider the following examples of institutional structure: a kib-
butz (or a collective) organises social life in some ways and not in others, as 
does a business enterprise. On the assumption that the social sciences seek to 
understand why society is organised in some ways and not in others, social 
scientists will have to at least consider the explanatory potential of some insti-
tutional structures. Since empirical questions cannot be prejudged, perhaps no 
institutional explanation will be up to the task of explaining this or that social 
phenomenon. However, assuming that the social sciences truly seek to under-
stand social phenomena, one would not expect social scientists to refuse out-
of-hand to even consider institutional structures as potential explanations for 
social phenomena. And yet some social scientific fields seem to do just that.
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This chapter deals with one such case. It is the case of a field known as 
Communication Studies (and more specifically, the subfield of Journal-
ism Studies). Although scholars of communication are no strangers to the 
institutional explanation of media phenomena, they often exhibit the curi-
ous tendency of playing down or resisting such explanations. Interestingly, 
this resistance does not appear only before these scholars attempt empirical 
research into aspects of media behaviour but also after the empirical research 
has been carried out (usually, though not always, by others)1 and has yielded 
confirmatory findings.
An illuminating case of communication scholars’ resistance to institutional 
explanations has been previously studied. This is the case of the reaction of 
mainstream communication scholars to Edward Herman and Noam Chom-
sky’s work on media behaviour.2 Herman and Chomsky offered a formal insti-
tutional explanation for the behaviour of the American elite media, known 
as the Propaganda Model (PM). They hypothesised that the corporate own-
ership, size and profit orientation of the mainstream media, as well as their 
dependence on advertisers’ money and their reliance on cost-free official 
sources (alongside pro-establishment experts), would produce a systematic 
pro-business and pro-government bias in media coverage, when crucial inter-
ests of these institutions were at stake. Herman and Chomsky then proceeded 
to test their hypothesis by analysing the coverage of paired examples of near-
identical events with varying consequences for business and government 
interests, and by assessing the range of debate in the media on several key 
issues. The media were conclusively found to serve business and government 
interests when these could be threatened by certain angles and information 
(which were accordingly excluded from media coverage, played down or dis-
torted).
Mainstream communication scholars reacted to these conclusions with sus-
picion and hostility. Whereas some of them acknowledged that the specific 
cases presented by Herman and Chomsky made telling points,3 they falsely 
attributed to Herman and Chomsky a series of claims they have never made 
and committed other logical fallacies.4 However, evidence suggests that these 
logical fallacies have also been overlooked by scholars in subsequent main-
stream communications studies.5 The implications of overlooking these logical 
fallacies for theory and empirical research constitute the story unfolded in the 
present chapter.
This chapter begins by dissecting research which falsely presented itself as 
having a bearing on the validity of Herman and Chomsky’s work. Next, it fol-
lows the trail of scholarly citations to prominent examples of contemporary 
empirical and theoretical work and analyses its explanatory and analytical 
validity. These exercises will hopefully illuminate the significance of the docu-
mented scholarly practices for the course taken by the discipline of Journalism 
Studies (a subfield of Communication Studies).
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2. Challenging the PM or Simply Bracketing the Business 
Institution?
An influential study by Thomas E. Patterson and Wolfgang Donsbach sought 
to document and account for partisan bias in the news. To do so, the authors 
administered questionnaires to journalists across five countries (United States, 
Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Sweden).6 These questionnaires were no reg-
ular survey. Rather, they were intended as a quasi-experiment of partisan bias. 
It should be noted that despite the radical differences between their methodol-
ogy and that of Herman and Chomsky, Patterson and Donsbach believed their 
findings had a bearing on the validity of Herman and Chomsky’s study, includ-
ing the PM. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in the following text, Patterson and 
Donsbach were convinced that the PM was belied by their (i.e. Patterson and 
Donsbach’s) empirical work.
The questionnaires in Patterson and Donsbach’s study were so constructed as 
to detect journalists’ political/ideological views, as well as to simulate a series 
of news decisions, such as the determination whether a particular story was 
newsworthy, what would be an appropriate headline for it and what would be 
a fitting visual. Once the questionnaires were completed, the scholars were in 
a position to test correlations between journalists’ ideological views and their 
mock news decisions. Such a correlation was found. On the basis of this data, 
Patterson and Donsbach concluded that journalists’ ideological views produce 
a moderate bias in news decisions, with some variations between countries.
Crucially, Patterson and Donsbach have contrasted their findings against 
previous studies of partisan bias. One of the studies mentioned is Herman and 
Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent. As Patterson and Donsbach conclude:
Gans’s perspective [that most journalists hold ‘progressive’ but ‘safe’ 
views]… seems to be more convincing than the claim that journalists 
serve conservative interests of state and established elites (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988). This claim may have some validity when applied to 
news organisations and their owners but cannot be easily reconciled 
with the evidence presented here. Journalists are not radicals, but nei-
ther are they conservatives. They are best described as a mainstream 
group with liberal tendencies. Indeed, journalists can act as a partisan 
counterbalance to the news organisations in which they work (465).
But Herman and Chomsky paid virtually no attention to journalists’ individual 
political preferences, as their view was indeed much closer to the idea that ‘news 
organisations’ qua institutions and corporate ‘owners’ were the genesis of the 
bias. Herman and Chomsky’s study was carried out on the assumption that in a 
media system which is business-run, the personal views of journalists are caus-
ally irrelevant to the nature of media behaviour when crucial systemic or major 
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corporate interests are at stake, as journalists do not control the media, either 
individually or collectively. However, for Patterson and Donsbach to acknowl-
edge this crucial distinction between the two studies would be to acknowledge 
the inexorable power dynamic that obtains between the business of news and 
the industry of news,7 whereby business necessarily constrains journalism’s 
truth-seeking potential and its capacity to engage the public in politics. But this 
would immediately undermine the significance of Patterson and Donsbach’s 
focus on journalists’ individual political views. As it would become self-evident 
that their research design omits the most crucial implications of the business 
control over journalism.8 Although Patterson and Donsbach do mention the 
business element in passing, they do not regard it as an inexorably biasing force. 
The reader should recall Patterson and Donsbach’s claim that ‘journalists can 
act as a partisan counterbalance to the news organisations in which they work.’
In essence, the quasi-experimental design of Patterson and Donsbach’s study 
creates a reality which is unheard of in the mainstream corporate media. That is, a 
reality of journalists making news decisions under conditions of perfect autonomy 
from newsroom pressures and constraints. Moreover, even if we ignore this cru-
cial point for the sake of argument, and we assume that journalists’ decisions in 
Patterson and Donsbach’s study were indeed reflective of their actual news deci-
sions and consistent with the ultimate decisions made by editors in real existing 
news organisations, that still wouldn’t salvage their case for a causal nexus between 
journalists’ attitudes and news content. And for good reason. For their case to 
follow, the possibility that journalists’ mock decisions correspond to their actual 
decisions simply because these journalists were more likely than average to accept 
the institutional dictates of news organisations, would need to be eliminated.9
But, perhaps, the fact that Patterson and Donsbach failed to demonstrate the 
actual explanatory power of journalists’ attitudes vis-á-vis news content does 
not mean such a demonstration is impossible. As senior researchers David 
Weaver and Cleveland Wilhoit point out ‘[...] it would be a mistake to think 
that individual journalists have little freedom to select and shape news sto-
ries, or to change the nature of the news organisations for which they work.’10 
Thus, we would need to look at other attempts to demonstrate the causal nexus 
between journalists’ attitudes and news content.
3. Contemporary Research
3.1 Role Conceptions as Causal Factors
The debate about the causal nexus between journalists’ individual attitudes and 
news content is often cast in the language of ‘role conceptions.’11 Role concep-
tions are essentially purported social goals which journalists ascribe to them-
selves in their capacity as journalists, such as informing the public, serving as 
democracy’s watchdog, entertaining the public, etc.12 Consider how one of the 
scholarly works citing Patterson and Donsbach – without pointing to the prob-
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lems addressed in the previous section – by van Dalen, de Vreese and Albaek, 
makes the case for the explanatory power of role conceptions in a leading peri-
odical of journalism studies, Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism:13
Studies of cross-national role conception variation presumes [sic] that 
variation in role conceptions causes variation in content[…] while 
cross-national studies of content speculate that content variation is 
caused by variation in role conceptions [.…]14
Thus, at issue is what causes news content to be the way it is. This has obvi-
ously been a long-standing concern of media and journalism studies.15 Since one 
major product of the media, on which the public relies for trustworthy informa-
tion, is the news, it is a high-priority task for enlightened and democratically-
oriented scholarship to illuminate the mechanisms behind news products.
Hence, the authors identify an empirical lacuna in the literature which they set 
out to address: ‘[...]the study of role conceptions by means of journalism surveys 
and the study of news content by means of content analysis are generally not com-
bined’.16 Although Patterson and Donsbach are viewed as one of the ‘exceptions’17 
to this disconnect between journalism surveys and content analyses, the reader 
should recall, once again, that actual news content did not figure at all in Patter-
son and Donsbach’s study. Still, it is worth pondering the question of what the sig-
nificance would be of combining journalism surveys data and content analysis. In 
my discussion of Patterson and Donsbach’s work, I have remarked that even if the 
mock news decisions they simulated in their study were found to be consistent with 
actual news products, it would still be impossible to tell whether one of the variables 
was causally related to the other, or what was the directionality of the causation. 
This is a fortiori the case with respect to a prospective correlation obtained between 
journalistic role conceptions and news content, in a study which does not even pre-
tend experimental validity. Thus, a study finding such correlations would be a still 
weaker case for causal relations, even without going into further detail.
But Van Dalen et al. are mindful of the problem of causation. As they correctly 
note (citing Donsbach), ‘cross-national comparisons do not provide a rigid test 
for causal relations in the same way as experiments or large N-studies:’18
In this comparative study of roles and content, we search for regularities 
and ‘on the basis of prior research or theory (…) place causal interpreta-
tions on those observations’ (Jackman, 1985: 172). Studies showing a 
relation at the individual level are ultimately a prerequisite to explain 
similar relations found at the macro-level studies. This study therefore 
builds on journalism studies of the professional attitude–behaviour rela-
tion at the individual level and extends these to explain the role–content 
relation on the macro level.19
Thus, the authors acknowledge that their causal account of news content 
by recourse to role conceptions, is purely speculative. But there is a more 
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 fundamental problem here. Role conceptions are not specific about what goes 
on in the reporters’ minds. They are rather generalised beliefs about broad soci-
etal roles journalists ascribe to their own work, such as informing the  public, 
rousing it, entertaining it, etc. There are presumably various different ways of 
understanding and performing these roles. A journalist uncritically echoing 
powerful sources and a critical investigative journalist might both see their 
work as commensurable with the rather broad role of ‘informing the public.’ 
But the survey questions – asking journalists to indicate their level of agree-
ment or disagreement on a 5-point scale – posed by Van Dalen et al. were even 
more general, as they did not capture one specific role conception at a time:
[...] national politics is newsworthy by definition; [...] mass media 
should report about national politics in full detail [...] The medium I 
work for has a specific political colour which guides me in how to do 
my work;[...] In the news section, my medium keeps a neutral position 
in partisan or policy disputes[…].20
The responses to these rather general questions were correlated against a num-
ber of content features of a sample of published news stories. I juxtapose in the 
following table the above survey items against excerpts from the corresponding 
content analysis codebook.
Survey Item Content Analysis Item
National politics is news-
worthy by definition; ... 
mass media should report 
about national politics in 
full detail…( 910)
Visibility of political news was operationalised as the 
proportion of stories on the front page which cover 
national politics (compared to the total number of  
stories on the front page). Coders coded whether the 
story was framed in terms of conflict (focusing on  
disagreement between politicians) (de Vreese et al., 
2001) or presented politics as a game (focusing on a 
politician winning or losing) …(911)
The medium I work for 
has a specific political 
colour which guides me 
in how to do my work;...
In the news section, my 
medium keeps a neutral 
position in partisan or 
policy disputes…(910)
The presence of coverage bias was measured by  
comparing the visibility of political actors belonging to 
the largest left leaning and right leaning political party
The presence of statement bias was measured by  
comparing the mean tone towards politicians of these 
two parties. The tone can range from positive (when the 
emphasis in the story is on the actor’s merits,  
successful solutions, solved problems or abilities) to 
negative (when the emphasis is on the actor’s failures, 
unresolved problems or inabilities). (911)
Table 4.1: Survey questions versus content codebook in van Dalen et al. (2012).
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As should be apparent, the attitude-behaviour parallels drawn by van Dalen 
et al. are quite problematic. As the authors’ own data shows, journalists who 
think national politics are newsworthy by definition21 may well decide to use 
conflict and game frames (913, Table 4.2). The only way in which the use of 
these frames could be exclusively indicative of journalists’ denial of the inher-
ent newsworthiness of national politics, is if journalists could only draw on one 
criterion of newsworthiness at a time. But this is plainly not the case. Why can’t 
a journalist think politics are inherently newsworthy and simultaneously think 
the same about conflict or game-like competitiveness among politicians?
In contrast, decisions about the proportion of articles on the front page which 
deal with national politics may indeed correspond to some news personnel’s 
attitudes about the newsworthiness of national politics, but those decisions 
typically fall within the jurisdiction of the editor, not of individual journalists. 
However, by their own account, Van Dalen et al. have surveyed parliamentary 
reporters, not editors.
Still more problematic are the attitude-behaviour parallels having to do 
with partisan bias. The survey questions already reveal that journalists are not 
being asked exclusively about role conceptions, but about the behaviour of 
their news organisations. This is a tacit, albeit inadequate, backdoor reintro-
duction of the institutional structure into a study of role conceptions. Con-
sider, once again, the following statement: ‘The medium I work for has a spe-
cific political colour which guides me in how to do my work.’ This is plainly 
not merely a question about a journalist’s attitude or role conception, but also 
a proposition about the political bent of the news organisation in which she 
or he is employed.
Similarly, it doesn’t follow from the quantitative content measurements 
which Van Dalen et al. offer that the news coverage is either biased or unbiased. 
The proportion of coverage afforded each political party can be meaningful 
only on the assumption that the parties markedly differ from one another on 
policy issues. If the two parties converge on major policy issues, then an equal 
level of attention given these two parties in the news coverage wouldn’t indicate 
an absence of bias.22 It is possible that in some of the countries surveyed the 
political parties did markedly differ, but no information is provided about an 
attempt, on the authors’ part, to ascertain a meaningful level of political dif-
ference between the two largest political parties taken to be representative of 
both sides of the political spectrum in each one of the countries. Instead, the 
applicability of the terms ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ to these parties is taken 
for granted.
But let us assume for the sake of argument that the political parties in each 
country are markedly different in the policies they promote. Even if one politi-
cal party is disproportionately represented in one of the newspapers, that still 
doesn’t mean the disproportionality is the result of the political orientation of 
the newspaper. Indeed, the level of attention afforded each party may have more 
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to do with the party’s or party members’ conduct, than with the newspaper’s 
political bent. Unless the specific conduct of political parties is held constant, 
the claim of bias in cases of disproportionate attention remains speculative.23
Relatedly, the analysis of the tone adopted toward political actors has appar-
ently much more to do with the behaviours of political actors than with the 
intentions of journalists (even if we assume they are the ultimate shapers of 
content). If politicians, either from the self-identified left or from the self-iden-
tified right, act egregiously, it is their behaviour rather than the political bent 
of news personnel/news organisation that would account for the positive or 
negative tone. Only by controlling in some manner for the potential variance 
in the behaviours of politicians could van Dalen et al. hope to document bias. 
But this was not the route taken.
3.2 Non-Causal Role Conceptions
But not all role conception research presupposes the explanatory power of role 
conceptions. Mellado and Van Dalen24 have begun in recent years research into 
the gap between role conceptions and news content. Although this research 
rightly questions the direct causal relationship between role conceptions and 
news content, it uses an equally problematic methodology as studies which 
presupposed such an influence. Combining general survey questions with a 
similarly general content analysis codebook, this research seeks to measure 
the discrepancy between the survey data and the content analysis data. And 
indeed, it finds such gaps.
Thus, for instance, one of the most (apparently) dramatic findings is that 
journalists’ ratings of the importance of the watchdog role do not jib at how 
much criticism their actual coverage directs toward politicians, businessmen 
and other groups.25 Leaving aside that it is easy for journalists to exaggerate 
their commitment to the watchdog role (what could at least partly account for 
the gap) and that the amount of criticism toward various actors may depend 
on the realities of the studied country (e.g. researchers would have to control 
for the potential confounding variables of the incidence of egregious govern-
ment and business practices), even a hypothetical alignment of a journalist’s 
watchdog role conception with his or her actual news content would not indi-
cate the journalist is free to act as watchdogs, which is how Mellado and Van 
Dalen interpret their findings. As they write
[…]the results of this study confirm the view of scholars who argue that 
a disconnect between roles and content is inevitable, since journalists 
lack sufficient autonomy to live up to their ideals.26
Although the argument itself is essentially correct, it does not follow from the 
study’s findings. And for relatively simple reasons. Beyond the trivial  distinction 
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between correlations and causality (i.e. role conceptions being correlated with 
news content wouldn’t suggest they cause news content), there is also the some-
what less obvious matter of the systemically innocuous character of the kind of 
criticism that Mellado and van Dalen’s content analysis captures. Consider the 
following codebook items:
Act as watchdog of business elites: Questioning de facto powers (the 
journalist): By means of statements and/or opinions, the journalist 
questions the validity or truthfulness of what individuals or groups 
in power say or do; Act as watchdog of political parties; Questioning 
de facto powers (the source): Questioning of individuals or groups of 
power through quotes, statements and/or opinions given by someone 
other than the journalist.27
On occasion, businesses attack one another and quite often attack the govern-
ment. News businesses are no exception.28 Yet per Mellado and Van Dalen’s con-
tent analysis these instances would register as the realisation of the watchdog 
role. Thus, while journalists may be doing wittingly or (more likely) unwittingly 
their publishers’, editors’ or advertisers’ bidding, journalism scholars sympa-
thetic to Mellado and Van Dalen’s empirical operationalisation would regard 
them as fully autonomous from extraneous influences. The fact that these 
are hypothetical scenarios does not detract from the validity of the critique, 
because Mellado and van Dalen take their study to be indicative of reporters’ 
level of freedom.29
Thus, unlike Herman and Chomsky who posit rather neatly delineated 
explanatory variables30, and conclusive content-based evidence of media bias, 
Van Dalen et al. and Mellado and Van Dalen provide thoroughly murky vari-
ables, including uninformative content data which is simply assumed to be 
indicative of bias and journalists’ level of freedom.
News Practices
So far, we have seen that the study of role conceptions diverts scholarly atten-
tion away from the power realities of journalism. But this is only half the story. 
The ascription of explanatory power to and excessive focus on journalists’ ‘role 
conceptions’ are not the only ways in which mainstream scholars conceal the 
institutional realities of journalism. Instinctively suspicious about institutional 
explanations, the literature tends to lionise the scholarly interest in journalists’ 
institutionally de-contextualised everyday routines and practices.
In a recent volume co-edited by Wolfgang Donsbach, who has passed from the 
scene in the meantime, a prominent media theorist by the name of David Ryfe, 
announces that the study of institutional sources of power which shape journal-
istic practices is passé.31 How he arrives at this conclusion, though, ought to be 
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retraced, if we are to understand the contemporary mode of reasoning about 
‘news routines’ and ‘news practices’ among mainstream journalism scholars.
Ryfe begins by situating his discussion between two waves of Journalism 
Studies research. A first wave of ethnographies from the 1960s and 1970s 
which, according to Ryfe, contend that ‘news is best explained as an outcome of 
organisational and economic pressures.’32 And a second wave of ethnographies 
from the 1980’s and 1990’s finding that
[...] reporters constantly argued about which routines applied in what 
context, and even about how to perform a given routine. They took from 
this finding that reporters have far more latitude to interpret  routines—
over and against organisational and economic pressures—than the 
 earlier work implied.33
Ryfe takes the significance of this debate to be anchored in ‘a series of severe 
economic and symbolic disruptions’34 which journalism faces today. For Ryfe, 
at issue here is ‘whether and the extent to which journalists can adapt their rou-
tines.’35 A few pages later Ryfe clarifies the severity of the crisis facing journal-
ism and what he means by his reference to journalists’ ability to adapt:
From roughly 2006 forward, the advertising revenue generated by 
American newsrooms (which employ the great majority of working 
journalists) began to plummet. With it went jobs. In the 7 years between 
2006 and 2013, roughly 30% of American journalists were laid off or 
took buyouts. Today, revenue generated by American newspapers sits 
at levels last seen in 1950, and newsrooms are as small as they have 
been since 1980. This crisis is not as acute in other Western societies. 
But journalism across the industrialised world is losing readership and 
viewership, losing revenue, and losing workers.
The crisis in journalism has galvanised scholars to take renewed inter-
est in news production. For the most part, they have sought to under-
stand how journalists are responding to the technological and economic 
changes facing their industry.36
These passages are curious ones. The first paragraph cited above depicts the 
crisis of journalism in lucid and informative institutional terms: plummeting 
advertising revenues, layoffs and buyouts. Moreover, newspaper revenues are 
said to be at the level of the 1950s. Obviously, these institutional processes do 
not substantially depend on journalists’ choices under current power relations. 
Journalists do not decide on their news organisation’s revenue, on whether 
they are going to keep their jobs or on the company that owns or acquires the 
news organisation in which they are employed. Thus, so far, Ryfe seems to be 
cognisant of the fact that journalists are not the agents behind or drivers of 
the developments he describes. But then the second paragraph (cited above) 
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reveals that mainstream scholars of journalism have been primarily concerned 
with how journalists respond to these changes. Not with trying to explain why 
these institutional changes occurred in the first place. Be it as it may, I take 
Ryfe’s general description of Journalism Studies’ scholarly emphases to be 
robust and accurate. But Ryfe has additional theoretical insights to contribute.
Ryfe qualifies the earlier statement that the ethnographies of the 1960s and 
1970s saw ‘news’ as ‘best explained as an outcome of organisational and eco-
nomic pressures.’ Instead, he now argues:
Most of this early literature understood that reporters had some degree 
of flexibility in adapting their routines to circumstance. For instance, 
Tuchman  ...calls news routines ‘typifications’ as a way of allowing that 
they ‘leave room for a great deal of reportorial flexibility.’ In a similar 
vein, Gans ... refers to routines as ‘considerations’ that reporters take into 
account when deciding which stories to run and how to report them.37
Only that now Ryfe notes that this earlier work also didn’t include evidence of 
as much uniformity (in journalistic routines) as the authors of this work had 
implied.38 Ryfe suggests that the uniformity was ‘implied’ by such phrases as 
‘organisation men’ and ‘manufacturing the news’39 (in Fishman’s work).
However, Ryfe makes clear that the said ‘uniformity’ is, in any event, not the 
consequence of power inequalities within the news organisation or the news 
business, but of mere consensus among journalists: ‘According to this literature, 
reporters share a largely implicit consensus about how to report the news.’40 But 
if reporters merely share a consensus why can’t the consensus simply change 
if reporters (collectively, if not individually) wish it to change? Why does such 
uniformity limit journalists’ ‘latitude’?41 This set up reveals the false dichotomy, 
in Ryfe’s rendering, between flexibility and uniformity. Both concepts are con-
sistent with a journalism unmarred by hierarchical power relations.
Political Economists of the media, however, reached rather different conclu-
sions about the same literature. As Herman and Chomsky write about Gans, 
he ‘[...]greatly understates the extent to which media reporters work within 
a limiting framework of assumptions’ (F2 332-333, citing specific statements 
from Gans’s book).42 Similarly, McChesney has referred to Fishman, Tuchman 
and Gans’s research as work which
tended to accept the dominant institutional arrangements as a given. 
The institutions were unassailable, and the work tended to concentrate 
upon newsroom organisation, professional practices, and the implica-
tions for content.43
A major assumption in Ryfe’s resistance to a power analysis of journalism is the 
claimed usefulness of what he calls ‘practice’ theories, which recent  prominent 
studies of journalism have presumably demonstrated.44 The term ‘practice 
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 theories’ is a reference to a collection of ideas by several theorists whose work 
is ‘designed to overcome the conceptual impasse’45 between structure and 
agency.46 Here are some of the tenets Ryfe draws from ‘practice’ theories:
Within practice theory, routines are properly understood not as expressions 
of external pressures on journalists (whether understood as organisational, 
political, or economic pressures)[…]47 (emphasis added).
And once again,
[…] there is no need to impute a structure to social action (economic, 
political, or otherwise) beyond the conditions of practice (132, empha-
sis added).
Thus, for Ryfe, the idea that structure has anything to do with practice is  invalid 
a priori. There is no need to admit structure into the explanatory  calculus. 
Instead, it should be enough – or so Ryfe would argue – to meticulously 
 document the details of how reporters cope with their changing economic and 
technological environment.
4. Conclusion
I have argued that the aversion of mainstream journalism scholars to the analy-
sis of journalism in terms of institutional structures expresses itself not merely 
in particular dogmas, but also in scholarly practices and emphases, both in the 
kinds of methodologies adopted and in the data which is deemed meaningful. 
Specifically, I have provided examples of how mainstream scholars drew on 
journalists’ political beliefs, journalists’ conceptions of their own professional 
roles and newsroom practices, to obscure the power relations in journalism.
I tried to illustrate the severe analytical and methodological problems inher-
ent in this scholarly work. Thus, I have noted the tendency to construct research 
designs which eliminate or obfuscate the hierarchical relationship between the 
business side and the production side of news, the unsatisfactory quality of the 
evidence used to infer the general features of the news content, and the refusal 
to consider news practices in the context of institutional power mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 5
Does the Propaganda Model Actually 
Theorise Propaganda?
Piers Robinson1
1. Overview
The Propaganda Model (PM), first published in Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media2 and describing how corporate media 
serve as conduits for business and government propaganda, has weathered 
many criticisms over the years. Derided by some as ‘simplistic’ or ‘conspirato-
rial’, shunned by the ‘respectable’ academy and, perhaps more often than not, 
simply ignored, the model has, however, stood the test of time and, at least to 
this writer, it seems that there is little in the way of substantial disagreement 
amongst many scholars with the basic claims put forward in the model. The 
way in which the model has been adopted by researchers has not been optimal, 
however, and this chapter puts forward the case for a significant expansion of 
the model and the way it is employed so as to provide a more thorough-going 
analysis of the strategies and organisations actually involved in the creation 
of propaganda: as such, I argue for an expansion to the model which would 
allow it to live up to its name. To be clear, this is not necessarily a criticism of 
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 Herman and Chomsky given that they always saw the  Propaganda Model of the 
media as one part of a much broader set of structures and processes through 
which dominant ideologies are communicated and vested political and eco-
nomic interest protected: but it is a criticism of the way in which the model 
has tended to draw attention to the corporate media at the expense of a more 
detailed consideration of the strategies and organisations that function to cre-
ate a propagandised information environment in the first instance.
The chapter proceeds in three stages: section two briefly recaps the core claims 
of the Propaganda Model as well as summarising initial criticisms and then 
noting the extent to which the model is now accepted and indeed endorsed by 
many critical scholars. Section three then sets out the argument that, in signifi-
cant ways, the model captures only a portion of the processes involved in the 
production of propaganda. In this way, perhaps ironically, the model shares the 
same shortcomings as other more mainstream models of media-state relations. 
Section four then sets out the processes which should be incorporated into a 
revised and expanded Propaganda Model. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of the importance of this suggested expansion with respect to assess-
ing the democratic health of contemporary liberal democracies and identifies 
some areas for future empirical research.
2. From Outcast to Mainstream: A Short History of the 
 Propaganda Model
The original model developed by Herman and Chomsky detailed the now well-
known five filters (size, concentration and profit orientation of the mainstream 
media, their reliance upon advertising and official sources, flak and the ideol-
ogy of anti-communism) which worked together in order to shape the news 
output of corporate US media.3 Early reactions to the Propaganda Model from 
the academy were largely dismissive, arguing variously that the model was 
inaccurate, simplistic or counter-productive4 whilst frequent ‘off the record’ 
conversations experienced by this writer suggested their work was polemical 
or unscholarly. Indeed, two academics reported that they had experienced sug-
gestions to remove references to Chomsky’s work write:
these have been made by those who say that they agree with Chomsky 
but were concerned to protect us from the costs of being associated with 
him. On one occasion, it was suggested that, even though a manuscript 
written by one of us indicated concurrence with Chomsky’s analysis on 
a particular issue, references to Chomsky should remain in the manu-
script only when disagreement with Chomsky was being registered. The 
point was made an argument would be dismissed merely for having 
Chomsky’s name attached to it, whereas if it had a mainstream big name 
as the source, it would be applauded for its great wisdom.5
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Such prejudice has led, over time, to a remarkable silencing of their work across 
significant swathes of mainstream academic research on media and politics. 
Herring and Robinson reviewed eight significant studies of media-state rela-
tions, all of which shared similar analyses of the relationship of mainstream 
media to power, but none of which referenced Manufacturing Consent.6 Woods 
identified a similar pattern across a corpus of introductory texts to Interna-
tional Relations.7 Since then, however, many important mainstream accounts 
of media-state relations have, to varying degrees, reflected or concurred with 
many of the basic claims made in the Propaganda Model8 whilst others have 
continued to draw attention to the importance of their work for understanding 
media-state relations9. It is perhaps possible then that there might now be some 
kind of generalised academic acknowledgement of the analysis they provide, at 
least for those who accept that there are powerful and significant constraints 
acting upon media autonomy such that their ability to speak truth to power 
and hold the powerful to account are not being met. In addition, other scholars 
are continuing the media critique epitomised by the Propaganda Model10 and 
earlier Marxist-inspired analyses of the media. So, in sum, the challenge and 
resistance to power represented in the work of Herman and Chomsky has then 
been far from futile.
3. Identifying Theoretical Limitations to the Propaganda 
Model and its Elite-driven Bedfellows
As mentioned above, the central claims of the Propaganda Model are largely 
compatible with the body of critical literature, the elite-driven paradigm, which 
theorises media-state relations and identifies the great extent to which corpo-
rate media are closely located to political and economic power. Lance Bennett’s 
oft-cited indexing hypothesis,11 Daniel Hallin’s media spheres,12 Robert Entman’s 
cascading activation model,13 Gadi Wolfsfeld’s political contest model14 and my 
own policy-media interaction model,15 all are compatible with the central claims 
set out in the Propaganda Model. All of these accounts focus on theorising, 
with sometimes relatively subtle differences, the forces that act on media in 
order to create their ‘close proximity’ to political and economic power. In par-
ticular, they all place great significance on the role of media reliance upon offi-
cial sources when defining the news agenda (i.e. the sourcing filter described 
in the Propaganda Model). However, in doing so, they all share a particular 
weakness: they fail to go beyond this official source-media linkage into a deeper 
exploration of ways in which officials, and the governments and business inter-
ests that they represent, engage in the systematic manipulation of information. 
To put this another way, before the point is reached at which an official source 
passes information to the journalist, all of the elite-driven paradigm models 
provide minimal insight into the processes of ‘information management’ and 
propaganda production.
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This is an important shortcoming, especially for a model with the title ‘propa-
ganda’. The PM asserts that a highly propagandised worldview is being commu-
nicated to media precisely because they are so dependent upon official sources 
and that this worldview serves elite interests. But the model provides little or 
no insights into how this distorted worldview is created in the first instance. In 
a sense, the PM and other elite-driven paradigm models are only presenting us 
with half the picture of what is going on. There are several reasons why this is 
a problem; some minor, some major. First, to the extent that the Propaganda 
Model focuses attention on the media, and why they come to fail, the attention 
and blame is focused upon journalists and editors. This might be fair enough 
for some, but it does take attention and blame away from the governments 
and corporations involved in actively manipulating and distorting informa-
tion: it takes two to tango and one might reasonably expect governments and 
corporations to take an even greater share of the responsibility in this rela-
tionship. Second, in theoretical terms, there is a tension between the fifth fil-
ter (ideology) and the fact that there is also active production of propaganda. 
The ideology filter posits the existence of a fixed system of ideas which fix or 
shape understandings, closing off some ways of thinking about the world and 
enabling others. Ideology, as it is commonly understood and presented in the 
PM, is not a particularly active process and is normally assumed to function 
in a way that does not involve conscious and intentional actions:16 the ideol-
ogy of anti-communism, for example, referred to a widely shared perspective 
that assumed communism was inherently bad, whilst capitalism was morally 
superior. Journalists, editors and officials simply shared this outlook, so, for 
example, when it came to the Vietnam War, all understood the ‘right’ way of 
interpreting the conflict and without having to think about it. But there this is 
more to it than that. Those ideologically driven anti-communist impulses did 
not spontaneously occur; they had to be constructed and promoted at some 
point, and that is where an understanding of propaganda can help make greater 
sense of the ideology filter. Propaganda understood as the active promotion 
of particular world views can be seen as, in the first instance, the establisher 
of particular ideological constructs. In the US, a large part of the propaganda 
which helped cement the ideology of anti-communism presumably emerged 
with the infamous ‘red scares’ of the 1950s and McCarthyism as well as exag-
gerated intelligence claims regarding the threat posed by the Soviet military. 
In sum, the point here is that bringing propaganda production into the frame 
helps us to understand better how ideological frameworks get to be constructed 
in the first instance.17
There are even more important reasons why we should take the ‘propaganda 
short-coming’ of the PM seriously. The scale of the euphemistically titled ‘public 
relations’ industry is vast and indeed represents one of the largest industries in 
the world, and with massive impacts. For example, the US federal government 
spent $16 billion on ‘outside PR, ads’ between 2002 and 2012. In the recent past 
persuasion and manipulation of public perceptions has been conducted by the 
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tobacco industry about the dangers of smoking, causing 100 million deaths 
in the twentieth century,18 and also by the fossil fuel industry attempting to 
obfuscate understanding of climate change.19At the same time, sophisticated 
strategies are involved in manipulating perceptions and behaviours and which, 
together, constitute a clear set of doctrines and practices. Propaganda produc-
tion also involves co-ordination with think tanks, academia and NGOs. For all 
these reasons, one can reasonably assume that the production of propaganda 
is a process involving very significant resource allocation, intensive activity, 
and one which is extremely important. Indeed, the resources allocated and the 
intensiveness of the activity far outstrips those related to corporate media. For 
example, as recent Pew studies have shown and others have commented upon, 
the imbalance between journalists and PR workers is even greater now than 
before with the latter outnumbering the former three to one.20 Suffice to say, if 
we want to fully understand how and why the media come to present such a 
distorted worldview, we need to examine all of these dimensions related to the 
production and dissemination of propaganda: And this means moving beyond 
a focus on corporate media and expanding analysis to include examination of 
propaganda strategies and sites of production. And it is to this task that we now 
turn.
4. Extending the Explanatory Reach of the Propaganda Model 
through an Examination of Propaganda Production
If we are then to fully understand the way in which media function as a propa-
ganda arm for powerful interests, it is necessary to expand the existing model 
in ways which might do greater justice to the actual production of propaganda. 
What follows is no more than an approximate sketch of the kinds of issues 
which should be incorporated into an expanded version of the existing Propa-
ganda Model. But taking the issues identified above, I want to discuss first the 
matter of the persuasion strategies employed as part of propaganda campaigns, 
and second the range of actors involved in propaganda production.
4.1 ‘Strategies of Propaganda and Persuasion’
The term propaganda is actually widely disputed. For some, propaganda is 
understood to refer to any kind of persuasion21 whilst for others it is under-
stood to refer to only manipulative forms of persuasion.22 Clearly, in terms of 
how Chomsky employs the term propaganda, he is understanding it to involve 
manipulative forms of persuasion and it is certainly the case that most work-
ing definitions of propaganda employ some notion of manipulation. It is also 
important to note that actors involved in propaganda production are likely to 
hold a variety of self-perceptions about what they are engaged in: some will be 
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fully aware that their activity involves intentional manipulation of beliefs and 
behaviours; others might have already internalised a particular world view and 
believe that they are telling the truth; and for others it might be the case that 
attempts to manipulate opinions and behaviours is a necessary and acceptable 
part of contemporary society. The common feature across all of these self-per-
ceptions is the organised, systematic and intentional manipulation of informa-
tion in ways that either distorts peoples’ perception of reality or pushes them to 
behave in ways they would not otherwise do.
But how does persuasion and influence become manipulative and what con-
stitutes manipulation? Neither the literature on propaganda, nor the Propa-
ganda Model as currently formulated, give much in the way of insight to this 
question. The existing and most widely adopted definition of propaganda 
involves demarcating propaganda into white, grey and black categories.23 This 
is actually a rather crude and inadequate formulation because it falls into the 
trap of equating white propaganda, whereby one-sided but factually accurate 
claims are made in order to persuade, with truthful communication. However, 
as Bakir et al. explain,24 stating only half the truth can itself be fundamentally 
deceptive and, therefore, manipulative. A more productive approach is to con-
ceptualise clearly the ways in which communicative processes of persuasion 
and influence can become manipulative. For example, Herring and Robinson25 
developed a conceptual framework which mapped the key ways through which 
the propaganda strategy of deception works. Deception might occur through 
lies: statements of fact known to be untrue which are nonetheless communi-
cated in order to deceive. However, although many associate propaganda with 
lying, and it is certainly the case that many people interpret Chomsky’s posi-
tion, and that of the PM, with this form of deception, it is also the case that 
‘lies have short legs’26 and, moreover, are a high-risk political strategy. In other 
words, getting caught out in a lie is normally fatal in political terms. More com-
mon ways in which deception occurs is through strategies of omission and dis-
tortion. Omission involves selecting some facts, and ignoring others, in a way 
that makes your case more likely to persuade. This is more than a matter of sim-
ply trying to persuade someone based upon how you might see an issue. It is a 
matter of deliberate omission of information that might be critical to whether 
or not someone is likely to be persuaded. Another frequently employed tactic 
is to distort or exaggerate facts. As Herring and Robinson27 describe, the now 
infamous deception over Iraq’s alleged possession of WMD in the run-up to the 
Iraq War involved a fundamental distortion of intelligence estimates: through 
distortion of information an actual intelligence assessment that described Iraq 
as a potential future threat, perhaps five years down the line, was distorted to 
say that Iraq was currently capable of launching WMD within 45 minutes of 
an order.
It is also important to recognise that propaganda strategies involve more than 
the deceptive manipulation of information in the three ways described. It also 
frequently involves misdirection28 which entails producing and  disseminating 
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true information but which is intended to direct public attention away from 
problematic issues. Beyond the management and shaping of the information 
environment, propaganda can also involve action in the real world or, to be 
more precise, shaping material contexts through the use of incentives and, 
at times, influencing conduct via threats.29 For example, sanctions against 
regimes involving the targeting of populations and governments in order to 
alter their behaviour are examples of incentivising strategies aimed at 
 organising conduct. Again, strategies such as the ‘shock and awe’ campaign 
witnessed at the start of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, involving highly visible 
and dramatic bomb attacks on Iraqi government buildings right in the  centre 
of Baghdad, are designed to communicate powerful coercive messages to 
populations largely revolving around a message to surrender and comply with 
invading forces!
Overall, analysing and understanding the precise strategies of persuasion and 
influence that are employed in any given case can help to provide a richer and 
deeper understanding of the ways in which information, which is then passed 
through the media and on to the public, comes to be profoundly distorted in 
the ways claimed by Herman and Chomsky. The concepts of incentivising and 
coercing propaganda messages,30 add important additional layers to our under-
standing of the propaganda techniques used by powerful actors.
4.2 Sites of Propaganda Production
The production of propaganda involves more than government and corpora-
tion ‘spin doctors’ and ‘PR’ agents, it also involves a variety of entities, including 
think tanks, NGOs, and even academia. It also involves actors from within the 
so-called ‘deep state’ including the intelligence services.
For example, think tanks can be used as vehicles in order to generate informa-
tion and, frequently, operate in ways which reflect the interests and agenda of 
their sponsors.31 Although not necessarily always part of contributing towards 
manipulated and propagandised representations of particular issues, some-
times they are. So, for example, Spinwatch recently produced a report on the 
Henry Jackson Society, a think tank founded in 2005 and presented as biparti-
san. As they document in their report,32 this think tank, funded by an array of 
undisclosed donors, has been active in ‘promoting a strongly pro-Israel agenda, 
organizing anti-Islam activities … (and) advocating a transatlantic military 
and security regime’.33 Interestingly, and as revealed in a leaked document, HJS, 
also planned co-ordinated activities aimed at discrediting Noam Chomsky via 
influencing mainstream media journalists.34 Clearly, shaping the information 
environment and manipulating opinions (aka propaganda) would appear to 
have been a key objective of this think tank.
NGOs have also been implicated, on occasion, in the unintentional circula-
tion of propagandistic information. For example, during the Libyan war in 2011, 
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human rights-related claims against the Libyan government circulated prior to 
the intervention, including in an AI press briefing.35
 After the intervention, however, an AI investigation could not corroborate alle-
gations of mass human rights violations by Gaddafi regime troops.36 In the case of 
the 2011-present war in Syria, the White Helmets group are presented as an inde-
pendent organisation set up to save civilians. However, one government docu-
ment indicates that the organization has been funded as part of broader attempts 
to support ‘moderate opposition to provide services for their communities and 
to contest new space’, and to empower ‘legitimate local governance structures to 
deliver services [and giving] credibility to the moderate opposition’.37 As such, 
the White Helmets would appear to be part of a broader US/UK regime change 
strategy which has supported the overthrow of the existing Syrian government. 
At the same time, the White Helmets have served an important public relations 
purpose by providing ‘an invaluable reporting and advocacy role’ and ‘confidence 
to statements made by UK and other international leaders made in condemna-
tion of Soviet actions’.38 Because the White Helmets only operate in areas held by 
opposition groups, they can only present a partial picture of events. The utility of 
this organization, intentional or not, for propaganda purposes is without ques-
tion. Indeed, a film about the White Helmets was even awarded an Oscar in 2016.
Academia is not immune from propaganda activities and can itself become 
part of the broader propaganda apparatus. For example, Herring and Robin-
son39 argued that, to a large extent, the filters identified in the Propaganda Model 
as acting upon the media are also relevant to academia. Reliance upon grants, 
wishing to curry favour with official sources, as well as ideological imperatives, 
all mean that academia is far less free from the influence of power than is often 
assumed by those outside the academy, and also many within academia.40 For 
example, Simpson’s Science of Coercion draws upon a variety of sources, includ-
ing FOI’d documents, and carefully documents the relationship between the 
fledgling academic discipline of communication science/studies and US psy-
chological operations (psy ops).41 He highlights powerfully the interdepend-
ence between the academy and the US government and makes a powerful case 
that, in a very fundamental sense, communication science/studies are shaped, 
to this day, by the imperatives of political power.
Finally, the intelligence services are key producers and disseminators of 
propaganda in contemporary liberal democracies. For example, long before 
the now notorious intelligence-based WMD allegations made against Iraq dur-
ing the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, British intelligence was involved 
in manipulating evidence in order to promote the impression that Iraq had 
an ongoing WMD programme. From 1991 onwards the MI6 Operation Rock-
ingham was involved in cherry picking intelligence from the UN weapons 
inspections (set up after the Persian Gulf War) in order to, as a former chief UN 
weapons inspector put it, skew ‘UK intelligence about Iraqi WMD towards a 
preordained outcome that was more in line with British government policy that 
it was reflective of the truth’.42 Such activities were geared toward influencing 
the UN Security Council but also most likely designed to help maintain public 
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support for the UK sanctions regime against Iraq. Operation Mass Appeal, ini-
tiated in the late 1990s, was precisely geared towards influencing public opinion 
by exaggerating the threat posed by Iraqi WMD.43 Finally, propaganda activi-
ties extend beyond attempts to influence publics via mainstream media and 
include popular culture propaganda. For example, Schou has documented the 
close involvement between the CIA and Hollywood.44 The relationships here 
range from mutual exploitation, through co-optation, and on to more direct 
patterns of censorship. The overall net objective is to manipulate beliefs and 
attitudes in ways that are conducive to the interests of the US government.
In sum, a full analysis of propaganda requires identification and critical 
examination of the various sites of propaganda production which, in practice, 
extend well beyond the communications officials and PR offices of govern-
ments and major corporations to include think tanks, NGOs, academia and 
the intelligence services. In extending the Propaganda Model to include analy-
sis of these sites of production, it is also essential to maintain a weather eye on 
the potential overlap between, and even integration of, these apparently dis-
crete sites of propaganda production. For example, there is evidence that some 
journalists working in the media have been either intelligence service assets 
or, indeed, members of the intelligence services themselves.45 At the same time 
academics have become involved with intelligence-military activities on many 
occasions; for example, anthropologists have become, controversially, involved 
in the human terrain system (HTS) project aimed at using ‘local’ knowledge in 
order to, in the broadest sense, win hearts and minds and organise conduct in 
countries that Western governments have invaded and occupied.46 A similar 
phenomenon emerged with the involvement of psychologists in the US post 
9/11 torture programme.47 It is also worthwhile addressing the question of the 
extent to which networks connecting think tanks, NGOs, and perhaps even 
some individuals within academia, might be involved in propaganda activi-
ties. For example, in relation to the current Syrian conflict, in 2012, the then 
US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton authorised the ‘training for more than a 
thousand (Syrian) activists, students, and independent journalists’48 in order 
to promote her regime change preference. The question begged by the revela-
tion from Clinton is how many of those apparently recruited are working in 
support of NGOs, for example the White Helmets discussed above, and have 
become either connected or involved with think tanks or perhaps even exist 
now within academia. In sum, these sites of propaganda should not be investi-
gated only as discrete sites of propaganda production, but also, potentially, as 
part of broader propaganda networks.
5. Concluding Comments: Propaganda, the Exercise of Power, 
and the Health of Contemporary Liberal Democracy
We know much about the media and why it so frequently fails to speak truth 
to power, fails to relay accurate information on the most important issues of 
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our day, and frequently ends up relaying propaganda designed to manipulate 
beliefs and behaviour. Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model has played 
an important role in raising awareness of these failures amongst both academ-
ics and the public at large. The model and their work have been a major ser-
vice to critical thinking and, ultimately, democracy. It is the experience of this 
author, with 20 years teaching in higher education, that many more students 
today are aware of the structural failings of mainstream media than was the 
case in the 1990s. Referencing and talking about the Propaganda Model seems 
to elicit fewer smirks and knee jerk reactions than was the case 20 years back. 
Progress has been made.
However, moving understanding and critical awareness forward means 
extending and widening the Propaganda Model, refocusing attention away 
from the well-documented failings of the mainstream media and on to those 
actors who are, ultimately, the source of propaganda. Some of this work 
involves the examination of propaganda tactics and strategies, or doctrines, 
which make up the tool kit of the propagandist. Some of these tactics involve 
processes of information manipulation whereby deception can occur through 
lying, distortion, omission and misdirection. But some are more physical and 
‘real world’ involving incentivisation and coercion. Propaganda is about win-
ning hearts and minds and also about organising conduct and this can involve 
shaping material contexts and action in the real world.49 Beyond tactics and 
strategies, we also need to extend analysis to include the array of entities, 
from think tanks to the academy, which can become involved in propaganda 
 activities and the way in which these might sometimes overlap and be inter-
connected.
Such an expansion of the Propaganda Model would help us to much bet-
ter understand how the propaganda, which is relayed by mainstream media 
so readily, is produced and the ways in which the minds and behaviour of 
people in contemporary liberal democracies might come to be manipulated 
and conditioned. Shining a light on those involved in the actual creation 
of propaganda would also serve to increase public accountability of those 
actors and organisations who are involved in these activities, just as the origi-
nal Propaganda Model has helped increase the accountability of corporate 
media. Finally, mapping these activities across multiple cases and through 
detailed empirical research will serve to elucidate hidden agendas, interests 
and networks, and the way in which propaganda is employed in order to 
exercise power in ostensibly accountable and democratic political systems. 
Establishing just how far this propaganda extends, and the extent to which 
there has been a ‘major and permanent adjustment or displacement of real-
ity’,50 will provide vital insights to the democratic health, or ill-health, of con-
temporary liberal democracies.
Seventeen years in to the twenty-first century, the liberal democracies of the 
West have experienced multiple wars initiated and led by the US, profound eco-
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nomic crisis and a continued hesitation to confront some of the most pressing 
issues of our time such as global poverty and environmental crisis. As Chom-
sky himself has noted on many occasions in recent years, we are on a preci-
pice, facing the potential even of extinction due to climate change or nuclear 
war.51 Propaganda has undoubtedly had much to do with facilitating this state 
of affairs, whether through persuading publics of non-existent WMD threats 
(in the case of Iraq), mobilising consent for a ‘war on terror’52 or helping pow-
erful vested interests such as the fossil fuel industry sow seeds of doubt about 
climate change.53 We must fully understand, expose and critique propaganda 
in order to regain accountability and control over our course. Extending the 
Propaganda Model in order to do this is a pressing,54 urgent, matter.
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PART I I
The Internet and  
New Digital Media

CHAPTER 6
Propaganda 2.0 : Herman and  
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age 
of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media
Christian Fuchs
1. Introduction
Herman and Chomsky’s book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media1 was published nearly 30 years ago. Today, not only has the 
Soviet Union disappeared, but we have also experienced the progressive inten-
sification of neoliberalism and financialization, the 2008 world economic crisis, 
austerity, constant growth of inequalities, and the extension and intensifica-
tion of nationalism, new racism, and xenophobia. The news media are in crisis. 
Advertising has shifted from print towards targeted online ads. Today we not 
only have the World Wide Web and mobile phones, but also Big Data, Google, 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, Wikipedia, blogs, etc. have 
become important means of information and communication. Given these 
changes, the question arises if and how we can make sense of the propaganda 
model in the age of the internet and social media.
Herman and Chomsky summarise the propaganda model in the following words: 
The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news ‘filters’, 
fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, 
owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; 
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(2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the 
reliance of the media on information provided by government, busi-
ness, and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and 
agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) 
‘anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism. These 
elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of 
news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed 
residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpreta-
tion, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and 
they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda  
campaigns.2
The key aspect is that wealth and power inequalities shape what is consid-
ered newsworthy, what gets reported, and what is heard, read and watched. 
It should be noted that the propaganda model is not a theory. A theory of 
propaganda and ideology requires a systematic theory of society and capital-
ism, in which the role of culture, ideology and propaganda is clearly defined. 
It is for example unclear why exactly there are five elements and how they 
are theoretically justified. Moreover, entertainment and the spectacle as a fil-
ter that displaces and colonises political communication is missing from the 
model. Jürgen Habermas argues that entertainment is part of the process of 
the feudalisation and de-politicisation of the public sphere: ‘Reporting facts 
as human-interest stories, mixing information with entertainment, arranging 
material episodically, and breaking down complex relationships into smaller 
fragments – all of this comes together to form a syndrome that works to depo-
liticize public communication.’3 It is therefore best to view the Propaganda 
Model (PM) as a not necessarily complete list of elements that are ideologi-
cally influencing factors on the agenda of the news media. The fifth element 
of anti-communism should probably best be generalised in terms of dominant 
ideologies that influence the media.4 Also Joan Pedro suggests to term the fifth 
dimension ‘dominant ideology’.5 In the thirty years since the publication of the 
book, especially the neoliberal ‘belief in the “miracle of the market” (Reagan)’6 
has become dominant.
In respect to criticisms arguing that the model is functionalist and does not 
take resistance and contradictions into account, Herman argues that ‘the sys-
tem is not all-powerful,’7 that there are ‘uncertain and variable effects’ and ‘con-
testing forces.’8
2. Social Media and Power
One often hears that social media and the decentralised character of the internet 
overcome hierarchies and foster a participatory culture and democratic commu-
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nication. Edward Herman has voiced scepticism about this assumption: ‘Some 
argue that the internet and the new communication technologies are breaking 
the corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening an unprecedented era of 
interactive democratic media.’9 He argues that new technologies ‘permit media 
firms to shrink staff even as they achieve greater outputs, and they make possible 
global distribution systems that reduce the number of media entities.’10
2.1 Size, Ownership, Profit Orientation
The dominant social media platforms have concentrated ownership. Google- 
co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin own 42.4% and 41.3% respectively 
of Alphabet’s class B common stock. Page controls 26.6% of the voting power; 
Brin 25.9%.11 Facebook owner Mark Zuckerberg controls 85.3% of the compa-
ny’s class B common stock and 60.1% of the voting power.12 Social media is also 
a highly concentrated market: Google controls 71% of the world’s searches, and 
Facebook and its subsidiary WhatsApp account for 48% of users worldwide of 
the top 10 social media platforms.13
Both Google searches and the Facebook news feed are very important sources 
of news today. In respect to the 2016 US presidential election, the group of 
18–29-year-olds considered social media the most important news source:14 For 
all who are 30 or older, TV news was the most important source. Taking the 
entire adult population together, 78% used television during one week for learn-
ing about the election, 65% used digital information sources (48% news websites; 
44% social networks), 44% used the radio, while 36% read print newspapers. The 
data indicate that the internet does not substitute but merely complements tra-
ditional news sources. Among younger people, however, it is the most important 
source of news.
Algorithms determine the ranking of Google’s search results and Facebook’s 
news feed. The centralised ownership of these companies (from which users are 
excluded), combined with the huge market share of users the two companies 
hold and the fact that both platforms are important news sources, results in the 
circumstance that ownership also means control over algorithms that deter-
mine news sources for a significant part of the population. Both algorithms are 
intransparent; they are corporate secrets. As capitalist companies, Google and 
Facebook want to protect themselves from competition. Factors that play a role 
in Facebook’s news feed algorithm e.g. include your closeness to a person post-
ing content (closeness meaning how regularly you interact with them through 
messaging, likes, etc.), the type of a post or the achieved popularity of a post.15 
It is also possible to boost a particular post by paying for it, or to buy a spon-
sored ad that targets a specific group of users’ news feeds. Google’s PageRank 
algorithm ranks web pages using various criteria, such as the number of sites 
that link to them – a weight is given to each link. So, if the New York Times links 
74 The Propaganda Model Today
to your web page, then this link is likely to have a higher weight than the link 
your best friend posts on her/his site. Also, on Google is it possible to purchase 
sponsored links that are boosted to prominent screen positions.
The discussion shows that social media’s ownership matters in several 
respects. Firstly, social media markets tend to be highly concentrated. Private 
ownership locks users out from the control of algorithms that determine the 
priorities of how search results and news are presented. The specifics of the 
algorithms are secret because of the secret nature of intellectual property and 
because capitalism’s laws of competition foster secrecy.
Online advertising is, however, contradictory. On average, users only click 
on one out of one thousand advertisements.16 And even then, it is uncertain if 
they really stay on a linked page and if they buy something there. The effects of 
targeted online advertising may therefore be overstated. Because of the fetish-
istic idea that algorithms and Big Data allow perfect interest-based targeting, 
advertisers gain the impression that they can sell commodities via social media. 
If it turns out that this is a misconception, then targeted advertising may lose 
credibility and social media capitalism’s financial bubble may burst and cause 
the next dot-com crisis.
2.2 Advertising
Figure 6.1 shows statistics about the development of the distribution of global 
advertising spending.
The data shows that the share of online advertising has increased from 17.9% 
to 28.3% in the years from 2010 until 2015. During the same time, news paper 
advertising revenue has dropped significantly and its share has decreased from 
20.5% to 14.8%. Online advertising has globally become the second most 
Fig. 6.1: The development of global ad spending’s distribution.17
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important form of advertising after television advertising. Especially in times 
of crisis, online advertising seems to appear to advertisers as the more secure 
option because it is individualised through extensive surveillance of online 
behaviour and algorithmically targeted. Traditional news journalism is in a 
crisis of a commercial character, notably in relation to its advertising revenues.
Google, Facebook and Twitter are not just sources of news and informa-
tion. These websites are also among the world’s largest advertising agencies. 
They are in the business of selling targeted ad space as a commodity and 
derive their revenues almost exclusively from targeted advertising.18 Her-
man and Chomsky remarked in an interview about the PM in respect to the 
second filter that Google and Yahoo ‘are heavily dependent on advertising 
revenue.’19 Given their high numbers of users, platforms such as Google and 
Facebook can expect to attract large shares of ad investments seeing that 
companies are interested in reaching a large number of people from their 
targeted audience. Social media advertising allows both broad reach and 
precision targeting.
Herman and Chomsky argue that advertisers prefer to run ads during TV 
programmes that are ‘culturally and politically conservative,’20 i.e. entertain-
ment and spectacle oriented programmes and news and discussion pro-
grammes that have a right-wing, conservative and pro-capitalist bias. The 
effect is that media that focus on entertainment and spectacles tend to attract 
more advertisements, whereas independent media ‘suffer from the political 
Fig. 6.2: Example of a promoted tweet. Data source: twitter.com, accessed on 
11 November 2016.
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discrimination of advertisers.’ On social media, the situation is slightly dif-
ferent, but not necessarily better: on Facebook and Twitter, users can pay to 
promote postings. Facebook, Twitter and Google allow targeted ads. On Twit-
ter, it is also possible to promote trends. Figure 6.2 shows a promoted posting 
from Twitter.
Promoted posts show up on Twitter users’ news feeds, profiles or tweet detail 
pages. Figure 6.3 shows that on Twitter, targeting is not only possible based on 
gender, languages and devices, but also based on search keywords, followers of 
particular users, interests, TV shows, behaviours, and events. Figure 6.4 shows 
details of Twitter’s behavioural targeting feature.
On television, advertisers target particular audiences who watch specific pro-
grammes. In newspapers, they target the typical reading audience. On social 
media, multiple audiences can be targeted at once because there are micro and 
niche publics. This makes the logic of advertising different on social media than 
in traditional media. The overall effect is an online advertising-user-spiral, in 
which more and more advertising revenue shifts from print to digital due to 
the targeting possibilities. The advertising-circulation-spiral was first observed 
in the realm of newspaper advertising,21 but it certainly also contributes to 
the monopolisation of online markets. In 2015, the finance and insurance 
 industry, followed by the retail industry, comprised the largest share of ad 
 spending on Google. Amazon was the largest advertiser with investments of 
US$ 157 million.22 In 2013, Samsung was with US$ 100 million the biggest 
advertiser on Facebook.23
FPO
Fig. 6.3: Targeting of ads on Twitter.
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The discussion shows that online advertising acts as a filter in several ways: 
(i) It allows large transnational corporations with large ad budgets to confront 
a large targeted audience with content and ads; (ii) Regular content becomes 
ever more difficult to discern from advertising. There is no clear temporal or 
spatial differentiation. Corporations are interested in native online advertising 
and branded online content as it allows them to deceive users and to almost act 
like news media, effectively undermining the independence of reporting. Com-
panies can increase reach via social media; (iii) The online advertising-user-spiral 
increases social media’s power in advertising and news-making and advances 
monopoly tendencies in the online economy; (iv) An important fourth dimen-
sion that needs to be added which Herman and Chomsky do not discuss is that 
advertising means exploitation of audience labour.24 On social media, users’ digi-
tal labour produces a data commodity and is exploited by the platforms for sell-
ing targeted ad spaces.25
2.3 Sourcing
Colin Sparks argues for an extension and refining of the PM: 
The central departure from the classical formulations of the PM is 
that, in place of the stress it gives to the uniformity of the media, we 
now expect to find diversity. The divided nature of the capitalist class, 
the presence of powerful critical currents which find legitimate public 
expression in a capitalist democracy, the need to address the concerns 
Fig. 6.4: Behavioural targeting on Twitter.
FPO
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of a mass audience, political differentiation as a marketing strategy, all 
point to the necessity for any viable media system to include a range of 
different opinions. […] Of course, it is entirely true that the range of dis-
senting voices is carefully controlled. There tends to be a preponderance 
of elite voices, and those in turn will tend to reflect the views of power-
ful groups in economics and politics. […] Sometimes, however, radical 
individuals do get regular exposure in the media […] partly at least for 
the good business reason that it fits the marketing strategy of particular 
media to attract the substantial number of radical individuals towards 
their niche in the market.26
Des Freedman27 discusses the example of the British tabloid the Daily  Mirror 
that during the 2003 Iraq war substituted its usual focus on celebrities and 
scandals with an anti-war campaign. The example shows that also mainstream 
media, especially in situations of crisis, can take alternative positions, and that 
such exceptions matter. Freedman argues for giving attention to ‘both structure 
and agency, contradiction and action, consensus and conflict.’28 Herman and 
Chomsky acknowledged the possibility for diversity: ‘The mass media are not a 
solid monolith on all issues.’29
Sourcing as a filter is different online than in broadcasting because the inter-
net has a decentralised and global architecture. Manuel Castells30 argues that 
the internet allows mass-self-communication, which means that a larger num-
ber of producers online as compared to the broadcast model can reach a larger 
audience. The basic difference between computer networks and broadcasting 
is that the network is a universal machine, at once a technology or production, 
distribution and consumption. Combined with its global reach and significant 
bandwidth rates, this allows the phenomenon of user-generated content. User-
generated content does however not automatically imply political plurality and 
diversity. The key question about communication power shifts from the control 
of production towards the control of attention and visibility. Attention and vis-
ibility, however, also need to be produced and are thus aspects of production. 
Gaining online attention and visibility requires money, time and labour-force. 
Everyone can in principle produce content online, but in a capitalist society 
only a minority attracts online visibility and attention.31
A first online asymmetry concerns the fact that ‘the traditional media them-
selves have occupied the internet and are dominant news providers there; […] 
they have the resources and pre-existing audiences to give them a huge advan-
tage over alternative media potential rivals.’32 In November 2016, the most 
popular online news site was CNN.com. While CNN was on 11 November, 
2016, the 72nd most accessed website in the world, the independent news sites 
alternet.org and democracynow.org were only ranked in positions 5,967 and 
9,493 respectively on the list of the world’s most accessed websites.33 Notwith-
standing, alternative online media certainly attract significant audiences. At the 
same time, they tend to face resource problems because they are not organised 
as capitalist businesses.
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Second, money is an important factor in attaining online visibility and attention. 
It is possible to boost one’s online attention by buying likes, followers, re-tweets, 
etc. Figure 6.5 shows an example of a company that sells Facebook followers. Users 
with a budget to spend can buy more visibility online. If your number of followers 
is large enough, then it is also more likely that others start following you because 
there are reputational hierarchies and the artificially inflated number of likes, re-
tweets and followers is a form of psychological impression management.
Third, there are reputational inequalities. Social media attention is highly 
stratified. A small elite group of users dominates online visibility and  attention.34 
As an example, table 6.1 shows the Facebook pages that have the largest  number 
of fans.
The data indicate that corporations and entertainment dominate social media 
attention. News and information therefore tend to focus on popular topics. 
Fig. 6.5: An example for online attention as commodity. Data source: http://
www.followersandlikes4u.com.
Rank FB Page Number of Fans Type
1 Facebook for Every iPhone 500 300 326 App
2 Facebook 174 559 960 Corporation
3 Cristiano Ronaldo 117 252 364 Footballer 
4 Shakira 104 416 196 Musician
5 Vin Diesel 100 378 269 Actor
6 Coca-Cola 99 713 570 Brand, corporation
7 FC Barcelona 94 669 625 Football team
8 Read Madrid C.F. 92 645 690 Football team
9 Eminem 91 308 332 Musician
10 Leo Messi 87 147 610 Footballer
Bernie Sanders 4 653 316 Politician
Karl Marx 1 450 139 Political theorist
Table 6.1: The most popular pages on Facebook. Data source: https://www.
socialbakers.com, http://www.facebook.com, accessed on 12 November, 2016.
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 Politics is less visible and more marginalised. Bernie Sanders and Karl Marx, 
two symbols of left-wing politics, have significantly fewer fans. In an interview, 
 Herman and Chomsky point out this development: ‘[M]uch of the new media on 
the internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics sec-
ondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources 
and outreach and specialize in critical analysis rather than news-making.’35
The tabloidisation of social media is, however, just a tendency, not a deter-
minism or totality. Social movements often use social media because they are 
not adequately represented in the mainstream media. They tend to understand 
how to use online communication as a tool for political organisation well. The 
capitalist online public sphere is not totally, but predominantly, an entertain-
ment sphere, and only to a lesser extent is it a political public sphere.
Fourth, political bots play a role in online political communication. A bot is 
a piece of software code that performs certain online behaviour based on an 
algorithm. Examples are automatic tweets or re-tweets or the posting of images 
and texts from a database at particular times. The problem of bots in politi-
cal communication is that they can appear human-like, can distort attention, 
harass and scare people, etc. They are an expression of the online automation 
of human action, the replacement of humans by machines. There are concrete 
humans who own, control, and programme bots. So, whereas the political bot 
does not have political attitudes, morals and interests, its behaviour is shaped 
by human beings who have particular political interests.
Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley have analysed around 10 million tweets men-
tioning Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump around the time of the third US 
presidential election debate.36 They found that political bots posted 36.1% of the 
pro-Trump tweets and 23.5% of the pro-Clinton tweets. Given that political opin-
ion and sentiment analysis is increasingly conducted on Twitter and with the 
help of Big Data analytics, political bots can manipulate the public perception of 
public opinion. Considering that a certain degree of online politics is automated, 
political attitudes should probably not at all be measured with the help of Big 
Data analytics. Political bots, Big Data analytics and computational social science 
methods can colonise, distort, instrumentalise and manipulate the public sphere.
2.4 Flak/Mediated Lobbying
Herman and Chomsky do not properly explain the name of the fourth dimen-
sion: Flak. This German term stems from military jargon. The Nazis used Flak 
as an abbreviation for Fliegerabwehrkanone. In a comprehensive overview, Joan 
Pedro suggests to speak of ‘countermeasures to discipline the media’37 instead 
of flak. We could also simply speak of mediated lobbying attempts.
Herman and Chomsky define flak the following way: ‘‘‘Flak” refers to nega-
tive responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters, 
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telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, 
and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized 
centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of indi-
viduals.’38 In the digital age, lobbying for certain interests has been extended to 
social media and is no longer simply aimed at centralised media organisations, 
but now aims to directly transmit political messages to as many internet users 
as possible.
At the time of the 2011 Arab Spring and the subsequent Occupy movements, 
there was much euphoria about protest and revolutionary movements’ use 
of social media for public engagement and political organisation.39 After the 
world economic crisis had started in 2008, it seemed like revolution was pos-
sible. The role of social media in revolutions and protests was often overstated. 
Empirical analysis shows that in protests, social media communication tends 
to interact with other forms of political communication, especially face-to-
face-communication.40 Revolutions and protests are not virtual, but take place 
offline and online simultaneously.
Political groups and movements from all parts of the political spectrum uti-
lise the internet and social media for political communication. The example 
of political bots mentioned in the previous section shows that both support-
ers of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton used bots for trying to boost their 
candidate’s popularity. Automated lobbying is a particular form of flak in the 
digital age.
In the early days of the internet, sometimes the impression was conveyed that 
left-wing and green movements such as the Zapatista solidarity campaigns were 
very skilled at utilising the internet for political communication because they 
are grassroots organisations and that far-right groups were very bad at it due 
to their hierarchical leadership ideology. The basic argument was that grass-
roots movements as well as the internet have a flat and decentralised structure 
and therefore are suited for each other. This assumption underestimates the 
internet’s social hierarchies and power structures that are not technically deter-
mined. Today right wing lobbying is a large-scale affair on the internet.
In November 2016, Hillary Clinton had 10.9 million Twitter followers, while 
Donald Trump had 14.6 million. French President François Hollande had 1.78 
million followers, the National Front leader Marine Le Pen 1.18 million. In the 
UK, left-wing Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn had 662k followers, Nigel 
Farage 516k.41 The data indicate that right-wing groups and individuals are at 
least just as active and popular on social media as left-wing activists and groups.
Figure 6.6 shows a typical tweet by Donald Trump. It achieved a high number 
of likes and re-tweets: More than 7,500 likes and 20,000 re-tweets. The example 
shows that right-wing politics today to a significant extent takes place online 
and on social media.
Right-wing lobbying is not limited to established parties and politicians, but is 
to a significant degree carried by right-wing social movements. The alt-right 
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movement is a far-right movement that is predominantly active on the internet. 
It is racist, white supremacist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-feminist, and 
Islamophobic. It uses social media, internet memes, and right-wing sites such 
as Breitbart News. Donald Trump has appointed Breitbart’s executive chair-
man Steve Bannon as his White House chief strategist. The alt-right move-
ment uses hashtags such as #WhiteGenocide, #MAGA (Make America Great 
Again), #ccot (Conservative Christians on Twitter), #tcot (Top Conservative 
on Twitter), #WhiteSupremacist, #AltRight, #AntiWhite, #WhiteLivesMatter, 
#WarOnWhites, #NRx (Neoreaction). The Guardian has reported that Trump 
supporters spread fake news stories and conspiracy theories about Hillary Clin-
ton on social media.42 Empirical research confirms such tendencies.43 As dia-
lectical counter-pole to the fact that there are fake online stories, one must also 
stress that fact-checking organisations that work on professionally revealing 
truths and falsehoods have emerged. They are organisations such as the Inter-
national Fact-Checking Network.
The Norwegian Nazi terrorist Anders Breivik was quite digitally savvy. He 
gathered information online, purchased weapons and bomb equipment online, 
was an online gaming enthusiast (World of Warcraft, Call of Duty) participated 
in far-right discussion fora such as Stormfront, nordisku.nu and document.no, 
Fig. 6.6: A tweet by Donald Trump. Source: twitter.com.
Propaganda 2.0 83
gathered more than 9,000 friends on Facebook, and spread propaganda videos 
with the help of YouTube and Vimeo.44
Even if we do not like it, fascism and right-wing extremism on social media 
are to a significant degree public forms of communication. They constitute 
a reactionary public sphere that is mediated by the internet, social media, 
mobile communication, etc. The point is to create a political climate in soci-
ety that advances democratic and civil public spheres, which is however not 
just an issue that concerns how we communicate. It is also a political task 
that needs to aim at overcoming inequality, discrimination exploitation and 
domination in society. Online fascism is online communication that aims to 
advance creating a fascist society by spreading hatred, prejudices, authori-
tarian populism, friend/enemy propaganda, and fetishist political ideology. 
Right-wing extremism online appropriates certain elements of fascism (e.g. 
hatred against immigrants and refugees, anti-Semitism, anti-socialism, etc.) 
in online speech.
In an interview Herman and Chomsky argued that right-wing media, 
including Fox News, right-wing talk radio and blogs, form ‘a right-wing attack 
machine and echo-chamber.’45 In the current political climate of nationalism, 
racism, xenophobia and elements of fascism, social media is certainly a right-
wing attack machine. It must, however, also be seen that the political left is 
skilled at using social media, which maintains online politics as a contradictory 
space.
2.5 Ideologies
Ideology is a complex term with many meanings that range from individual 
or collective meanings or worldviews to the notion of false consciousness.46 
The advantage of a critical notion of ideology over a general one is that it 
allows normative judgements about how a good society looks like. Her-
man and Chomsky speak of neoliberal ideology,47 Western ideology,48 anti- 
Communist ideology,49 the national-security ideology,50 right-wing ideol-
ogy,51 and the ideology of national security.52 But they never define the term. 
Ideology can in a critical manner be understood as a semiotic process in 
which humans practice the production and spreading of information, mean-
ings, ideas, belief, systems, artefacts, systems, and institutions that justify or 
naturalise domination and exploitation.53 Ideology is the semiotic level of 
domination and exploitation.
In times of crisis, it is highly likely that all sorts of ideologies are expressed 
and challenged in public communication. There are both ideologies of the 
internet and ideologies on the internet. Ideologies of the internet are a form of 
public communication that fetishises instrumental control of online communi-
cation. It is instrumental communication about instrumental communications, 
a meta-form of communication that justifies and defends the application of 
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instrumental reason to the internet. Neoliberal ideologies of the internet pre-
sent the online world as a frontier for investments that create a better world. 
They leave out questions of inequality, digital labour, class and exploitation. An 
example is that Google describes itself as showing that ‘democracy on the web 
works,’ reducing democracy and participation to the issue that ‘Google search 
works because it relies on the millions of individuals posting links.’ Questions 
relating to the secrecy of Google’s search algorithm, its monopoly power in 
the search market, users and employees’ lack of control of its means, etc. are 
not asked. State ideologies of the internet justify state surveillance, censorship 
and control of the internet and leave out questions of privacy and freedom of 
speech.
Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May said that without advanced surveil-
lance capacities and technologies, ‘we run the risk that murderers will not be 
caught, terrorist plots will go undetected, drug traffickers will go unchallenged, 
child abusers will not be stopped, and slave drivers will continue their appall-
ing trade in human beings.’54 Compare this quote to Donald Trump’s tweet 
in figure 6.6. Both present society as being full of illegal immigrants, crimi-
nals, drugs, terrorism, child abuse, slavery, and other dangers. The ideological 
trick is to first create the impression of ubiquitous danger and to then call for 
quick fixes by calling for deporting or locking up or monitoring scapegoats, 
enhancing the use of surveillance technologies, etc. The problem is that there 
is no technological fix to political and socio-economic problems. Categorical 
suspicion turns the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt so 
that certain humans are automatically considered terrorists and criminal until 
proven innocent.
Ideology on the internet is the phenomenon of fascism, racism, right-wing 
extremism, nationalism, classism, sexism, anti-Semitism, etc. online. Given 
that right-wing ideology is flourishing in many societies, it is also exceed-
ingly present online and on social media. Ideology on the internet tends to 
make use of visual means and tabloidisation (simplification, using few words, 
emotionalisation, scandalisation, polarisation, banalisation, manipulation, 
fabrication, etc.). User-generated ideology is the phenomenon that ideology 
production is no longer confined to professional ideologues, but has become 
possible on the level of everyday life. Ideologies are sensational, populist, 
simplistic, emotional, and speak directly to particular subjects. Because of 
these features, online ideology tends to attract a lot of attention. Algorithms 
reward those who gain significant levels of attention by helping to further 
amplifying them. Therefore, there is a tendency of algorithmic amplification 
of online ideologies.
The 2016 Austrian presidential election saw a run-off between far-right 
 candidate Norbert Hofer representing the Freedom Party of Austria and the 
Green Party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Hofer’s supporters  mobilised 
especially on Facebook, where they often spread violent threats against Van 
der Bellen, refugees, immigrants, and others. An analysis of such  comments 
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showed that the important elements of political communication were: 
(1) authoritarian populism guided by the leadership principle, (2) nationalism, 
(3) the friend/enemy scheme, and (4) militancy and violent threats.55
Herman remarks that the ‘fifth filter – anti-communist ideology – is pos-
sibly weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union and global socialism.’ The 
situation has again changed since with various Occupy movements, Jeremy 
Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Syriza, Podemos, etc., once again putting the idea of 
socialism on the political agenda. We see both liberal and right-wing main-
stream media in Britain waging an ideological war against such people and 
movements. As an example, a study of journalistic representations of Jeremy 
Corbyn found that in 89% of 812 analysed news stories, Corbyn’s views were 
absent, distorted or challenged. Forty-three per cent of all stories ridiculed or 
personally attacked Corbyn. The study concludes that ‘the degree of viciousness 
and antagonism with which the majority of the British newspapers have treated 
Corbyn is deemed to be highly problematic from a democratic perspective.’56 
Another study showed how anti-socialist ideology directed against Corbyn also 
spread on Twitter and was organised as a red scare 2.0.57 ‘In the analysed data-
set, users for example argued that because of being left-wing, Corbyn is loony, 
an extremist and dangerous (compressed general ideology), is a friend of ter-
rorists, radicals and dictators and thereby supports Britain’s enemies (foreign 
policy discourse topic), wants to create a state-controlled economy that will 
result in poverty and deprivation for all (command economy-discourse topic), 
wants to create a totalitarian state like Stalin or Mao did (authoritarian and 
totalitarian politics discourse politics), and is an old, badly dressed, vegetar-
ian, bike-riding loony-left hippie with a beard (culture and lifestyle discourse 
topic). The foreign policy, command economy, and lifestyle-discourse topics 
were also prominently featured in the right-wing media. User-generated ideol-
ogy on Twitter in these cases is closely related to ideologies spread by the mass 
media. It copies the latter’s contents by linking to articles, using certain head-
lines or biased phrases such as ‘the Loony Left’ and at the same time feeds these 
media by showing that there is an interest in and positive response to stories 
that scapegoat the Left.’58
But social media and society are not exclusive terrains of the right. There is 
always the potential for contestation. The same study showed that left-wing 
activists can challenge ideology by characterising those attacked in positive 
terms, using satire, humour, sarcasm, provide links and arguments showing 
the world’s complexity and contradictions, argumentative dialectical reversals. 
Such strategies tend to be smart, complex, and dialectical.
3. Assessment
Table 6.2 summarises the discussion of the online propaganda model.
On the one hand it seems like the propaganda model is also relevant in 
the online world because we continue to live in a society shaped by class 
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and domination. On the other hand, the model also needs to be adapted 
and extended because of particular features of digital capitalism and digital 
media.
Above we have discussed the role of algorithms that partly automate propa-
ganda in the form of intransparent search and ranking algorithms as well as 
political blogs. Native advertising and branded content enhance the power of 
corporations and enable them to displace journalism’s autonomy and to present 
product propaganda as editorial content. A further differentiation that must be 
taken into account is that in computer networks and on networked computers, 
the production, diffusion and consumption of information converges. Audi-
ences become users and prosumers (productive consumers). This model is dif-
ferent from the broadcast model of communication. Power asymmetries are, 
however, not automatically sublated, but further complicated. Another impor-
Dimension Internet
Size, Ownership, 
Profit Orientation
Concentrated social media markets, concentrated  ownership, 
intransparent and secret algorithms that determine the 
 priorities of how results and news are presented
Advertising Transnational corporations are able to confront users with 
targeted ads and content;
Native online advertising and branded online content threaten 
news-media’s-independence;
The online advertising-user-spiral increases social media’s 
power in advertising and as news media and advances 
 monopoly tendencies in the online economy;
On social media, users’ digital labour produces a data 
 commodity and is exploited by the platforms in order to sell 
targeted ad spaces
Sourcing Traditional news organisations are powerful actors in online 
news;
Online attention as commodity manipulates political 
 communication;
Corporations and entertainment dominate social media 
 attention;
Political bots distort the political public sphere
Flak, Mediated 
Lobbying
Bots and other tools for automated lobbying;
Social media use by politicians, parties, movements;
Online hate speech
Ideologies Ideologies of the internet;
Ideologies on the internet and user-generated ideologies;
Algorithmic amplification of online ideologies
Table 6.2: The Online Propaganda Model (PM).
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tant aspect is that we should always think of potentials for resistance and study 
actual oppositional developments.
I find the PM a useful model for the analysis of power structures in media 
systems, as this chapter demonstrates. But we also need a further refinement 
and extension that brings us beyond the PM and takes critiques of capitalism, 
anti-democratic elements of state power, acceleration, etc. into account when 
analysing media systems. There is a range of topics, such as the exploitation of 
labour and surveillance, that relates to (digital) media that need to be critically 
analysed.59 Wherever there are communications systems in capitalism, there 
are also workers. And a specific share of them is exploited in class relations. 
In the production of digital media, there is an international division of digital 
labour in which we find diverse workers, such as African slave-miners, Chi-
nese hardware-assemblers working at Foxconn, highly paid and highly stressed 
software engineers, precarious clickworkers and call centre agents, online free-
lancers, precarious creative workers, social media user-workers, etc.60 Edward 
Snowden unveiled the existence of a surveillance-industrial internet complex, 
through which secret services bulk-monitor users’ online activities, which has 
resulted in concerns about the violation of basic rights. Social media are accel-
erated, high-speed media. Nobody can read all tweets posted about an impor-
tant topic. Tweets and online information flow at such a speed that there is no 
time for real debate and controversy. Postings tend to be short, entertaining, 
and superficial. Online brevity provokes superficiality and the negation of the 
world’s complexity. Online communication tends to take place in fragmented 
and isolated publics, filter bubbles, and echo chambers that lack constructive 
controversy.
All of these problems are not problems of propaganda but of power in gen-
eral. We therefore need a model of power on social media. It needs to stress 
various dimensions, conflicts, and lines of potential struggle. For doing so, we 
also need a model of society. Society is the totality of communicative, social 
relations that take place in the context of dialectics of structure and agency. 
An understanding commonly used in sociology is that society and all social 
systems have three dimensions: the economy, politics, and culture. These are 
realms for the production of use-values (economy), collective decisions (poli-
tics), and meanings (culture). Any particular social system has an economic, a 
political and a cultural dimension. One of these dimensions may be dominant, 
which situates this social system in a particular subsystem of society. Table 6.3 
shows the role of power structures in society in general and modern society in 
particular.
The internet and social media platforms are social systems. Power should there-
fore be analysed in the context of the economic, political and cultural  dimensions. 
Modern society has a capitalist economy that is based on the  accumulation 
of monetary capital. It is, however, according to Pierre Bourdieu, also based 
on the accumulation of political (influence) and cultural power ( reputation). 
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Accumulation of power is the defining feature of modern society that there-
fore not only has a capitalist economy but also is a capitalist society. Table 2 
therefore also shows the forms that power take on in capitalist society.
Table 6.4 shows a theoretical model of power in digital capitalism.
As mentioned above, this model is based on a theoretical distinction between 
three realms of society: the economy, politics, and culture.62 It is also grounded 
in the philosophical dialectic of the subject and the object that contains three 
dimensions: human subjects, inter-subjective processes, and objective struc-
tures/social systems. Power in class societies is contradictory. It is organised 
in the form of economic, political and cultural contradiction. Which pole is 
more powerful under particular conditions is not pre-determined. Those who 
control resources normally tend to have power advantages. Given that there are 
structural contradictions, there is always the potential for actual social strug-
gles. These potentials are, however, not automatically realised.
Table 6.4 shows a power structure model for digital society that could also be 
more generalised for modern society as a whole, for class societies, etc. Herman 
and Chomsky’s PM covers some aspects of the power structure model, espe-
cially those that focus on politics, economy, the system, and dominant subject 
groups.
This chapter has shown that the PM remains relevant for the critical study of 
the internet, social media, and Big Data. Given the dialectical and historical 
character of both communications and society, we need to think of subjects, 
processes, objects, contradictions, the economy, politics, and culture, as well as 
the interaction of these dimensions, when analysing power in class societies.
Dimension of 
society
Definition of power Structures of power in modern 
society
Economy Control of use-values and 
resources that are produced, 
distributed and consumed. 
Monetary capital: Control of 
money and capital.
Politics Influence on collective decisions 
that determine aspects of the 
lives of humans in certain com-
munities and social systems.
Influence: Control of 
 governments, bureaucratic 
state institutions, parliament, 
military, police, parties, lobby 
groups, civil society groups, etc.
Culture Definition of moral values and 
meanings that shape what is 
considered as important, reputa-
ble and worthy in society.
Reputation: Control of 
 structures that define moral 
values and meanings in society 
(e.g. universities, religious 
groups, intellectual circles, 
opinion-making groups, etc.).
Table 6.3: Three forms of power.61
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CHAPTER 7
System Security: A Missing Filter for the 
Propaganda Model?
Daniel Broudy and Miyume Tanji
7.1 Introduction
In the present post-9/11 dispensation, the world’s so-called indispensable nation1 
has managed, to a great extent, to dispense with liberty in the interest of secu-
rity.2 As with the spread of neoliberal ideology, the spreading assault on civil lib-
erties appears to be a global phenomenon. But, what can be said of societies and 
their systems of public awareness and mass surveillance that seek to reinforce 
and normalise the destruction of these cherished liberties? We hypothesise from 
our close studies of the public discourse that powerful forms of state and corpo-
rate propaganda play integral parts in the political theatre conditioning citizens 
to tolerate the revolting decomposing corpse of liberty. For insights on how this 
decay appears today we turn to a postulated model of propaganda to help us 
apprehend what it can tell us about resistance to this contemporary stagecraft.
While gaining currency as a research tool, the ‘Propaganda Model’ (PM 
hereafter) set out by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media has, over the past three 
decades, helped throw a critical light on elite control and management of 
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the public discourse. Since the book first appeared in 1988, leaders in post- 
industrial societies have successfully mobilised support through technologi-
cal advances in cybernetic communications. Efforts to control public per-
ception and awareness have also been greatly enhanced through mass media 
consolidation3 and have, since 9/11, advanced to new levels of influence. 
In this chapter, we highlight the need for an additional filter in response to 
recent re-configurations of political and corporate power and emerging sys-
tems of control over information and public debate.
The original PM featured five conceptual ‘filters’ which have been useful 
in scholarship theorizing, exposing, and analysing the complex connections 
among society’s dominant institutions and non-coercive methods used to 
propagandise citizens and to control public awareness.4 As an effective filter 
both permits and impedes the flow of whatever materials seek to pass through 
it, they play a crucial role in the creation of clean fuel fit for an engine’s effi-
cient use. Filters screen harmful debris that might hamper the (re)production 
of power. The motors of heavy industry, for example, run as a result of these 
functions, so, from a maintainer’s perspective, debris must be filtered out when 
it threatens to infect and compromise the overall system. Corporate media and 
ideological institutions that strategise and run the gathering, analysis, and dis-
semination of news information employ similar means of filtering out poten-
tially dangerous debris in ideas, perspectives, and voices.
In an effort to explain mainstream media responses to voices such as Edward 
Snowden’s and other ‘leakers’ over the past decade as well as revelations regard-
ing National Security Agency (NSA) counter-intelligence activities, this chap-
ter engages with the question of how the general public is ‘driven from the 
arena of political debate’5 and conditioned to support political elites promulgat-
ing policies claiming to be essential for state security and public safety. While 
these mechanisms of cultural conditioning comprise interconnected networks 
of print and digital media, they also represent and reflect interlocking govern-
ment and corporate interests that span international boundaries. We suggest 
that ‘state security’ can now be read as code for ‘system security’, which is the 
protection of a global capitalist system through digital media control mecha-
nisms. We, thus, wonder to what extent elite responses to ‘security leaks’ can 
explain the high value placed upon secrecy as a purported guarantee for sys-
tem security and stability of the status quo. While contemporary media perfor-
mance suggests that a System Security Filter (SSF hereafter) has emerged as a 
safeguard for this post-9/11 era of global capitalism, we propose that this filter 
be considered as a component of the PM’s conceptual framework.
7.2 The Elite ‘System’
As the SSF is meant to be a metaphorical filter, we detect a ‘System’ that uti-
lises the SSF for its own interest. Systems are complex collections of interacting, 
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interrelated, and interdependent parts (or people) forming a largely organised 
whole. Whereas horsepower generated from systems of internal combustion, 
for example, rely upon unique sets of pistons, cams, and interlocking gears and 
pulleys, political power may be generated from unique sets of interdependent 
persons interacting in an interlocking self-interested whole. News in the corpo-
rate media constitutes such pulleys and gears, interacting with other essential 
components that (re)generate the political power of wealthy individuals, larger 
industries and the state, which we call the elite ‘System.’
While governments are more visible within the public sphere, Chomsky con-
tends, the state is relatively invisible but more stable and comprised of institu-
tions that routinely establish the actual conditions for public policy, including 
the media. The state constitutes the ‘actual nexus of decision-making power ... 
including investment and political decisions, setting the framework within 
which the public policy can be discussed and determined,’ whereas government 
consists of ‘whatever groups happen to control the political system, one com-
ponent of the state system, at a particular moment.’6
In the United States, private interests appear to the electorate to occupy one 
or both political parties that have long dominated the public discourse.7 Con-
cerning the Republican system of governance, for example, Ian Haney López 
observes, that, ‘They’re giving over control of the regulatory state to the cor-
porations, they say they want to shrink the Federal deficit, but in fact they’re 
spending massive amounts of money either on tax cuts for the really rich or 
in big subsidies that go to corporations.’8 The public’s voice has been filtered 
out and replaced by the ‘corporate managers [who] can in effect buy elections 
directly.’9 Beyond American party politics, the System, beholden to the impera-
tives of transnational big business, assumes a global standing, next to the state 
and government. In its turn, mass media have, through the government’s gift 
of deregulation, largely seized power over the public discourse to filter out dis-
senting views that might challenge or defy elite interests.
While the precise meanings of the term ‘elite’ are not so easy to pin down, 
Raymond Williams provides some background – observing that ‘elite’, from 
Old French, was used originally to describe someone elected but was, in time, 
extended from those formally chosen in the social process to those specially 
selected by God for some particular purpose. Today’s associated meanings of 
the elite in society are wealth, power, position, authority, and control. Williams’ 
final thought on the term is particularly relevant today: ‘the forgotten etymo-
logical association between elite and elected has a certain wry interest.’10
Herman and Chomsky describe the System as a ‘guided market system’11 
within which the guidance is ‘provided by the government [the elected elite], 
the leaders of the corporate community, the top media owners and execu-
tives, and the assorted individuals and groups’ who are assigned or allowed to 
assume positions that enable them to handle the levers of power. Globalization 
processes comprise part of the ‘guided market system’ in today’s transnational 
political economy.
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Reflecting in 1928 on the democratizing influence of the steam engine, the 
press, and public school to shift power from the aristocracy to the masses, 
Edward Bernays observed that even the bourgeoisie came to fear the emerging 
might of the public. As a response to this progressive downward diffusion of 
social and economic influence, the elite minority found an effective counter-
weight in prevailing techniques of mass persuasion made possible by modern 
psychoanalysis to better understand and manage (or manipulate) the public 
mind. ‘Modern propaganda,’ observed Bernays, ‘is a consistent, enduring effort 
to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, 
idea, or group.’12 This socializing enterprise with its underlying aims from the 
early twentieth century persist in many contemporary capitalist democracies: 
manufacture, through mass media, public consent to political, corporate, and 
military strategies profiting the centres of elite power and wealth.
Critiquing the elite perspective on the market guided system, Chomsky dis-
tils some of the results of a 1975 Trilateral Commission study, aptly titled The 
Crisis of Democracy, that urged more ‘moderation in Democracy’13 to curb 
excesses in social freedoms exercised during America’s 1960s protest move-
ments. As regards the Commission’s assessment of American democracy dur-
ing this ‘counter-cultural’ period, Chomsky reinterprets and casts some of its 
central propositions in plain language: ‘the general public must be reduced to 
its traditional apathy and obedience, and driven from the arena of political 
debate, if democracy is to survive.’14
Pure democracy, from the vantage point of the elite class, was/is thought 
to be an unwieldy and destructive force for achieving and maintaining civil 
order and control.15 As witnessed through the 1960s, direct democratic action 
emboldened by a widespread belief in the power of utilitarian democracy16 had 
come to profoundly alter institutionalised systems of racial and gender oppres-
sion. Indeed, ‘shifts in public opinion dramatically [illustrate] how the vitality 
of democracy in the 1960s (as manifested in increased political participation) 
produced problems for the governability of democracy in the 1970s (as mani-
fested in the decreased public confidence in government).’17
7.3 Managing Information
Standing at odds with these elite interests are recent citizen movements initi-
ated by the likes of Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Julian Assange 
who have sought to expose and challenge privileged exploits and abuses of 
power. Their disruptions to official counter-intelligence policy have been called 
‘illegal’ and read as unacceptable interpretations of patriotism. However illegal 
they may have been, it was also the structure of exploitation that was exposed – 
the System that exploits the public’s faith that civic participation in democratic 
actions (voting, petitioning, etc.) can bend elite power to the will of the people. 
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The Snowden, Manning, and Assange cases have shown that enduring confi-
dence in the effectiveness of American-styled democracy is a false assurance.
US government agents engaged in the work of gathering and analysing coun-
ter-intelligence data on American citizens must have construed Snowden’s 2013 
interview with Glenn Greenwald as a critical ‘service disruption’ to the System. 
A key indicator of this perception appeared in the propaganda disseminated by 
those in power that portrayed Snowden (and earlier Manning) as grave dangers 
to national security. As such, their reputations as patriotic citizens necessitated 
a kind of assassination. It was vital that the positive qualities they had enjoyed 
as servants of the state be ‘filtered out’ immediately in the interests of maintain-
ing System Security.
With the publication of Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning’s classified disclo-
sures to WikiLeaks, a significant moment in history unfolded on 25 July 2010, 
‘the beginning,’ notes Denver Nicks, ‘of the information age exploding upon 
itself.’18 Following the publication of ‘Collateral Murder’19 and other later erup-
tions of raw news about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and American diplo-
macy more broadly, P.J. Crowley, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs, observed that the leaks, ‘literally touched on just about every relationship 
the United States [has] had with every other government around the world.’20
Acquitted on the charge of aiding the enemy, Manning revealed to the public 
rather alarming details long concealed concerning civilian casualties during the 
war as well as evidence already known to US authorities that the Maliki govern-
ment was torturing its political opponents, and US officials did nothing to stop 
it. These revelations represent a significant shock to the System as concealed 
truths concerning system-wide abuses came to light. Indeed, despite Manning’s 
prosecution, confinement, early clemency, and continued castigation,21 the sig-
nals communicated in Executive Orders, and President Obama’s own insistence 
on the value of rules and laws at the time, must have offered, at least, some hope 
to those in positions to do so to call public attention to state breaches of law.
In no case shall information be classified … in order to: conceal vio-
lations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent embarrass-
ment to a person, organization, or agency … or prevent or delay the 
release of information that does not require protection in the interest of 
the national security.22
Subsequent news stories featured a range of unambiguous declarations about 
Manning, his character, his motives, and the conjectured damage that his leaks 
had created. Right-wing commentators pronounced Manning guilty ‘of trea-
son’ and that ‘anything less than an execution [would be] too kind a penalty.’23 
According to Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly, ‘the Sleaze ball … Julian Assange’ who 
runs ‘this despicable website’ [where Manning’s disclosures appeared] is ‘bent 
on damaging America.’24 Neither did the left-wing leaders hold back. Presi-
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dent Obama proclaimed: ‘We’re a nation of laws. We don’t individually make 
our own decisions about how laws operate,’ and concluded, ‘[Manning] broke 
the law.’25
More recently, Edward Snowden’s 9 June 2013 interview with The Guardian’s 
Glenn Greenwald posed yet another significant shock to the System, character-
istic of the sort of debris routinely ‘filtered out’ of power structures. Snowden 
and the stories he had told posed an almost immediate danger to the established 
order by exposing to the public rather serious systemic impurities which, in turn, 
immediately made Snowden himself both politically and ideologically toxic.
Nevertheless, the very breadth and depth of today’s counter-intelligence sys-
tem and the conceptualization of it were scarcely fathomed by the broader pop-
ulace, and this pervasive societal ignorance is indicative of hegemonic domina-
tion. As in the case of Manning, dominance is demonstrated in the methods 
used by agents of social power to silence any threats to the established order, 
such as character assassination, or literal assassination (i.e. ‘I can’t wait to write 
a defense of the drone strike that takes out Julian Assange,’26 or ‘Can’t we just 
drone strike this guy?’)27
Among the epithets used to describe Snowden, ‘traitor,’28 ‘criminal,’29 ‘defec-
tor,’30 and ‘thief ’31 appear to have largely supplanted ‘whistleblower,’ ‘leaker,’ and 
‘dissident.’ John Bolton, then Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute 
suggested lynching as he observed that Snowden, ‘committed treason, he ought 
to be convicted of that, and then swing from a tall oak tree.’32
7.4 Controlling the Public Debate
Greenwald’s interview with Snowden did more than verify what many Ameri-
cans had already tacitly sensed about their own government in this post-
PATRIOT Act era: the government routinely spies on its own citizens with 
impunity. Indeed, to those aware of the lessons of history, recent news of the 
NSA’s PRISM33 program was hardly surprising as the past half-century reveals 
a range of government efforts to tap into the lives of its citizens. Operation 
SHAMROCK (1945–1975), Project MINARET (1967–1973),34 COINTELPRO 
(1956–1971),35 Main Core (1980s-present),36 STELLARWIND (2001–2011)37 
and ECHELON (1966-present)38 all reveal, in part, the extent to which elite 
power in a ‘free’ society moves to assert with impunity its sweeping privileges.
With increased uses of personal electronic devices to communicate mes-
sages across the globe have come increased beliefs in the internet to equalise 
power between the private citizen and the corporate person. The public at large, 
thus, appears possessed by a mostly uncritical trust in its relative power and 
autonomy to access and direct the forces of digital communication in ways that 
temper traditional forms of elite control over discourse.
Yet, observes Edward Herman, there is ‘no evidence to support this view,’ 
that the opposite, in fact, could be argued. These new and more powerful tech-
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nologies now ‘permit media firms to shrink staff even as they achieve greater 
outputs, and they make possible global distribution systems that reduce the 
number of media entities.’39 The digital nature of information and the near-
real-time production of news stories disseminated in text, signs, symbols, and 
videos enable ‘elite domination of [mass] media and the marginalization of dis-
sidents’40 with the temerity to alert the public to its hidden flaws.
Beyond ‘corporate media consolidation’41 in the private domain lay power 
consolidation and joint coordination in the public. In San Francisco, for exam-
ple, Mark Klein, a telecommunications expert formerly with AT&T for over 
twenty-two years, testified in a class action suit filed in June 2006 that he was 
required as part of his job to maintain a ‘splitter’ that effectively shares all 
AT&T communications data traffic with the NSA. He also ‘learned that other 
such [splitters] were being installed in other cities, including Seattle, San Jose, 
Los Angeles, and San Diego.’42 Freedom rights advocates at the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation point out that, ‘AT&T’s deployment of NSA-controlled surveil-
lance capability apparently involves considerably more locations than would be 
required to catch only international traffic.’43 These sorts of coordination efforts 
have emerged from presidential decrees which, in recent years, are ‘lawlessly 
bypassing Congress … and gutting privacy protections.’44
In accordance with the ‘Assignment of National Security and Emergency Pre-
paredness Communications Functions’ – an Executive Order defining justifica-
tion for an Executive internet ‘kill switch’ – the System is also part of ‘ … a joint 
industry-Government center … capable of assisting in the initiation, coordi-
nation, restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP communications services or 
facilities under all conditions of emerging threats, crisis, or emergency.’45 The 
euphemistic title of this Order, whose enforcement is free from judicial review, 
reflects corresponding efforts in corporate media to enhance their dominance 
over the public’s free speech rights.
In demonstrating on CBS’s Face the Nation an inability (or unwillingness) to 
acknowledge already-existing abuses of power, Senator Dianne Feinstein obfus-
cated the NSA’s activities, since Snowden’s disclosures, by arguing that, ‘[she has] 
seen no abuse by these agencies, nor ... any claim ... made in any way shape or 
form that this (power) was abused.’46 In referencing Glenn Greenwald’s sugges-
tion about why Snowden may have fled, Bob Schieffer, host of Face the Nation, 
couched his query in his own speculation about Snowden’s motives: ‘This (leak) 
seems to me to go beyond your basic whistle-blower case.’47 Feinstein agreed and 
re-asserted her position that Snowden is not, ‘a whistle-blower ... [that] he has 
taken an oath (of secrecy)’ and that ‘if [he] can’t keep the oath, [he ought to] get 
out (of the NSA) and then do something about it in a legal way.’48
The ironies, absurd as they appear on the surface, are scarcely inescapable, 
as Senator Feinstein’s calls for legal challenges come from the lawmaker herself 
who, at the same time, holds the position of Chair of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. Within this medium of corporate discourse, the tight bounda-
ries drawn around a discussion of Snowden’s actions by two powerful public 
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personalities, as well as the labels used to define Snowden himself, illustrate 
a level of hegemonic control over public debate. Viewers of Face the Nation 
witness an unfolding narrative restricted to a discursive framework of law 
within which legislative leaders are free to condemn anyone who questions 
or uncovers System abuses while, at the same time, absolving themselves of 
responsibility.
When asked to put into perspective and make sense of the present issues of 
intelligence breaches, Senator Feinstein responded that, ‘What this is all about 
is the nation’s security.’49 The ‘nation’ referenced here is part of the larger global 
System, or world order. In the words of Herbert Schiller, the System is built 
upon and employs an informational infrastructure that ‘produces meaning and 
awareness,’ and has a strong hand in controlling the key definitions, ‘images, 
and messages of the prevailing social order.’50 The internet represents a key 
component of that infrastructure.
7.5 Protecting the System
Systems, as we have shown, are vulnerable to attack and, so, require powerful 
mechanisms of protection. Safeguarding today’s System demands both the rou-
tine maintenance of compliant actors working within as well as accommodat-
ing media without, which can effectively educate the masses by reflecting the 
policies of established power.
Protections for this particular System dominating US political power and its 
interests in the globalised market economy today are peculiar to the present 
Information Age. Public acquiescence, central to maintaining social control, is 
reinforced more explicitly within the System where well-paid participants, such 
as Manning and Snowden, signal their willingness to comply (through signed 
non-disclosure agreements) with the demands of secrecy in the interest of 
maintaining System Security. Indeed, the language of the intelligence appara-
tus serves as an unequivocal reminder that security trumps all other concerns, 
legal or illegal.51 In the domain of intelligence gathering, for example, those 
who work within this System understand and accept at least one guiding prin-
ciple underlying the successful protection of sensitive information: one must 
have a ‘need to know’ in order to be ‘read on’ (i.e. gain access) to the informa-
tion that one works with.52
As such, this aspect of the System is certainly not a democracy: that partici-
pants are not free to speak of its inner-workings but most forgo some of the 
rights of citizenship even as national intelligence-gathering practices plainly 
infringe upon the constitutional rights of the larger nation. The Manning and 
Snowden cases (and others that have preceded and will likely follow) illustrate 
a strange paradox: access to highly sensitive secrets confers a kind of power that 
can be self-destructive. When secrets conflict with ethics, the resulting cogni-
tive dissonance can compromise notions of unquestioned obedience. Yet, the 
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expectations to maintain unswerving compliance remain. Widespread societal 
submission to the dictates of the System can confer upon the public an abiding 
sense of security and peace of mind. It suggests, also, that all is well and that the 
elite, as usual, have things under control. This kind of necessary conformity to 
the status quo, Chomsky observes, is well reflected in the media we consume: 
‘The United States is unusual among the industrial democracies in the rigidity 
of the system of ideological control – “indoctrination” we might say – exercised 
through the mass media.’53
The filters of protection are generally comprised of privately owned, pub-
licly traded, organizations oriented toward rational market-driven efficiencies 
and the processing of digital information – the concepts, ideas, and defini-
tions that form the ‘raw materials of news’54 fit to print. One can observe the 
mechanisms of protection that sustain the System embedded in the doctrine of 
arcanae imperii (secrets of the empire). These are reflected in the words, signs, 
symbols, and actions of right-minded actors at work in various leading institu-
tions. Sheldon Wolin commented on the latest processes of wiretapping, secret 
surveillance, and extreme interrogation (torture) as an apparent aim to ‘extend 
the privileged secrecy of foreign policy to domestic affairs.’55 Such activities 
bespeak a kind of paranoia on the part of elites obsessed with controlling leaks 
to the public and maintaining security classifications for official communica-
tions from the distant past so as to shape future readings of history.56
Access to the System is guarded by powerful telecommunications companies 
whose public slogans serve to reinforce the impression, however insincere, that 
meaningful relationships between consumer and producer are forged through 
‘free market’ ideals. Operating with the full weight of corporate power to imbue 
‘free market’ with unique stipulated definitions, companies such as Comcast 
boast, ‘The Future of Awesome.’ Verizon asks, ‘Can you hear me now? Good.’ 
AT&T reminds consumers, ‘Your world. Delivered.’ Yet, in light of recent coun-
ter-intelligence revelations, it is also worth inquiring, to whom in this ‘free 
market’ is our ‘world’ being delivered, and who exactly is ‘hearing’ what we 
say? And, yes, the future may appear ‘awesome,’ but from whose perspective? 
From the perspective of the citizen secure in his or her personal communica-
tions, answers to these questions appear rather grim. In clarifying how dark 
the clouds over public discourse are presently gathered, Robert McChesney 
observes in a 2014 interview that we no longer have:
… privacy anymore and [large monopolistic corporations] use [our] 
information to sell to advisors. […] They work closely with the govern-
ment and the national security state and the military. They really walk 
hand-in-hand collecting this information, monitoring people in ways 
that by all democratic theory are inimical to a free society.57
McChesney’s criticisms are verified by recent efforts in the US Congress to 
eradicate consumer privacy protections that, according to Glenn Greenwald, 
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‘… free Internet service providers (ISPs) – primarily AT&T, Comcast and Veri-
zon  – from the Obama-era FCC regulations barring them from storing and 
selling their users’ browsing histories without their consent.’58 Backed by legions 
of lawyers campaigning in the corridors of political power for rules that profit 
their corporate employers, defences for the present System are also fortified 
by the public’s own participation in social networking and internet commerce 
where all activities, habits, sentiments, and attitudes are secretly monitored. 
This contemporary reconfiguration of the ‘free market’ has seen a compelling 
downward trend in civil freedoms over the years.
7.6 Conclusion
As we have aimed to illustrate in the cases of Manning, Snowden, Assange, and 
others, the System grants the elite a virtual monopoly over the definition of the 
acceptable boundaries of public debate and control over the ‘correct’ interpreta-
tion of key terms and ideas. This is the power of the System today, to impose 
upon the general public the designs of corporate, political, and military power, 
to define dissenters and differences in opinion with the status quo as traitorous, 
and to consign to the fringe of the public discussion whistleblowers who expose 
wrongdoing in the interest of the public itself. In these times when the interests 
of the corporate and political elite have merged, the rights of corporate persons 
subvert the intrinsic value of individual citizen rights, and mass media have 
had a direct hand in painting unflattering portraits of figures who call public 
attention to abuses.
Today, despite the conviction (and clemency) of Manning, Jim Michaels 
observes that, ‘the country faces threats from thousands of people with access 
to information and the ability to publish it instantly.’59 Whereas corporate 
media performance today maintains a façade that a System Security Filter has 
emerged as a safeguard for this post-9/11 era of global capitalism, we propose 
that the SSF be considered for further discussion as a possible sixth filter for 
the PM. As the cases of Manning and Snowden show, the public discourse has 
become a well-managed elite enterprise featuring tight controls over dissenting 
views and private figures who risk their personal freedoms defending the Con-
stitution against foreign and domestic assaults.
Notes and Bibliography
 1 In his final official trip abroad, Barack Obama urged incoming president 
Trump to regard America as the ‘indispensable nation’. For details of his 
final speech, visit https://www.ft.com/content/643f6c9c-af84-11e6-a37c-
f4a01f1b0fa1.
System Security: A Missing Filter for the Propaganda Model? 103
 2 A summary of key details concerning surveillance and government over-
reach under the PATRIOT Act can be found at https://www.aclu.org/info-
graphic/surveillance-under-patriot-act.
 3 Ben Bagdikian (2004), The New Media Monopoly,Boston: Beacon Press, 16.
 4 In rare instances of transparency, mainstream media personalities publicly 
reveal some of their underlying aims as news presenters. In responding to 
a perceived threat from President Trump and his habit of circumventing 
mass media filters to communicate directly to the public, Mika Brzezin-
ski, MSNBC news anchor, observed that ‘…while unemployment and the 
economy worsens, [Trump] could have undermined the [corporate media] 
messaging so much that he c[ould] actually control exactly what people 
think. And that, that is our job.’
 5 Noam Chomsky (2003), Necessary Illusions: Though Control in Democratic 
Societies, Anansi: Toronto, 3.
 6 Noam Chomsky (1985), Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central Amer-
ica and the Struggle for Peace. London, Pluto, 230; also see Jeffery Klaehn 
(2002), ‘A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky’s 
“Propaganda Model”’, European Journal of Communication, 177.
 7 In Japan, alternatively, nearly complete dominance over the public dis-
course has been maintained since the end of World War II by the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the de facto rulers of the postwar political economy.
 8 Ian Haney-López (2014b), ‘The Dog Whistle Politics of Race, Part II’ Inter-
view with Bill Moyers. Moyers & Company, Web. 10 March 2014.
 9 Noam Chomsky (2010), ‘The Corporate Takeover of U.S. Democracy,’ In 
These Times, 3 February 2010. Web. 2 March 2014.
 10 Raymond Williams (1976), Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 
 London: Fontana, 113.
 11 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media.,New York, Pantheon, xii.
 12 Edward Bernays, Propaganda.(2005 [1928]), New York, Ig Publishing, 52.
 13 Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Jyoji Watanuki (1975). The Cri-
sis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilat-
eral Commission, New York, New York University Press, 113.
 14 Noam Chomsky (1989), Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic 
Societies, Boston, South End Press, 3.
 15 It may be no coincidence that George H. W. Bush’s calls for a ‘new world 
order’ during 1990 began taking shape during his work in the CIA as well as 
his involvement in the formation of the Trilateral Commission during the 
mid-1970s.
 16 Utilitarian democracy: created to be practical and useful rather than attrac-
tive and vacuous. While the abstraction ‘democracy’ tends to hold positive 
connotations, practices of democratic principles in representative democ-
racies, such as in the United States, are becoming increasingly anti-dem-
104 The Propaganda Model Today
ocratic. Widespread public belief in democracy, generally, as a useful and 
practical way for the masses to engage in government affairs has not pre-
vented elected representatives from acquiescing to their corporate donors. 
Direct forms of democratic action undertaken by the masses are increas-
ingly seen as utilitarian and, thus, a threat to the representative order.
 17 Op cit., Crozier, 76.
 18 Denver Nicks (2012), Private: Bradley Manning, Wikileaks, and the Big-
gest Exposure of Official Secrets in American History. Chicago IL, Chicago 
Review Press, 191.
 19 ‘Collateral Murder’ is the title of a segment of leaked footage from Iraq dis-
playing the killing of journalists covering the war. The title appears to be 
an attempt by Wikileaks to reverse the flow of Orwellian language (i.e. pre-
emptive War is Peace) into the public discourse by using accurate descrip-
tions for the action taken against journalists. It is also worth noting that the 
title (Collateral Murder) of the leaked segment itself made news because 
of its honesty, yet the English title can be found in Wikipedia under the 
innocuous search term ‘July 12, 2007 Baghdad airstrike.’ By its own admis-
sion, Wikipedia states that it, ‘has been criticised for allegedly exhibiting 
systemic bias, presenting a mixture of ‘truths, half-truths, and some false-
hood’, and, in controversial topics, being subject to manipulation and spin.’ 
We let our readers decide whether the Wikipedia appearance of ‘collateral 
murder’ qualifies as manipulation. A version of the segment can be found 
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rXPrfnU3G0
 20 P. J. Crowley (2009), Interview by Matthew Bell. What Did Bradley Manning 
Disclose? PRI’s The World. Web. 21 August 2013.
 21 James Kirchick (2017), ‘When transgender trumps treachery,’ New York 
Times. 29 August. Web. 30 August 2017.
 22 Barack Obama, ‘Classified National Security Information.’ Executive Order 
13526 of December 29, 2009. Section 1.7 1 March 2014.
 23 Mike Huckabee (2010), ‘101129 Huckabee at the Reagan Library.’ Maria 
Sanchez Show, 20 November. Web. 3 March 2014.
 24 Bill O’Reilly (2010), ‘There Are Traitors in America.’ The O’Reilly Factor, 29 
November. Web. 1 March 2014.
 25 Barack Obama (2011), ‘Obama_Bradley.3GP’ Free Bradley Manning Protest, 
21 April. Web. 1 March 2014.
 26 According to Mediaite’s Evan McMurray, Time magazine journalist Michael 
Grunwald tweeted Saturday night that he was thrilled for the imminent 
assassination of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, a tweet that was deleted 
just as quickly as it was condemned (18 August 2013).
 27 Hillary Clinton on Assange can be found at: https://twitter.com/wikileaks/
status/782906224937410562
 28 John Bolton, Interview by Bill Hemmer. Fox News. 17 December 2013.
 29 Rick Perry, ‘Snowden: U.S, ‘setting fire to future of the Internet’: NSA leaker 
chides companies for not protecting customers,’ 10 March 2014, quoted in 
Mike Ward, The Houston Chronicle. Web.
System Security: A Missing Filter for the Propaganda Model? 105
 30 Michael Hayden, ‘Hayden Labels Snowden a “Defector’,’ 11 August 2013, 
quoted in Emma Caitlin, Politico. Web.
 31 Mike Rogers, ‘House Intelligence Chairman Hints at Russian Help in 
Snowden Leaks,’ 18 January 2014. Meet the Press. Web.
 32 John Bolton, Interview by Bill Hemmer. Fox News. 17 December 2013.
 33 Glenn Greenwald and MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism program taps in to user data 
of Apple, Google and others.’ The Guardian, 7 June 2013.
 34 Ed Pilkington, ‘Declassified NSA files show agency spied on Muhammad 
Ali and MLK.’ The Guardian, 26 September 2013.
 35 Branko Marcetic, ‘The FBI’s secret war.’ Jacobin, 31 August 2016.
 36 Tim Shorrock, ‘Main Core: New Evidence Reveals Top Secret Government 
Database Used in Bush Spy Program,’ Democracy Now, 25 July 2008.
 37 Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman, ‘NSA collected US email records 
in bulk for more than two years under Obama,’ The Guardian, 27 June 2013.
 38 Jane Perrone, ‘The Echelon spy network,’ The Guardian, 29 May 2001.
 39 Edward Herman (2013), ‘The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective.’ Against 
All Reason: Propaganda, Politics, Power. 9 December. Web. 3 March 2014.
 40 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media, New York, Pantheon, 1988, 2.
 41 B. Yu, ‘Cable Monopoly’s Gain is Community Media’s Loss: Comcast/Time 
Warner Cable Merger Threatens Local Voices.’ Fairness & Accuracy In 
Reporting. 1 April 2014. Web. 2 April 2014.
 42 Detailed testimony of Klein can be found at: https://www.eff.org/files/file-
node/att/Mark%20Klein%20Unredacted%20Decl-Including%20Exhibits.
PDF
 43 The full article may be found at: https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/
presskit/ATT_onepager.pdf
 44 Alex Newman, ‘Obama Vows to Bypass Congress and Rule by Decree.’ The 
New American, 15 January 2014. Web. 15 July 2014.
 45 Further details of this Executive Order can be found at :http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/06/executive-order-assignment-
national-security-and-emergency-preparedness-
 46 Dianne Feinstein, Interview by Bob Schieffer. ‘Sen. Feinstein on Edward 
Snowden: “The Chase is On”.’ Face the Nation, CBS News. 23 June 2013. 
Web. 3 March 2014.
 47 Bob Schieffer, Interview by Bob Schieffer. ‘Sen. Feinstein on Edward 
Snowden: “The Chase is On’.’ Face the Nation. CBS News. 23 June 2013 Web. 
3 March 2014.
 48 Op cit., Feinstein.
 49 Ibid.
 50 Herbert I. Schiller (1999), ‘U.S. as global overlord: Dumbing down, Ameri-
can-style,’ Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1999.
 51 DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007: The Department of Homeland Secu-
rity Personnel Suitability and Security Program. June 2009. Accessed 24 May. 
Web
106 The Propaganda Model Today
 52 U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Position Classification Standard for 
Security Administration Series, GS-0080. December 1987. Web. 24 May.
 53 Noam Chomsky (1988), On Language, New York, The New Press, 8.
 54 Herman and Chomsky (1988), Manufacturing Consent, 2.
 55 Sheldon Wolin (2008), Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter 
of Inverted Totalitarianism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 133.
 56 Ibid.
 57 Robert McChesney (2013), ‘Digital Disconnect: Robert McChesney on 
‘How Capitalism is Turning the Internet Against Democracy,’ Interview 
with Amy Goodman and Juan González, Democracy Now. 5 April. Web. 4 
March 2014.
 58 Glenn Greenwald (2017), ‘To Serve AT&T and Comcast, Congressional 
GOP Votes to Destroy Online Privacy,’ The Intercept, 29 July. Web. 29 March 
2017.
 59 Jim Michaels, ‘Manning Case Redefines Meaning of Traitor.’ USA Today. 
Gannett, 30 July 2013. Web. 4 March 2014.
CHAPTER 8
From #15M to Podemos : Updating 
the Propaganda Model for Explaining 
 Political Change in Spain and the Role of 
 Digital Media
Miguel Álvarez-Peralta
Every system has its own vulnerabilities.
Anonymous
8.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a contribution to the ongoing debates regarding the updat-
ing of the Propaganda Model for the twenty-first century. It will focus on the 
model’s boundaries, those situations where it faces difficulties for apprehending 
some communication dynamics, like social media, countries with a particular 
political culture (like Spain) and contexts of crisis and instability (2008–2016).
These aspects have been noted as possible vulnerabilities of the model that 
require further exploration,1 together with personal agency and strategies 
for social change, which I will also take into account. Herman and Chomsky 
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observed that, ‘it has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis given the vary-
ing degrees and forms of penetration, and different cultural conditions.’2 This 
 chapter aims to open the debate on a meaningful case.
8.2 Discussing the Propaganda Model: Dead Ends and Hot Spots
Since the Propaganda Model (hereafter PM) was first formulated, media 
research has provided strong evidence of its validity3 as a tool to explain the 
constrictions of news-making processes and the dominance of news framing 
that favour the interests of elites during periods of stability.
Most of the early criticism against the PM came from ideological positions which 
basically failed to acknowledge the importance of class division in the operation 
of the media system. The controversies between the PM’s assumptions and the 
classical liberal view of the media (which conceptualises journalism as a ‘free mar-
ketplace of information’ or as a ‘watchdog’ that defends the interests of the people 
from power abuse by government and corporations) have already been thoroughly 
explored, and the arguments involved in such exchanges have been contested.4
Herman and Chomsky themselves have addressed in a satisfactory manner 
the main issues pointed by this kind of dismissive criticism.5 They recognised 
that the PM is both simplistic and deterministic to some extent, as every model 
is. That’s a common characteristic of clearly defined theoretical models in soci-
ology and political science, because they need to remain applicable to a large 
range of different particular situations.6 These arguments do not address the 
PM itself, but they pick on the use of simple theoretical models to schematise 
social interaction. Such discussions are doomed to a dead end as it happens in 
other fields, like economics or sociology. There aren’t many reasons to expect 
any positive resolution for these debates, as the positions in dispute belong to 
different paradigms in the Kuhnian’s sense.7
The second wave of criticism8 was more fruitful. It accepted to engage with 
the fundamentals of the model, sharing a common ground that made fertile 
controversies possible. It produced the exchanges between Corner and Klaehn,9 
for example, or the stimulating criticism from Boyd-Barrett10–who suggested 
more emphasis on intentionality and a sixth filter regarding the direct buying-
out of journalists – and Sparks11 – who was interested in the application of the 
model in different international contexts, especially those involving difficulties 
for consensus between the elites. These exchanges helped to broaden the scope 
of the PM by pointing useful directions for future research.
The operation of the filters is considered contingent and variable within dif-
ferent contexts. The PM is an open prototypical clarification of media perfor-
mance in modern capitalism, not a detailed, final or totalizing explanation of 
the process of news circulation:
We don’t claim that it explains everything and we are clear that elite differ-
ences  and local factors  (including features of individual media institutions)  
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can influence media outcomes. We argue that the model works well in 
many important cases, and we await the offering of one that is superior. 
But we also acknowledge that there remains lots of room for media studies 
that do not rest on the PM. This same room opens the way to criticizing the 
model for its failure to pursue those tracks and fill those spaces.12
These claims set the goal of describing PM’s vulnerabilities in different con-
crete contexts, as a way to improve the model. Joan Pedro-Carañana13 has high-
lighted this need for updating and expanding the model:
[The PM] could be enriched by relating it to an analysis of the specific 
logic of capital in the current socio historical process (…) by placing a 
greater focus on the specific social and market conditions and relations, 
on contradictions, on divisions and dysfunctions, on counter-forces, on 
moments of crisis, and on the gaps and the exceptions, all so as to better 
understand the existence of a real, if limited, plurality and dissent, and 
the possibility of change. (…) It is necessary to first consider the scope 
of the PM’s applicability to the media of countries other than the United 
States (where Herman and Chomsky focused their analysis), to Internet 
media, and to media products other than news.14
Accepting these indications from Edward Herman and Pedro-Carañana, my 
framework focuses on elite differences, local factors and ‘features of  individual 
institutions’, as aspects that explain interesting exceptions to the PM on 
moments of crisis, where ‘counter-forces’ take advantage of the contradictions of 
the media system to advance the possibility of change, specially through  internet 
media and products other than news. We will consider those key aspects in a 
very  different time-space context from the one where the PM was created: 
Spain, three decades later.
8.3 Contextual Limitations of the Model: Southern Europe, 
New Media and Situations of Crisis
Thirty years after the publication of Manufacturing Consent, some global dynam-
ics of capitalism have changed, due to macroeconomic phenomena. The col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and the neoliberal revolution pioneered by Thatcher 
and Reagan inaugurated a cycle of uni-polar geopolitics and global deregula-
tion policies. The development of internet and low-cost computing fostered the 
financialization of the economy and the globalization of free-market ideology.
If anti-communism played a major role in the first PM, this fifth filter has had 
to be reformulated in the post-Cold War cycle, as ‘convergence in the domi-
nant ideology,’15 the ‘provision of a Face of Evil,’16 ‘pro-war dichotomies’ against 
Islamic Fundamentalism17 or the more abstract formulation ‘Us/Them narra-
tives.’18 Today, we see how populism occasionally plays the role of the universal 
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enemy of democracy. In any case, this filter has been blurred and broadened 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
But the liveliest debates about the PM today are those regarding internet. 
The arrival of digital social media during the past decade, like Facebook (after 
2006) or Twitter (after 2010), is having an undeniable impact in the structure of 
global communication fluxes. The obsolescence of traditional business models 
of the press and broadcasting has been accelerated, and different survival 
 strategies regarding ownership structure and profit sources are being tested.19
A third hot area within PM discussions concerns its applicability under dif-
ferent geopolitical and cultural contexts. In our case, the political system and 
culture in Spain differ strongly from the US. In the first democratic elections, 
for example, after a four decades-long military dictatorship, in 1977, the Com-
munist Party got 20 seats out of 350 (and has maintained representation in Par-
liament until today, directly or through coalitions). The Spanish Socialist Work-
ers’ Party (PSOE), whose official ideology at the time was Marxism, was second 
with 118 seats and 29% of the vote. Altogether, self-proclaimed socialist forces 
reached 45% of the vote. Five years later, PSOE wan the elections (already as a 
social-democratic party) and its leader, Felipe González, was President of Spain 
for 14 years.
Those were the times when the Propaganda Model was being elaborated in a 
strongly different zeitgeist. According to the Values and Worldviews Report 2013, 
elaborated by the BBVA bank, the Spanish are still the people of Europe that feel 
less identified with ‘capitalism’ and have the most negative view of corporations and 
free-market economy.20 These brief remarks give an idea of how national ‘common 
sense’ (Gramsci) depends on the history and international position of each nation.
Spanish political culture demands an adaptation of the PM’s filters as the con-
ditions for hegemony change. While anti-communism was indeed promoted 
by right-wing fractions of Spanish elites, it always coexisted with strategies that 
advocated political openness and the assimilation of critical discourses as part 
of the ‘legitimate diversity,’ that were much more efficient in creating stability 
and articulating functional narratives. They became hegemonic. This illustrates 
what Sparks21 and Pedro-Carañana have already pointed out, ‘the strength of 
the filters is not as great in regions such as Europe’, due to their ‘more open cul-
tural and ideological context […], strong critical currents, the presence of leftist 
political parties with representation in government, […] which permit a wider 
range of news content. In general, there is greater diversity in countries with a 
tradition of social democracy than that found in the United States.’22
The presence of a strong public broadcast system, with national, regional and 
local channels (television, radio, and now also internet services), has also func-
tioned as a counterbalance to corporate discourses and as a decent standard of 
independency, diversity and political openness in key moments (thanks to the 
pressure from renowned professionals and unions, among other factors). This 
also indicates the necessity of adapting the PM, as its second hypothesis restricts 
its application to countries where the media is ‘under corporate rather than state 
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control.’23 But, the first private TV channels (Antena3, Canal+ and Tele5) arrived 
to Spain in 1989, after the publication of Manufacturing Consent. Until then, 
Spain only had public televisions, which is significant since ‘the Propaganda 
Model is not applicable to public media outlets,’24 or at least not entirely.
A final important divergence must be pointed out. Politics in Spain can, 
increasingly, be elucidated through postcolonial theoretical frames. During 
Franco’s dictatorship, the cooperation of Eisenhower’s government with the 
extreme-right regime was crucial for explaining its duration and the late subal-
tern integration of Spain in the European Union. Still today, the submission of 
domestic economic policies (even the Constitutional Reform) to the declared 
interests of the Paris-Berlin axis, corroborate Spain’s vulnerability in the post-
subprime crisis of economic reorganization.25
The relations of global powers with Spain have an increasingly colonialist pro-
file, but PM does not work in the same way in the colony as in the metropole. 
There is a visible conflict of interests between global corporations and smaller 
national companies that still hold a great power of influence on domestic public 
opinion. This has an impact in the operation of the filters. While, in the case of the 
US, we can generally assume that the largest national corporations widely overlap 
with global ones and share common interests, this is not the case for Spain. Actu-
ally, in the south of Europe, though some corporations have also become trans-
national or are increasingly penetrated by foreign capitals, the strategy for many 
economic sectors and corporate associations, including cultural industries, relies 
on combining moderate internationalization with inland lobbying against their 
governments for protection. Lobbying here also means public criticism. They try 
to force the government to resist pressure from global digital giants such as tel-
ecommunication conglomerates or the so-called ‘Over The Top’ companies (like 
Netflix, Google, and Amazon) and favour domestic industries.
This dynamic led the Spanish right-wing neoliberal government of Mariano 
Rajoy, for example, to accept the requirements of the National Newspaper Edi-
tors Association (AEDE) and set a new toll for search engines that included 
their contents within search results. It was known as the ‘Google Tax’ (or ‘AEDE 
canon’), and it made Google News abandon the country.26 A similar phenom-
enon takes place when national private DTT broadcasts (cable and satellite TV 
have never been prominent in Spain) aggressively lobby on the ruling party so 
that it transfers or at least extends the specific taxes and obligations that affect 
them (to invest in Spanish films, co-fund state media, etc.) to their global com-
petitors like YouTube, HBO or Netflix. Governments have to choose who to 
favour here, and whom dissatisfaction to bear with, but we cannot speak of elite 
consensus, in this case. This helps to explain the weak influence of some filters, 
and the hard criticism of some primetime TV shows against Government and 
transnationals. The impact of neocolonialist confrontation between elites and 
PM contextual validity deserves more attention.
Due to these conditions, along with the credibility crisis of Spanish journal-
ism27 and the mobilization of the so-called ‘indignados’ or 15-M movement, 
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there are reasons to think that the first hypothesis of the PM does not fully apply 
to Spanish context. According to the remarks made by Klaehn and Mullen:
The first hypothesis put forward by Herman and Chomsky is that, where 
there is consensus amongst the corporate and political elite on a particular issue, 
the media tend to reflect this. Herman asserts that ‘where the elite are really 
concerned and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware of their 
own stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective propaganda, the media 
will serve elite interests uncompromisingly’. (…) ‘Where the powerful are in 
disagreement, there will be a certain diversity of tactical judgements on how to 
attain generally shared aims, reflected in media debate’ (Herman and Chom-
sky, 1988, p.xii). (…) The PM acknowledges dissent and makes no predications 
regarding the effectiveness of hegemonic control. 28
In terms of the political culture, the last decade in Spain has been character-
ised as an erosion (and even rupture) of the ‘Transition Consensus,’29 the name 
given to the cultural climate that gave birth to the agreements and implicit red-
lines that allowed for the stable equilibrium of forces (dictatorship’s appara-
tus, peripheral independentism, the monarchy, recently legalised parties and 
unions, etc.) frequently called as the Regime of the 78.
The 15-M movement exploded in 2011 and aggravated that erosion thanks to 
the combination of physical and digital mobilization. It soon reached a support of 
81% of the population.30 From the beginning, the internet was the second most-
used source to get information about it (66.3%) after TV (77.58%), and it was 
first (82%) within young people under 24 years old. Preferred internet sources 
were the digital press (70.04%) and Facebook (51.45%). Twitter, which had just 
arrived in Spain, was the favourite source among youngest people.31 It was in fact 
popularised by the social movement; they became attached to each other.
If we consider these data as indicators of ‘ordinary citizens’ being ‘aware of their 
own stake’ within the issue of the financial crisis, or at least ‘not immobilized by 
propaganda,’ then they demand a closer look at the PM in that context and after, 
how it worked differently (or possibly failed) as an explanation of media behaviour.
At the same time that the print press faced its reputation and profit crisis, 
new digital left-wing media were created reaching a considerable support and 
credibility (e.g. eldiario.es, infoLibre, La Marea, Cuarto Poder or CTXT, all of 
them created after 2011). Moreover, a new kind of high-impact progressive 
‘parajournalistic’ TV magazines and talk-shows were breaking records of share 
on a daily basis, bringing pluralistic political debates to the primetime and late 
morning fringes.32 That’s the case with El Intermedio, Salvados, La Sexta Noche, 
El Objetivo, Al Rojo Vivo, Las Mañanas de Cuatro, all of them sharing some 
common characteristics: 1) they serve as a ‘reserve’ for moderators or guests 
with unprecedented critical opinions; 2) they use humour, political incorrect-
ness, and other infotainment trends to get more audience; 3) they have created 
their own star-system of popular anchormen and anchorwomen that attract 
significant volumes of audience (and who have publicly resisted flak), which is 
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the case of Jordi Évole,33 Gran Wyoming, Ana Pastor, Antonio Maestre, Jesús 
Cintora, Ignacio Escolar, Antonio Ferreras, Jesús Maraña, etc.
The fourth and fifth filters do not seem to be working here. These became 
most prominent voices also in the digital press and Twitter. Pablo Iglesias him-
self, the leader of Podemos party, is a product of such a new wave of pluralistic 
political TV shows, where his fame was produced before jumping to electoral 
competition.34 The vital importance of Star-System agency within the PM is 
strategic and deserves also further attention.
8.4 Digital Social Media: A New Playground for Information
As I have mentioned, there is a lively discussion regarding the need to adapt 
the PM to the internet age, particularly to digital multimedia newspapers, 
where entrance-barrier costs have dramatically decreased, and to online social 
networks (hereinafter OSN), where content production is mainly assumed by 
users who interact through the networks (prosumers). The observation that 
prosumers represent both the unpaid digital labour-force and the commod-
ification of audiences35 is essential but does not answer the questions about 
diversity of discourses, agency amplification or cultural effects. Unpaid labour 
already existed in the pre-Twitter age, since analogical audiences completed 
the commodification cycle of information contributing to its production and 
consuming the advertisements that surround it. Audiences were considered 
a commodity to be produced and sold to advertisers in traditional media, as 
well.36 These are not innovations of social media, though they have escalated. 
In the case of user-generated content platforms, the direct role of prosumers in 
achieving capital gains is clearer, but the dependency of benefits on the ability 
of each digital environment to attract users and keep them connected is strong, 
as well, and plays a role on the PM revision.
The propagation of mobile devices has also had enormous impact on the way 
information is sold and consumed. A well-established corporate press faces a 
significant business-model crisis today because it has to share the income from 
advertising they used to manage on a national scale with several kinds of new 
digital competitors on a global scale. Digitalization also reduced newspaper 
sales as the new generations got used to receiving information for free, directly 
on their mobile devices, selected and commented by equals through their digi-
tal communities. OSNs are the main source of visits for online news sites and 
are, thus, more important than Google or their own homepages.37
These reading practices threaten editorial agenda-setting and priming strate-
gies, as they change selection criteria and foster ironic and critical comment of 
the news being shared. That means a significant loss of control for corporate 
media. At the same time, they deepen the fragmentation of the public sphere 
into isolated regions (the so-called ‘filter bubble,’38 which should probably 
be incorporated into a new more abstract filter of the PM in order to address 
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the impact of personal ecosystems within OSNs). Regardless of the questiona-
ble quality of the selection criteria on that news circulation processes, the result 
is a structural mutation on the information lifecycle, with consequences to be 
gradually revealed during the coming years.
When the PM saw the light, such alterations were hardly predictable or prop-
erly evaluable. Even for some cultural industries like books or records, things hap-
pened so fast that adapting to the new habitat was not always possible. Instabil-
ity led to important bankruptcies. Financialization and concentration processes 
after the subprime crisis have not made it easier to overcome new phenomena 
like massive online file sharing, decreasing ads revenue, pay-walls failure, the 
so-called click-bait tendency, citizen-journalism, automated content creation, 
peer-to-peer economy, open source movements and many other new challenges 
coming into scene year after year. In the case of Spain, the press audience fell from 
42.1% in 2008 to 26.5% in 2016.39 The main newspaper, El País, dropped from 
selling 440.226 copies in 2003, to 115.402 in 2015, a decline of 73.8%.
The notion of ‘filter’ needs to be adjusted in order to apprehend these vicis-
situdes. Social media’s role in today’s communications cannot be dismissed 
as ‘secondary’ or ‘marginal.’ Keeping the PM unaltered would lead to a quick 
obsolescence of a model that has nonetheless proved its prognosis strengths 
in pre-Twitter times. Additionally, the PM revitalization needs to deal with a 
wider question: to what extent is public opinion based on news and informa-
tion? It seems to be increasingly influenced by other kinds of emotional and 
spectacular communication, so it would be a mistake to disregard OSN because 
most of its contents are ‘not political,’ nor informational. For good or bad, cul-
tural hegemony disputes seem to have less to do with truth, facts and objectivity, 
and more with emotions, feelings, self-storytelling and desires, as professional 
politicians know very well.40
8.5 Twitter: A Newborn News Lifecycle
Facebook became open to every adult with a valid email address only in 2006. 
In 2009, Herman and Chomsky were asked if alternative sources of informa-
tion provided by the internet could render the PM ‘increasingly marginal in its 
applicability.’ They predicted the opposite (as ‘‘old media” have a growing place 
and advertising has become steadily more important [on the Web]’), but they 
left an open door to that eventuality: ‘It is possible that this might happen.’41
By that time, Facebook was not much more than a new trend, a very promis-
ing start-up. Smartphones were just starting to take over our pockets and per-
manent attention, and the modern networks that allow fluid mobile naviga-
tion were only a project. The iPhone was elected invention of the year by Time 
magazine at the end of 2007, but still didn’t support 3G networks. After that, 
Twitter gradually came onto the scene: the ‘Trending Topics’ list didn’t exist in 
2009, and users couldn’t see pictures without leaving the platform until 2010. It 
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did not reach its first hundred-million users until September 2011,42 three years 
after Facebook.
In Spain, these developments arrived years later. The first Spanish version 
of Twitter came out in January 2010, one year after Facebook’s Spanish ver-
sion. It took a few years for OSNs to become mainstream and to be used by a 
substantial range of the population and deserve regular media attention. The 
first digitally-centred campaign was run by Podemos for European elections, in 
2014, six years after Obama’s first Big Data-driven campaign.
These remarks lead to a conclusion: the ongoing cultural and ideological 
impact of ‘mass self-communication networks’ (as Manuel Castells calls them) 
was impossible to estimate back in 1989 and hardly evaluable even in 2009. 
Even today, the long-term impact of social networking on information prac-
tices and consent-production is dubiously predictable. In an analysis devoted to 
‘rebooting’ the PM for the new media, Goss concludes that the internet is being 
conscripted for authoritarian purposes.43 This conclusion applies for the profes-
sional blogging activities he examines but specific analysis of OSN phenomena 
like the evolution of prosumers’ informational practices remains pending.
While old media focused on content production, OSNs just needed to keep 
a growing number of users interacting and producing their own contents, 
instead. So, networks focused on carefully providing an addictive experience 
for prosumers, knowing that any false step (like excessive ads, or censorship, or 
too limited interactions) could mean an unexpected downfall (as happened to 
Hi5, Tuenti, MySpace or other big OSNs that did not survive). They do not cre-
ate (nor fully control) contents, in any case, and this is a key difference.
Does this mean that Twitter or Facebook are committed to freedom of speech 
and ideological pluralism? Certainly not. The pluralism and diversity of the con-
tents is just a side-effect of their business model. They are aware that repeated 
failures on interaction management, or simple lack of renewal, could mean quick 
obsolescence, an opportunity for rivals, or massive migrations to open-source 
rivals (as recently happened from Whatsapp to Telegram network). There are many 
social networks, some of them based on a peer-to-peer structure without central 
servers, which could profit from an eventual freezing of Facebook fever, like N-1.cc, 
identi.ca, friendi.ca, OSSN, pump.io, Kune, GNU-Social, Diaspora*, BuddyCloud, etc.
The underlying question here is: why would big corporations like OSNs be 
helpful to grass-root criticism? As global warming and other environmen-
tal threats demonstrate (and history does, as well) global capitalism is not a 
perfectly stable system which is able to foresee and plan or carefully calculate 
and produce the conditions for its own sustainability. But, quite often, radical 
intellectuals depict it in that way, against the fundamentals of Critical Theory. 
Because of its subordination to the short-term logic of the competitiveness 
within unregulated markets, capitalism works much more like an out-of-
control machine that can only focus on immediate maximization of profits and 
permanent competition regardless of distant-future consequences. It constantly 
digs its own grave in different ways.
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Massive online social communication can also be regarded as an unexpected 
progressive externality of the evolution of digital capitalism (quite like the 
print was for pre-capitalist orders). From the Political Economy point of view, 
the outbreak of global real-time human cooperation, despite its contradictory 
 procedures (or thanks to them), could also start to be regarded as a critical 
turning point. A milestone where ‘the development of productive forces of 
society comes in conflict with the existing relations of production or – what is 
but a legal expression for the same thing – with the property relations within 
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the produc-
tive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social 
revolution.’44
8.6 Refining the PM: Beyond Cyber-pessimism  
and Cyber-euphoria
This last claim will of course be contested as unreasonably optimistic. But it 
can only be read as such if we consider an epoch of revolution as a necessarily 
positive event. It could also mean, as happened before in the history of capital-
ism after periods of economic instability, the advent of new kinds of war and 
authoritarian regimes. The current flourishing of xenophobic and chauvinistic 
populisms and new sorts of terrorism in western countries, the rise of ‘governa-
bility issues’ discourses and the escalation of military budgets worldwide do not 
seem to point in an optimistic direction. So, this perspective is not to be read 
as techno-euphoria, although it certainly diverges from the techno-pessimism 
that dominates debates about internet and the PM.
Against some predictions,45 interactive media have served democratic ends, 
at least in Spain and other countries. Spontaneous coordination as seen in the 
15-M Movement, the Arab Spring, the Kitchenware Revolution in Iceland, the 
Umbrella Revolution in China, or some left-wing electoral populist irruptions 
like those embodied by Pablo Iglesias, Jean Luc Mélenchon or Jeremy Corbyn, 
would have been categorically different without the existence of OSNs, if they 
had ever existed at all. They have made intense use of viralisation, crowdfund-
ing, crowdsourcing, meme seeding and curation, gamification, online discuss-
ing and voting, mobile apps, etc.
There is growing evidence of massive interactive dynamics challenging main-
stream framings, ‘hacking’ official agendas and conquering visibility for new 
subjects and issues that used to remain invisible, for example about the finan-
cial crisis and banking bailout in Spain.46 Activists who moved from traditional 
to digital social media know this very well, as they are able to reach wider audi-
ences. We observe that the internet is serving for social control in the long-term 
but also for democratic ends, occasionally, in the meantime. The internet opens 
a field for stable worldwide collaboration, as projects like Wikipedia, Linux, 
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Indymedia or eMule and Torrent networks have evidenced, among other expe-
riences that do not fully meet commercial logics. Regarding the PM’s filters, 
the fact that social media like Facebook or search engines like Google belong 
to huge private corporations with concentrated ownership must of course be 
acknowledged. They are totally dependent on ads revenue and operate through 
opaque algorithms that select what we read first and what appears in less vis-
ible positions or do not appears at all.47 OSNs won’t render the PM redundant, 
but they do need to satisfy new kind of requirements in order to maintain their 
dominant position.
8.7 ‘Old Media’, Online Social Networks  
and the Propaganda Model
Opinion-driving campaigns on OSNs are being carried out by governments, 
but also by social organizations. At least in Spain, it is nowadays very strange 
not to have a critical political Trending Topic every day on Twitter. This is a 
situation which activists couldn’t dream of in traditional media’s landscape. 
Prosumers are not fired by the network due to advertisers or government’s 
pressure as happened to journalists in traditional media. How could own-
ers condition what I write on my Twitter account the way they did with my 
column on a newspaper or my local radio debate? Can they easily get my 
mouth shut, or could that generate what the net jargon calls a ‘Streisand 
Effect’ (increased circulation of the censored content) or ‘Underdog Effect’ 
(solidarity with the excessively punished or relegated)? It is clear that within 
OSNs the filters do not apply to content creation, but to content promotion. 
That is another key difference, as promotion also depends in prosumers’ 
actions, not only opaque algorithms. Filters do not work like they did for 
professional journalism. They do not prevent mentions, answers, re-medi-
ations and other exchanges between individuals, public institutions, jour-
nalists, corporate accounts, political parties, social movements, candidates, 
celebrities, well-known activists, scholars, advertisers, etc. This freedom of 
interaction creates possibilities that were unthinkable in traditional media’s 
landscape.
Concluding that ‘old media’ have a growing place within OSNs would not be 
accurate. During the twentieth century, one-way media had almost total con-
trol on the visibility of their Star-System, including renowned anchormen. They 
also controlled the visibility of their audience’s feedback. But in the OSNs they 
don’t. Interaction between TV broadcasts and Twitter is constantly producing 
examples where an attempt at manipulation or a simple imprecision is imme-
diately contested and generates a Trending Topic in seconds. Communication 
is not strictly unidirectional anymore. Moreover, Twitter produces its own Star-
System: individuals that surpass the digital audience of news broadcasts and 
118 The Propaganda Model Today
governments, with infinitely more engaged followers. As Pedro-Carañana48 
has pointed out the, internet constitute[s] a media model quite different from 
that of radio, newspapers, or television. Indeed, the internet is the platform on 
which non-corporate, participatory media outlets with critical  perspectives and 
support for social change have been able to develop and grow. In this respect, 
there are different dynamics intrinsic to the way the internet operates that the 
PM does not consider.
8.8 Flak Against Twitter Stars? A Brief Review of the Spanish 
Twittersphere
In his critical review of Twitter as a new public sphere, Christian Fuchs consid-
ers the asymmetrical power of the visibility of personal accounts49 concluding 
that celebrities from the entertainment business, particularly pop stars, dominate 
attention measured by number of followers. Politics is much less represented (…) 
Alternative political figures, such as political documentary producer Michael 
Moore, have far fewer followers, which is an expression of the asymmetrical 
political attention economy of capitalism that discriminates critical voices.
Group Twitter account Social significance .000 followers
Traditional 
newspapers
El País Most important  
newspaper
6.1M (52% fake)
El Mundo Newspaper with most-
visited digital edition.
2.84M
20minutos Most read cost-free  
newspaper.
1.28M
Politicians & 
political parties
Pablo Iglesias Leader of Podemos  
(left-wing populist party) 
2.01M
Mariano Rajoy President of Spain. 1.41M
Alberto Garzón Leader of PCE and the left 
coalition IU. 
777K 
Partido Popular Ruling party. 620K
Critical online 
newspapers
& editors
Publico.es Left-wing digital-only 
newspaper.
812K
Nacho Escolar Editor of eldiario.es. 724K
Eldiario.es Most read digital-only left 
wing newspaper
722K
Jesús Maraña Editor of infoLibre.es. 253K
Table 8.1: Some politically significant accounts on Twitter (29 June 2017).
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He also notes that only 7% of the Trending Topics (TT) were ‘political’ in 
2009, and politics has been even more marginal in the following years. This is 
not the case of Spanish TTs.50 Accepting these quantitative criteria as an indica-
tor of visibility, we can turn to Table 8.1 and check some Twitter audiences in 
Spain.
A Spanish alternative political documentary producer, Jordi Évole, who can 
undoubtedly claim the title the Spanish Michael Moore, amply surpasses the 
twitter-audience of every traditional media, politician, or TV broadcast.51 The 
public face of the Communist Party, Alberto Garzón, has more followers than 
the ruling party and more than the most-watched TV news broadcast (Informa-
tivos Telecinco). The leader of the disrupting anti-liberal left-wing populist party, 
Podemos, who belongs to the Marxist school of thought as well,52 surpasses the 
number of followers of most mainstream news media, parties, and politicians. If 
Group Twitter account Social significance .000 followers
Private TV
Channels and 
Broadcasts
Antena3 First private TV-channel 
created in Spain.
1.29M
Antena3 Noticias Third most-watched news 
broadcast.
1.58M
La Sexta Noticias Second most-watched news 
broadcast.
981K
El Intermedio Critical ‘parajournalistic’ 
daily magazine. 
903K
TeleCinco Largest audience TV 
 channel. 
830K
Salvados Audience-leading political 
documentaries
696K
Informativos T5 Most-watched news 
 broadcast. 
634K
Progressive 
TV star-system 
anchormen
Buenafuente Critical ironical late-night 
show moderator.
3.42M
Jordi Évole Producer of Salvados 
(political documentaries).
3.02M
Ana Pastor Moderator of El Objetivo 
(critical journalism).
1.91M
Others EFE National state-owned news 
agency. 
1.2M
La SER Audience-leader national 
radio station.
1.09M
Table 8.1: Continued.
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we look at the progressive ‘born-digital’ press, the audience gap with traditional 
media has been shortened in social networks. They reach similar digital audi-
ences as the most watched television channels and news-broadcasts.
In this sense, it wouldn’t be accurate to say that ’old media’ have a growing 
place within OSNs, or that technologies such as the internet have been colonised 
by established media outlets. Of course, personalist individualism is a contro-
versial trend to be observed on the web, but the fact is that PM does not cope 
in detail with the structure-agency dialectics regarding individuals that enter 
a profitmaking Star-System. It mostly disregards the role of personal agency 
within cultural industries, which is absolutely key in advancing social change.53 
In Twitter, the formation of a local or sectorial Star-System is less dependent on 
structural factors than it was in television or press, more open to outsiders with 
appealing discourses, and this multiplies personal agency of individuals.
8.9 Conclusion
Before the commercial boom of OSNs, Herman and Chomsky acknowledged 
four factors protecting the hegemony of traditional media in the internet age: 
(1) they are still dominant news providers; (2) they have pre-existing audiences 
and resources; (3) Internet operators are also dependent on advertising rev-
enue; and (4) new media is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with 
politics secondary at best, with limited resources and outreach, and specialise 
in critical analysis rather than news-making.54
As we have seen, these ‘protecting factors’ are increasingly uncertain, at least in 
some contexts. Pre-existing audiences are not directly transferable to the social 
media, where the resources needed to publish have dramatically decreased. This 
has reduced the gap between traditional and new alternative media or individu-
als as news providers in the OSNs (see Table 8.1). In times of political instabil-
ity, Twitter becomes a privileged arena for real-time information, widely used 
by journalists, politicians and activists. The hegemony of Spanish traditional 
national media has entered an impasse, and it is at stake in front of new global 
actors (like Google, Twitter or Facebook themselves as news providers) and new 
alternative media and individuals that maintain large online audiences. This 
dynamic may help to explain the fall of the two-party system in Spain after 2011, 
and the decline of the opinion-industry that supported them.
Therefore, the arguments that recommend maintaining the PM mainly 
unchanged within new media because old media have quickly dominated the 
new scene must be re-examined in the light of new evidence from different 
countries and political circumstances. The growing power of Twitter and Face-
book as the biggest real-time self-fed databases of human interaction is unde-
niable, and it is clear that they are becoming the means for new sorts of social 
control through Big Data exploitation. But at the same time, in a contradictory 
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manner as the very nature of capitalism, they only reach that power by main-
taining an attractive arena for sufficiently free global real-time communication, 
which creates unpredictable externalities, interactional practices, and windows 
of opportunity for political change in episodes of instability, at least in periph-
eral countries.
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CHAPTER 9
Anti-Communism and the Mainstream 
Online Press in Spain : Criticism of 
Podemos as a Strategy of a Two-Party  
System in Crisis
Aurora Labio-Bernal
9.1 Introduction
The year 2016 will be remembered in Spain for a prolonged electoral crisis 
marked by the elections of December 2015, the repeat elections in June of the 
following year and the looming threat of a third call to the ballot box, which 
ultimately did not materialise. The inability to form a government after the 
first vote was due to the absence of a majority for either of the two traditional 
major parties as a result of the rise of other political forces, such as the Ciu-
dadanos and Podemos parties. Both these groups emerged as alternatives to the 
two dominant parties, seizing a place of their own on the traditional ideologi-
cal spectrum: Ciudadanos drawing votes on the right; and Podemos turning 
into the voice of many voters on the left. It is important to bear in mind that 
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Podemos was born in the context of the 15-M protest movement and the public 
discontent with the austerity policies of recent years. Established as a party in 
January 2014, just three months later it took five seats in the European elections 
and won 69 in the national elections of 2015. In the repeat elections in June 
2016, Podemos formed a coalition with Izquierda Unida, winning 71 seats.
The rise of Podemos, along with the fragmentation of the Spanish political 
spectrum into different ideological forces, has precipitated a crisis for the ‘gov-
ernmental monopoly’1 maintained by the two major parties, the Partido Popu-
lar (People’s Party, or PP) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist 
Party, or PSOE). These special circumstances in the political life of the country 
have led mainstream newspapers to adopt positions in defence of the establish-
ment, while taking a critical line with Podemos based on its classification as a 
radical leftist and/or ideologically communist political party. In light of this sit-
uation, I believe it particularly interesting to apply the concept of the fifth filter 
in Herman and Chomsky’s2 propaganda model to the case of the online editions 
of the main Spanish newspapers. Despite the view that ‘anti-communism’ could 
be deemed a somewhat outdated notion3 since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this 
idea has taken on a certain relevance to the media agenda today and demon-
strates the contemporary validity of the propaganda model.4 Although Herman 
himself has acknowledged5 that they added free market ideology to the fifth fil-
ter in the 2002 edition, he also asserted that the concept of anti- communism as 
a value of the establishment continued intact. On the other hand, some authors 
speak of the ‘prevailing ideology’6 to expand the framework to include super-
structural aspects that represent a dissident voice in media messages. Although 
I agree with this view, I argue and will demonstrate in this paper that anti-
communism has seen a powerful re-emergence in Western countries due to the 
crisis of traditional parties and the threat to the status quo.
Thus, in Spain the association of Podemos with the regimes of Venezuela, 
Bolivia, or Cuba has been a common strategy in the speeches of different politi-
cal leaders as a way of attacking the new force, but also in the news stories and 
editorial opinions of Spain’s major newspapers. The vocabulary which, explic-
itly or implicitly, revives communism as the enemy of the Western democratic 
order has flooded the pages of the newspapers. The origin of this behaviour in 
news publications is rooted in the relationship with the other filters listed by 
Herman and Chomsky, as the two-party system currently in crisis bears a close 
relationship with the ownership interests of the media corporations and their 
connections to the political and business elite.
9.2 Anti-communism Revived in the Neoliberal Era
When considering how Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model may be 
revised and/or updated, it is always more interesting to try to avoid repeating 
previous studies and offer a perspective that takes recent events into account as 
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much as possible. Although it is obvious that we cannot compartmentalise the 
filters identified by the two authors to describe the propaganda strategies of the 
establishment, I have decided here to focus on one of them in particular, anti-
communism, applying it to the current political reality in Spain and the rise 
of a new party, Podemos, a leftist movement that has burst onto the political 
landscape as an alternative to the traditional parties.
As a premise for this study, I argue that Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda 
Model continues to be perfectly valid for analysing the ideology of the media, 
broadening the scope of application to contexts outside of the United States. I 
concur with other authors7 who argue that with the increasing complexity of 
the media industry and the intensification of capitalist ideals in the new neolib-
eral era, the Propaganda Model reveals the mutual support the different filters 
provide one another as the means whereby the establishment continues to con-
trol society through the manufacturing of consent.8
According to this line of argument, it follows that the dominant ideology 
operating as a superstructure of the system would repress or even silence any 
dissenting voice. But to understand how discourses are created, it is essential 
to analyse the communicative structure at global and national levels. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that the context of corporate oligopoly, despite 
the crises that the big media groups have been suffering in recent years,9 con-
tinues to be one of the basic features of the media industry. Ownership of the 
media thus remains in the hands of the same elite that share connections with 
the political and financial powers. As suggested in a recent study by various 
authors in the anthology Global Media Giants:
By ascribing to a relational definition of power, we argued that eco-
nomic, political, and cultural power are all woven into the fabric of 
media power precisely because media corporations are situated within 
these spheres, but they also have the ability to influence these spheres in 
different ways.10
It is important to remember that for Herman and Chomsky the ideology of anti-
communism was the fifth filter of the Propaganda Model of the Western sys-
tem. It is obvious that this issue was much more palpable during the existence of 
the Soviet Union and the first years after the Cuban Revolution; however, anti- 
communism has regained relevance on the media agenda today due to the new 
use that the political classes themselves have been making of it. During the US 
elections, Donald Trump described Bernie Sanders, one of the Democratic can-
didates for the White House, as a ‘communist.’11 The shadow of the radical left 
was also invoked by Tony Blair when he referred to Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of 
Britain’s Labour Party, as a ‘populist politician’ of the left, and a ‘dangerous experi-
ment’ that represented ‘a big challenge for the [political] centre.’12 Meanwhile, in 
the French elections of 2017, the conservative newspaper Le Figaro described the 
leftist candidate Jean-Luc Mélechon as the French Hugo Chávez.13 For several days 
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the campaign headlines continued to depict the French politician as the defender 
of the ‘Bolivarian regime’14 or as the ‘apostle of the revolutionary dictators.’15
These examples make it clear that any effort to push the boundaries of social-
ism is quickly identified by the establishment as communism, an approach 
which, according to Herman and Chomsky, constitutes the creation of an 
enemy to the order, as will be demonstrated in the analysis of the sample cho-
sen for this paper. But first, it would be timely here to offer a description of the 
genesis of Podemos as an alternative party emerging in the context of a pro-
found economic, political and social crisis in Spain.
9.3 Birth of Podemos in the Two-Party Context
In February 2017, the journalist Pablo Pombo published an article in the digital 
newspaper El Confidencial with the headline ‘Podemos becomes the Commu-
nist Party 2.0.’16 It was not the first time that this term was used to describe the 
movement that arose out of the 15-M protests; a few months earlier, José Car-
los Díez in El País published an article with the title ‘Populism: Communism 
2.0’.17 In both cases, the reporters dismissed Podemos as the political heirs to 
the Communist Party of Spain and promulgators of old and outdated policies. 
Such references were nothing new in the media’s treatment of Podemos and 
its leaders, despite the fact that Pablo Iglesias himself has denied any political 
identification with communism on repeated occasions.
The insistence of the Spanish media on linking Podemos to communism has 
from the outset taken a biased view of the party as being against the established 
order. In this respect, the idea of the ‘communist peril’ represented by Podemos has 
been accompanied by another term: populism. Indeed, this word was chosen as the 
word of the year in Spain by the Fundación del Español Urgente (Foundation of 
Emerging Spanish), whose coordinator, Javier Lascuráin, described it as applying to 
‘politicians of all ideologies but with the same trait of making an emotional appeal 
to the public and offering simple solutions to complex problems.’18 Podemos would 
thus be depicted in the media as a movement that is both communist and populist, 
definitions that conveyed a markedly negative image to society.
To understand this portrayal of Podemos by the mainstream media, we need 
to examine what the birth of the party has represented, and what its platform and 
ideology have been. Emmanuel Rodríguez López19 has studied the civic-politi-
cal trajectory from the protest movements of the ‘indignados’ in May 2011, also 
known as 15-M, to the creation of Podemos, in January 2014. It seems undeniable 
that the birth of the party led by Pablo Iglesias was the necessary culmination 
of the public discontent in the period of economic crisis, welfare cutbacks and 
sharply rising unemployment.20 The ultimate idea of not trusting the institutions 
of the State or the traditional parties to turn the situation around was summed up 
perfectly in the declaration ‘no nos representan’ (‘they don’t represent us’) chanted 
by the crowds at all the demonstrations. As Rodríguez López suggests:
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15-M and the wave of movements that followed it seemed to have been 
based on a political critique that went further than the traditional (leftist) 
criticism of the ‘regime’. Unlike such criticism, which viewed the inad-
equacies of Spanish democracy as the result of the continued presence of 
certain underlying elements of Francoism (from the political class and the 
judiciary to state terrorism and the ‘governing style’), the new criticism 
viewed the parties of the left as major players in the political regime.21
Out of these demonstrations, 15-M would develop its own network organi-
zation through meetings, the so-called citizens’ circles or discussion groups, 
online mobilization and horizontal decision-making. Citizens became activ-
ists, but without adopting specific symbols or ideologies, other than their out-
rage over the problems related to issues such as public housing, healthcare and 
education or the lack of jobs for young people. This empowerment of the citi-
zenry needed to be channelled, and in this respect organizations like Democ-
racia Real Ya played an important role; however, it was necessary to establish a 
political party to move from civil protest to political struggle. This would be the 
task taken up by Podemos as of January 2014.
The creation of a new political force to run in the European elections of May 
2014 was proposed only a few days earlier with the presentation of the Manifiesto 
Mover Ficha. Convertir la indignación en cambio político (‘Make a Move: Turning 
Outrage into Political Change’). As Rodríguez López explains, the project was led 
by Pablo Iglesias, who in only two days obtained the 50,000 signatures needed 
to endorse the initiative. José Ignacio Torreblanca22 has studied the profile of 
Podemos voters to draw some rather interesting conclusions. Torreblanca sug-
gests that Podemos has captured the votes of abstainers and generally apathetic 
citizens all over Spain. He also supports the view that they are votes of discontent, 
from the moment the party obtained higher percentages in poorer neighbour-
hoods and regions hardest hit by the crisis. With respect to age, it appears that 
Podemos has won support from every generation, although it has been more 
successful with voters under thirty. In relation to academic level, Podemos voters 
tend to be among the most highly educated. In ideological terms, Pablo Igle-
sias’ party has seized votes from the parties on the left: Izquierda Unida and the 
Socialist Party (PSOE), although it has also captured the attention of voters in the 
center. Geographically, Podemos has been more successful in cities than in small 
towns, and, although it has voters all over Spanish territory, its biggest support is 
located in Madrid, Asturias, Aragón, and the Balearic and Canary Islands.
9.4 Analysis of the Sample
For this study, I have developed a content analysis that I will apply using a series 
of categories for the period running from the birth of Podemos in January 2014 
to the Spanish general elections in June 2016. The categories will be applied to the 
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online versions of two major newspapers in Spain: El País and ABC, two papers 
representative of the two-party political system. Furthermore, these two periodi-
cals are owned by two large media corporations, Prisa and Vocento respectively, 
both connected to the national and international corporate and financial appa-
ratus. In the case of the owner of El País, the company Prisa, its stakeholders 
include the British investment fund Amber Capital, as well as Caixa Bank, Tel-
efónica and Banco Santander. A block of shares is also in the hands of the Polanco 
family, which in turn is associated with organizations such as the Trilateral Com-
mission, where we find another prominent family in the media world, the Ybarra 
family. The Ybarras are related to the owner of the other newspaper under study, 
ABC, in the hands of Vocento. One of its members, Emilio Ybarra, along with 
his brother Santiago, controls Vocento and is a member of the Trilateral Com-
mission, which also includes figures such as Ana Patricia Botín, Chairwoman of 
Banco Santander Central Hispano. Meanwhile, another family with a presence in 
Vocento, the Bergareches, have an influence that extends to the oil giant Cepsa 
and the infrastructure and services operator Ferrovial, as Santiago Bergareche 
has held or currently holds various executive posts in all these companies.
The above information is provided to place the media outlets under study here 
in their political and corporate context, in order to understand that their mes-
sage is directly related to the interests of the group to which they belong and the 
system of which they form a part. The analysis of news stories published in El País 
and ABC about Podemos is thus connected to the corporate structure of Prisa 
and Vocento as companies present in the framework of the market economy. 
Anti-communism therefore operates as a variable to convey a negative image of 
Podemos to the public. The corpus of the sample is made up of 150 news articles 
(70 from ABC and 80 from El País) from the period indicated above retrieved by 
means of key word searches in the digital archives of both newspapers. These key 
words constitute the references for the following categories of my content analysis:
- Podemos and Venezuela. As will be shown, both newspapers have repeatedly 
linked the party to the government of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro 
to raise doubts about the democratic nature of Podemos and its leaders. 
The variables in this category include repeated references to alleged illegal 
financing of Podemos by the Venezuelan government (the legal proceed-
ings for which have been dismissed by the Spanish courts as many as seven 
times)23, as well as the identification of Pablo Iglesias or Juan Carlos Moned-
ero with a regime described as a dictatorship and a violator of human rights.
- Podemos and its relationship with countries with governments of the so-
called ‘radical left’. Principally, a connection would be made with Cuba, 
and in so doing, with communism. But this would also extend to other 
nations and leaders like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, 
and Alexis Tsipras in Greece.
- Podemos and countries considered to form part of the ‘axis of evil’. The term 
was of course coined by George W. Bush in 2002 to refer to enemy states of 
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the West. Specifically, it referred to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. For the case 
that concerns us here, the main link made is with Iran.
- Podemos, explicit communism and populism. In this category, I will ana-
lyse the terminology used to identify Podemos directly with the com-
munist party, or with Marxism or any of its derivatives, including anti-
establishment characteristics. Directly associated with this and as a means 
of attempting to discredit the new political movement, there are constant 
references to Podemos being a ‘populist’ party. In this respect, I adopt the 
approach of Vicenç Navarro, who considers that the ‘term “populism” has 
no scientific value and is used as an insult by the Spanish and European 
establishments to define any movement they deem a threat or that does not 
have their approval.’24 The negative references to Podemos and its suppos-
edly populist character are frequent in the newspapers studied.
Having defined the categories and variables, I will next offer a qualitative analy-
sis with certain quantitative data. Firstly, it is important to note that most of 
the news articles that link Podemos to communism are based on the party’s 
relationship with the government of Venezuela. In the case of ABC, 60% of 
the samples studied contained news on this topic, while in the case of El País 
it was a little higher, at 62.5%. The main content of these articles is related to 
the idea that Venezuela is a communist-style dictatorship and that its leaders, 
both Hugo Chávez previously and Nicolás Maduro today, are tyrants who wield 
power on their own. This relationship is made by the media sources studied 
either through the repetition of statements by other political leaders or through 
the disclosure of documents that allegedly demonstrate financial ties between 
the Venezuelan government and Podemos. Some examples of this strategy can 
even be found in the headlines, such as one in ABC on 23 June 2016: ‘Rajoy 
responds to Iglesias: ‘Spain is not Venezuela.’ The PP leader assesses the state-
ments of the Podemos leader on the security of the voting process.’25 Another of 
the fundamental issues associated with the long shadow cast by the Venezuelan 
government over Podemos has to do with the financial backing which it alleg-
edly received in the Chávez era. The misinformation began with the publication 
of headlines like the one appearing in ABC on 25 February 2015: ‘Venezuelan 
Government and CEPS accused of illegal financing of Podemos.’26 The theory 
of the newspaper has always been that Podemos was financed by consultancy 
services provided by the Centre for Political and Social Studies (CEPS, for its 
initials in Spanish) prior to the existence of Podemos, but in which some of its 
future leaders participated, including Pablo Iglesias himself, Iñigo Errejón, and 
Juan Carlo Monedero. It is not a case of false information, but of information 
taken out of context and a lack of evidence. There were payments for these ser-
vices that met all legal requirements, and it was never demonstrated that they 
were used to finance the party. In fact, ABC itself recognised that it was Ven-
ezuela’s main opposition party that had made the accusation of ‘alleged illegal 
financing’ of Podemos.
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El País took a similar line, repeating the story of the payment of Podemos 
leaders by the Venezuelan government. Although it did not directly claim that 
this was a case of illegal financing, it did adopt the same theory as ABC. Some 
of the news articles published in El País, such as an article on 17 June 2014, ran 
with headlines like ‘Foundation related to Podemos charged Chávez 3.7 million 
euros over 10 years,’27 or attempted to establish a direct connection with one of 
the founders of Podemos, such as the story on March 1, 2015, stating that ‘El 
Nacional links Monedero to payments of 3.2 million euros. The Venezuelan 
newspaper claims that the co-founder of Podemos took payments from a Chav-
ista think tank of which he was a director.’28 Days prior to the elections of June 
2016, El País brought up the topic once again with a news story with the head-
line: ‘Venezuelan Assembly investigates financing of Podemos by Chavismo.’29
The negative impact of the media allegations of the financing of Podemos 
by Venezuela was intensified with the alleged involvement of another coun-
try: Iran. As mentioned above, this country is one of the nations classified as 
enemies of the West within the ‘axis of evil’. The validity of the anti-commu-
nist filter, adapted to the current era through the ‘us versus them’ binary,30 is 
reinforced with the inclusion of Iran as one of the supporters and financiers 
of Podemos. Both ABC and El País would corroborate this link in their news 
stories and opinion pieces to characterise Podemos’ leaders as heretics against 
the system. The difference between the two media sources in relation to the 
Podemos-Iran connection lies in the focus of attention in each case. In the case 
of ABC, the focus is placed on the money received by Pablo Iglesias from Teh-
ran for his work as a presenter on the program Fort Apache for the Madrid-
based Iranian network HispanTV.31 According to ABC, this network was spon-
sored by ‘the Iranian government in the final years of the presidency of the 
Islamist conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to influence Spain and other 
Spanish-speaking countries.’ The article also claims that this alleged financing 
is being investigated by the Economic and Fiscal Crime Unit of the National 
Police. This story from January 2016 would continue to be cited in the months 
that followed, with ABC directly asserting that the birth of Podemos had been 
‘sponsored’32 by Venezuela and Iran, with captions like ‘Chavistas and Ayatol-
lahs have contributed more than 6 million euros to the growth of the party.’
In the case of El País, the presence of Iran takes more of a political focus in an 
effort to demonstrate that its link to Podemos is an attempt to undermine the 
foundations of democracy in Spain. In this case, the newspaper uses opinion 
columns to promulgate this theory, like the article penned by Ángel Mas in 
February 2016, in which he warns of Iran’s interest ‘in destabilizing a Western 
democracy in the heart of Europe.’33 He goes on to argue that:
[…] the party that has benefited from the support of a regime like that 
does not even feel the need to conceal it from voters, who in any mature 
democracy would run screaming from the possibility of being associ-
ated with such a brutal theocracy.
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Equally critical of Pablo Iglesias is Ignacio Martín Blanco, for whom:
[…] it is abominable to listen to someone who aspires to be your nation’s 
prime minister, or at least deputy prime minister, acknowledging una-
shamedly that he has collaborated with a theocratic regime that stones 
women and homosexuals, with the sole objective of destabilizing our 
country from within.34
Martín Blanco takes an even stronger tone when he asserts that:
[…] instead of accepting the rules of the democratic game, Iglesias 
expresses his determination to take drastic measures, with no consid-
eration whatsoever for political pluralism, and to join forces with Iran 
and Venezuela against their common adversary, which is none other 
than constitutional Spain regardless of whether it is governed by the PP 
or the PSOE.
Beyond the question of financing, the idea that Podemos is a force working against 
the democratic order due to its proximity to radical ideologies also appears in 
relation to other countries of Latin America and other European leaders who 
have offered alternatives to the prevailing two-party system. Specifically, it is also 
common to read of connections between Pablo Iglesias or other members of 
Podemos and leaders like Evo Morales, as asserted in October 2014, when ABC 
published a news story that cites the Bolivian president as suggesting that ‘Spain 
should be the door for Bolivia to enter Europe,’ which can be achieved ‘with 
brothers like Pablo Iglesias.’ It should be highlighted that, although apparently a 
news article reporting the statements of Evo Morales, the interest lies in the fact 
that the Bolivian president himself is a dissident force according to the power 
structures and the media establishment. The researcher Manuel Rodríguez Illana 
has published a study on this, based on his doctoral dissertation, in which he 
concludes that ABC is the Spanish newspaper that is most hostile in its treatment 
of news on Evo Morales, to such an extent that he could be classified as a ‘devil 
of the media’.35 This theory seems to be supported by an analysis of an interview 
published by this newspaper with the Bolivian colonel Germán Cardona, with 
the headline ‘Germán Cardona: The Bolivian and Venezuelan military exports 
cocaine on official planes.’36 The interview, which attempts to uncover a cocaine 
trafficking network, contains two moments that reflect the negative treatment 
of the Bolivian president and the contaminating effect of this bias on Podemos. 
When Cardona is asked whether Evo Morales is involved in cocaine trafficking, 
the colonel replies: ‘I cannot accuse him directly, but Evo is the maximum leader 
of the coca growers and everything that happens in the Chapare, in the crop 
regions and cocaine production goes through him.’ The second and more dis-
turbing moment in the interview occurs when Cardona is asked about the pos-
sible entry of cocaine by drug cartels using political influences. Cardona answers:
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The cartel wants the Podemos party to take over the Government of 
Spain so that they can open a door for direct entry of cocaine into 
Europe. My sources tell me, ‘Colonel, the MAS (Movimiento Al Social-
ismo, Evo Morales’ party) is going to have its president in Spain; we have 
a party now; Evo is financing brother Pablo (Iglesias), he has been to 
the Chapare, our brother president brought him here.’ I asked whether 
money was given to Pablo Iglesias and they told me no, that it is given 
‘to an organization in Spain’. My informant assures me that Evo Morales 
says that with the ‘MAS’ party (Podemos), we are going to get our prod-
ucts directly into Spain, that ‘brother Pablo has said so’ (Evo Morales 
had received Pablo Iglesias in Santa Cruz the previous September).  
I asked whether they were going to take advantage of this legal trade to 
get cocaine in and he told me ‘possibly’.
This serious accusation by the newspaper ABC has its political parallel in the praise 
which, according to other writers for the newspaper, the leaders of Podemos heap 
on countries like Cuba. Thus we have the words of Mayte Alcarazen in June 2014, 
discussing Juan Carlos Monedero, one of the founders of Podemos:
Knowing that Mr Monedero considers that the repression, the execu-
tion of dissidents and the lack of the most basic elements of democracy 
in Cuba are, as he revealed yesterday, ‘situations that need to improve’, I 
have reached a conclusion. Cuba is the model.37
Also following this line of argument is Isabel San Sebastián, who in April 2016, 
only a few weeks before the elections, asserted:
Podemos is not a typical democratic force, comparable to the PSOE or 
even to Izquierda Unida. It does not defend ideological positions com-
patible with pluralism. It does not even take the trouble to conceal its 
true nature by raising its voice to condemn the unrelenting persecution 
suffered by the opposition in Venezuela or Cuba.38
Also included in this Bolivarian axis of evil is Ecuador. Thus, as if it were a 
criminal act, in December 2015 ABC featured the headline: ‘One of Iglesias’ 
deputies worked for eight years for Correa.’ In the body of the article we find 
references to the similarities between the Ecuadorean president and Pablo Igle-
sias, after which the newspaper chose to insert the following:
The political leader Diego Ordóñez (center-right) commented to ABC 
that ‘Podemos’ alliance with the Bolivarian regimes is parasitic and the 
impact is felt by Venezuelan and Ecuadorean citizens, who suffer the loss 
of their civil liberties and impoverishment due to the populist recipes that 
have already proven to be pernicious in the handling of the Greek crisis.’
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This manifestly hostile attitude toward Podemos and its leaders by linking it to 
socialist Latin American countries appears to be somewhat more moderate in the 
case of El País, although the association of the party with communist principles 
is still present. One example of this is a column written by Enrique Collado Pérez 
entitled: ‘Castro and Iglesias: Starting Over’, with the subheading: ‘Podemos isn’t 
proposing anything new. 60 years later it offers a clear parallel with the postulates 
of Castro’s Cuba.’39 It is true that the identification of Podemos with the Cuban 
regime is made mostly by its columnists, as also demonstrated by a piece penned 
in May 2015 by Ernesto Ekaizer in response to the departure of Juan Carlos 
Monedero from the party, in which he suggests: ‘Monedero’s letter oozes nos-
talgia. It gives the impression that Monedero identifies with Ernesto Che Gue-
vara when he left Fidel Castro’s Cuba.’40 The suggestion of alignment with Cuba 
and other countries within the socialist orbit even leads some reporters, such 
as Paulina Gamus, to speculate on what would happen if a party like Podemos, 
which she describes as a ‘Tyrannosaurus’, were to come to power:
The essential ingredient for the victory of a Tyrannosaurus is resent-
ment. Those seeking to achieve it must foment rage, envy and a desire for 
revenge against the politicians, who are responsible for the fact that you, 
them and I have a hard life. When the Tyrannosaurus comes to power, it 
doesn’t empower anybody except itself and its clique. In its speeches it had 
already announced, without many noticing, that a break with democracy 
was needed. It thus proceeds to destroy the institutions that guarantee 
civil rights and freedoms, and applies the same economic recipes that 
sank Cuba, that have sunk Argentina time and again, and that are now 
sinking Venezuela in the deepest pit of the most shameful misery. 41
The apocalyptic tone taken with Podemos goes to its furthest extreme in dis-
cussions of the danger it poses to the established order when it is also linked 
to two other issues: populism and radical leftism, or directly to communism. 
Clear examples of this linkage can be found in both newspapers. Thus, in an 
article announcing the publication of the book El engaño populista (The Populist 
Deception) by Gloria Álvarez and Axel Kaiser, in May 2016 ABC published the 
headline: ‘A Podemos government would be catastrophic.’42 A few days earlier, 
the newspaper had already begun promoting the book and criticizing Podemos 
when it published an article under the headline ‘The five pillars of communist 
populism’, which includes quotes from the aforementioned authors like this one:
The Bolivarian movement sweeping through Latin America does not 
belong to the leftist tradition, say Kaiser and Álvarez; it is pure populism. 
The leader of Podemos, like the presidents whom he has taken as his model, 
‘has deliberately fostered a great deception, which is the promise of wellbe-
ing for all with ideas and political projects whose only outcome would be 
the destruction of any chance of progress and freedom for the people.’43
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According to ABC, in addition to Latin American populism, there is another 
European model, embodied in the figure of Alexis Tsipras in Greece and of 
Beppe Grillo in Italy. These are examples of leftist populists, but the break with 
the two-party system also appears, according to ABC, on the right in Marine 
Le Pen in France, and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom. On this same spec-
trum of so-called populism, ABC decides to include all these leaders, thereby 
engaging in an ideological simplification typical of the commercial logic of the 
mainstream media. This is reinforced with the help of certain opinion pieces in 
the paper, such as one written by Ramón Pérez Maura, who talks directly of the 
‘communists’ of Podemos in the following way:
The tension we have seen this week between the Iglesias and Errejón 
factions in Podemos brings to mind the old days of the Russian Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party, which in the early twentieth century faced 
up against Lenin’s Bolsheviks and Yuli Martov’s Mensheviks.44
On other occasions, however, it is the paper’s news stories themselves that 
speak boldly of communism in their references to the new party. A few days 
prior to the elections of 2016, ABC ran the headline: ‘This is how Podemos is 
camouflaging its communist plan.’45 And in the body of the article, the con-
servative journalist identified this as ‘taking power, putting communism into 
practice and establishing a new “constitutional process” that will topple the cur-
rent constitutional system.’
El País also uses its columnists to make the same comparison and association 
between populism, Marxism and post-Marxism, as can be seen in a column by 
Héctor E. Schamis, who argues: ‘The so-called “populism” of this century in the 
end is profoundly authoritarian, resulting in a kind of Stalinist restoration.’46 
Other authors, like Antonio Elorza, decide that it is better to link the ‘populism’ 
of Podemos with the idea of ‘anti-systems’ intended to ‘dismantle a fragile dem-
ocratic State.’47 But without doubt the most explicit example in El País in this 
sense is the previously mentioned article titled ‘Populism: Communism 2.0’, by 
José Carlos Díez, who asserts that:
In Europe, populism is unfeasible within the democratic and legal 
framework of the EU. Syriza tried it and ended up rescuing the banks 
and applying tough cutbacks like Rajoy’s in 2012. In Spain, Podemos 
and its partners will not even be able to attempt it, holding only around 
80 out of 350 seats. Their municipal leaders are already paying the debt 
they promised not to pay, the austerity continues, the youth are still 
angry and the same poverty is still there.48
All of the above constitutes a few examples of the constant criticism that the 
two biggest newspapers in Spain make of Podemos in the context of the rise of 
this new party. This study aims to offer an exploration of the biased and decon-
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textualised treatment of news stories related to Podemos and its leaders at a 
moment of clear crisis in the two-party system. This criticism has been based 
on the use of the fifth filter in Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, in 
what I consider to be an updated version of that model. While perhaps during 
the 1990s, the fall of the Berlin Wall made it hard to see any signs that anti-com-
munism would continue to form part of the apparatus of the establishment, the 
economic and financial crisis of the last few years, which has provoked a public 
reaction and mobilization in various regions of the world (including Spain) has 
given rise to new parties like Podemos, and this emergence of new ideological 
forces that have broken up the usual alternation of power between progres-
sives and conservatives has represented a disruption of the established order. 
In this situation, traditional politicians and mainstream media, integrated in 
the power structures, have revived the anti-communism filter as a propaganda 
method. In the next section, I will set out the main conclusions of this study, 
which will need to be expanded on in future years as the Spanish political con-
text evolves.
9.5 Conclusion
The rise of Podemos as a new political force in the context of two-party domi-
nance has constituted an unprecedented development in the recent history of 
Spanish democracy. The traditional power structures, heirs to Francoism albeit 
updated in the context of globalization, have thus felt threatened (at least in 
the early days of Podemos’ existence) by this new party. As a result, the other 
political parties and the mainstream media (both their paper and digital edi-
tions) have identified it as a new ‘enemy’ which they have been quick to label as 
radical leftist, thus making new use of the ‘anti-communism’ filter as a means 
of averting the dangers posed to the established order. Although it is true that 
‘anti-communism’ does not operate like it did in the past,49 it is nevertheless 
clear that the binary of good guys and bad guys, of us versus them, continues 
to work effectively. Moreover, in the case that concerns us here, I have demon-
strated that the identification of ‘them’, the ‘enemy’, or the ‘bad guy’ is closely 
associated with the resurgence of a possible communist threat.
To make this negative impact clear, two of Spain’s biggest newspapers, El 
País and ABC, have published news stories and opinion pieces that associate 
Podemos with other ‘devils of the media’, to quote Ramón Reig.50 The study 
presented here shows that there has been a clear media manipulation in an 
effort to demonise Pablo Iglesias’ party, to which end various techniques have 
been used. One of these has involved the prioritization of content, as demon-
strated by the ongoing importance given to the alleged financing of Podemos 
by Venezuela. In this case, furthermore, certain important pieces of informa-
tion have been purposefully omitted, resulting in the decontextualization of the 
facts. Despite the fact that no court has been able to confirm such financing and 
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that every legal action filed has been dismissed due to a lack of evidence, the 
two newspapers have repeated the story, in many cases using sources from the 
Venezuelan opposition and casting doubt on the words of Podemos’ leaders. 
The contamination of the information has been further supported by opin-
ions published in both media sources that have given columnists free reign to 
classify the members of Podemos as populists and radicals. The negative bias 
is also evident in the choice of sources, with priority given to actors who are 
manifestly against the new political party. Furthermore, the anti-Podemos slant 
has also been demonstrated by the choice of preconceived ideas in the collec-
tive imagination associated with the axis of evil (Iran or the Bolivarian states of 
Latin America) to develop this superstructural identification.
As noted above, this analysis is only a first approach to the treatment of 
Podemos by the Spanish, mainstream, online media. The fundamental purpose 
of this study has been to confirm what seemed to me to be a scientific intuition 
that Podemos was not being accepted by the media system because it is viewed 
as a threat to the latter’s survival, as was communism during the Cold War. It 
is clear that the new Left apparently represented by Podemos has been turned 
into an enemy to attack for the power structures in which the media, politicians 
and corporations all appear to share the same interests.
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PART I I I
Screen Entertainment and 
Broadcast Media

CHAPTER 10
A Screen Entertainment Propaganda 
Model
Matthew Alford
How useful is Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Propaganda Model (PM) 
for analysing the entertainment media? I have previously established that the 
PM is an essential tool for analysing cinema1 and that the objections raised to 
such an enterprise are insubstantial.2 Both Herman and Chomsky have indi-
cated that they consider the model to be more widely applicable but that the 
entertainment media is beyond their immediate fields of interest.3 This article 
applies the PM to both the cinema industry and to network television, as a 
means by which we can assess the model’s utility more widely in contemporary 
America.
The PM hypothesises that the US media ‘mobilise support for the special 
interests that dominate state and private activity’4 and that media representa-
tions of the US’ role in the world can be explained through five contributory 
factors or ‘filters,’ which ‘cleanse’ information from the real world to leave only 
the ‘residue’ which is acceptable to established power systems.5 The filters are 
as follows: ‘size, ownership and profit orientation’ (first filter); ‘the advertising 
license to do business’ (second filter); the need for the media to use power-
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ful organisations in ‘sourcing’ information (third filter); the ability of powerful 
organisations to issue flak (fourth filter), and a dominant ideology of a superior, 
benevolent ‘us’ in the West versus a backward ‘them’ overseas (fifth filter).
The residue never goes beyond certain ‘bounds of acceptability,’6 including 
the idea that the US is a ‘terrorist’ state,7 ‘rogue’ state,8 or ‘failed’ state.9 In turn, 
the US and its media consciously or unconsciously classify all populations as 
‘worthy’ (the US and its allies) and ‘unworthy’ (everyone else – the ‘unpeople’ 
to borrow Mark Curtis’ term10).11 America’s image of itself, in short, is rendered 
benevolent and, even, exceptionalist.
10.1 A Screen Entertainment Propaganda Model:  
Predictive Capabilities
To test their hypothesis, Herman and Chomsky examine the news residue 
carefully to see if any remaining elements challenge fundamental assumptions 
about established power systems, particularly the US treatment of ‘official ene-
mies’ overseas. They find very little. What does remain – the ‘residue’ – we can 
further categorise into five distinct areas:
1. That which has little or no political relevance, and, in terms of the political 
world, is merely distraction;
2. That which is overtly supportive of establishment goals;
3. That which initially appears to criticise the political system but, on closer 
reading, provides it with fundamental support;
4. That which does genuinely challenge Western power systems but is explic-
itly marginalised by the media mechanisms;
5. That which does genuinely break through the filtration system, which 
invariably occurs for irregular reasons and/ or with serious caveats.
I will now address each of these five elements of the residue and also establish 
how they relate to a screen PM, specifically how well they can predict output. 
This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of the model in this context.
(i) That which has little or no political relevance, and, in terms of the politi-
cal world, is merely distraction.
Herman and Chomsky point to astrology, crossword puzzles, sports, and the 
‘funnies’ in newspapers that serve only to entertain the public and provide no 
relevant information to the real world. As Chomsky explains:
This is an oversimplification, but for the eighty per cent [of the popula-
tion] or whatever they are, the main thing is to divert them. To get them to 
watch National Football League. And to worry about ‘Mother with Child 
with Six Heads,’ or whatever you pick up on the supermarket stands and 
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so on. Or look at astrology. Or get involved in fundamentalist stuff or 
something or other. Just get them away. Get them away from things that 
matter. And for that it’s important to reduce their capacity to think.12
Similarly, large quantities of film and television relates in little or no way to the 
US’ role in the world. Shows like X-Factor and films like Sharknado do not tell 
us much, at least not directly, about American politics, whilst some shows like 
Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire? may even be construed as actively 
damaging broader socio-cultural advances such as feminism.
(ii) That which is overtly supportive of establishment goals, particularly the 
treatment of official enemies.
Herman and Chomsky take it for granted that there is a strong strain of think-
ing on the right that reflexively supports the core planks of establishment 
thinking, specifically the benevolence of the US system and its right to utilise 
force at its sole discretion. This plank of the media is ‘crazy’ and may be equated 
to fascism.13
Similarly, film and television is replete with products that follow this line. In 
fact, we know that the CIA, Pentagon and White House explicitly support a long 
line of political products. My latest research with Tom Secker, drawing on Free-
dom of Information Act requests, demonstrates that this has consisted of over 
800 Hollywood films, over one thousand TV shows along with hundreds more 
supported by the CIA, NSA, White House, and State Department.14 We know 
now that the state is far more involved in entertainment, with scant acknowl-
edgement or open documentation, than scholarship has ever been able to dem-
onstrate previously and its ability to control narratives is similarly remarkable.
Many more products are commonly accepted as supporting establishment 
narratives, but without explicit production assistance, from Rambo to Taken.
(iii) That which initially appears to criticise the political system but, on 
closer reading, provides it with fundamental support.
The above two categories are relatively uncontroversial. It is widely accepted 
that the media is ‘dumbed down’ and even Ben Shapiro, a prominent media 
researcher who bemoans what he sees as pervasive left-wing messages in enter-
tainment culture, admits that there is a body of right-wing products including 
the TV series 24.15 The remaining three categories are more controversial.
Herman and Chomsky examine examples of where the media is commonly 
assumed to have challenged the state, as with the coverage of the Watergate 
break-in or the Vietnam War (2002). As key parts of their critique in these 
cases, respectively, they point to: the media supporting the Democrat desire to 
oust President Richard Nixon over comparatively minor domestic crimes, and 
it ignoring the aggression by the US against South Vietnam.
Similarly, with screen entertainment, we can try to identify output that genu-
inely challenges established power systems. Here are some prominent examples 
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of products from the past thirty years that have been labelled as very challeng-
ing to Western political structures but which, at their core, are embedded with 
messages that actually support these narratives. I give two examples here, one 
from cinema (Munich) and one from television (West Wing) although to this 
list we might add Avatar, Hotel Rwanda, Three Kings, Thirteen Days, Amistad, 
Homeland and Newsroom, amongst others, many of which I have discussed in 
detail elsewhere.16
Munich (2005) was condemned by various Israeli groups as being opposed to 
Israeli policy. It was boycotted by the Zionist Organisation of America (ZOA) 
and mainstream media outlets emphasised its even-handedness. In a single 
article, uncited elsewhere, director Steven Spielberg said explicitly: ‘I agree with 
[Israeli Prime Minister] Golda Meir’s response [to the 1972 terrorist attack at 
the Munich Olympics].’17 A year after the release of the film, his foundation, The 
Righteous Persons Foundation donated $1m to Israel during the US-backed 
invasion of Lebanon in 2006.18 The most celebrated ‘anti-war scene’19 is a two-
and-a-half minute exchange between an Arab and an Israeli, but a close textual 
reading shows that this merely points out that the Palestinian struggle is both 
futile and immoral.20 The film elsewhere contrasts the emotional struggle felt 
by the civilised Israelis compared with the callousness of the Arabs. The film is, 
therefore, an apologia for the state of Israel, the ‘worthy’ victim, and, by exten-
sion, its closest ally, the United States.
The West Wing (1999–2006) was dubbed by right-wing critics as ‘The Left 
Wing’21. In fact, the series depicts the White House team as well-meaning, com-
petent, and idealistic. According to one of its stars, Rob Lowe, who spoke to Presi-
dent Bill Clinton in 2000, the White House staff was ‘obsessed with the show’ 
and Clinton himself was reported as thinking it was ‘renewing people’s faith in 
public service’22. The West Wing bromide worked for the Bush administration 
too – just after 9/11, the series’ creator Aaron Sorkin rushed through production 
a special episode about a massive terrorist threat to America entitled ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael.’ ‘I’m going to blow them [the Jihadists] off the face of the earth with the 
fury of God’s thunder,’ says the President, in rhetoric more audacious than that of 
even the real-world incumbent, despite it being spoken by Hollywood’s leading 
anti-war liberal, Martin Sheen. In series two, the anti-globalization movement 
is cut down in a stylish and impassioned speech by a White House official that 
concludes: ‘… Free trade stops wars! And we figure out a way to fix the rest. One 
world, one peace.’ The two central theoretical underpinnings of US foreign policy, 
neoliberalism and neo-conservativism, are thereby endorsed with a flourish.
(iv) That which does genuinely challenge Western power systems but are 
explicitly marginalised by the media mechanisms.
Herman and Chomsky also find examples of news reports that are buried, 
barely publicised. For example, the isolated news reports that the Bush admin-
istration was deliberately avoiding a diplomatic solution to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990.23 Or Arthur Schlesinger’s op-ed on the eve of the Iraq War 
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that it was the US that today lived in infamy.24 Herman and Chomsky routinely 
emphasise the rarity of such articles.
A number of comparable cases of screen entertainment products do indeed 
similarly present genuinely challenging narratives, just like those rare excep-
tions Herman and Chomsky point to in the news, but which are similarly given 
remarkably limited distribution, in line with the first and fourth filters of the 
PM. Of course, in some cases it might simply be that the products did not 
resonate with the public and therefore had no box office successes. Prominent 
cases of these include Canadian Bacon (1995) (investment $11m, box office 
$178,000, Rotten Tomatoes 14%), They Live (1988) (investment $3m, box office 
$13m, Rotten Tomatoes 83%), Redacted (2007) (investment $5m, box office 
$782,000, Rotten Tomatoes 43%) and War, Inc (2008) (investment $10m, box 
office $1,296,184, Rotten Tomatoes 29%).
In some of cases, we know of targeted campaigns to shut the films down 
for political reasons. In the cases of NewsCorps’ Bulworth (1998) and Disney’s 
Fahrenheit 9/11, the distributors ultimately impeded the release of their own 
films for political reasons.25
In several cases on television, we know that the hardest hitting material was 
also either suppressed or edited by its own distributors for political reasons.
Elaine Briere26 struggled to get her film Bitter Paradise: The Sell-Out of East 
Timor (1997) to CBC. This was not for lack of quality or opportunities but 
rather because the film challenged the interests of CBC. The film had won 
the prestigious Hot Docs award for best political documentary, which usually 
results in screenings on CBC. Briere commented:
I offered first window to the CBC but it was tossed around like a hot 
potato between three of their current documentary programs. It was 
lawyered, something that rarely happens with the CBC. The CBC 
wanted several important changes including deleting the part about 
Pierre Trudeau, our then Prime Minister, meeting with [Indonesian 
dictator] Suharto several months before the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor, taking out the part about Canadian oil and mining companies 
investing in Indonesia, and at one point even replacing me as a narrator, 
saying I was too subjective and not journalistic enough. Bitter Paradise 
never at any point claimed to be journalistic, but was a point-of-view 
documentary, an accepted genre of the day.27
Eventually, Briere saw no alternative but to work with a different distributor – 
TV Ontario – but she writes about the film’s ongoing problems:
Bitter Paradise was screened only once [on TV Ontario] in a strand 
called A View from Here when I got a call from the then head of TVO, 
Rudy Buttingol. He said that INCO, Canada’s giant multinational nickel 
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mining company based in Sudbury, Ontario, with large mining opera-
tions in Sulawesi, Indonesia, wanted the film off the air or they would 
sue TVO. (there was a short section on INCO’s operations in Indone-
sia in the film.) INCO, at the time, was TVO’s second largest corporate 
donor. Rudy told me not to go to the media and that they would handle 
it. I heard nothing back from TVO and the film never aired again. Nor-
mally it would have had four screenings on A View from Here.28
A similar pattern of events affected the cases of Lumumba and Strip Search.29 
Even on The Daily Show, seemingly a law unto itself, host Jon Stewart was 
forced to apologise publicly after calling President Harry Truman a ‘war crimi-
nal’ for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.30
(v) That which does genuinely break through the filtration system, which 
invariably occurs for irregular reasons and/ or with serious caveats.
There does remain a small but significant quality of productions that have made 
it through the filtration system and with a reasonable level of studio backing 
(over $10m), without seeming to have been subject to the usual filters, most 
famously as follows:
JFK (1991); Malcolm X (1992); Heaven and Earth (1993); Nixon (1995); Wag 
the Dog (1997); Starship Troopers (1997); Lord of War (2005); Syriana (2005); 
V for Vendetta (2006); Rendition (2007); Green Zone (2009); Fair Game (2011); 
The Bourne Identity series (2002-); Kill the Messenger (2014); Selma (2014). In 
television, the list includes Roots (1977) and Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the 
United States (2012).
Each film is at least loosely based on true stories about American systems 
of domination and sympathetically highlights ‘unworthy’ victims. Their 
existence points to a still flickering flame of permissible oppositional dis-
course. It is important, however, not to overstate the importance of these 
products in terms of the challenge they present to the PM. This is where Her-
man agrees that the model only offers ‘a broad framework of analysis that 
requires modification depending on many local and special factors, and may 
be entirely inapplicable in some cases.’ In line with the model, some of the 
films reflect dissensus amongst the elites, as with Rendition (rendition and 
torture) and Malcolm X and Selma (minority rights). In the case of Heaven 
and Earth (the Vietnam War), Green Zone and Fair Game (the Iraq War), in 
particular, it is worth bearing in mind that these products came many years 
too late to influence the political debates with which they are primarily con-
cerned. Other films on the list might be better placed in the second category, 
in that although they may be critical of some aspects of the US system, they 
are very supportive of it in other ways – the clearest cases being JFK and 
Nixon, which assault the system but glorify a bygone era dominated by the 
Kennedy family.
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10.2 Analytical Limitations
There are four limitations to the screen PM: (i) the relative difficulty in measur-
ing results; (ii) the non-specificity of the filter metaphor; (iii) the vagueness of 
the fifth filter, (iv) the apparent weakness of the first four filters.
I shall explain each in turn.
(i) The relative difficulty in measuring results.
Reading entertainment products using Herman and Chomsky’s theoretical 
framework does not sit well in cultural studies, and with some justification. 
Herman and Chomsky are particularly interested in the representation of vic-
tims, perpetrators, heroes and villains but if we are to identify these quite lim-
ited representations in cinema, we would miss many subtle differences between 
films. For example, we would be unable to distinguish between a macho mili-
taristic action-thriller like Executive Decision (1996), and a macho militaristic 
action-comedy like True Lies (1994). Both these films had very similar plots 
(Islamic terrorists threaten the US government with nuclear weapons) but they 
are very different products in terms of what they offer audiences, in respect of 
genre, but also in terms of gender, race, imagery, and so on. Because the PM 
does not accommodate such perspectives, its reading of any cultural product 
is liable to be caustic and lacking in subtly. The point is well summarised by 
a review of this author’s book Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American 
Supremacy (2010) that sympathetically applied the PM to cinema: ‘[it] renders 
much that film studies has tried to do over the last fifty years ... as effectively 
wasted effort.’31
In defence of the model, Chomsky himself points to some ‘paired examples’ in 
cinema, in some very unusual forays into the field. He notes that in the early 1950s 
the establishment heaped extensive praise onto On the Waterfront (1954) whilst 
Salt of the Earth (1954) was subjected to the most extraordinary attacks by the FBI 
and other official organisations. Both films are now regarded as classics but their 
differing experiences at the time appear to come down to the fact that the former 
was anti-Union and the latter was pro-Union32 Chomsky drew a similar compari-
son between the box office record-breaker American Sniper (2014), with the civil 
rights drama Selma (2014).33 For his part, Herman stresses that a focus on micro-
issues of language, text interpreting and gender and ethnic identity is ‘politically 
safe and holds forth the possibility of endless deconstruction of small points in a 
growing framework of jargon,’34 which implies that being overly concerned with 
genre, gender, race, and imagery is a distraction from the fundamentals.
However, neither Herman nor Chomsky can refute the limitation entirely. 
Stuart Hall35 contends that textual meaning cannot be finally ‘fixed’ because the 
same image can carry several different meanings and, in the words of Philip 
Davies and Brian Neve ‘a reading’ is precisely what the word implies – ‘not a 
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revealed truth.’36 Of course, certain aspects of an entertainment product can be 
observed with very broad, if not an absolute, consensus. For example, we can 
usually agree on the general phenotypes for each character – ‘good guy,’ ‘bad 
guy,’ hero, villain, victim, and so on. Nevertheless, whilst Herman and Chom-
sky can readily demonstrate bias in the US news media by examining quantity 
of coverage in paired examples, for example when they contrast the shocking 
lack of coverage on the Indonesian invasion of East Timor with coverage of Pol 
Pot’s killing fields in Cambodia,’37 comparably elegant results are not as easy to 
establish in screen entertainment.
As Robert Kolker argues, the formal conventions of Hollywood film tend to 
‘downplay or deny the ways in which it supports, reinforces and even sometimes 
subverts the major cultural, political and social attitudes that surround and 
penetrate it.’38 In contrast, news media convey their messages in more straight-
forward terms. For example, Robert Ray (1985) argues that ‘problem pictures 
critique large social issues but ultimately have happy endings that resolve those 
problems.’39 Richard Dyer concurs and illustrates with a popular example: in the 
second and third Rambo movies (1985 and 1987), the protagonist John Rambo 
is ‘doing the job… that the United States government should be doing. Thus, he 
repeatedly upholds basic American values against the actuality of America.’40
Decoding screen entertainment becomes even less accurate when we consider 
the value of wholly metaphorical readings. For example, Alan Nadal (1997) 
claims that the Disney cartoon Aladdin (1992) is a ‘metaphor for American cul-
ture,’ ‘a critique of the Muslim Middle east,’ and ‘asserts the immense destructive 
potential of a nuclear armed Middle East.’41 Whilst there is a case to be made 
for such a reading, there are, of course, no direct references within Aladdin to 
nuclear weapons, US power, or contemporary Middle Eastern politics and so the 
case remains mired in the ambiguities of a post-Structuralist reading.
In turn, this ambiguity about interpretation opens up the debate about the PM’s 
evasion of audience effects. Herman and Chomsky rightly insist that the model is 
one of ‘performance’ not ‘effects’42 and Klaehn neatly states that ‘[t]o criticise the 
model for failing to scrutinise that which it was not designed to explore, investi-
gate or assess is perhaps analogous to condemning a book for failing to provide 
surround sound.’43 However, in light of the difficulties in agreeing how to read an 
entertainment product, it is arguably more important to establish which products 
need to be read. If Aladdin has a significant political impact on audiences (which 
we do not know, since audience studies of cinematic effects are scarce), this sug-
gests it should be analysed. If we do not know whether it did or did not, then it 
makes deciding on a sample for analysis much harder and more subjective.
(ii) The non-specificity of the filter metaphor.
John Corner argues that the notion of a filtration model is ‘ambitious,’ consid-
ering that the PM is ‘in essence a broad checklist of downflow tendencies.’44 
Chomsky essentially agreed when he told me there’s no algorithm for judging 
relative importance [of each filter] abstractly. It varies from case to case. Simi-
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larly, Oliver Boyd-Barrett accepts the premises of the PM but complains that it 
does not ‘identify methodologies for determining the relative weight of inde-
pendent filters in different contexts.’45 This somewhat detracts from the beauty 
of the metaphor and, so, understandably, Corner concludes that he is more com-
fortable with Herman’s later description of the PM as a ‘first approximation.’46
Klaehn contests this by posing a rhetorical question: ‘How vague are the con-
cepts of “alienation” and “reification” (conflict theory) or “systems” and ‘collec-
tive conscience” (structural functionalism)?’ Arguably very. Should the PM be 
held to a higher standard than other models within the social sciences? If yes, 
why? Is it because it challenges power and can be understood and utilised with-
out the need for intermediaries?’ The answers to Klaehn’s questions are obvious 
but it is nevertheless important to identify the extent to which the PM can pre-
dict and explain, rather than just settling on it as being eminently serviceable, 
as Thompson (2009) also opines when he applies the PM to financial media 
reporting.47
Oliver Boyd-Barrett argues that the PM privileges structural factors and 
‘eschews or marginalizes intentionality.’48 He recommends greater attention to 
journalistic departures from, rather than routine conformity with, the prefer-
ences of official sources, and further study of journalistic fears of flak from edi-
tors, the right-wing media, and government officials. Boyd-Barrett also suggests 
a sixth filter: the ‘buying out’ of individual journalists or their media by intelli-
gence agencies, other government bodies and/or special interest groups. Disput-
ing Chomsky’s stance on ‘conspiracy theory,’ Boyd-Barrett points to the 1970s 
US Senate investigations and the ‘irrefutable evidence of wide-scale, covert CIA 
penetration of media – by definition, an illustration of conspiracy’ at work.49 As 
such, it might be more appropriate to have some of the purifying work of the 
filters assisted by needles injecting additional fluids to generate that resultant 
residue. Klaehn50 responds that the PM does not ‘make predictions concern-
ing agency and/or subjectivity’ but rather ‘highlights the fact that awareness, 
perception and understandings are typically constrained and informed by struc-
tures of discourse.’51 Again, Klaehn is right to defend the integrity of the model 
but nevertheless I maintain it is important to highlight where its limits lie.
(iii) The vagueness of the fifth filter.
The fifth filter is egregious because it does not specify a powerful entity like 
advertisers, the government or corporations that filter material. Rather, it is just 
what Herman and Chomsky call a ‘cultural milieu,’52 which is hard to reconcile 
within the filtration system. Klaehn disagrees, saying that:
Analytically, the fifth filter is extremely useful and applicable to a range 
of case studies. It may play out in different ways at different times, con-
tingent upon specific time/place contexts, and is extremely broad (as are 
many other concepts within the social sciences, such as hegemony and/
or patriarchy, for instance). That the fifth filter is so generalised makes it 
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relatable to a range of social phenomenon, and creates space for the PM 
to be utilised in a variety of social scientific research.53
A less charitable term for ‘generalised’ though is ‘vague.’ If, indeed, it is neces-
sary, it seems at least to warrant being given a single, fixed and neutral phrase 
such as ‘tribe mentality,’ since the present formulations provided by Herman 
and Chomsky emphasise a range of a priori leftist bug-bears: dominant ideol-
ogy, anti-Other, anti-communism, and pro-free market.
(iv) The apparent relative weakness of the first four filters.
As the videogames industry shows, even if we quite dramatically reduce the 
concentration of US ownership, output remains comparably de-radicalised. 
Whereas the Hollywood majors own at least three quarters of the movie mar-
ket, US gaming companies own just a third of the videogame market and are 
very much challenged by Japan and Europe in an industry that has global suc-
cesses from numerous countries. Yet there remains a substantial contingent of 
gaming products that are highly militaristic and nationalistic, and very little 
could be described as opposing US exceptionalism.54
The importance – or otherwise – of advertising can also be identified by 
examining the output of Home Box Office (HBO), which relies on subscrip-
tion rather than any advertising revenue. HBO has produced shows that appeal 
more to anti-authoritarian sensibilities, such as The Daily Show (1996-), South 
Park (1997-), and Game of Thrones (2011-). Yet none of these productions 
could be identified as agitating for radical political change.
David Edwards of Media Lens, argues that the attempt to isolate the filters is 
essentially an impossible task:
HBO might be protected from the impact of direct advertising but it’s 
immersed in a media, cultural, political and economic system that isn’t 
protected. Its workers, managers, stars, viewers and critics are all prod-
ucts of that advertiser-dependent culture, so that culture impacts HBO 
indirectly that way. Everyone is responding to HBO from inside an 
advert-drenched and conditioned culture.55
The point is well made but it only adds to the case that the filtration metaphor in 
any Screen Entertainment PM must be non-specific and that the first and second 
filters do not function with the efficiency Herman and Chomsky imply, even whilst 
they do contribute to the ‘strong tendency’ for narratives that support US power.
None of this is to say that the PM is inaccurate – each filter applies to the 
screen entertainment industry overall. It just means that it is not good at 
measuring or predicting when each filter applies with regards to screen media 
beyond the news. These are the ‘special factors  ... that will modify its appli-
cability’56 to which Herman refers, that add to the overall sense that a Screen 
A Screen Entertainment Propaganda Model 155
 Entertainment Propaganda Model is of less direct use than the original formu-
lation for news and that even the original PM cannot be defended uncritically.
10.3 Conclusions
The PM rightly characterises elite news media as keeping political debate within 
tightly controlled boundaries and therefore as ranging between not challenging 
established power systems to directly supporting them. When we apply the PM 
across screen media, in predictive terms it suffers from the same limitations as 
with news and is also harder to test because theorists are understandably more 
liable to disagree about interpretations of entertainment texts. Its explanatory 
capabilities are also weaker, since although each filter can be important, screen 
products so infrequently challenge organised power that the fourth filter is 
rarely activated, although some evidence suggests it does become important 
in exceptional cases when the other filters fail. The second filter – advertising, 
is significant, but even when its role is significantly reduced, as with HBO, the 
impact on the ideology of output is not decisive. The first filter – ownership, 
is important but shows like TV Nation indicate that the system is prepared 
to allow some forms of dissent and the greater reduction in US ownership in 
video-gaming points to the limits of its importance. Recent evidence has sug-
gested that the third filter, sourcing, is considerably more important than schol-
arship has hitherto accepted, with government entities directly affecting the 
politics of many thousands of entertainment products, although even here it is 
typically hard to say exactly how much influence such forces are actually able 
to exert, or the extent to which similar or identical products would be made 
regardless.
Of course, if all existing forms of media ownership, funding and sources were 
revolutionised, the outputs would be very different, akin to a ‘PBS-plus’ model, 
but for this to have a decisive impact on the way it represents the interplay 
between heroes, villains and victims, rather than just tonal changes – the kind 
of differences exhibited between HBO and Fox, or the BBC and Disney – these 
kinds of changes would need to be total rather than incremental. We are left 
with a model that remains a clear framework for predicting and highlight-
ing the ideological constraints and regressive characteristics of wider cultural 
output but one which relies on a loose ‘catch-all’ final filter to account for the 
unmeasurable impacts of the first four factors.
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CHAPTER 11
American Television:  
Manufacturing Consumerism
Tabe Bergman
11.1 Introduction
Television plays a central, highly visible role in American society as well as 
across the globe. It is little wonder then that scores of scholars have examined 
television in all its facets and from a wide range of perspectives. Equally unsur-
prising, the conclusions have been diverse. Despite the flood of scholarship, 
as far as the author can tell, devising a critical model of the political economy 
of American television has not been a focus, although critical political econo-
mists, and scholars often cited by them, have of course studied popular culture 
and television. This chapter, then, provides a critical political-economic model 
of American television. It introduces a Propaganda Model for American Tel-
evision (PMTV) by adapting the five filters of Herman and Chomsky’s Propa-
ganda Model (PM) to the American television industry and programming.
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11.2 A Propaganda Model for American Television (PMTV)
11.2.1 Filter One: Private Ownership and Pro-business Regulation
Not just television news but all programming is ultimately the product of a few 
corporations. Setting up a television station requires a large amount of capital, 
which severely limits who can do so. The freedom to influence American cul-
ture by broadcasting television thus belongs to the happy few who own and run 
the handful of corporations that dominate the American market and, thus, the 
public mind. Additionally, they control many other media holdings, includ-
ing radio stations, magazines, film studios, cable channels, and so on.1 Often 
they bundle their forces in joint ventures. Virtually everyone else is effectively 
barred from entering the market, though on occasion an independent produc-
tion breaks into the mainstream.
The television corporations belong to even larger conglomerates. For instance, 
NBC is owned by telecom giant Comcast and by the Walt Disney Company. 
The people who own and manage these corporations and conglomerates are 
wealthy and have definite domestic and foreign policy interests, which they 
often successfully promote in Washington DC through an army of lobbyists. 
They often have connections at the highest levels. For instance, Disney’s CEO 
advised President Donald Trump.2
Unlike with print journalism, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has the legal right and duty to regulate US broadcasting in the public 
interest. The constitutional freedom of the press clause has no bearing on fic-
tional shows and other non-news programming. The FCC prohibits cursing 
and what it considers excessive nudity, especially during the day and prime-
time. More to the point, the FCC holds the authority to distribute and revoke 
broadcast licenses, and to prevent excessive market concentration by setting 
limits on cross-ownership and the market share that any one entity is allowed 
to control.
Potentially, then, the special legal status of broadcasting allows the FCC to 
take action to ensure that programming serves the interests of the population. 
Public broadcaster PBS is an underfunded, largely unsuccessful attempt to do 
just that. The central problem is that the FCC has been effectively co-opted by 
the media industries it purports to regulate, as illustrated by the revolving door 
between them. Many FCC commissioners and staffers have gone on to work 
for media corporations, while many employees of media corporations have 
accepted positions at the FCC.3
Unsurprisingly, the television industry usually, though not always, gets its 
way in Washington DC.4 For instance, the deregulation of the television indus-
try in the 1990s was a boon to corporations, causing ‘all the small [production] 
businesses [to fall] apart as big TV corporations moved production in-house 
so that they could sell texts on through infinite other territories and media.’5 In 
short, federal regulation provides crucial support to the television industry in 
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its never-ending quest for more and more profit. The policy-making process 
has been captured and co-opted by big business, showing the tight and mutu-
ally reinforcing connections between capital and the state in American society. 
Hence private ownership and regulation make up the first filter together.
11.2.2 Filter Two: Advertising
Advertising is the lifeblood of American television. About a quarter of total 
broadcast time consists of commercials.6 Television additionally features cov-
ert advertising, known as product placements. With programming, corpora-
tions first amass and then sell audiences to other corporations, the advertisers. 
The audience thinks of itself as a mass of consumers, but from the perspective 
of media owners it is the product. If shows prove unable to attract a sizeable, 
preferably affluent audience – and thus the interest of advertisers – they run a 
high risk of getting cancelled. From a program’s inception particular attention 
is therefore paid to creating narratives that support the ‘buying mood.’ Adver-
tisers, big businesses for the most part, generally do not appreciate complicated, 
socially-engaged programming, especially the kind critical of capitalism.7 In 
short, the needs and demands of advertisers are central to understanding what’s 
on. Television is ‘an effective corporate instrument, whose sole purpose – as its 
executives will tell you – is to sell you to the advertisers.’8
It has been like this since the very beginning. In the early years, advertis-
ers even produced the shows themselves, and this still happens on occasion.9 
The demands of advertising of course influence programming. This is why 
programs often play up, or at least do not damp, the many supposed joys of 
consumption. For instance, as Mark Crispin Miller explains, advertisers prefer 
programming to avoid ‘dark suggestiveness’:
For advertisers are obsessed not just with selling their own specific 
images but also with universalizing the whole hermetic ambience for 
selling itself – the pseudo-festive, mildly jolting, ultimately tranquilizing 
atmosphere of TV and its bright epiphenomena, the theme park and the 
shopping mall.10
In this age of advertising glut, television sometimes consciously provokes to 
garner attention, for instance by showing gay people kiss. Reality shows are 
some of the main culprits:
TV execs believe that the more they bait advocacy groups like NOW, 
the NAACP, and GLAAD, the more controversy a show will generate. 
Offensiveness = hype = increased eyeballs for advertisers and cash for 
networks, making outrageous bigotry less a by-product of reality TV 
than its blueprint.11
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In short, both in the past and the present, per the second filter, advertisers sup-
ply networks with a de facto licence which permits the networks to remain in 
show business. Or not.
11.2.3 Filter Three: The Rules and Conventions of Production
The following discussion of a number of American television’s conventions and 
rules of production intends not to be comprehensive, but merely indicative of 
how the production process primarily serves the needs of advertisers and the 
television industry, rarely the interests of citizens. First, it should be noted that 
the production process is, to a large extent, top down. Making television has 
always been typified by the ‘characteristic modes of production’ and the hier-
archical ‘organization of industrial corporations.’12 For instance, that shining 
symbol of American entertainment, Walt Disney, introduced a highly compart-
mentalised, factory-like process for producing animations.13 Industry deregu-
lation in the 1990s strengthened management’s hold on production. From 
then on, ‘The people who made the creative decisions about everything from 
storylines to wallpaper were overridden again and again by men in suits who 
lacked relevant expertise.’14 In short, and with exceptions, television’s creative 
intelligentsia are totally free to produce what they like – as long as their bosses 
like what they produce.
‘Common sense’ notions as to what constitutes gripping television guide the 
production process. One of these is that rapid movement works well on the 
screen. Enter acts of violence, car and other chases, and special effects. The vio-
lence is almost always person-on-person and committed for personal motives, 
including the virtually ubiquitous revenge. Never mind that taking revenge 
plays a distinctly minor role in motivating people’s behaviour in the actual 
world. The crux to understanding television is realizing that it resembles more 
of a fun house mirror than an ordinary one. Television thrives when the focus is 
on individuals, with plenty of opportunity for close-ups conveying stark emo-
tions. Shots are kept short, not to say ultra-short, as the act of changing shots 
and thereby the viewer’s perspective is a tested way of keeping eyeballs glued 
to the screen. It’s simple physiology. Too much information, on the other hand, 
confuses the screen. In short, commercial television focuses on depicting indi-
viduals and providing compelling images, with the result that the content tends 
to be superficial and more about conveying emotions than explicating ideas.
Much more than print journalism, making television is a long, collective 
undertaking. The vision of the screenwriter, the true creative, often gets diluted 
by the subsequent persons that revise the original work with an eye on the 
bottom line. The original work gets ‘mainstreamed’: made more palatable for 
the market. The short length of shows, which in part is a result of the need to 
reserve time for commercials, together with their highly formulaic structure, 
probably limit the ability to tell non-stereotypical stories. Sitcoms, for instance, 
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are only about 22 minutes long and adhere to a rigid, almost minute-by-minute 
structure.15
Like corporate journalists, then, the individuals working in television pro-
duction are highly restricted in their creativity. They need to honour the com-
mon conventions and rules of production, which are enforced by management 
with the bottom line in mind. On occasion, the process produces (or rather 
allows) enlightening or subversive programming. A tiny number of writers and 
actors has reached such an exalted status that they can push through projects 
that normally would not stand a chance. Yet most of the time, the production 
process serves the interests of owners and advertisers. In short, the business 
of television strongly prefers the profitable predictability of business as usual.
11.2.4 Filter Four: Overt and Covert Influence
Aside from media corporations themselves, and regulators and advertisers, 
many other organizations and institutions are profoundly concerned with, and 
try to influence, television content. Congressional hearings on supposed com-
munist subversion in Hollywood right after World War II sent a chill through 
the entertainment industry by making suspect anything that smacked of pro-
gressivism. All through the Cold War, state agencies influenced television and 
movies, often with the active cooperation of the networks. The CIA has a long 
and successful history of influencing, behind the scenes, its image in movies 
and television shows.16 Right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, executives from 
Hollywood and the major television networks met with a top advisor of Presi-
dent George W. Bush. The goal of the meeting reportedly was ‘to discuss how 
the entertainment industry could cooperate in the war on terrorism and to 
begin setting up a structure to make it happen.’17
It is no different today, as files released by the Department of Defense show:
The sheer scale of the Army and the Air Force’s involvement in TV 
shows, particularly reality TV shows, is the most remarkable thing about 
these files. ‘American Idol,’ ‘The X-Factor,’ ‘Masterchef,’ ‘Cupcake Wars,’ 
numerous Oprah Winfrey shows, ‘Ice Road Truckers,’ ‘Battlefield Priests,’ 
‘America’s Got Talent,’ ‘Hawaii Five-O,’ lots of BBC, History Channel and 
National Geographic documentaries, ‘War Dogs,’ ‘Big Kitchens’ — the 
list is almost endless.18
State agencies, thus, frequently enlist the entertainment industry, including tel-
evision, in information campaigns, which are likely to be all the more effective 
for not easily being identifiable as such.
In addition, various kinds of pressure groups on both the left and the right 
organise campaigns to influence content. The conservative Parents Television 
Council mounted so many successful campaigns against broadcasters that the 
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New York Times once dubbed it a ‘superstar in the culture wars.’ The Coun-
cil was responsible for ‘record-setting fines against media giants like CBS’ as 
punishment for programming that supposedly crossed the line, for instance as 
to profanities or nudity.19 Yet, in the final analysis, broadcasters probably care 
more about displaying shapely bottoms to pad bottom lines than catering to 
the sensibilities of cultural conservatives, or anyone else for that matter. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 a media expert remarked on the dif-
ficulty for the Parents Television Council ‘to stir up indignation about cultural 
issues at a time of economic woe.’20 Additionally, compared to the state and big 
corporations, the resources at the disposal of pressure groups are paltry. They 
are likely to lose out, in the end, to the needs of capital.
11.2.5 Filter Five: Neoliberalism as a Control Mechanism
Neoliberalism is America’s dominant ideology. It is a worldview that includes 
the core belief that private interests can do just about anything better than the 
state. With its opposition to social welfare programs, unions, public education, 
and idolization of the individual and ‘free markets,’ neoliberalism serves the 
interests of economic elites, including media owners. Just like ‘anti-communism’ 
during the Cold War, the ideology called neoliberalism
helps mobilise the populace against an enemy, and because the concept 
is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten 
property interests or support accommodation with [left-wing] states 
and radicalism. It therefore helps fragment the left and labour move-
ments and serves as a political control mechanism.21
The people involved in creating programming will, to some extent, be believers 
in American society’s dominant myths taught in school and by the media. And 
many people working in the television industry, especially the higher-ups, will 
have ‘fully internalised’ neoliberal values.22 Dissenters will encounter opposi-
tion in a myriad of subtle or overt ways. It is, thus, logical to expect program-
ming to reflect neoliberal biases.
Indeed, neoliberalism pervades much television content. The iconic Oprah 
Winfrey Show, with its incessant refrain of self-reliance and self-help, is a shin-
ing example.23 Many reality shows, including The Apprentice starring the future 
American president, mirror the neoliberal vision of society. The few at the top 
advise, criticise and disdain. From Olympian heights, they pronounce harsh 
verdicts on the countless aspirants, who desperately compete among each other 
in the vain hope of one day reaching an exalted position themselves. Coopera-
tion often ends up with deceit, which teaches a valuable lesson. In the quest 
for fame and fortune that is every American’s Reagan-given right, if not duty, 
no one can be trusted. We are all lone individuals trying to make it big in the 
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only way society affords. Cooking competitions mirror the worker’s precarious 
position in a neoliberal economy by depicting cooking as a ‘strictly regimented, 
highly individuated, labour hierarchy within an economic circuit.’24 Extreme 
makeover shows often promulgate individual solutions to problems, like obe-
sity, that have an inescapable social dimension.
Dramas also often affirm neoliberal articles of faith. They bubble over with 
depictions of physical or emotional blackmail, violence, manipulation, and 
assertions of authority. Time and again the moral of the story appears to be that 
individuals simply pursue their own self-interest, which is necessarily distinct 
from and in opposition to everybody else’s. The popular crime series CSI, for 
instance, ‘promises a form of governance that appeals to a post-9/11 society in 
which mitigating factors of social life are rendered irrelevant. On CSI, the state 
has or will fail the citizen, but science cannot.’25 The hospital series House, with 
its recurring mantra that ‘Everybody lies,’ also portrays other people as neces-
sarily hostile and selfish, and preaches a belief in science. Much content, thus, 
primes viewers to think in neoliberal terms, before, during and after which 
advertisers tickle status anxiety, generously providing the instant ‘scratch’ of 
consumerism.
The PM highlights what was not chosen as fit for print. So it is instructive 
to consider not just what American television is, but also what it is not. For 
only then the ideological limits that its ‘invisible’ political economy imposes 
on content become clearly discernible. Television is hardly concerned with the 
plight of the dozens of millions of poor people in the US. It is not anti-capitalist, 
anti-corporate or even merely critical of capitalism. It hardly criticises US for-
eign policy or the many wars the US has been involved in; in fact, it has often 
cheered the armed forces on. It rarely portrays unions or other social organiza-
tions in a positive light. It can hardly be deemed democratic, because it rarely 
portrays citizens successfully coming together to improve their lives.
11.3 Additional Thoughts on a PMTV
11.3.1 Television as Technology
The PM identifies factors that influence information across media, but a PMTV 
models a medium. Thus, the influence of the technology of television needs to 
be considered. In the author’s view, the medium influences the content. As ear-
lier noted, television makers know that rapid movements on the screen make 
for more gripping television than static ‘talking heads.’ So, it is unsurprising that 
programming has greatly sped up over the years. Quite a few contemporary 
viewers will find it hard to watch old movies, because of their leisurely pace. 
The question is whether the technology or commercialism is the driving force, 
or rather, to which extent each can be considered responsible. In the author’s 
opinion, where technology ends and capitalism begins, is impossible to tell. The 
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issue appears intractable beyond the observation that television’s technological 
characteristics to some extent influence content. Technology’s influence is sub-
sumed in the PMTV’s third filter, for technology’s assumed characteristics help 
shape the rules and conventions of production.
11.3.2 The Uses of Television
Apart from content and technology, other features of the phenomenon of 
television broadly conceived also promote inimical values and behaviours. 
For instance, the widespread association of television with the home might 
reinforce in people a view of society as nothing but separate individuals with 
competing interests. There is, of course, nothing inevitable in the widespread 
practice of watching TV at home alone, although capitalism certainly has had 
a hand in stimulating the idea that the good life constitutes owning one’s own 
home, car, lawnmower, television, and so on. These days, mobile television 
affords watching in many places, but the smallness of the screen still favours 
watching alone. On the other hand, social media do stimulate sharing content 
and interaction. To be clear, the ways people use television are not part of a 
PMTV.
11.3.3 Methodology: Comparing the PM and PMTV
Compared with the original model, a PMTV has a notable methodological 
weakness. After describing the political economy of the news media, Herman 
and Chomsky prove in detail that the biases one would expect the American 
news to exhibit can indeed be found. First, they identify ‘paired examples,’ 
for instance two sets of atrocities of similar scale occurring at about the same 
time, the main difference being that one is committed by Washington or 
with its complicity, and the other by an enemy state. Then, they document 
that the news media treat these two similar series of events very differently. 
When Washington is implicated in crimes, coverage is sparse and condem-
nation mild at best, whereas when official enemies are the culprits, coverage 
is plentiful and condemning. Unfortunately, such a sophisticated method 
is unavailable for a PMTV. Herman and Chomsky disprove much of the 
mainstream media’s coverage with facts from more reliable and independent 
sources, but because fiction cannot be proven factually right or wrong, the 
same cannot be done for American television as a whole. As to evidence, 
then, the PM is more convincing than a PMTV. Yet, an added value of a 
PMTV is that it contextualises the PM. A PMTV provides a critical evalu-
ation of the programming that surrounds, arguably overwhelms, television 
news. A PMTV, thus, helps explain the media environment in which the PM 
is embedded.
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11.3.4 Strength: Comparing the PM and PMTV
The PMTV’s filters perhaps function as even more potent censorship mecha-
nisms than the PM’s. The PMTV’s first, second and third filters – ownership and 
regulation, advertising, and the production rules and conventions – are unre-
strained by professional journalism’s norm of a separation between manage-
ment and editors. In other words, because pandering to advertisers is simply an 
integral part of television’s business model, it might be that a PMTV is stronger 
than the PM. The same goes for the fourth filter, overt and covert influence on 
the television industry. Among television producers one might expect less reti-
cence to cooperate openly or behind the scenes with state agencies than among 
journalists. One might also expect the former to be more amenable to influence 
by other organizations, unless the supreme right to make money is challenged.
As to the fifth filter, both television’s creators and journalists have a reputation 
for liberal politics. Beyond that observation, we can only speculate as to the rela-
tive strength of the respective fifth filters. One might argue for instance that, com-
pared to the news, dramas contain more opportunities for and actual instances of 
fundamental criticisms of society. For the driving force behind drama is conflict. 
The need for stark conflict opens the door for perspectives that challenge received 
wisdom. Yet, even if this point has merit, it remains doubtful that fictionalised criti-
cism leads to a more socially engaged audience. Perhaps its consumption often has 
the opposite effect, amounting to just another form of escapism through catharsis.
11.3.5 American Television: Aim and Effects
There can be no dispute as to what American television aims for. Those in 
charge have clearly explained. The goal is to sell people’s attention to large 
corporations that promote buying stuff, experiences, and services. Corporate 
television, thus, attempts to manufacture consumerism. Draping itself in the 
flag, especially during times of war and other crises, television routinely links 
consumerism with patriotism. Corporate television happily relayed President 
George W. Bush’s admonition in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that Ameri-
cans continue shopping, to show the terrorists that they were not cowed. Con-
sumerism, of course, does not serve the public’s interests. In fact, much empiri-
cal evidence shows that it damages people’s mental and physical health.26
Corporate television provides an additional crucial service to elites by inun-
dating people with depoliticizing entertainment. It is the Great Distraction 
Machine. As one of the foremost thinkers on propaganda, Jacques Ellul, noted 
in the late 1980s:
Today the greatest threat is that propaganda is seeking not to attract 
 people, but to weaken their interest in society. I am astonished by the 
 enormous number of TV game shows, football games, computer games.  
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They  encourage people to play: ‘Let yourselves be entertained, amuse your-
selves, do not concern yourselves with politics, it’s not worth the trouble.’27
This second service, too, is rendered not without premeditation. As the late 
founder of the Mexican network Televisa frankly proclaimed: ‘Mexico is a 
country of a modest, very fucked class, which will never stop being fucked. 
 Television has the obligation to bring diversion to these people and remove 
them from their sad reality and difficult future.’28
How effective is American television in stimulating consumerism and depo-
liticizing citizens? Like the original PM, a PMTV is not an effects model. It 
remains silent on the extent to which American television succeeds. Indeed, 
empirically establishing media effects is tricky. On the individual level, effects 
are mediated by a myriad of factors, including gender, religion, education, age, 
and so on. Even after thousands of studies much uncertainty and controversy 
remain.29 Nonetheless, Americans clearly live in a depoliticised, consumerist 
society. To imagine American television washing its hands in innocence of all 
that does not seem right at all. An American businessman once famously com-
plained that, ‘Half my advertising is wasted, I just don’t know which half.’30 Usu-
ally, this statement is trotted out to illustrate the difficulty of influencing people 
with media or establishing media effects. But, if one half of the money spent on 
advertising is wasted, then the other half is not. The statement, thus, simultane-
ously points out a truth that probably all media influencers have discovered: the 
media do in fact influence people.
11.4 Addressing Objections to a PMTV
Some will reject a PMTV. Here, five anticipated objections are discussed. One, 
a PMTV is only a general model, a first approximation, for understanding 
American television. A PMTV surveys the television industry and captures 
the thrust of the programming, but recognises that social reality is endlessly 
complicated and that exceptions exist. To point to examples of anti-neoliberal 
content on American television, for instance, thus constitutes an unconvincing 
argument for dismissing the model.
Two, advancing a PMTV is not meant to imply that people who enjoy watch-
ing television, including the author, are therefore stupid or inferior. People can 
love American television – wholely but more likely in part – while at the same 
time cultivating a critical distance as to its overall social function. Three, some 
will object to the word ‘propaganda,’ with its connotations of conscious duplic-
ity. But the word means not to suggest that the television industry is popu-
lated with conscious propagandists, although some owners and producers will 
knowingly act as propagandists some of the time. The term is still apt because it 
is often defined, including here, as exerting influence that serves special inter-
ests as opposed to the public interest.31
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Four, a PMTV does not contend that American television serves a conserva-
tive agenda on cultural matters. Television has, in fact, become more progres-
sive on a range of issues, for instance playing a role in promoting the social 
acceptance of gay relationships, however problematic the portrayals often 
remain. A PMTV does contend that on issues that directly affect the interests 
of elites, for instance the economy, television remains a steadfast supporter of 
the status quo.
Five, some will assert that recent changes in society, including the rise of 
the internet and streaming services, undermine a PMTV. Certainly, much has 
changed since the broadcast era. In this digital age, viewers can enjoy an ample 
array of quality shows and have more control over when and where they watch. 
No wonder that some have talked of television’s New Golden Age. But as a late 
media columnist for the New York Times recognised, there is a dark side: ‘Tel-
evision’s golden age is also a gilded cage, an always-on ecosystem of immense 
riches that leaves me feeling less like the master of my own universe, and more 
as if I am surrounded.’32 Indeed, in an age of climate change, with progressive 
change possibly necessary for survival, the recent flood of quality program-
ming poses a peculiar problem. Depoliticizing programming so enjoyable that 
many people, including hard-to-please viewers like professional media col-
umnists, simply cannot resist, constitutes bad news for the prospects of change 
instigated by an engaged citizenry.
The rapid permutations taking place in the television industry perhaps affect 
the efficacy of a PMTV because, for instance, consumers can now easily block 
advertising. Yet, apart from a PMTV not being an effects model, the changes 
hardly threaten the television industry or its dominance, and therefore also do 
not threaten the analytical viability of a PMTV. Streaming services like Hulu 
are growing rapidly but are still dwarfed by traditional delivery channels.33 
Networks and cable channels supply the bulk of the offerings on streaming 
services. Leading streaming service Netflix is itself a publicly-traded global 
enterprise. It has dispensed with commercials, but other streaming services, 
including Hulu, which are owned by traditional television powerhouses, in part 
depend on them.
The television industry, thus, remains a highly concentrated, corporate 
undertaking buttressed by pro-business regulation. It remains firmly in elite 
hands. Although the relative importance of advertising as a revenue source 
is on the decline, it remains crucially important. Programming is still a com-
modity.34 The television industry is still influenced by a myriad of powerful 
organizations, including state intelligence agencies, and they promote neolib-
eral ideology. Viewers do currently enjoy more convenient access to television 
and more control over how to consume it. Although liberating in a way, these 
innovations also deepen television’s reach into the everyday fabric of people’s 
lives. Once upon a time, we could run away from the television set. These days, 
who runs without a smart phone? Television also remains profitable and pop-
ular, although perhaps not all is well on the horizon.35 In 2014, the average 
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 American over fifteen years old watched almost three hours of television per 
day.36 Baseball is often referred to as America’s national pastime, but would it 
not be more accurate to grant watching television that honour? How, after all, 
do most Americans watch their games?
11.5 Conclusion
The internet is turning out to be mostly a faux threat to the television indus-
try. Compared to the 1990s, when many observers were sanguine about the 
democratic potential of the internet, elites have made great strides in incor-
porating the internet in existing power structures. Intrusive surveillance prac-
tices are shifting much of the power early internet users once had to comment 
and organise back to elites. Commercialism runs rampant online. Google and 
Facebook depend on advertisers too. A mutually beneficial synergy has devel-
oped between the television industry and the internet giants, including Google, 
which owns advertising-supported YouTube. The website has become an addi-
tional treasured outlet for mainstream channels.37
In other words, it is unlikely that the mere availability of certain technologies 
will upend a PMTV as long as the five filters, especially the first two, remain 
in place. Hope, such as there is, lies with the coming together of people who 
realise the need for change, and who will employ the available technologies not 
for tuning out the crucial issues of the day by tuning into American television, 
but for raising critical awareness and organizing resistance.
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CHAPTER 12
The Sport of Shafting Fans and Taxpayers : 
An Application of the Propaganda Model 
to the Coverage of Professional Athletes 
and Team Owners
Barry Pollick
This paper applies Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model (hereafter called 
the ‘PM’) to the media’s coverage of sports team owners vs. professional ath-
letes, hypothesizing that the media will use more negative terms (e.g., ‘greedy’) 
to describe the athletes than to describe the owners. This hypothesis reflects 
the predictions of the PM, which posits that the dominant classes will tend to 
receive favourable coverage while workers’ interests will tend to be excluded 
from the debate. While it is true that professional athletes are typically privi-
leged workers with high salaries and influential public profiles, the main role 
they are expected to perform is to generate massive profits for team owners, 
sponsors, and TV networks by providing non-controversial entertainment. 
Furthermore, these athletes may suffer serious injuries such as ACL tears or 
even brain trauma, which may eventually lead to arthritis or chronic traumatic 
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encephalitis (CTE) respectively. As former NFL player and present Noam 
Chomsky enthusiast John Moffitt put it, in explaining why he abruptly gave 
up the fame and fortune of pro football, ‘I think it’s really madness to risk your 
body, risk your well-being and risk your happiness for money. He added, ‘Once 
you tear away the illusions of it, it’s hard work. And it’s dangerous work. And 
you’re away from your family.... It’s very tough on families’—sentiments that 
would characterise any number of professional sports.1
12.1 Summary of Empirical Studies Using the PM
There has been ample empirical evidence for the PM with respect to the 
coverage of such issues as the North America Free Trade Agreement, anti- 
globalization protests, the environment, regulation of the chemical industry, 
US foreign policy, union-management skirmishes, etc. from studies in the US, 
UK, Canada, Australia, and Spain.2 Yet this author could find no test of the PM 
vis-á-vis sports coverage. Since Chomsky argues that critical theorists should 
consider a wide range of cultural artefacts, not restricting themselves to elite 
subjects,3 it would be useful to content-analyse the coverage of professional 
athletes vs. that of sports team owners to determine quantitatively the extent 
of the hegemonic biases predicted in the PM. Such a content analysis may 
enable sports enthusiasts to recognise and resist manipulative coverage. As 
Kellner puts it,
Cultural studies shows how media culture articulates the dominant val-
ues [and] political ideologies …of our era and provides tools that enable 
us to read and interpret our culture critically, empowering us to resist 
media manipulation, increase our freedom and individuality, and strive 
for alternative cultures and political change.4
To achieve that end, this paper will conduct a key word analysis of the media’s 
coverage of professional athletes vs. that of team owners in major US sports, 
with a particular focus on what is widely viewed as America’s national sport, 
NFL football.5 Specifically, the paper will analyse coverage by both the elite 
New York Times, which represents what Herman and Chomsky call the 
‘agenda-setting’ elite press that determine what issues and events are deemed 
newsworthy by the lower-level media and establish the parameters within 
which debate and interpretation can occur6 and Google.com, which repre-
sents a more universal source of sports news that includes newspapers, maga-
zines, blogs, etc. If Herman and Chomsky’s claims are true—that the media 
frame issues in a way that favours elite interests—we should find that players 
are rarely described in positive terms (as, say, generous), whereas team own-
ers, by contrast, are rarely described in negative terms (as, say, greedy or lazy 
or overpaid).
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12.2 Context of the Study
Ironically, while Herman and Chomsky point out that it is taboo for media 
organizations, as corporate entities that depend on other corporate entities 
(advertisers), to mention socialism in a positive light,7 one type of socialism 
seems to receive a free pass: that which benefits powerful interests. Namely, 
major cities across America have socialised the profits of multi-millionaire 
sports team owners at the expense of those cities’ taxpayers. Indeed, owners 
of teams in the four largest sports leagues (the NFL, MLB, the NBA, and the 
NHL) received nearly $20 billion in taxpayer subsidies for new arenas from 
1990 to 2011, even though ‘urban planners and economists have argued that 
building facilities for private sports teams is a massive waste of public money.’8 
Yet Easterbrooke notes that this economic injustice has earned little coverage 
by the media—local or national—whereas the free agencies of Robinson Cano 
(in baseball), Lebron James and Carmelo Anthony (in basketball) and Terrell 
Suggs (in football) have received considerable coverage9 (e.g., James has been 
a free agent for just two days, yet a Google search on June 26, 2014, yielded 
3,670,000 ‘hits’), much of it negative—focusing on how overpaid the players 
are.10
What’s more, whereas team owners have been demanding socialised prof-
its, free agent players are merely exercising their free-market right to play for 
the highest bidder, after 5–7 years of being required to play for the team that 
drafted them—in violation of free-market principles and, arguably, anti-trust 
laws. In light of such ironies, were Herman and Chomsky’s PM to be inaccurate, 
we would expect to see professional athletes covered in a fairly sympathetic 
light—given that they were compelled to play for a team not of their choosing 
for many years (via a draft)—and sports team owners covered in a more critical 
manner, given that their tax-payer-subsidised profits would seem to be the sort 
of scandal that a vigilant press, dedicated to acting as the public’s watchdog, as 
Thomas Jefferson advocated, would pounce on. On the other hand, if the PM 
is accurate, we would expect to see neutral or favourable coverage for team 
owners and more negative coverage for professional athletes. For, to paraphrase 
the two scholars, hegemonic ideas favouring powerful elites are internalised by 
beat journalists and presented to news consumers as ‘common sense.’11
12.3 Methods Section
To test the prevalence of various stigmatizing terms describing athletes vs. 
those describing team owners in both the internet at large and America’s so-
called ‘paper of record,’ the New York Times, I typed such terms as spoiled ath-
lete, spoiled owner, etc. into the search engines of Google, as well as that of the 
Times’ site, which searches issues of the Times all the way back to the first edi-
tion in 1851. I chose to pair the Times, a so-called ‘liberal’ paper, with Google.
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com because the latter gives a more macro-oriented perspective, including 
blogs, the professional news media, and fan posts. Thus, in using Google, I’m 
implying a broader definition of media, which is what one encounters when 
one accesses Google.com as so many do each day.
Due to the imprecision of Google searches as a methodological tool, how-
ever, the study also includes quantitative dimensions, checking websites to see 
what they actually say and whether they are commercial outlets or fan blogs. 
This added check is important because, as Pedro notes, Google search results 
are not website neutral:
A review of specialised literature suggests that  .  .  . the selection and 
ordering of the results respond to hierarchical criteria which tend to 
favour sites belonging to established, dominant institutions, at the 
expense of new and less well-established sites, and thus for innovation 
and diversity.12
Key words and phrases examined by the study include ‘greedy athletes’ and 
‘greedy team owners’; ‘spoiled athlete’ and ‘spoiled team owner’; ‘selfish athlete’ and 
‘selfish owner’; ‘unmotivated professional athletes’ and ‘unmotivated team owners’; 
and ‘‘inflated salaries,’ players’ vs. ‘inflated salaries’ owners. Pedro, however, notes 
that the order of the keywords affects the search results, with the first words car-
rying more weight than later terms, so this study uses various permutations of 
keyword phrases (e.g., ‘lazy owner’ team; ‘lazy owner’ sports team; etc.).13
12.4 Financial Information on the New York Times and  
Google.com
The New York Times has a market capitalization of $2.35 billion, as of 3 July 
2014.14 It also owns 40 per cent of a paper company and in recent years has 
owned nine television stations, the Boston Globe, Boston.com, 16 other daily 
newspapers, and more than 50 web sites, including About.com, an online digi-
tal information provider, according to NewYorkTimes.com.15 As a multi-billion-
dollar enterprise, the Times shares common interests with such dominant insti-
tutional sectors as the banks (from which the Times acquires loans) and other 
major corporations (from which the Times seeks its large-dollar advertising rev-
enue) and thus would be expected to view issues such as union-management 
skirmishes through a corporate-friendly prism. Google, by contrast, is worth 
roughly 350 billion dollars, as of 2013.16 Celebritynetworth.net adds that Google 
is an ‘international corporation’ based in the US that offers internet services 
and products, such as advertising techniques, cloud computing, and internet 
searches.17 Note, then, that Google, not even 20 years old, is worth more than 
one hundred times what the ‘Gray Lady,’ as the 163-year-old New York Times is 
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nicknamed, is worth—for precisely the reasons that Herman identifies in updat-
ing the filters: that the ascendance of the internet and the corresponding decline 
of the newspaper industry has meant that newspapers are ever more dependent 
on senior beat sources and corporate public relations departments and less able 
to deploy investigative reporters that may, for example, run an exposé on the 
trend toward government subsidization of sports stadiums and other incentives 
given to prevent team owners from moving their teams.18
Below, I’ve listed the results of the key-word analysis, bold-facing key find-
ings. A brief discussion of the results follows each table.
One trend stands out in Table 12.1: Terms disparaging NFL players’ salaries 
or just athletes’ salaries drew vastly more hits than terms disparaging team own-
ers’ salaries. For example, the phrase inflated athletes’ salaries (not in quotes) 
drew 567,000 hits and the term inflated NFL salaries drew over 423,000 hits. 
(A random check of 30 of the hits indicated that all referred to players’ salaries, 
none to the earnings by owners.) By contrast, the phrase ‘inflated salaries’ own-
ers drew just 16,000 hits and perhaps 85 per cent of them referred to players’ 
salaries. This discrepancy seems to underscore Herman and Chomsky’s point 
that the common-sense view, expressed via the internet, reflects the interests of 
hegemonic forces, such as the extremely affluent team owners.
It should be acknowledged, however, that ‘inflated sports ticket prices’ drew 
12 million hits but fans may not hold team owners directly responsible for 
such inflation; in fact, it is just as likely that they would blame players’ inflated 
salaries, since owners’ team related earnings do not appear much on the web, 
Google.com, 1/6/2014 No. of ‘hits’
Inflated athletes’ salaries 567,000
Inflated sports ticket prices 12,000,000 (but at least half refer to ‘ticket 
 scalping’ in Europe
Inflated NFL salaries 423,000
Inflated NFL ticket prices 837,000
‘inflated NFL salaries’ 53 (but all refer to players’ salaries)
‘inflated NFL players’ salaries’ 0
‘Inflated NFL owners’ salaries’ 0
‘NFL owners’ inflated salaries’ 0
‘Inflated salaries’ players 20,100
‘Inflated salaries’ owners 16,000 (but perhaps 80% of the hits refer to 
 players’ salaries)
Table 12.1: Keyword search on Google.com Focusing on ‘Inflated’ and  ‘Salaries’.
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Google.com 6 January 2014
Overpriced NFL tickets 131,000
‘overpriced NFL tickets’ 8590
Overpriced NFL players 46,000
‘Overpriced NFL players’ 2
Overpriced professional athletes 29,900
Overpriced NFL (athletes OR players) 131,000
‘Overpaid NFL players’ 9670
‘Overpaid NFL owners’ 4 (and 3 of the 4 are from fans’ blogs/web-
pages; only 1 is from a media organization)
‘Overrated NFL players’ 46,400
‘Overrated NFL owners’ 1 (a blog-post from a fan)
‘Lazy professional athletes’ 703
‘Lazy professional athlete’ 85
‘Lazy athletes’ 5460 (but many don’t refer to professional 
athletes)
‘Lazy athlete’ 450 (likewise, many don’t refer to profes-
sionals)
‘Lazy owner’ sports teams 894
‘Lazy NFL owner’ 0
‘Unmotivated NFL owner’ 0
‘Lazy owner’ team 28,200 (but the vast majority seem to refer 
to fantasy football or baseball owners; 
motorboat owners; or dog-owners. An 
examination of the first 20 hits showed that 
just one of them referred to an NFL team 
owner: the Philadelphia Eagles owner. And 
this is a fan’s blog post speculating that the 
Eagles’ owner might be lazy or might not. 
‘Unmotivated professional athletes’ 963
‘Unmotivated professional athlete’ 35 
‘Unmotivated owner’ 829 (but I didn’t see any hits related to 
sports team owners)
‘Unmotivated owners’ sports teams 41 (but none refer to sports team owners)
‘Unmotivated owner’ sports teams 7 (only two refer to sports team owners)
Table 12.2: Keyword Search on Google.com Using ‘Overpriced,’ ‘Lazy,’ and 
‘Unmotivated’. 
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relative to players’ earnings. Nor does the media tend to provide much analy-
sis of owners’ influence on pricing, further insulating them from the fans’ ire.
Sample quote: ‘Sports fans hate nothing more than lazy, unmotivated athletes. 
By that standard, Albert Haynesworth...’19
Note the stark contrast between the number of hits for ‘overpaid NFL players’ 
(9,670 hits) and that for ‘overpaid NFL owners’ (4—and just one came from a 
media organization). So, as Herman points out in a different context, the issue 
of inflated salaries is framed in terms favourable to elites—despite a massive 
increase in NFL owners’ income relative to players’ in recent years.20 Specifi-
cally, over the past ten years, the NFL TV contract, which is paid to the owners, 
has more than doubled in value,21 as has NFL parking prices,22 and ticket prices 
have risen over 50 per cent.23 By contrast, NFL players’ salaries have only risen 
40% during those 10 years and most of that money is unguaranteed.24 What is 
more, there seems to be hardly any recognition that team owners and high level 
management receive handsome salaries. NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, 
for example, earned $29.5 million in 2011, according to Bleacherreport.com—
even though the NFL is classified as a non-profit organization and thus can 
secure public funds for building stadiums and tax subsidies for the land on 
which the stadium is built, so that the public is effectively subsidizing much of 
Goodell’s considerable salary.25
In addition, ticket and parking price hikes affect the fans more directly than 
players’ salaries do, since the team owners can offset higher player salaries by 
reducing their own salaries. Finally, the trope of the overpaid NFL athlete, 
which appears to be perpetuated by the media and fans alike on Google, belies 
four facts: (a) that NFL players make 30 to 70 per cent less than their counter-
parts in professional basketball and baseball and, unlike the latter two, tend to 
have unguaranteed contracts;26 (b) that they also make far less than each of the 
32 NFL owners (17 of whom are billionaires), whose teams have an average 
worth of over a billion dollars27 and tend to be family-owned, so that many of 
the owners, like those that inherit newspapers, have not needed to work for 
a salary;28 (c) that the players ‘play’ a sport so violent that the league recently 
settled a class action lawsuit involving thousands of players who retired with 
debilitating brain injuries apparently due to the many concussions they suf-
fered while playing professional football; (d) that the players are considerably 
underpaid for the first five to seven years of their career due to a draft that 
artificially deflates salaries.29
It is also interesting to note that ‘overrated NFL players’ [46,400 hits] and 
‘unmotivated professional athlete/athletes’ [998 hits] receive vastly more hits 
than ‘overrated owners’ [just one hit—from a fan’s blog post] and ‘unmotivated 
owners’ sports teams’ [only 2 of the 48 ‘hits’ for ‘‘unmotivated owners’ sports 
teams’ refers to sports team owners]. While it is true that some players may not 
live up to their athletic potential, they did manage to reach the elite league in 
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their given sport, which means they are among the top 600 players in the entire 
country (if one is referring to the NBA) or 1,200 players in the country (if one is 
referring to the NFL). Conversely, while some owners made their own fortunes, 
many of them inherited their wealth (e.g., the current Rooney ownership in 
Pittsburgh, Jimmy Haslam in Cleveland; Mike Brown in Cincinnati) and thus 
may be considered both ‘overrated’ (in that their financial power is not cor-
related with how hard they worked for it) and unmotivated (in that they have 
little incentive to work hard). Finally, many owners do not invest their team 
revenue in acquiring expensive free agents, preferring to pocket the revenue—
yet another sign of a lack of motivation.
Note the vast gap between spoiled athletes or spoiled players [about 40,000 
hits altogether] and spoiled team owners [about 820 hits]—a gap even more 
pronounced vis-á-vis NFL owners and players. Yet it is the players who must 
stay in shape, practice almost daily during a gruelling season (162 games in 
baseball, 82 in the NBA and 16 in the NFL, plus four pre-season games) in 
which they are away from their families for long periods, and endure rela-
tively short professional athletic careers that which can end suddenly, due 
to injury or nonrenewal of contract; conversely, the owners cannot be cut or 
fired—except under extremely unusual circumstances (as San Diego Clip-
pers owner Donald Sterling discovered), generally remain team owners for 
Google.com, 11 January 2014
‘spoiled athlete’ 34,800
‘spoiled owner’ 2,860 (but virtually none concern sports 
team owners)
‘spoiled team owner’ 8
‘spoiled owner’ team 809
‘spoiled player’ team 3,470
‘spoiled player’ 6,230
‘spoiled NFL player’ 1,290
‘spoiled NFL owner’ 3 (including a blog spot from a fan)
‘greedy owner*’ sports team 101,000
‘greedy player*’ 103,000
‘greedy player*’ sports team 2,450
‘greedy athlete*’ 67,400
‘greedy athlete’ sports team 15,100
‘greedy professional athletes’ 3,470
‘greedy professional athlete’ 943
Table 12.3: Keyword Search on Google.com Using ‘Spoiled’ and ‘Greedy’.
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many years (e.g., the Rooney family in Pittsburgh has owned the Steelers for 
over 50 years), and can hire others to manage and travel with the team, while 
they may remain home with their families. This public misperception of play-
ers being more spoiled than owners may stem from the fact that the public 
identifies with the players, most of whom come from working or middle-
class backgrounds, but accept as ‘the natural order’ that team owners are 
fabulously wealthy. Herman and Chomsky note that such a ‘common sense’ 
perspective—akin to the public’s disdain for affirmative action that benefits 
historically underrepresented classes while feeling neutral about the legacy 
affirmative action that benefits the children of elites—serves the interests of 
hegemonic groups.30
Now that the keyword search of Google.com has been performed, the study 
will search for keywords from NYT.com.
Note that ‘lazy player’ significantly outnumbers ‘lazy team owner,’ in that 
only two of the latter refer to a sports owner—and this is the same article listed 
twice. By contrast, ‘lazy player’ or ‘lazy players’ appears a total of 18 times. This 
8 January 2014, NewYorkTimes.com
‘Unmotivated professional athlete’ 0
‘Unmotivated professional athletes’ 0
‘Unmotivated athletes’ 0
‘Unmotivated owners’ sports teams 0
‘Unmotivated owner’ sports teams 0
‘Unmotivated owner’ 0
‘Lazy athletes’ 0
‘Lazy athlete’ 0
‘Lazy players’ 7
‘Lazy player’ 11
‘Lazy owner’ 0
‘Lazy owners’ 7 (none refer to sports owners)
‘Lazy team owner’ 3 (One refers to fantasy football owners; 
another refers to the ‘Princess Vampire’ 
fan site; the third refers to Michigan’s 
‘Dash for Cash,’ which involves small-
time race cars, not multi-millionaire 
team owners)
‘Lazy NFL owner’ 0
‘Unmotivated NFL owner’ 0
Table 12.4: Keyword Search on NYT.com Using ‘Lazy’ and ‘Unmotivated’.
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is ironic in light of the inherited wealth of many sports franchise owners, par-
ticularly NFL owners, vs. players who, in reaching the top 500–1,000 or so in a 
sport played by millions, most likely polished their skills for thousands of hours 
even as children, so that they were good enough to make the pros by their late 
teens (in basketball and baseball) or early twenties.31 By contrast, even owners 
who did work hard to earn their vast fortunes do not have to work particularly 
hard as team owners; they generally hire general managers, team presidents, 
‘Spoiled athlete’ 14
‘Spoiled player’ 4
‘Spoiled player’ team 3
‘Spoiled owner’ team 0
‘Spoiled owner’ 0
‘Spoiled team owner’ 0
‘Spoiled NFL owner’ 0
‘Spoiled NFL player’ 584
‘Spoiled NFL athlete’ 0
‘Selfish player’ 105
‘Selfish owner’ 5 (but none are about sports—e.g., dog owners are 
discussed)
‘Egotistical athlete’ 1
‘Egotistical owner’ 1
‘Egotistical player’ 4
‘Ungrateful owner’ 1
‘Ungrateful player’ 2
‘rich player’ 8
‘rich athlete’ 17 (16 are related to sports)
‘rich owner’ 90 (over 2/3 are not related to sports owners) 
‘overpaid athlete’ 19
‘overpaid player’ 10
‘overpaid owner’ 0
Inflated NFL salaries 125 (but at least one sides with the players, noting 
that the owners were accused of inflating salaries 
and capping contracts)
‘Inflated salary’ player 10 (2 are used as metaphors—e.g., a stockbroker is 
deemed ‘a player’) 
Table 12.5: Search on NYT.com Using ‘Spoiled,’ ‘Egotistical,’ ‘Lazy’ etc., 
11 January 2014.
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coaches, etc. to do the work for them. Finally, it is ironic because owners tend 
to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies from cities desperate to 
keep a given team from moving to another city.32
Sample quote: ‘I think the vast majority of  players  in the  N.F.L.  have guns,’ 
former Giants  ...  He’s just one more  spoiled  egocentric prima donna who is 
being ...’
As Table 12.5 shows, the New York Times uses the phrases ‘overpaid athlete’ and 
‘overpaid player’ a total of 29 times but never uses the phrase ‘overpaid owner.’33 
On the other hand, the Times does use the phrase ‘rich owner’ 90 times vs. ‘rich 
player’ or ‘rich athlete’ a total of 25 times, but only about 20 of the 90 are related 
to sports owners. The search term inflated NFL salaries appeared 125 instances 
in the Times, whereas the Times much more rarely referred to the inflated sala-
ries of owners. On the other hand, the Times did refer to the term ‘greedy own-
ers’ and ‘greedy owners’ sports about six times as frequently as ‘greedy athletes’ 
but they referred to the quoted term ‘generous owner’ four times as often as 
‘generous player’ or ‘generous athlete’.
‘Inflated salary’ owner 30 (but none are related to sports team owners—in 
fact, 5 are related to players’ salaries)
Inflated NFL owners’ salaries 55 (but most concern inflated players’ salaries. In 
fact, when the limiter ‘-players’ was added to the 
search, no results appeared.)
Inflated NFL owners’ salaries
–players
0
‘undeserving player’ 3
‘undeserving owner’ 0
‘greedy athletes’ 10
‘greedy athlete’ 1
‘greedy professional athlete’ 0
‘greedy professional athletes’ 0
‘greedy owner’ team 6
‘greedy owners’ team 38
‘greedy owner’ sports 13
‘greedy owners’ sports 61
‘generous player’ 4 (only one is related to sports players)
‘generous athlete’ 3
‘generous owner’ 42 (only 13 are related to sports owners)
Table 12.5: Continued.
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Why then aren’t New York Times and other professional writers pointing 
out how underpaid professional athletes are relative to the owners that drafted 
them? Herman and Chomsky’s third filter—involving journalists’ sourcing and 
beats—offers a plausible explanation for this discrepancy. To understand how, 
consider that sports writers routinely rely on the teams they cover to provide 
press releases, press conferences, interviews with the press secretary of a given 
team, etc. Indeed, every NFL team has a public relations office that facilitates 
the sports beat of the press in the given city. By contrast, the NFL players, or 
the players of any league, for that matter, have only one union headquarters and 
no union offices in given cities. Furthermore, if a beat reporter starts asking 
players about the issues mentioned above (e.g., the draft), that reporter can be 
denied access to the team’s players and press conferences, and thus be rendered 
unable to perform his/her job as a beat writer, a privileged position that pays a 
healthy salary and affords him/her access to superstar athletes and a pass to all 
of the team’s games.
Another reason might be more subtle. Journalists, like fans, don’t identify 
with owners the way they do with professional athletes, many of whom sud-
denly ascended from impoverished backgrounds (especially in the NBA) to 
earn annual pay checks the average American won’t accumulate in a lifetime, 
often despite having little education, poor articulation skills, and gang-like 
attire. By contrast, journalists and fans generally see owners like Jerry Jones 
wearing a dark business suit, articulating their thoughts well, and avoiding 
the kinds of reckless behaviour that seems to plague so many young athletes. 
What is more, as Gramsci’s interpreter notes, fans and journalists alike tend to 
grow up in a city where a family like the Rooneys (in Pittsburgh) or the Hunts 
(in Kansas City) have owned the team for generations, so that this owner-
ship dynasty becomes internalised as our common sense idea of how things 
ought to be, just as it doesn’t strike us as undemocratic that presidents pre-
dominantly come from the upper middle and upper classes and attended Ivy 
League schools.34 Moreover, since sports journalists interact with corporate 
elites far more so than fans do, they may gradually take on the hegemonic per-
spectives of those elites, seeing a player like Alex Rodriguez as vastly overpaid 
but not noticing that ‘A-Rod’ was denied his true market value until eight years 
into his career or that the league itself is a monopoly. In taking on such per-
spectives, journalists are acting in accordance with Herman and Chomsky’s 
fifth filter: they are reinforcing the dominant ideology that social inequality, 
as exemplified by the monopolistic practices of billionaire owners, is beyond 
questioning or even examining.35
12.5 Conclusion
Following Herman’s call for using the PM to understand how the mainstream 
US media works, this paper has tried to sensitise readers to the subtle ways in 
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which media discourses on sports strive to legitimate an increasingly unequal 
economic system by characterizing professional athletes in largely negative 
terms and sports team owners in relatively more favourable terms.36 Specifically, 
the quantitative analysis found that stigmatizing terms such as ‘spoiled’, ‘greedy’, 
‘unmotivated,’ ‘overrated,’ ‘egotistical,’ ‘overpaid,’ ‘rich,’ and ‘lazy’ are used far 
more often to disparage professional athletes, particularly NFL players, than to 
describe team owners; by contrast, the benevolent term ‘generous’ is used far 
more often to describe team owners than to describe players. This finding holds 
not only for a Google search of the internet in general but even for reporting 
in the august and ostensibly ‘liberal’ New York Times. In fact, ironically, the 
New York Times was even slightly more favourable to NFL team owners than 
Google.com was—at least in characterizing players, but not owners, as spoiled. 
Whereas Google.com had 1,290 hits for ‘spoiled NFL player’ vs. 3 for ‘spoiled 
NFL owner,’ (a ratio of about 400 to 1), the Times had 594 hits for ‘spoiled NFL 
player’ vs. none for ‘spoiled NFL owner’. And whereas Google had 3470 hits for 
‘spoiled player’ team vs. 809 for ‘spoiled owner’ team (a 4 to 1 ratio), the Grey 
Lady had 3 hits for ‘spoiled player’ team and 0 hits for ‘spoiled owner’ team.
That even Times journalists display this hegemonic bias reinforces the micro-
level theory of media sociologists such as Tuchman and the Langs that report-
ers over time tend to reflect the views of their senior beat sources (in this case, 
team management/ownership, which has a public relations department, instead 
of the players, who, although having a union, lack a centralised public relations 
office, in the city in which they play), who would naturally see themselves as 
generous and the players whose salaries they hope to hold down as greedy. Yet 
the findings also reflect what Mullen and Klaehn call the more macro-level 
perspective of the PM, which focuses on power and social class, theorizing that 
constraints inherent in the social system—such as the dearth of labour report-
ers vs. the proliferation of business journalists—incline journalists to internal-
ise as common sense ideas and language that favour the powerful.37 What is 
more, the findings show a correlation between the biased, hegemonic sports 
coverage in an elite, well-respected publication, the Times, and the biased, 
hegemonic sports coverage on Google.com, which includes online versions of 
news publications (e.g., USA Today), public comments posted on those sites, 
and personal blogs or websites. Thus, we can posit that the team-owner-friendly 
perspective of prestigious papers like the Times, America’s so-called ‘paper of 
record,’ may influence the perspective of both less prestigious publications/
websites and news consumers that post comments online.38
Finally, as Klaehn notes about the PM in general, the findings in this study 
do not imply that journalists are consciously favouring team owners over 
 professional athletes but merely that ‘awareness, perception and understand-
ings are typically constrained and informed by structures of discourse.’39 Yet 
paradoxically, Herman argues that this more subtle bias enhances the media’s 
propaganda effects all the more, as the public presumably attaches more 
credence to the ‘objective reporting’ of papers like the Times than it does to 
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 explicitly  ideological sources like Rush Limbaugh.40 Thus, as Herman argues, 
it is incumbent on researchers to use the PM to show how the mainstream 
media frame issues and events and ‘allow debate only within the parameters of 
the elite perspectives. .  .  . When ordinary citizens are not aware of their own 
stake in an issue or are immobilised by effective propaganda, the media will 
serve elite interests uncompromisingly.41 And as Kellner adds, it is incumbent 
on researchers using the PM to focus not only on ‘serious issues’ but on low-
brow subjects like sports, in order to show how voices and struggles are ‘omit-
ted from mainstream views,’ thus preserving the existing power structure.42 For 
by becoming more aware of this double standard in media coverage, sports 
fans can more easily resist such hegemonic values and begin to challenge the 
increasingly undemocratic system that has given rise to them.
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CHAPTER 13
The 2008 Financial Crisis, the Great 
Recession and Austerity in Britain :  
Analysing Media Coverage Using the  
Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model
Andrew Mullen
13.1 Introduction
The Propaganda Model (PM) developed by Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky – articulated in Manufacturing Consent in 1988 and Chomsky’s 
Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in 1989 – falls clearly within the criti-
cal political economy tradition of mass media and communication research. 
Initially formulated to explain the performance of the mass media in the 
United States (US), its advocates and critics have long debated the relevance 
of the PM in countries with diverging media systems.1 This chapter inves-
tigates the utility of the PM in Britain and how it can explain media cover-
age of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession and austerity that 
 followed.
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It begins with a brief overview of how the economic and political elite in 
Britain responded to the 2008 financial crisis (i.e. bailout), the ensuing reces-
sion (i.e. stimulus), and the consequent deterioration of the public finances (i.e. 
austerity). The second section presents original empirical data regarding mass 
media coverage of these events. It considers how mass media treated the idea 
of a wealth tax as a radical alternative to austerity. The third section applies the 
PM to such media coverage and suggests it is, indeed, relevant and applicable 
in Britain.2
13.1.1 Sampling and Methods
The chapter draws upon two sets of data from newspaper articles and televi-
sion programmes. A Nexis database search was conducted using the terms 
‘cuts’ or ‘recession’ and ‘crisis’ or ‘financial crisis’. The search focused on eight 
periods between 2008 and 2010, each of four weeks in duration, wherein sig-
nificant events occurred. These included: (1) the bailout of the financial sys-
tem (24 September to 21 October 2008); (2) the New Labour Government’s 
stimulus package (10 November to 7 December 2008); (3) the Conservative 
Party Leader’s ‘age of austerity’ speech (12 April to 9 May 2009); and (4) 
the party conference season (13 September to 10 October 2009). They also 
included (5) the Treasury Select Committee’s report on the 2008 financial 
crisis (13 November to 10 December 2009); (6) the 2010 General Election 
(15 April to 12 May 2010); (7) the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coali-
tion Government’s Emergency Budget (8 June to 5 July 2010); and (8) the 
Coalition Government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (8 November to 5 
December 2010).
A sample of 1,586 articles was generated which encompassed news reports, 
commentary, editorials, and letters. It included 596 articles from The Guard-
ian and Observer and 993 articles from the Daily and Sunday Telegraph. The 
Guardian and Observer represented the left while the Daily and Sunday Tel-
egraph represented the right. These broadsheets demarcate the respective 
ends of the mainstream political spectrum in the mass media. A sample of 47 
television programmes – produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), the commercial Independent Television (ITV) network, Channel 4 
and Channel 5 – broadcast between 2008 and 2015 on subjects related to the 
2008 financial crisis, the Great Recession and austerity were recorded. These 
included several episodes of current affairs series such as the BBC’s Panorama 
and Channel 4’s Dispatches, commissioned programmes and live television 
debates.
Following the methodological approach pioneered by the Glasgow Media 
Group over three decades ago,3 analysis of newspaper articles and television 
programmes focused on identifying (a) the primary sources used; (b) the main 
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issues discussed plus those that were absent; (c) the quantity of text devoted to 
the main issues; and (d) the key discourses constructed. The comparative nature 
of the analysis enabled two secondary propositions to be tested. Firstly, cover-
age in The Guardian and Observer, which are ostensibly progressive newspa-
pers, should reflect a broader and more oppositional (i.e., anti-austerity) range 
of voices, issues, and discourses. Secondly, the regulatory duties of  Britain’s 
broadcasters to ensure balanced reporting, due accuracy and due impartiality – 
which do not pertain to Britain’s newspapers – should result in more critical 
and diverse coverage.
13.2 The 2008 Financial Crisis, the Great Recession and 
 Austerity in Britain
The 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession and austerity that followed 
had a significant economic, political, and social impact on Britain as a private 
sector debt crisis was converted, both discursively and policy-wise, into a sov-
ereign (i.e., public sector) debt crisis.4 In October 2008, with the financial sys-
tem reportedly on the brink of collapse, the New Labour Government spent 
£500 billion on a bailout of the financial system and nationalised some of Brit-
ain’s biggest financial institutions at a cost of £850 billion. It spent a further 
£200 billion in 2008 and 2009 on an economic stimulus package designed to 
mitigate the Great Recession. Although such action helped prevent economic 
calamity, it resulted in a marked deterioration of public finances. Sensing an 
opportunity to restore the neoliberal order after the New Labour Govern-
ment’s brief flirtation with Keynesianism, in April 2009 the Conservative Party 
argued that Britain was ‘living beyond its means’ and insisted that restoring 
the public finances would require significant public spending cuts and an ‘age 
of austerity’.5
The Conservatives successfully transformed the discursive and ideological 
terrain; the three main political parties contested the 2010 General Elec-
tion pledging to eliminate the budget deficit and reduce the level of national 
public debt. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, 
formed in May 2010, introduced substantial public spending cuts and a 
programme of privatization with the support of the corporate sector and 
a network of right-wing pressure groups and think tanks. Having initially 
opposed such measures, from June 2011 the Labour Party embraced much 
of the Coalition Government’s agenda in the form of its policy of ‘austerity-
lite’.6 Some opposition appeared during this period, however. Certain politi-
cal parties rejected austerity, while left-wing pressure groups, think tanks, 
and the student and trade union movements helped to organise demonstra-
tions, engaged in strike action and promoted alternatives to public spending 
cuts (see Table 13.1).
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Nevertheless, the twin objectives of tackling the budget deficit and reducing the 
level of national public debt, via swingeing public spending cuts rather than sub-
stantial revenue-raising, became the ‘new normal’ in a classic example of what 
Naomi Klein termed the ‘shock doctrine’.7 In short, Britain’s economic and political 
elite, having utilised taxpayers’ money to rescue the financial system and stimulate 
the economy, cynically embraced austerity in yet another attempt to reconfigure 
the state to further their commercial interests and boost their political power.
13.3 Mass Media Coverage in Britain
13.3.1 Newspaper Coverage
One of the most important aspects of any media analysis is to establish who gets 
to speak. In other words, which individuals and organizations constitute the 
primary sources of news and information used by editors and journalists when 
they construct their articles? These primary sources, which are often viewed 
as credible, have the power to set the agenda and to frame the parameters of 
debate. The primary sources used in the Guardian/Observer and Telegraph arti-
cles between 2008 and 2010 are shown in Table 13.2.
The Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles exhibited similar sourcing 
patterns. Members of the New Labour and Coalition governments, their 
official oppositions and their spokespeople constituted the primary source 
in 28% of Guardian/Observer articles and 22% of Telegraph articles. Other 
prominent sources included corporations (14.4 and 30% respectively); 
the financial sector (5.2 and 12% respectively); and the Bank of England 
and other financial regulators (3.2 and 5.4% respectively). By contrast, 
Supporters of Austerity Opponents of Austerity
1. Conservative Party
2. Labour Party (until 2015)
3. Liberal Democrats
4.  United Kingdom Independence Party
5.  Corporate sector (e.g. British Cham-
bers of Commerce; Confederation of 
British Industry; Federation of Small 
Businesses; Institute of Directors)
6. British State (e.g. Treasury)
7.  Right-wing think tanks (e.g. Adam 
Smith Institute, Institute of  
Economic Affairs)
8.  Right-wing pressure groups 
(e.g., Taxpayers’ Alliance)
     9. Green Party
10. Plaid Cymru
11. Scottish National Party
12.  Trades Union Congress and wider 
trade union movement
13.  Left-wing think tanks (e.g. Institute 
for Public Policy Research)
14.  Left-wing pressure groups  
(e.g. People’s Assembly Against 
Austerity, UK Uncut)
Table 13.1: Position of Key Economic and Political Organizations on Austerity.
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Primary Source Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph  
articles)
Corporate representative 86 (14.4%) 228 (30)
Foreign government  
representative 
50 (8.4) 94 (9.5)
Prime Minister 34 (5.7) 73 (7.4)
Government Department  
spokesperson
64 (10.7) 70 (7)
British bank representative 12 (2) 63 (6.3)
Foreign bank representative 18 (3) 52 (5.2)
Bank of England 16 (2.7) 41 (4.1)
Cabinet Minister/ 
spokesperson
32 (5.4) 30 (3)
Chancellor of the Exchequer 17 (2.9) 28 (2.8)
Economist 10 (1.7) 27 (2.7)
Non-governmental organization 
 (NGO) representative 
17 (2.9) 22 (2.2)
Conservative politician 11 (1.8) 19 (1.9)
European Union representative 3 (0.5) 17 (1.7)
Former politicians 9 (1.5) 17 (1.7)
Scottish and Welsh politicians 4 (0.7) 17 (1.7)
Public sector representative 21 (3.5) 16 (1.6)
Celebrity 8 (1.3) 15 (1.5)
Member of the public 23 (3.9) 14 (1.4)
Financial regulator 3 (0.5) 13 (1.3)
International Monetary Fund 
representative
14 (2.3) 13 (1.3)
Leader of the Opposition 7 (1.2) 12 (1.2)
Media organization 12 (2) 10 (1)
Transnational organization 4 (0.7) 10 (1)
Trade union representative 13 (2.2) 8 (0.8)
Think tank representative 5 (0.8) 7 (0.7)
European Central Bank 2 (0.3) 7 (0.7)
Table 13.2: Primary Sources Used in Coverage of 2008 Financial Crisis, the 
Great Recession and Austerity in the Guardian/Observer and the Daily/ 
Sunday Telegraph (2008-2010).
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 members of the public constituted the primary source in only 3.9% of 
Guardian/Observer articles and 1.4% of Telegraph articles. Other relatively 
neglected sources included the public sector (3.5 and 1.6% respectively); 
trade unions (2.2 and 0.8% respectively); and anti-cuts activists (0.8 and 
0% respectively). Put simply, the corporate elite and their political allies 
who caused the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession, 
and who systematically profited from these events, were dominant in terms 
of sourcing. Meanwhile, the voices of the victims of austerity (i.e. members 
of the public and public sector), or those arguing for alternatives (i.e. anti-
cuts activists and trade unions), were marginalised. Some notable sourc-
ing differences, however, appeared. The Telegraph articles were twice as 
likely to prioritise the voices of corporations and the financial sector, while 
the Guardian/Observer articles were twice as likely to feature oppositional 
voices (i.e. members of the public, the public sector and trade unions) – 
albeit in a small number of cases.
The main issues discussed in the Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles 
between 2008 and 2010 are set out in Table 13.3.
Primary Source Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph  
articles)
Charity representative 12 (2) 6 (0.6)
Banking sector lobbyist 1 (0.2) 5 (0.5)
Shadow Chancellor/Minister/
Spokesperson
8 (1.3) 4 (0.4)
Labour politician 7 (1.2) 4 (0.4)
Academic 20 (3.4) 4 (0.4)
Liberal Democrat politician 2 (0.3) 2 (0.2)
Religious leader 2 (0.3) 2 (0.2)
Royal Family 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2)
Deputy Prime Minister 5 (0.8) 1 (0.1)
Green politician 0 1 (0.1)
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
representative
1 (0.2) 1 (0.1)
World Bank representative 2 (0.3) 0
Anti-cuts activists 5 (0.8) 0
Table 13.2: Continued.
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Main Issue Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Number of words in sum
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph 
articles)
Number of words in sum
Trade (impact of crisis/cuts/
recession on)
72 articles (12.1%)
42,726 words
153 (15.4)
63,214
Stocks and shares  
(impact on)
19 (3.2)
9,956
101 (10.2)
59,622
Bailout (details of) 37 (6.2)
21,901
98 (9.9)
62,252
Party politics (influence of/
impact on)
52 (8.7)
38,188
82 (8.3)
47,330
Spending cuts (Government 
Departments)
56 (9.4)
8,958
61 (6.1)
25,141
Human cost (of crisis/cuts/
recession)
66 (11)
43,967
54 (5.4)
29,037
Interest rates/inflation  
(impact on)
7 (1.2)
3,742
46 (4.6)
17,810
Financial system (failure of) 13 (2.2)
7,079
44 (4.4)
23,740
Property market (impact on) 5 (0.8)
2,196
34 (3.4)
16,989
Failing banks 7 (1.2)
4,025
27 (2.7)
15,631
Private sector redundancies 18 (3)
7,335
23 (2.3)
6,053
Financial cost (of bailout/cuts/
recession)
11 (1.8)
5,379
23 (2.3)
11,353
Employment (impact on) 15 (2.5)
8.025
19 (1.9)
7,988
Taxes (changes to) 8 (1.4)
4,141
17 (1.7)
8,710
Regulators (failure of) 4 (0.7)
3,308
17 (1.7)
11,349
Eurozone (impact of/on) 3 (0.5)
2,620
14 (1.4)
11,145
Table 13.3: Main Issues Discussed in Coverage of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
the Great Recession and Austerity in the Guardian/Observer and the Daily/
Sunday Telegraph (2008-2010).
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Main Issue Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Number of words in sum
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph 
articles)
Number of words in sum
Government spending  
(impact on)
18 (3)
8,958
11 (1.1)
6,991
Activist state (return of) 4 (0.7)
2,886
11 (1.1)
8,372
International relations  
(impact on)
9 (1.5)
7,793
11 (1.1)
5,096
Profligate public spending  
(as cause)
11 (1.8)
6,576
10 (1)
3,745
Demonstrations/protests 
(against austerity)
55 (9.2)
30,441
9 (0.9)
4,613
Systemic causes (of economic 
crisis)
8 (1.3)
5,821
9 (0.9)
6,546
Government-backed guarantee 
schemes
1 (0.2)
658
9 (0.9)
3,744
Public sector redundancies 8 (1.3)
3,829
9 (0.9)
3,373
Welfare benefit cuts 16 (2.7)
7,014
8 (0.8)
5,112
Greedy bankers (as cause of 
economic crisis)
2 (0.3)
700
8 (0.8)
3,494
Individuals responsible  
(for economic crisis)
2 (0.3)
1,219
7 (0.7)
4,470
Neoliberalism  
(claimed demise of)
1 (0.2)
435
7 (0.7)
5,242
Public sector pay cuts 10 (1.6)
4,633
7 (0.7)
2,314
Green policies (impact on) 6 (1)
4,393
6 (0.6)
2,744
Regulatory changes (claimed 
need for/proposed)
1 (0.2)
657
6 (0.6)
2,410
Tax rises (in general) 4 (0.7)
2,344
6 (0.6)
2,176
Other failing financial  
institutions (i.e. other than 
banks)
1 (0.2)
1,757
6 (0.6)
2,435
Table 13.3: Continued.
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Main Issue Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Number of words in sum
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph 
articles)
Number of words in sum
Government social programmes 
(impact on e.g. Sure Start)
7 (1.2)
3,863
6 (0.6)
2,435
Strike action 1 (0.2)
272
5 (0.5)
1,135
Education system (impact on) 11 (1.8)
9,051
5 (0.5)
1,628
Arrests/criminal charges (lack of) 0 3 (0.3)
1,526
Nationalization of banks 1 (0.2)
600
3 (0.3)
2,190
Economic models/theories 
(failure of)
0 2 (0.2)
1,175
Increased taxes on the rich 1 (0.2)
717
2 (0.2)
684
Pension system reforms (e.g. 
closure of final salary schemes)
2 (0.3)
483
2 (0.2)
1,408
Local government spending cuts 3 (0.5)
1,045
2 (0.2)
413
Misunderstanding of financial 
risk
0 2 (0.2)
2,296
Tackling tax avoidance and tax 
evasion
1 (0.2)
412
1 (0.1)
803
Quantitative Easing 2 (0.3)
2,027
1 (0.1)
799
Housing Benefit cuts 6 (1)
2,937
1 (0.1)
411
Reduced working hours/rise of 
part-time working
1 (0.2)
631
1 (0.1)
268
Credit rating agencies  
(complicity of)
0 1 (0.1)
283
Sub-prime housing market (as 
cause of economic crisis)
2 (0.3)
1,427
1 (0.1)
819
Abolition of quangos 2 (0.3)
1,004
1 (0.1)
Table 13.3: Continued.
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Main Issue Guardian/Observer
Number of articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Number of words in sum
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph 
articles)
Number of words in sum
Big Society 3 (0.5)
2,865
0
End of inflation-indexed wel-
fare benefits
2 (0.3)
2,089
0
Privatization of public services 1 (0.2)
1,046
0
Wealth tax 0 0
Land tax 0 0
Tax on bankers’ bonuses 0 0
Tax on financial institutions 0 0
Both the Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles downplayed the causes 
of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession. Only 4.5% of Guardian/
Observer articles and 5% of Telegraph articles explored the role of greedy and 
reckless bankers; the complicity of the credit rating agencies; sub-prime mort-
gages; flawed economic models; ‘high public spending’; regulatory failure; and 
systemic factors (i.e. capitalism). Significantly, the demonstrably false charge of 
‘profligacy’ by the New Labour Government was twice as likely to be cited in 
the Guardian/Observer articles, while only the Telegraph articles attended to the 
lack of criminal prosecutions against bankers, politicians, and/or regulators. A 
significant number of Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles detailed the 
bailout of the financial system and stressed the consequences of this for the 
public finances (8% and 12.2% respectively). Only 0.3% of Guardian/Observer 
articles and 0.3% of Telegraph articles, however, mentioned higher taxes lev-
ied on the rich and the efforts to tackle tax avoidance and tax evasion by cor-
porations and wealthy individuals. Moreover, no consideration was given to 
the various ways in which substantial revenues might have been generated, as 
alternatives to spending cuts, in either the Guardian/Observer or the Telegraph 
articles. Attention to radical measures such as a banker bonus tax, a financial 
transactions tax, a land tax and a wealth tax8 – which could have helped to 
avoid austerity and a prolonged recession – were conspicuously absent.
Some notable thematic differences, however, emerged. The Guardian/Observer 
articles focused more on the human and social impact of the Great Recession 
and austerity while the Telegraph articles tended to concentrate on the macro-
economic aspects of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession. More 
Table 13.3: Continued.
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specifically, and manifest in both the number of articles and the volume of text 
on these issues, 40.1% of Guardian/Observer articles, but only 21% of Telegraph 
articles, discussed the loss of public services, public sector pay cuts and pension 
changes, public and private sector redundancies, and welfare benefit cuts. Mean-
while, 33.6% of Telegraph articles, but only 17.3% of Guardian/Observer articles, 
assessed the implications for inflation, interest rates, property prices, stocks and 
shares, and trade. Furthermore, there were proportionately ten times as many 
articles in the Guardian/Observer about the protests against austerity.
Key discourses constructed in the Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles 
between 2008 and 2010 appear in Table 13.4.
Key Discourse Guardian/Observer
Number of  
articles
(% of all Guardian/
Observer articles)
Daily/Sunday
Telegraph
Number of articles
(% of all Telegraph 
articles)
Economic crisis inherited from actions 
of Labour Government
9 (1.5%) 53 (5.3)
Public spending cuts necessary/ 
unavoidable
10 (1.7) 22 (2.2)
Inaction will lead to financial ruin 5 (0.8) 21 (2.1)
Protests against the cuts 66 (11) 17 (1.7)
Bailout of banks necessary/unavoidable 6 (1) 12 (1.2)
Strikes against the cuts 6 (1) 8 (0.8)
Tax rises necessary/unavoidable 3 (0.5) 8 (0.8)
Public spending cuts risk a double-dip 
recession
8 (1.3) 4 (0.4)
Cuts will hurt the poorest most 36 (6) 4 (0.4)
Cuts are too fast and too deep 11 (1.8) 3 (0.3)
Cuts made in a way that is fair and 
progressive
0 2 (0.2)
Britain is bankrupt 1 (0.2) 2 (0.2)
Cuts will affect women more than men 11 (1.8) 1 (0.1)
Cuts will affect young people more than 
the general population
1 (0.2) 1 (0.1)
Table 13.4: Key Discourses Constructed in Coverage of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, the Great Recession and Austerity in the Guardian/Observer and the 
Daily/Sunday Telegraph (2008-2010).
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Both the Guardian/Observer and Telegraph articles indulged the elite discourses 
that the New Labour Government ‘crashed the economy’ and that public spend-
ing cuts were ‘necessary’ and ‘unavoidable’ (3.2% and 7.5 % respectively). Nota-
ble discursive differences, however, appeared. Reflecting their partisanship, the 
Coalition Government’s discursive claim that the 2008 financial crisis was caused 
by the New Labour Government was reflected in 5.3% of Telegraph articles but 
only 1.5% of Guardian/Observer articles. Paradoxically, given that the Telegraph 
purportedly supports ‘free markets’, the Telegraph featured twice as many articles 
endorsing the discourse that a state rescue of the financial system was essential 
to avoid ruin (2.1% compared to 0.8% in the Guardian/Observer). Furthermore, 
the latter were more likely to entertain oppositional discourses than the former. 
Specifically, 21.3% of Guardian/Observer articles, but only 3.7% of Telegraph 
articles, focused on protests against public spending cuts, public sector strikes, 
risk of a ‘double-dip’ recession, and the regressive nature of austerity (i.e. that it 
disproportionately impacts the poorest, women and young people).
Data presented above regarding sourcing, issues, and discourses are similar to 
findings of other studies.9
Television Coverage
Details of the 47 programmes on subjects related to the 2008 financial crisis, 
the Great Recession and austerity broadcast between 2008 and 2015 – high-
lighting the primary sources – are shown in Table 13.5.
The most quoted sources in these programmes, with 29 appearances, were 
current or former members of the Coalition and New Labour governments, 
previous Conservative administrations, and their official oppositions. Other 
prominent sources included bankers (15 appearances); backbench politicians 
(13); corporate executives (12); journalists (12); and academics (10). Middle-
ranking sources included economists (7); members of the public – excluding 
participants in the live debates (7); foreign finance ministers (6); right-wing 
think tanks (6); tax justice campaigners (5); and welfare recipients (5). Rela-
tively neglected sources included religious representatives (4); the Treasury (4); 
the Bank of England (3); anti-cuts activists (3); the House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee (3); left-wing pressure groups (3); right-wing pressure 
groups (3); the poor (3); left-wing think tanks (3); public sector workers (2); 
regulators (2); and the super-rich (2). One celebrity appeared, as did a trade 
unionist. While a direct comparison is not possible, sourcing patterns in these 
programmes are strikingly similar to those in newsprint; in short, the corpo-
rate elite and their political allies dominated while oppositional voices were 
marginalised.
Categorizing the 47 programmes by their subject matter, 14 focused on 
how and why the 2008 financial crisis occurred. Others highlighted pub-
lic spending cuts and the state of the public finances (11 programmes); 
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Table 13.5: Synopses of Television Programmes on the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
the Great Recession and Austerity (2008-2015).
Broadcast Date Programme Primary Sources
March 2008 BBC
‘Super-Rich:
The Greed Game’
Philip Beresford (compiler of 
Sunday Times Rich List)
January 2009 BBC
‘The City Uncovered’
Various bankers
February 2009 BBC
Panorama
‘Tax Me If You Can’
Tax Justice Network; Treasury
March 2009 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘How They Squander Our 
Billions’
House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee; Taxpayers’ 
Alliance; various politicians 
June 2009 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Crash Gordon: The Inside 
Story of the Financial Crisis’
Gordon Brown (Prime  Minister); 
Alistair Darling ( Chancellor); 
George Osborne (Shadow 
 Chancellor); other politicians; 
Bank of England; Treasury; 
 bankers; civil servants; economists; 
foreign finance ministers
September 2009 BBC
‘The Love of Money: The 
Banking Crisis One Year On’
Gordon Brown (Prime Minister); 
Alistair Darling (Chancellor); Tim 
Geithner (US Treasury); Alan 
Greenspan (US Federal Reserve); 
Mervyn King (Bank of England); 
Robert Reich (economic advisor 
to US President Barack Obama); 
foreign finance ministers
September 2009 BBC
Panorama
‘Banks Behaving Badly?’
Peter Mandelson (Business 
 Secretary); Richard Murphy 
( offshore tax specialist); Treasury
June 2010 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Crash’
Various bankers
June 2010 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘How to Save £100 Billion –  
Live’
Andrew Haldenby (Reform); Neil 
O’Brien (Policy Exchange); Bridget 
Rosewell (former Treasury  advisor); 
Dr Karol Sikora (Doctors for 
Reform); Robin Hood Campaign
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Broadcast Date Programme Primary Sources
September 2010 BBC
Look North
‘Spending Review – The 
Look North Debate’
Public sector workers
October 2010 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘How the Rich Beat the 
Taxman’
Danny Alexander (Chief Secretary 
to the Treasury); Chris Bryant 
(Shadow Cabinet Minister); David 
Cameron (Prime Minister); Philip 
Green (businessperson); Philip 
Hammond (Secretary of State for 
Transport); Tax Justice Network
November 2010 Channel 4
‘Britain’s Trillion Pounds 
Horror’
Brendan Barber (Trades Union 
Congress); James Bartholomew 
(author of The Welfare State We’re 
In); Alistair Darling (former 
Labour Chancellor); Nigel Lawson 
(former Conservative Chancellor); 
various politicians
March 2011 BBC
Panorama
‘The Big Squeeze’
Ros Altmann (pensions expert); 
Nicola Horlick (businessperson); 
Mick McAteer (Financial Inclusion 
Centre); members of the public
March 2011 ITV
‘Charities in Crisis’
David Cameron (Prime  Minister); 
several Cabinet Ministers; 
 representatives of charities
March 2011 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Selling Off Britain – Live 
Debate’
Antony Beever (historian); Kevin 
Cahill (author of Who Owns 
 Britain); Katie Clarke (Labour 
 politician); Tim Cross (British 
Army); Edwina Curry (former 
 Conservative minister); Allister 
Heath (City AM); Afua Hirsch 
(Guardian journalist); Maxwell 
Hutchinson (architect); Michael 
Kitson (economist); Jonny Irwin 
(property developer); Peter Roberts 
(Drivers’ Alliance); Ralph Silva 
(banker); Zoe Williams ( Guardian 
journalist); Quentin Wilson 
( motoring journalist)
October 2011 BBC
‘The Future of Welfare’
Centre for Social Justice; welfare 
claimants
Table 13.5: Continued.
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Broadcast Date Programme Primary Sources
November 2011 BBC
‘Your Money and How They 
Spend It’
Ken Clarke (former Conservative 
minister); Alistair Darling (former 
Labour chancellor); Alan Johnson 
(Labour politician); Boris Johnson 
(London Mayor); Norman Lamont 
(former Conservative  chancellor); 
David Laws (former Liberal 
Democrat minister); Nigel Lawson 
(former Conservative chancellor); 
Peter Mandelson (former Labour 
minister); Alex Salmond (Scottish 
First Minister); Peter Stringfellow 
(businessperson); Tax Research 
UK; anti-cuts campaigners; 
 members of the public
November 2011 BBC
Panorama
‘Britain on the Fiddle’
Jim Gee (PKF Littlejohn Forensic 
and Counter-Fraud Services)
November 2011 BBC
‘When Bankers Were Good’
Giles Fraser (former canon of St 
Paul’s Cathedral); Jacob Rothschild 
(banker); Jonathan Sacks (Chief 
Rabbi); Adair Turner (Financial 
Services Authority); Andrew 
 Wilson (historian)
November 2011 BBC
Panorama
‘Who’s Getting Rich on Your 
Money?’
House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee; Mark 
 Hellowell (author of report on 
Private Finance 2); David Metter 
(chief executive of Innisfree)
May 2012 BBC
Panorama
‘The Truth About Tax’
House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee; Revenues 
and Customs; Treasury
July 2012 BBC
Panorama
‘Britain on the Brink: Back 
to the 1970s?’
Academics; bankers; members 
of the public; Joseph Rowntree 
 Foundation; Stewart Lansley 
(author of The Cost of Inequality)
October 2012 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Secrets of Your Bosses’ Pay’
Various chief executive officers; 
members of the public; Will  Hutton 
(economist); various politicians
Table 13.5: Continued.
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Broadcast Date Programme Primary Sources
November 2012 BBC
‘The Year the Town Hall 
Shrank’
David Cameron (Prime Minister); 
local councillors; members of the 
public
November 2012 BBC
Panorama
‘Undercover: How to Dodge 
Tax’
Corporate service providers
March 2013 ITV
Tonight
‘Breadline Britain’
George Osborne ( Chancellor); 
Department for Work and 
 Pensions; Barnado’s; Resolution 
Foundation; poor people
May 2013 BBC
Money Programme
‘Bankers’
Andrew Bailey (Bank of  England); 
Gillian Tett (Financial Times 
 journalist); Jean-Claude  Trichet 
(European Central Bank); 
Jonathan Welby (Archbishop of 
Cantebury); Martin Wheatley 
(Financial Services Authority); 
various bankers
February 2014 Channel 5
‘The Big Benefits Row – 
Live’
Steve Chalke (Reverend); Terry 
Christian (broadcaster); Edwina 
Currie (former Conservative 
minister); Sam Delaney ( journalist); 
White Dee (star of Benefits Street); 
Katy Hopkins (celebrity); Ken 
Livingstone (former London 
Mayor); Jack Monroe (anti-poverty 
campaigner)
February 2014 Channel 4
‘Benefits Britain – Live 
Debate’
John Bird (founder of Big Issue); 
White Dee (star of Benefits Street); 
Douglas Murray (Henry  Jackson 
Society); journalists (Mehdi 
Hasan and Owen Jones from the 
 Guardian/Huffington Post and 
Allison Pearson from the Daily 
Telegraph); various politicians
April 2014 BBC
Panorama
‘Don’t Cap my Benefits’
Various politicians; welfare 
 claimants
June 2014 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Breadline Kids’
Members of the public; civil 
 servants; various politicians
Table 13.5: Continued.
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 inequality and poverty (11); welfare reform (6); tax avoidance and tax evasion 
(4); and the Private Finance Initiative (1). Two distinct periods are discern-
ible. Between January 2009 and June 2010, before the Coalition Government 
came to power, ten television programmes focused on explaining the 2008 
financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Encompassing ‘The 
City Uncovered’ (BBC), ‘Crash Gordon’ (Channel 4 Dispatches), ‘The Love of 
Money’ (BBC), ‘Banks Behaving Badly’ (BBC Panorama) and ‘Crash’ (Chan-
nel 4 Dispatches), these broadcasts were highly critical of the financial sector. 
The causes of the 2008 financial crisis were clearly identified (i.e. de-regula-
tion, financialization, flawed economic models, and risk-taking) as were the 
culprits (i.e. greedy bankers, inept regulators and complicit politicians) and 
the consequences (i.e. the state of the public finances). By contrast, only one 
programme – ‘How They Squander Our Billions’ (Channel 4 Dispatches) – 
implied that ‘high public spending’ was responsible for the budget deficit and 
public debt ‘problems’.
Broadcast Date Programme Primary Sources
October 2014 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Benefit Britain: Universal 
Credit’ 
Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative 
Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions); Child Poverty Action 
Group; welfare claimants
November 2014 Channel 4
‘How Rich Are You?’
Ryan Bourne (Institute of 
Economic Affairs); Owen Jones 
(Guardian journalist);  Stewart 
Lansley (author of The Cost 
of  Inequality); Paul Mason 
( economist); Faiza Shaheen (New 
Economics Foundation); poor 
people; wealthy people
November 2014 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘How the Rich Get Richer’
Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative 
Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions)
January 2015 BBC
‘The Super-Rich and Us’
Ha-Joon Chang (economist); 
David Graeber (anthropologist 
and author of Debt); Chrystia 
Freeland (author of Plutocrats); 
Thomas Piketty (economist); High 
Pay Centre; various politicians; 
wealthy people
January 2015 Channel 4
Dispatches
‘Low Pay Britain’
Undercover reporters; members 
of the public; whistleblowers; 
 corporations; employment agencies
Table 13.5: Continued.
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From June 2010, following the formation of the Coalition Government, a 
marked shift in the nature of television coverage appeared. Two Channel 4 
Dispatches live debates, ‘How to Save £100 billion’ and ‘Selling Off Britain’, set 
the tone for explicitly embracing the Coalition Government’s austerity and pri-
vatization agendas. While the former debate considered some revenue-raising 
proposals (i.e. a financial transactions tax, user charges, and increasing VAT), 
the onus was clearly on public spending cuts. Radical proposals, such as levy-
ing a wealth tax, were conspicuously absent during both debates. It is signifi-
cant, however, that despite attempts by the presenters and other contributors 
to frame the proposed public spending cuts and privatizations as ‘necessary’ 
and ‘unavoidable’, most audience members, plus online participants at home, 
rejected these options when given the chance to vote.
Three other programmes – ‘Britain’s Trillion Pound Horror’ (Channel 4) 
and ‘Your Money and How They Spend It’ (BBC) – enthusiastically endorsed 
the case for substantial public spending cuts and, thus, bolstered the Coali-
tion Government’s austerity discourse. Unlike the ones broadcast in 2008 and 
2009, these programmes failed to link the state of the public finances with the 
costs of the bailout, the stimulus, and the Great Recession. In short, since zero 
historical context was provided, viewers were led to believe that public finances 
were ‘out of control’ due to the ‘profligacy’ of successive governments. Another 
five programmes – ‘Spending Review’ (BBC Look North), ‘Charities in Crisis’ 
(ITV) and ‘When the Town Hall Shrank’ (BBC) – considered the impact of 
public spending cuts on local services. One further programme about the 2008 
financial crisis aired during this period. ‘When Bankers Were Good’ (BBC) 
contrasted public perceptions in 2011 (i.e. bankers as greedy and reckless) with 
historical perceptions (i.e. bankers as philanthropists) and questioned whether 
the financial sector could ever redeem itself.
Of the eleven television programmes focusing on inequality and poverty in Brit-
ain, ten were broadcast during the Coalition Government’s term in office. ‘The 
Big Squeeze’ (BBC Panorama); ‘Britain on the Brink’ (BBC Panorama); ‘Secrets 
of Your Bosses’ Pay’ (Channel 4 Dispatches); ‘Breadline Britain’ (ITV Tonight); 
‘Breadline Kids’ (Channel 4 Dispatches); ‘How Rich Are You?’ (Channel 4); ‘How 
the Rich Get Richer’ (Channel 4 Dispatches); ‘The Super-Rich and Us’ (BBC); and 
‘Low Pay Britain’ (Channel 4 Dispatches) explicitly linked growing inequality and 
rising poverty in Britain with the 2008 financial crisis, the Great Recession, and 
austerity. Significantly, ‘The Super-Rich and Us’ – arguably the most critical and 
incisive programme during this period – was unique in actively exploring the 
radical option of levying a wealth tax as an alternative to austerity. The oddity – 
‘Super-Rich’ (BBC) – predated, but presciently foretold, the 2008 financial crisis.
Six programmes covering welfare aired during this period, and all linked 
debates about reform with either the state of the public finances or austerity. 
‘The Future of Welfare’ (BBC); ‘Britain on the Fiddle’ (BBC Panorama), and 
two live debates – ‘The Big Benefits Row’ (Channel 4) and ‘Benefits Britain’ 
(Channel 5) – explicitly endorsed the claim that welfare reform was ‘necessary’ 
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because of the ‘crisis’ in the public finances. By contrast, ‘Don’t Cap My 
 Benefits’ (BBC Panorama) and ‘Benefits Britain: Universal Credit’ (Channel 4 
Dispatches) were much more sympathetic to the plight of welfare recipients in 
the context of the Great Recession and austerity.
The four programmes on tax avoidance and tax evasion – ‘Tax Me If You Can’ 
(BBC Panorama); ‘How the Rich Beat the Taxman’ (Channel 4 Dispatches); ‘The 
Truth About Tax’ (BBC Panorama); and ‘Undercover: How to Dodge Tax’ (BBC 
Panorama) – were highly critical of such activities. The first three explicitly con-
nected losses of tax revenues from corporations and wealthy individuals to the state 
of public finances; explained that such taxes could offset the need for austerity; and 
criticised the Coalition Government’s discourse that ‘we are all in this together’.
One programme – ‘Who’s Getting Rich on Your Money?’ (BBC Panorama) – 
was highly critical of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). It cast the scheme as 
providing poor value for money and questioned why the Conservatives, hav-
ing opposed PFI in opposition, had participated in the Coalition Government’s 
expansion of the scheme. Although not the main subject of the broadcast, ‘How 
They Squander Our Billions’ (Channel 4 Dispatches) was also highly critical of PFI. 
Both broadcasts pointed out that, if the Conservatives were so opposed to leaving 
future generations with large amounts of public debt – the party’s main justifica-
tion for austerity – then why persist with PFI which does just that and which is 
more costly than state financing alone?
13.3.2 A Wealth Tax as a Radical Alternative to Austerity:  
The Media Response
As noted, zero articles analysed attended to the radical idea of levying a wealth 
tax as an alternative to austerity. To gain a more accurate picture of newspaper 
coverage of this issue, a supplementary search of ‘wealth tax’ in the Nexis and 
Financial Times databases was conducted for the period between 24  September 
2008 and 5 December 2010 consecutively. This generated a sample of 113 
 articles – including news reports, commentary, editorials, and letters – across 
eleven national dailies (see Table 13.6).
Exposing a clear ideological divide, 20 articles about levying a wealth tax 
appeared in the Guardian/Observer during this period, with 15 positive and 5 
negative, while the Telegraph featured 12, with 10 negative and 2 positive. In 
short, this more comprehensive analysis reveals that the wealth tax idea was, 
indeed, a neglected one. While the positive articles endorsed a wealth tax as 
an alternative to public spending cuts and a manifestation of social justice, the 
negative articles included several advising readers how and where they could 
invest their money and avoid wealth taxes. Other articles rejected the wealth 
tax on principle, portraying it as a form of theft, and attacked Labour and Lib-
eral Democrat politicians for contemplating the idea. From a broader perspec-
tive, all of Britain’s newspapers except the Morning Star, the socialist daily read 
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by around 10,000 people, marginalised the wealth tax idea. Nevertheless, it 
received more attention in the broadsheets (i.e. the Financial Times, Guard-
ian/Observer, Independent, Telegraph and Times), read by approximately 2.4 
million mainly middle class and wealthy people, compared to the tabloids (i.e. 
the Mirror and Sun) and mid-market newspapers (i.e. the Express and Mail) 
read by approximately 7 million mainly working class people.10 Furthermore, 
it received more support in left-liberal newspapers (i.e. the Guardian/Observer, 
Independent and Mirror) compared to right-wing ones (i.e. the Express, Finan-
cial Times, Mail, Sun, Telegraph and Times).
As noted, only one programme in the sample attended to the wealth tax pro-
posal. It is worth considering, at this point, how the ostensibly impartial BBC 
treated the proposal developed by Greg Philo from the Glasgow Media Group. 
Philo penned an article in The Guardian in August 2010 suggesting that a one-
off tax of 20% levied on the wealthiest 10% of Britons would raise enough rev-
enue to pay off the national public debt, clear the budget deficit and, thus, obvi-
ate the need for austerity. Philo had commissioned YouGov to conduct a survey 
which found that 74% of respondents – with majorities across all age groups, 
classes and genders – supported the wealth tax idea. Philo then toured the BBC 
studios to promote his proposal.11 The reaction of the presenters and guests is 
instructive. In short, the wealth tax idea, popular with the public, was treated 
with barely disguised contempt. The principal strategy adopted by the BBC and 
the other broadcasters in the sample was simply to ignore the wealth tax idea. 
When it did receive attention, as in these four BBC shows, the tactic employed 
seems to have been one of ridicule and dismissal.
13.4 Applying the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model
The PM advances three hypotheses, identifies five operative filters, and employs 
a comparative methodological approach.12
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Table 13.6: Coverage of the Wealth Tax Idea in British Newspapers (2008-2010).
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13.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Elite Consensus and Media Compliance
The economic and political elite in Britain actively supported austerity – evident 
in the manifestos of the three main political parties during the 2010 General 
Election, the Coalition Government’s budget deficit-reduction plan pursued 
from 2010 and the ‘austerity-lite’ variant promoted by Labour in opposition 
from 2011. The elite consensus persisted until the election of Jeremy Corbyn as 
Labour Party Leader in 2015 on an anti-austerity platform.
Politicians, corporations, and the financial sector (i.e. the economic and 
political elite) constituted the dominant sources in the sampled coverage of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Great Recession, and austerity. Such a privileged 
position enabled these interests to set the agenda and frame the parameters 
of debates about these events. The actual causes of the 2008 financial crisis 
and the Great Recession – the nefarious activities of the financial sector and 
inherent contradictions of capitalism – received little attention in the sampled 
media coverage. This clearly suited the economic and political elite who were 
responsible. Allied to this, there was very little scrutiny of the lack of crimi-
nal prosecutions against bankers, politicians and/or regulators in the sampled 
media coverage. This also suited the economic and political elite who would 
have been liable. Blaming the New Labour Government’s supposed ‘profligacy’ 
for the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, plus more general com-
plaints about ‘high public spending’ in Britain, gained some traction in the 
sampled coverage. Aided by the near silence of the Labour Party on its han-
dling of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn when in 
government – more specifically the bailout, the stimulus and the implications 
these had for the public finances – this discourse served the interests of the 
economic and political elite in their quest to ‘shrink the state’. The budget defi-
cit and level of national public sector debt were portrayed as ‘problems’, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in much of the sampled coverage. This helped to rein-
force the austerity discourse fashioned by the elite. Attention focused on the 
expenditure rather than the revenue-raising side of the public finances debate 
in much of the sampled coverage. For the elite, public spending cuts, which 
predominantly affect the masses, are clearly preferable to higher taxes and 
determined efforts to tackle tax avoidance and tax evasion, as these threaten 
elite wealth. Allied to this in the sampled coverage was little debate about levy-
ing a wealth tax. Such a tax would clearly not serve the pecuniary interests of 
most members of the economic and political elite.
The evidence supports Herman and Chomsky’s first hypothesis that an elite 
consensus will create media compliance. The elite consensus in Britain regard-
ing the appropriate response to the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Reces-
sion (i.e. bailout and stimulus), the apportioning of blame for these events (i.e. 
‘high public spending’), the preferred solution (i.e. austerity), and the unac-
ceptability of alternatives (e.g. the wealth tax idea) was, significantly degree, 
reflected in the sampled coverage.
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The results were far from uniform, however. The Guardian/Observer articles 
included more oppositional voices, issues, and discourses than the Telegraph 
articles. The differences are manifest in the more frequent use of members of 
the public, the public sector and trade unions as primary sources; greater atten-
tion to the human and social impact of the Great Recession and austerity, plus 
the protests against public spending cuts; and the questioning of the Coalition 
Government’s discursive claims. Similarly, the television programmes enter-
tained a more diverse and challenging set of issues and discourses than the 
newspaper articles. The differences are manifest in the pre-2010 tendency to 
blame bankers for the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, and the 
post-2010 focus on rising inequality and poverty, plus tax avoidance and tax 
evasion by corporations and wealthy individuals.
Such differences seemingly confirm the author’s secondary propositions, but 
with two important caveats. Firstly, the differences are slight: most Guardian/
Observer articles and a majority of the programmes reproduced the elite con-
sensus. Secondly, the relative neglect of radical alternatives to austerity (e.g. the 
wealth tax idea) by the Guardian/Observer and public service broadcasters, such 
as the BBC, bolsters the argument advanced by Chomsky and others about the 
role of left-liberal media.13 By marginalizing certain issues and policy options, 
and/or treating them with contempt, the left-liberal media serve a dual pur-
pose: they establish and defend the boundaries of thinkable thought and, thus, 
reinforce the status quo. By ignoring and/or ridiculing the wealth tax idea, the 
Guardian/Observer and the BBC helped cast it ‘beyond the pale’ as ‘unthink-
able’. By giving the idea at least some attention, however, they also reinforced 
the ‘necessary illusion’ of a lively media debate about the issue. Furthermore, 
by concentrating on the expenditure rather than the revenue-raising side of the 
public finances debate – albeit with more sympathetic coverage of the human 
and social impact of spending cuts – the Guardian/Observer and the BBC con-
tributed to the misimpression that ‘there is no alternative’ to austerity. In the 
supposed absence of ‘viable’ sources of revenue, the discursive claims of the 
elite became ‘common sense’ and the debate logically shifted focused on where, 
when, and how the ‘necessary’ and ‘unavoidable’ public spending cuts should 
be executed (e.g. Labour’s ‘austerity-lite’, the Channel 4 live studio debates, etc.).
13.4.2 Hypothesis 2: The Five Filters
The first filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the size, ownership and 
profit orientation of the mass media and the associated contention that bias 
derives, partly, from ownership. Media ownership in Britain, like in the US, 
has long been highly concentrated.14 In 2015, eight companies owned Brit-
ain’s national newspapers with a readership of approximately 63 million peo-
ple. The Telegraph Media Group owns the Daily and Sunday Telegraph. These 
same companies also monopolised the online news market. Five companies 
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controlled 75% of Britain’s regional and local newspapers. Five companies 
dominated cable and television broadcasting, with Viacom International own-
ing Channel 5, while two companies enjoyed a 40% share of the radio market. 
Many of these companies are interlocked (i.e. common directorships and stock 
holdings) and own shares in non-media companies. Others, such as News Corp 
UK, are foreign-owned.15 The Scott Trust oversees the Guardian Media Group 
that publishes The Guardian and the Observer. Lauded for pioneering a ‘unique 
form of media ownership’, the Scott Trust claims that ‘editorial interests’ at the 
Guardian and Observer, unlike other newspapers, ‘remain free of commercial 
pressures’ because ‘profits are reinvested in journalism and do not benefit a 
proprietor or shareholders’.16 Nevertheless, these newspapers operate on a com-
mercial basis (i.e. the advertising-based business model), while the Guardian 
Media Group is ‘thoroughly embedded within corporate networks and depends 
on corporate advertisers for 75% of its revenues’.17 The state-owned BBC is sub-
ject to non-commercial forms of control. The government appoints the BBC 
board of governors and the director general, while the license fee regime, which 
is reviewed every ten years, grants the government a considerable amount of 
leverage as renewal is usually preceded by lively debates about bias and value 
for money, plus complaints of market dominance. The BBC is also subject to 
commercial pressures. Since the 1980s, successive governments have encour-
aged the marketization of both the BBC’s structure and activities. Meanwhile, 
the state-owned Channel 4, which operates on a commercial basis, is fre-
quently threatened with privatization. In short, although not privately owned, 
these media are subject to the corporate ethos, plus, in the case of the BBC and 
Channel 4, direct state power.18
The owners and managers of the media companies in Britain, in common 
with the corporate sector more generally, had an obvious commercial interest in 
the state rescue of the financial system (i.e. the bailout) and the prevention of a 
Great Depression-style recession (i.e. the stimulus). Put simply, their continued 
profitability depended on such state intervention. As an example, in Decem-
ber 2008 the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) – with a membership 
that includes media companies such as the BT Group – urged the New Labour 
Government to follow the US lead and bail out Britain’s car industry.19 Further-
more, there was a clear commercial and ideological rationale for supporting the 
austerity-driven reconfiguration of the state. Commercially, a smaller public 
sector potentially means a bigger private sector and more profit-making oppor-
tunities for non-media companies partly-owned by the media companies. Ide-
ologically, it was not in the interests of the media companies, nor the corporate 
sector more generally, to accept the permanent return of an activist state which, 
under a progressive administration, might boost the regulation of the media 
industry and/or levy higher taxes on businesses and their owners. The logical 
choice was to resurrect neoliberalism via austerity. As an example, the chief 
executive of News Corp, Rupert Murdoch, delivered a lecture in October 2010 
honouring the late Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in which 
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he endorsed the Coalition Government’s budget deficit-reduction plan. Fur-
thermore, acknowledging that ‘the financial crisis was a shock to the system’, 
Murdoch insisted that, ‘while the effects linger, it must not be used as an excuse 
by governments to roll back economic freedom’.20
The second filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the advertising license 
to do business. Endorsing the historical observation that advertisers ‘acquired 
a de facto licensing authority since, without their support, newspapers cease 
to be economically viable’,21 they claimed that the preferences of advertisers 
constitute another source of bias, in three senses. Firstly, advertisers discrimi-
nate against working class media on commercial grounds. Secondly, advertisers 
shun left-wing media on ideological grounds, and thirdly, advertisers prefer 
those media forms that do not interfere with the ‘buying mood’.
The 2008 financial crisis and the risk of a Great Depression-style recession 
clearly imperilled the ‘buying mood’ as well as the continued profitability of the 
advertising industry. Advertisers, thus, joined the corporate sector more gener-
ally in welcoming the state’s efforts to avoid economic calamity. As an example, 
the chief executive of the British-based multinational advertising agency WPP, 
Martin Sorrell, commenting in April 2009 on the state of the British advertising 
market, expressed the hope that ‘the fiscal stimulus we have seen in this country 
must have some effect’.22 Furthermore, advertisers supported austerity. With the 
government spending nearly £208 million on advertising in 2009, making it the 
biggest player,23 sections of the advertising industry obviously suffered follow-
ing the implementation of government department, and other, public spending 
cuts. The opportunity to transform the state and the economy, however, eclipsed 
such financial losses. Sorrell, for example, backed the Coalition Government 
and its austerity agenda: ‘the Coalition Government’s economic policy has a lot 
going for it’ because ‘they have done the tough stuff and they are dealing with the 
deficit.’ Indeed, ‘for the first time in a long time you can feel bullish about the UK 
in the medium term’.24 Furthermore, having published a report in 2013 claim-
ing that the advertising industry contributed £100 billion a year to the British 
economy, the Advertising Association called for ‘government and regulators to 
get out of the way’. Seeking to exploit the Coalition Government’s deregulation 
agenda, Gavin Patterson from BT Group told the annual summit of the Adver-
tising Association in February 2013 that the sector ‘needed to be set free from 
overregulation to make an even greater contribution to economic growth’.25
The third filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the sourcing of news. 
They insisted that the provision of regular and reliable sources of information 
by governments and corporations draws media into a symbiotic relationship 
that results in another source of bias. These sources also benefit from the gen-
eral perception that they are credible and objective.
The sampled coverage of the 2008 financial crisis, the Great Recession, and 
austerity found that governments and corporations did, indeed, constitute the 
primary sources of news. Such privileged positions enabled these sources to 
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set the agenda (i.e. the unquestioning acceptance of the need for the bailout in 
2008, the stimulus in 2008 and 2009 and, from 2010, austerity). It also enabled 
these entities to frame the parameters of the debate about public finances (i.e. 
the ‘necessity’ of public spending cuts and the ‘implausibility’ of alternatives on 
the revenue-raising side such as a wealth tax). A prime example of the impor-
tance and role of sourcing is the observed transformation in 2010 of the sam-
pled television coverage. In short, when the government changed from New 
Labour to the Coalition so did much of the coverage.
The fourth filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is the role of flak and the 
enforcers. They observed that the ability to attack the media for its coverage, and 
to elicit a change in its behaviour, is a potent weapon and, thus, another source 
of bias. One particularly effective method is the corporate funding of right-
wing monitoring organizations designed to attack the media – such as Accu-
racy in Media, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and the Media Institute 
in the US – which attempt to enforce media compliance with elite interests.
Examples of flak deployed as enforcers appeared as the Coalition Govern-
ment attempted to ensure media compliance with their preferred reporting of 
austerity. The BBC has long been a target of the Conservative Party and other 
right-wing forces for its supposed ‘left-liberal bias’.26 Osborne attacked the BBC 
in December 2014 for its ‘hyperbolic coverage’ of the Coalition Government’s 
public spending cuts and future plans to ‘shrink the state’. Osborne also took 
the opportunity to complain about the BBC’s earlier reporting of his budget 
deficit-reduction plan in 2010.27 Tesco’s 2008 libel suit against The Guardian 
over an article critical of the company’s tax affairs is another example of the 
effectiveness of flak. Facing possible bankruptcy from the suit if it lost, The 
Guardian withdrew the article. This sordid affair had a ‘chilling effect’ on jour-
nalists at The Guardian, and the media more generally, according to then editor 
Alan Rusbridger.28 Tax avoidance and tax evasion by corporations and wealthy 
individuals are issues of significant public interest. They also deprive Her Maj-
esty’s Revenue and Customs of substantial sums of money. The risk of legal 
action against the media by corporations and the wealthy individuals, however, 
helps to explain, in part, their reluctance to investigate these issues.
The fifth filter identified by Herman and Chomsky is anti-communism as a 
control mechanism. In an updated edition of Manufacturing Consent (2002), 
Herman and Chomsky acknowledged that the end of the Cold War had weak-
ened the ideology of anti-communism. In its place, they suggested that the 
ideology of the ‘miracle of the market’ performs a similar dichotomization 
function.
Although the Cold War ended decades ago, anti-communism arguably has a 
residual functional utility for the economic and political elite in Britain – mani-
fest, for example, in the right-wing newspaper coverage of Ed Miliband, and his 
successor Jeremy Corbyn, as Leader of the Labour Party.29 The 2008 financial 
crisis and the Great Recession exposed the fragility of neoliberalism. Britain’s 
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elite temporarily abandoned their rhetorical faith in markets and hypocriti-
cally advocated a state bailout of the financial system. Furthermore, in a brief 
flirtation with Keynesianism, they also used the state to stimulate the economy. 
Objectively, such interventions reveal one of the fundamental contradictions 
of capitalism: that it periodically needs rescuing from itself by the state. Sub-
jectively, however, such facts barely registered in the sampled media coverage. 
Instead, much of the reporting, particularly post-2010, was re-infused with the 
revitalised neoliberal claim that ‘the state is the problem’.
Such evidence supports the second Herman and Chomsky hypothesis that 
the interplay of key structural forces (i.e. the five filters) shapes media coverage. 
Furthermore, their political economy analytical framework provides a more 
sophisticated understanding and explanation of media coverage of austerity 
than the other studies to date.
13.5 Conclusion
The Herman-Chomsky PM challenges the pluralist view of how the media sys-
tem operates (i.e. the claims that it is independent, features diverse perspec-
tives, serves as a guardian of the public interest and acts as a watchdog on the 
exercise of power) and provides an alternative analytical framework for under-
standing and explaining media performance. A truly pluralist media, which 
reflected and represented the interests of the masses, rather than just the elite, 
would have educated and warned audiences about the nefarious activities of 
the financial sector.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, it would have campaigned for prosecu-
tions and an end to banker bonuses. It would have called for the fundamental 
reform of the financial system so that it served the public good and the needs 
of the real (i.e. productive) economy. It would have exposed the self-destructive 
contradictions of capitalism and the hypocrisy of those who preach the virtues 
of ‘free markets’ while turning to the state for help when market failures invari-
ably strike. It would demand concerted action to tackle inequality, poverty, 
unemployment, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. Regarding the public finances 
debate, it would have informed audiences about the historic and invaluable role 
of debt in the economy,30 while defending the public realm and the public ser-
vices upon which we all rely. It would have emphatically rejected the option of 
austerity, as regressive and self-defeating, and would have stressed the need to 
raise additional government revenue (e.g. levying a wealth tax) in any attempt 
to ‘balance the books’. The sampled coverage, however, found little or no evi-
dence of such perspectives.
Instead, coverage largely reflected the interests and outlook of the elite. 
This is also true of the coverage in the putatively left-wing Guardian/
Observer and the regulated broadcasters, with important implications for 
the debates about the role of the left-liberal media and media regulation. The 
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PM, with its political economy focus, provides an alternative and arguably 
more robust analytical framework for understanding and explaining such 
media performance.
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CHAPTER 14
Corporate-Market Power and  
Ideological Domination : The Propaganda 
Model after 30 Years – Relevance and  
Further  Application
Florian Zollmann
14.1 Introduction
The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model (henceforth PM) is confirmed 
by a large body of scholarship.1 Already thirty years ago, when Manufactur-
ing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media was initially published 
authors of a range of scholarly studies produced findings in agreement with the 
main predictions of the PM.2 In spite of that, the PM has been marginalized by 
Western scholarship.3 The emergence of the internet and the new digital media 
environment (henceforth NME) have contributed towards further weakening 
the cogency of PM and related approaches. The decentralized structure of the 
NME as well as novel applications such as Web 2.0 allow for multi-dimensional 
flows of information thus potentially rendering gatekeeping models obsolete. 
As a consequence, a new wave of claims about novel and nearly  unprecedented 
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media freedoms has emerged in academia.4 The arguments of the so-called 
internet celebrants, who mirror the postulations of the liberal school of thought 
in media and Communication Studies, have been somewhat mitigated by 
 scholars who have been pointing to the flaws of what constitutes outright tech-
nicism.5
Notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship far too often lacks a structural 
critique of the corporate media system and its continued role as a dominant 
institution that serves state-corporate elite interests. In fact, much contem-
porary scholarship is concerned with applied research based on quantitative 
research designs at the expense of investigating broader societal issues.6 This 
is striking because next to a digital revolution we are currently witnessing an 
era of almost unprecedented inequality, consolidation of power, militarization, 
serial Western wars, secret interventions, and retail-terrorist blowbacks as well 
as nuclear, and climate disasters.7 McChesney, in fact, argues that society needs 
‘engaged communication scholarship from a broad range of traditions and 
employing a diverse set of methodologies to address the issues before us.’8 A 
PM approach, which is underpinned by an epistemology aimed at challenging 
the co-optation of the media by powerful forces in society, should certainly 
factor well in what we conclude to be significant scholarly debates. Robertson 
even suggests the PM would still ‘be of enormous value as a tool for direct criti-
cism of complicit mainstream media by both elite academics and a much wider 
population of citizens.’9
The aim of this two-part-essay is to further consolidate the relevance and 
applicability of the PM in the internet age as well as to point to areas that prom-
ise its fruitful application. More specifically, part one of the essay will highlight 
the continued significance of corporate-market constraints as major news ‘fil-
ters.’ Part two will address the issue of ideology, arguing that ‘humanitarianism’ 
has become a major reference point to justify Western militarism. The conclud-
ing section will outline a set of broad research areas for scholars interested in 
applying PM.
14.2 Corporate-Market Constraints: Still the Engine of Media 
Deception
The technological architecture of the NME enables one-to-many and many-to-
many flows of communication on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The World 
Wide Web, as a major service of the internet, allows for a multitude of applica-
tions that can be utilized in different ways to distribute information. Digitali-
zation has eliminated spectrum scarcity entry barriers so that any individual 
or organization can set up web-applications to distribute information or oth-
erwise communicate with people on local, national and international levels. 
With current technology, textual, audial, or visual information can easily be 
uploaded on a website and instantly be distributed across the globe. Further-
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more, mobile phones and cameras accelerate the rapid exchange of information 
about world events. Hence, during the 1990s and subsequently, a dominant 
school of thought about the internet emerged that highlighted these virtues 
of digital technology.10 Scholars, politicians, journalists, and public experts 
claimed that the internet would lead towards democratization, media freedom 
and empowerment potentially enabling a true Habermasian public sphere.11 
But as McChesney has highlighted, much of the scholarship and commentary 
about the internet had ‘a single, deep, and often fatal flaw that severely compro-
mises the value of their work’ which constituted their ‘ignorance about really 
existing capitalism and an underappreciation of how capitalism dominates 
social life.’12 The so-called internet celebrants have overemphasized the techno-
logical potential of the internet, thereby neglecting to interrogate how digital 
technology had been shaped by economic power.13
McChesney’s critique echoed important postulations that had been evoked 
in earlier epochs when shifts in media technology occurred. In 1973, Mur-
dock and Golding cautioned ‘against the euphoria which often accompanies 
discussion of […] new media technologies.’14 While speaking to developments 
in broadcasting, most notably innovations such as cable, cassette and satellite 
technology, Murdock and Golding pointed to an important fact:
In each of the media there is an increasingly apparent opposition 
between the social potentialities for redifferentiation and the trends 
towards economic concentration. New techniques permitting greater 
control by the consumer, greater fragmentation and localization, and 
cheaper production are quickly being enveloped in the same economic 
structure […].15
Murdock and Golding advanced the political economy perspective of the 
media suggesting that how media technology may evolve is crucially linked to 
wider societal structures and processes. Applying this framework, scholars have 
pointed to the fact that the technological potential of the internet had not been 
realized at the beginning of the twentieth century.16 In agreement with the pos-
tulation by Murdock and Golding, scholars have highlighted how the evolving 
internet technology has been shaped by economic structure. Most notably, and 
despite major technological changes, the institutional environment that consti-
tuted the old mass media system has remained intact.17 Due to the ‘privatiza-
tion’ of important web-infrastructure during the 1990s, corporations became 
the major driving forces of the internet.18 Furthermore, most internet transac-
tions and applications became regulated via markets that have developed in a 
highly oligopolistic fashion - a well-known phenomenon in the media indus-
tries. Online market concentration was facilitated by network effects because, 
unlike in traditional media markets, the value of an online application increases 
relative to the amount of its users.19 Furthermore, companies created artificial 
market entry barriers through conglomeration, the setting and patenting of 
226 The Propaganda Model Today
technological standards as well as copyright legislation.20 Corporate-market 
control has locked the internet by way of monopoly. Wu summarised the state 
of the developments as follows: ‘There is strong reason to believe that there is 
nothing new under the sun, that the great universal network is as disposed to 
monopoly as its predecessors.’21
The underbelly of corporate online concentration constitutes advertising, 
which has effectively honeycombed the internet. Major online markets for 
social media, search engines, internet access and e-commerce are underwrit-
ten by targeted advertising based on surveillance. Since the ‘privatization’ of 
the internet, the advertising industry has shaped media policy enabling the 
use of cookies and other user tracking technology.22 Today, major online firms 
including Facebook and Google, the leading companies in terms of users and 
revenues, use business models that rest on the exploitation of online user data 
for advertising purposes. Fuchs explained how this system operates with refer-
ence to Facebook:
Surveillance on Facebook is surveillance of prosumers, who dynami-
cally and permanently create and share user-generated content, browse 
profiles and data, interact with others, join, create, and build commu-
nities, and co-create information. The corporate web platform opera-
tors and their third-party advertising clients continuously monitor and 
record personal data and online activities; they store, merge and analyse 
collected data. This allows them to create detailed user profiles and to 
know about the personal interests and online behaviour of the users. 
Facebook sells its prosumers as a commodity to advertising clients. 
Money is exchanged for the access to user data that allows economic 
surveillance of the users.23
In the same fashion, Google, which has a portfolio of services including online 
search, e-mail, maps, video (YouTube) and operating systems (Android), 
amongst others, constitutes ‘a vast network for the collection and mining of 
personal data.’24 It is estimated that 90 per cent of Google’s revenues stem from 
selling online adverts. Moreover, Google accounts for one third of the spending 
of global advertising.25 As Fuchs further commented:
Google generates and stores data about the usage of these services in 
order to enable targeted advertising. It sells these data to the advertising 
clients, who then provide advertisements that are targeted to the activi-
ties, searches, contents and interests of the users of Google services.26
Next to Google and Facebook, a multitude of other companies engage in simi-
lar activities. Turow described these practices as ‘one of history’s most massive 
efforts in stealth marketing.’27 Online advertising, of course, poses serious ques-
tions about the nature and implications of surveillance. Furthermore, these 
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developments demonstrate that the internet is geared towards the interests of 
the corporate and advertising industries. As McChesney observed: ‘In most 
internet areas where profits can be generated, private interests have been able to 
convert beachheads into monopoly fortresses and generate endless profits. […] 
Today, the internet as a social medium and information system is the domain 
of a handful of colossal firms.’28
The issues outlined above directly translate into the applicability of the first 
and second institutional ‘filters’ theorized by PM: the media’s concentration 
in ownership size and audience markets as well as advertising dependency.29 
The performance of novel online applications is, thus, likely biased towards 
the interests that underwrite them. Hence, in 1998, Google founders Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin cautioned against advertising sponsorship: ‘We expect 
that advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased towards the 
advertisers and away from the needs of consumers.’30 Years later, when Google 
had already started to use advertising, some of its competitors had alleged that 
Google’s searches might weight their results for the benefit of its commercial 
offerings thus undermining choice.31 Similarly, at a US Senate hearing in 2011, 
Senator Herb Kohl asked: ‘Is it possible for Google to be both an unbiased search 
engine and at the same time own a vast portfolio of Web-based products and 
services?’32 Much more research is needed to answer questions about how cor-
porate-market power and advertising funding might specifically impact online 
searches, networking, and other novel web-applications. For scholars utilizing 
the PM, this significant research gap, in fact, opens up new areas beyond the 
usually applied studies of news media content. Moreover, this section has so far 
revealed that the online environment is constrained by corporate power in the 
same fashion as theorized by PM.
This is similarly true for the realm of news, which has been the primary 
concern of studies using PM. The internet has not facilitated major changes in 
terms of corporate news media performance. It is well documented that con-
temporary off- and online news media sectors are heavily consolidated and 
commercialized.33 Digital technology allows for the establishment of novel 
online offerings. This technically enables the production and distribution of 
news and could foster diversity in sources and opinions. Yet, at this point in 
time, a myriad of novel information websites and blogs are confined to niche 
spaces on the web - virtually invisible to larger publics.34 In contrast, the tra-
ditional news media brands are still the dominant forces in the online world.35 
Markets for online news are heavily concentrated in terms of audiences. A 
major study by Hindman found that ‘online audience concentration equals or 
exceeds that found in most traditional media.’36
It is true that consumption is becoming more fragmented as people increas-
ingly use social media, mobile applications as well as aggregators based on algo-
rithmic content selection to access news. Yet, these trends have not changed the 
fact that a handful of news brands remain dominant.37 People may access news 
via social media and other applications. However, the news content that users 
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actually consume stems from a small set of news brands. Accordingly, the 2016 
Digital News Report of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found 
‘that even in the era of social media and atomised media, news organisations 
and traditional news brands still matter enormously’ and ‘most of the content 
consumed still comes from newspaper groups, broadcasters, or digital born 
brands that have invested in original content.’38 While there are some novel, 
so-called online-only news organisations such as the Huffington Post or Buzz-
Feed, research suggests that the top news brands in terms of audiences are large 
corporations. For instance, a report by the Media Reform Coalition found that 
in the UK, five companies accounted for 80 per cent of newspaper consump-
tion including online, mobile readers and offline. In terms of local news, the 
report found that six giant conglomerates shared 80 per cent of all outlets while 
more than 50 other publishers allotted the remaining 20 per cent of titles. Simi-
larly, the broadcasting sector in the UK was heavily consolidated with big US 
companies like Rupert Murdoch’s 21st Century Fox empire, Liberty Global and 
Viacom International encroaching the market.39 The authors of the report for 
the Media Reform Coalition drew the following conclusion:
We believe that concentration within news and information markets in 
particular has reached endemic levels in the UK and that we urgently 
need effective remedies. This kind of concentration creates conditions 
in which wealthy individuals and organisations can amass huge politi-
cal and economic power and distort the media landscape to suit their 
interests and personal views. Urgent reform is needed in order both to 
address high levels of concentration in particular media markets and to 
protect against further concentration in others.40
The current state of the media system thus suggests applicability of the analyti-
cal categories of the PM, which place importance on how corporate control and 
consolidation as well as market pressures determine news choices. As Herman 
explained, the PM’s
crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media 
are firmly embedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking busi-
nesses, owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); and they 
are funded largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, 
and who want their advertisements to appear in a supportive selling 
environment.41
Hence, as Herman further pointed out, these structural factors should be seen 
as ‘the only possible root of the systematic patterns of media behaviour and 
performance.’42
Given the preceding outline of validity of the PM’s structural foundations, the 
following section explores the continued relevance of ideology and discusses 
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issues that are important in terms of resultant news media content bias. The 
chapter concludes by briefly outlining potential topics for further study.
14.3 Ideological Domination: Humanitarianism, Atrocities 
Management and Elite Utility of Suffering
Much scholarship applying the PM has focused on how military adventures, 
wars, and foreign policy issues have been reported in the news. Ideology has 
been an important concept in this research area: firstly, ideology has been used 
to explain why certain events and issues are able to permeate news filtering 
processes as opposed to others – as outlined by the fifth ‘filter’ of PM. Secondly, 
PM researchers have argued that media content patterns tend to be aligned 
with specific elite interests. As a result, corporate media content is regarded 
as necessarily ideological. Of course, both issues are connected: ideological 
assumptions can pass through the news gates if they are congruent with domi-
nant ideology (the fifth ‘filter’) and consequently manifest as ideological media 
content. The section below thus further explores the continued relevance of as 
well as crucial shifts in contemporary ideology.
Traditionally, scholars have been concerned with how ‘anti-communism’ has 
served as an important ideological tool to legitimize policies in favour of state-
corporate elites.43 For example, ‘anti-communism,’ also coined as the ideology 
of the ‘Cold War’ or the ‘Soviet threat,’ was used as a reference point to justify 
US military interventions after World War II.44 Since the end of the Cold War 
in 1991, ‘anti-Soviet’ ideology has become less important as a schema to legiti-
mise foreign policy adventures.45 According to Shalom: ‘With the collapse of 
the Soviet threat, US officials have had to work overtime to concoct new alibis 
to disguise US foreign policy.’46
Research has established that governments have employed a range of devices 
to explain, justify, and rationalise overt and/or covert military interventions in 
the affairs of sovereign states.47 Hence, old and new ideological narratives used 
to justify interventionist foreign policy agendas have been elaborated in the 
circles of state-corporate power. They include ideologies such as ‘free-market 
democracy,’ the ‘war on terror,’ the ‘war on drugs,’ ‘basic Western benevolence,’ 
and ‘humanitarianism.’48
In terms of military intervention, ‘humanitarianism,’ applied as a highly 
selective interventionist ideology to shame countries unwilling to integrate into 
the ‘Washington Consensus,’ has obtained particular prominence since 1991.49 
‘Humanitarianism’ played a major role in policy and news media discussions 
about potential or actual intervention in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), 
Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Darfur (2003–2017), Libya (2011), and Syria 
(2012–2018).50 ‘Humanitarianism’ was also evoked, in conjunction with other 
ideological devices, to legitimise the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 
2003 Iraq War.51 It should be noted that ‘humanitarianism’ as an ideology can 
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transport valid reasoning about human rights violations and how they should 
be addressed to alleviate human suffering. On the other hand, PM scholars 
have been concerned with how ‘humanitarianism’ has been instrumentalized 
to serve a narrow militarist agenda whose ultimate goal is not to stop human 
rights violations but to impose Western designs on other nations. Some exam-
ples of this will be further explored below.
An under-researched sub-set of ‘humanitarianism’ constitutes what this 
author defines as atrocity-shaming. In his early work on propaganda during 
World War I, Lasswell found that one goal of propaganda was ‘to mobilise 
hatred against the enemy.’52 According to Lasswell, this involved representing 
an oppositional country ‘as a menacing, murderous aggressor.’53 Such propa-
ganda depicted the enemy in contrast to the noble aims of the home state and 
was used to legitimize the war effort to the public in the home country.54
Atrocity-shaming had also been the topic of early work by Chomsky and Her-
man who looked at how human rights violations conducted by so-called ‘enemy’ 
states of the West were designated to the status of nefarious bloodbaths.55 Nefari-
ous bloodbaths were highlighted in Western policy and human rights circles and 
consequently received significant news media attention. During the process of 
atrocity-shaming, designated perpetrator countries faced serious repercussions 
like criminal proceedings, sanctions, and regime-change interventions.56 Accord-
ing to Chomsky and Herman, nefarious bloodbaths served ‘an extremely impor-
tant public relations function in mobilizing support for US military intervention.’57 
Chomsky and Herman’s research demonstrates how countries have been shamed 
selectively if this served Western strategic interests. So-called ‘allied’ states of the 
West have largely remained exempt from public campaigns of shaming even if 
they conducted similar or greater human rights violations than ‘enemy’ states.58
Moreover, shaming has led to intervention even in cases when evidence for 
atrocities was hardly conclusive and the identity of perpetrators far from clear. 
For instance, NATO used the so-called 1999 Račak massacre in Kosovo as a 
pretext for intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, although facts 
suggested that the dead could have been killed in battle.59 In fact, during the 
Yugoslav Wars, fought roughly between 1991–1999, selective atrocity-shaming 
took place in a range of theatres. Studies suggest that the Western news media, 
policy and human rights systems have mainly focused on Serbian villainy when 
assessing these conflicts.60 Thus, atrocities conducted by the Serbs against Bos-
nians, like the Srebrenica massacre, have received significant media attention 
and were framed as genocide.61 On the other hand, the major news media have 
failed to interrogate the preceding violence in the Srebrenica vicinity, con-
ducted by Bosnian paramilitary forces against the Serbs.62 Similarly, what argu-
ably constituted one of the largest ethnic cleansings during the Yugoslav Wars, 
the purge of the Serbs of the Krajina (in the Republic of Croatia), has largely 
been ignored in the West.63 In these latter cases of violence against the Serbs, 
the genocide label has not been applied in the West. This dichotomised framing 
of victims of violence has served Western policy objectives of establishing frag-
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mented and estranged client states in the Balkans. In contrast, a more objective 
treatment of atrocities committed by all sides in the conflict could arguably 
have better contributed towards conflict resolution and reconciliation.64
Atrocity-shaming as an ideology to demonise an opponent has achieved its peak 
performance during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The alleged 2011 
Benghazi crackdown on protestors in Libya was used as a justification for NATO 
intervention against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi on the basis of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It turned out, however, that the Benghazi ‘massacre’ 
was manufactured.65 Careful analysis of the documentary record demonstrates that 
Gaddafi’s forces had not used force indiscriminately against protestors.66
Similarly, in the present war in Syria, atrocities have been instrumentalised to 
justify proxy- and big power intervention.67 In the Syrian theatre, a range of atroc-
ities has been linked to the Syrian government and its forces. In many of these 
cases, however, responsibility for crimes could hardly be established because 
independent verification has not been possible. Furthermore, evidence suggested 
that the Syrian ‘opposition’ aimed at inciting foreign intervention by way of man-
ufacturing bloodbaths.68 Yet, contested atrocities like the Houla, Ghouta, or Khan 
Sheikhoun incidents have been used to justify regime-change agendas in Syria.69
The violence of preceding wars such as in Yugoslavia was evoked as an exam-
ple to call for preventive ‘humanitarian’ interventions. But how likely is it that 
Western military force is going to mitigate violence? In both Libya and Syria, 
Western intervention has had significant repercussions: Kuperman estimated 
that, ‘NATO intervention magnified the death toll in Libya by about seven to 
ten times.’70 Moreover, Libyan society fragmented along sectarian lines. At the 
same time, public health and security collapsed, sending bursts of refugees 
towards Europe.71 In Syria, proxy-intervention sparked high-intensity conflict 
and prolonged a deadly stalemate between the Syrian Army and ‘opposition’ 
forces.72 Additionally, violent conflict fostered the disintegration of the Syrian 
nation state. Taken together, intervention in Libya and Syria destabilised the 
Middle East and fostered the rise of ISIS as well as the massive refugee crisis of 
2014/2015.73 As a PM would predict, these violent repercussions have largely 
been ignored by the news media in terms of relegating Western responsibility. 
Yet, the Balkanisation of the Middle East was well in line with US- and EU  policy 
interests of establishing a set of weak and obedient vassal states. ‘Humanitarian’ 
ideology was crucial in facilitating these outcomes.74
14.4 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the continued relevance of PM in terms of three of its 
news ‘filters’: corporate-market power, advertising dependency, and ideology. 
Moreover, the chapter further provides indicative evidence that major conflicts 
since the end of the Cold War have been reported in the same dichotomous 
fashion that a PM would predict. Significantly, ‘humanitarianism’ has been 
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applied as an ideological device during highly selective campaigns of sham-
ing that led to military intervention. This suggests a shift from Cold War to 
‘humanitarian’ ideology. Of course, the presented examples only constitute a 
first approximation and much more research is needed to solidify the extent to 
which the PM remains relevant in the internet era. The following list provides 
some of the research areas that may be utilized for further study:
1. Assessing the impact of corporate-market constraints and advertising 
funding on the performance of online applications such as online search, 
networking, news, blogging, etc…
2. Providing a comprehensive empirical overview of PM’s ‘filters’ in relation 
to traditional as well as online news sectors.
3. Investigating potential changes and refinements to PM’s ‘filters’ under 
consideration of increased political and interest-group pressure levelled 
against the free flow of information (e.g. suppression of whistle blowers, 
campaign against Wikileaks, etc.).
4. Investigating the vast PR and propaganda industries that currently use the 
internet to disseminate targeted ‘information.’
5. Studying off- and online reporting of high- and low-intensity conflicts 
such as in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Ukraine or Bahrain, the refugee 
crisis, as well as domestic political, economic and social issues in consid-
eration of PM’s predictions.
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CHAPTER 15
Imperialism and Hegemonic  Information 
in Latin America : The Media Coup in 
Venezuela vs. the Criminalization of 
 Protest in Mexico
Francisco Sierra Caballero
15.1 Introduction
A systematic study and institutional analysis of the current performance of 
Latin American media groups based on the propaganda model illustrates how 
the mass media operate as effective transmitters of messages designed on the 
basis of strategic information manipulation criteria to mold, predict and con-
trol the public behaviour of the middle classes and popular sectors towards a 
colonial and imperialist logic, as evidenced by the recent media coups in the 
region.
If we take a look at the forms of ideological closure of public discourse and 
the voices capable of making themselves heard in the media sphere, the data 
reveal a steady and ruthless representation of the interests and criteria of the 
elites in newspaper accounts of vital issues for the countries of the South, which 
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for decades have been under the hegemonic control of foreign cultural indus-
tries and subject to the imposition of the policy of the free flow of information.1 
Moreover, it has become clear how, after the long neoliberal night, there have 
been substantial changes in the foundations and problems of the structure of 
information, as well as in the economic functions of the media and cultural 
industries, especially regarding the neocolonial role that hegemonic informa-
tion from the North plays in the contemporary capitalist crisis in which the 
countries of the subcontinent are currently immersed.
The governments of progress in the region introduced into the public debate 
observable historical contradictions created by the imbalance in the dominant 
structure of information against the right of access, popular communication 
and, of course, the rights of professionals, citizens and civil society as a whole. 
In the following pages, two illustrative cases of the social logic of journalistic 
mediation in Latin America are analysed: Venezuela and Mexico. These case 
studies illustrate the repetition of history as a farce through the systematic con-
tribution of information dependence and the violation of human rights, as has 
occurred before in US imperial projects such as Operation Condor.
The publication in 1988 of the first edition of Edward S. Herman and Noam 
Chomsky’s book, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media coincided in the USA with the end of the ‘Reagan era’ (1981–1989), a 
period marked by political conservatism and a foreign policy of intervention-
ism to which nobody remained indifferent, whose influence on Latin America 
would be decisive in episodes such as the dirty war in Nicaragua. It was in this 
context that Herman and Chomsky carried out a detailed investigation of the 
internal workings of the US media industry, its patterns of conduct, the motives 
behind the production of messages and their social function: the production 
of consent around a series of values destined to maintain the status quo at the 
time, both inside and outside the borders of the USA.
To illustrate the relevance of such a theoretical-methodological contribution, 
we will try to reveal the logic behind, and critical perspectives on, the basis and 
validity of the propaganda model and its application to recent newsworthy events 
in the region. The task is none other than to assess theoretical contributions by 
criticizing news mediation, on the basis of a structural analysis of the study con-
text of the two cases discussed below. The comparative analysis shows that elite 
interests are strictly defended by mainstream media in both cases, resulting in 
the systematic support of elite actors who violate human rights combined with 
aggressive attacks on the social and political forces that are considered enemies.
15.2 The Permanent War Against Venezuela
Bearing in mind the distinctive features of the real structure of information 
in practically all the countries of the region, the state of siege under which the 
Bolivarian revolution has been placed can be regarded as a revealing exam-
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ple of the validity of the propaganda model for the purposes described here. 
Since Hugo Chávez became President of Venezuela, the private media, national 
and international alike, have subjected the country to continual and systematic 
harassment, thus contributing to the construction of a distorted picture of the 
democratic processes in the Republic of Venezuela, even to the extreme of jus-
tifying the failed coup d’état in 2002.2
The North American ‘peace operations’ have, nonetheless, gone unnoticed 
by the populace. As a matter of fact, in the public space audiences do not have 
access to any other type of narrative than the vilification of the revolutionary 
leaders. To such an extent that the coordination and lobbying activities of those 
representing the hegemonic geopolitical interests remain hidden from the pub-
lic eye, by deliberate omission on the part of the mainstream media, while they 
contribute, without constraints, to control and repress the emergence of popu-
lar protest movements, if not to destabilize expressly unfavorable or unreliable 
governments, as is the case of the so-called ‘unrestricted warfare’ waged by the 
Pentagon against Venezuela.
Thus, the self-styled ‘independent media’ such as El País implemented an 
information policy to legitimize the planned coup and the destabilizing pro-
insurgency captained from Washington by expert conspirators like Otto Reich, 
a former collaborator of Ronald Reagan and a leading expert in counter-
insurgency and low-intensity operations such as those orchestrated in Central 
America against Nicaragua. The in-depth study of Fernando Casado illustrates 
analytically to what extent this process of psychological war relies on the com-
mitted work of the so-called ‘anti-journalists.’ A hundred qualitative interviews 
with Spanish-speaking journalists, both European and Latin American, from 
leading newspapers including Clarín (Argentina), El Tiempo (Colombia), El 
País (Spain) and El Comercio (Ecuador), revealed the existence of a deliberate 
propaganda campaign launched by the major media corporations against the 
Chávez government as part of a covert operation to counter the revolutionary 
process. In this coverage, several techniques have been employed to step up the 
media siege and propaganda war in which the country is currently immersed:
1. The caricaturing of Presidents Chávez and Maduro. The sensationalist 
representation of both heads of state has tended to waver between the 
ridiculous and the grotesque, both being criminalized by their antago-
nists, according to the Nixon hypothesis, as ‘dangerous, mad criminals.’ 
Be that as it may, at any rate it is possible to confirm a hugely negative and 
distorted portrayal of both presidents in the national and international 
media, which has gradually permeated public opinion to such a degree as 
to justify a possible intervention in ‘defence of democracy.’
2. Disinformation and psychological warfare. The production of false news, 
from non-existent conflicts on the Colombian border, to putative shortage 
crises, through set-ups involving cases of corruption and ties with drug 
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trafficking, has aimed to destabilize the Bolivarian government and iso-
late it on the international stage. In short, ‘information about Venezuela 
is usually spectacular and sensationalist; anecdotes turn into the focus of 
the news; important political figures as President Chávez are trivialized, 
emphasizing witty remarks rather than significant decisions which have 
benefited millions of people’.3
3. Campaigns against the lack of freedom of expression and democracy. The 
opposition and the international press have promoted continuous prop-
aganda campaigns, describing the Chávez government as a dictatorship 
because of the purported absence of liberties, a term that has been repeat-
edly dismissed by the Carter Foundation, the Organization of American 
States (OAS) itself, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and 
the European Union (EU), among other multilateral agencies.
4. The spreading of rumors and the dearth of news on social networks. Together 
with the clichés and the distorted picture of the country due to the continu-
ous disinformation in the mainstream media, social networks have been used 
to reinforce this prevailing image by circulating all kinds of canards about the 
leaders of the Venezuelan government or their allies, even, as has occurred 
during the elections in Spain, to invoke the alleged danger of a Venezuelan-
type drift in other countries whose progressive parties aspire to government.
5. The bias and imbalance in the sources and the use of ideologically focused 
language on a lexicological and semantic level. Furthermore, news about the 
country has been continually manipulated as regards the use of sources and 
semiotic operations, repeatedly employed with the clear purpose of propa-
ganda. Thus, for example, the mainstream international media only cite 
sources reflecting the stance of the USA and its opposition allies, without 
giving voice to the Venezuelan government, except to reinforce a priori the 
bias in news coverage or to ridicule its representatives in a conspicuous fash-
ion. By the same token, when reference is made to the democratically elected 
government of the country it is regularly referred to as a regime, which con-
jures up images of authoritarian systems such as that of the ex-USSR in the 
eyes of public opinion. This bias is applied across the board to North Korea, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia, and functions, in tandem with other semi-
otic strategies, to construct a view contrary to the revolutionary process.
Consequently, the media war against Venezuela ‘is translated into a continuous 
deformation and manipulation of information, produced serving destabilizing 
agendas against Bolivarian Revolution’, which systematically violates the right of 
readers and audience to receive truthful information’.4
It has always been held that, in war, as in times of peace, the first victim is 
the truth, but in the case of Venezuela the media have never, now or before, 
intended to shed light on the murky, coup-mongering web of interests oppos-
ing the Bolivarian revolutionary process. What is of real interest in the case, 
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however, is that the major disinformation campaigns orchestrated in favor of 
covert operations before the coup d’état were not a success, in spite of the fact 
that they managed to snare many intellectuals, journalists and media compa-
nies, who believed the manipulated version of the facts purposefully fabricated 
by the Cisneros Group and the psychological warfare advisors sent by the USA 
for that purpose, in their discursive plot and strategy of persuasion.
The situation of the Bolivarian Republic, described by the Pentagon ‘as a bat-
tle cry of communists and socialists’ in the heart of South America, recalls in 
this sense the plan designed to topple the government of Salvador Allende in 
1973: media smear campaigns, rumors and intense disinformation; the mobili-
zation of the elites; unfounded accusations against the person of the President; 
an army divided; the economic blockade promoted by the employers’ associa-
tion; the flight of capital; an attempted coup; and considerable international 
pressure. In this respect, the tragic events of September 1973 in Chile should be 
recalled, because not by chance Charles Shapiro, one of the actors also respon-
sible for operations in Trinidad and Tobago and an advocate of the terror cam-
paigns in Central America (Nicaragua and El Salvador), occupied the post of 
US Ambassador to Venezuela in order to implement a destabilizing pro-insur-
gency program against the Bolivarian government.
As in the case of the operation against the Popular Unity (UP) government 
in Chile, the counter-revolutionary operation in Venezuela has focused on four 
lines of strategic action bolstered by the activities of the media:
1. Economic destabilization (as in Chile, the gains in welfare and economic 
equality, a result of the reallocation and exploitation of the country’s oil 
resources, have been attacked by means of an active campaign based on 
the flight of capital and lockouts against the government’s policy of redis-
tribution).
2. Political-social destabilization (the economic and political establishment 
have attempted to present as a civil war what is none other than an active 
operation of psychological warfare and mobilization by means of reports 
with eye-catching headlines revolving around corruption, which have 
since proved to be unfounded).
3. Destabilization of the National Armed Forces (the protests of sectors 
of the army have been associated with the manoeuvring of the USA to 
garner support against Chávez and Maduro, inciting prominent military 
officers to implement a strategy of harassment and destabilization of the 
government).
4. Civil disobedience (after the failure of the coup d’état, minority groups 
of the population, overrepresented in the country’s oligopolistic media, 
painted a picture of ungovernability, which has had a strong impact on 
public opinion, with garimpas and continual sabotages, such as those 
instigated by Leopoldo López).
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Thus, media conglomerates such as PRISA have presented as a ‘civil rebellion’ 
what is none other than a mobilization organized by the corporate/media/mili-
tary bloc in favor of US interests. The outcome of these covert operations is 
unpredictable and, if this symbolic escalation of violence continues, it could 
lead to an authentic class confrontation. We have outlined this as a working 
hypothesis in previous studies. The problem with the spiral of dissembling and 
silencing dirty wars like this is that it is highly likely that it will lead to upheav-
als and disruptions, multiple disturbances and wars, in the growing escalation 
of exploitation and indiscriminate violence of this fearsome product of military 
engineering in Latin America, as is currently the case in Mexico.
15.3 Mexico: From Chiapas to Ayotzinapa
The second case study is a counter-factual example that confirms the propaganda 
model as regards the distinctions made by the press between worthy victims 
(opponents such as Leopoldo López in Venezuela or the pro-coup movement 
of the Brazilian extreme right against Dilma Rousseff) and unworthy victims 
(indigenous communities, students and peasants in the case of Mexico). The 
distortion of news, as in the case of Ayotzinapa and, prior to this, the Zapatista 
insurgency, perfectly illustrates the institutional working model of the media 
oligopoly governing the country, whose maximum expression lies in the ten-
dency to criminalize protests and collective mobilization, whether in Mexico’s 
poorest states (Oaxaca, Guerrero, Veracruz) or, as has been recently observed, 
on the occasion of the demonstrations against the gasolinazo.5 In this regard, the 
information blackout is, in these and other cases, striking indeed, as has been 
shown in studies conducted by the Technological Institute of Monterrey.
A content analysis of the coverage of the country’s main news programs, 
which constitute the primary and practically exclusive source of information 
for Mexicans, reveals conspicuous inequalities. Thus, ‘the public figures receiv-
ing most coverage belong to the Federal Government and, to a lesser extent, 
the legislative power and the State Government. By the same token and given 
that it is the ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) receives 
the lion’s share in comparison with other political institutions. It is no wonder 
then that the main issues addressed in the news have been the economy, secu-
rity and politics, since they are precisely the topics included on the agenda of 
these political figures’.6 As a dominant pattern, this agenda tends to be marked 
by Televisa, characterized by the systematic concealment or stigmatization of 
the social actors taking part in the protests. ‘The amount of time dedicated 
to social actors highlights the huge imbalance in their coverage, inasmuch as, 
whereas there is a vast amount of information about their political counter-
parts, those people concerned with social issues are relegated to the third, or 
even the fourth news slot. This difference in the coverage of the different actors 
within the social system denotes a lack of diversity in Mexican television con-
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tent, a state of affairs that was reconfirmed when applying the Gini Index (GI) 
(IG= 0.58) 7’
This logic has also been confirmed empirically in the case of the Zapatista 
uprising in Chiapas, the massacres of Acteal and the mobilizations in Oaxaca 
on the occasion of the teachers’ strike. So, for instance, ‘after analyzing the news 
broadcast by Televisa on 25 November 2006 following a huge demonstration, 
the researcher Margarita Zires concluded that, by means of its narrative logic 
and interpretation of reality, the news program represented the members of the 
APPO as provocative vandals even criminals and the federal security forces as 
the legitimate forces of law and order.’8’
In the last few years, social breakdown and increased repression throughout 
Mexico due to the deepening of the economic crisis have favored, as a result, a 
polarization between the reality of the process of militarization and indiscrimi-
nate violence on the part of the elites and state apparatuses and reality accord-
ing to the news programs and mainstream press. The contradiction between 
the dominant version in the media and the reality experienced by the majority 
of the population has consequently led to a crisis of trust in the Channel of 
the Stars (Televisa) and the quest for a greater control over information, with 
the resulting concealment and legitimization of state terrorism that has been 
unleashed against civil organizations, opposition parties and cooperatives and 
popular movements opposing the counter-insurgency policy of the Stalinist 
development model that President Peña Nieto currently represents. Notwith-
standing the crisis of confidence in the state and its ideological apparatus, the 
influence of the media duopoly still prevails. This has been possible thanks to 
a high level of concentration throughout the country’s history, under the sway 
of a small clique including the Azcárraga family. ‘In Mexico, Televisa (with 
three national channels) monopolises 66% of 465 concessions, has 52% audi-
ence share and channels 70% of commercial screen advertising. TV Azteca has 
28% of concessions, 21% of the audience and 25% of advertising. Together they 
account for 90% of the television audience.’9
The history of Mexican television has been characterized by the symbiotic 
relationship and alliance with the political-economic and media powers, thus 
constituting an authentic duopoly in which the vast majority of the population 
depends on a limited information framework:
The concentration of the mass media industry in only two institutions 
has been one of the most criticised aspects of the Mexican political sys-
tem, above all due to the impact that television has had on the demo-
cratic life of the country for many years now. However, despite the fact 
that Mexican population trust their national news, the concentration of 
television market could be working against them, in particular offering 
a biased view of reality as has been pointed out by some authors, who 
consider that, in the previously described conditions, media cannot 
strengthen democracy [...] The concentration characterizing Mexican 
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television is a factor that, in one way or another, has influenced the news 
content accessed by the majority of the country’s inhabitants, and the 
media policies that are ultimately implemented will have an impact on 
the vision that viewers have of national reality. The partiality with which 
information is treated is one of the most questionable aspects since it 
contravenes the principle of diversity through which an attempt is made 
to describe reality in all its complexity.’10
Therefore, the regular reports released by bodies such as Amnesty International 
denouncing the systematic violation of human rights in states like Oaxaca and 
Guerrero, and in Chiapas itself, have not been covered in the mainstream media, 
which have only mentioned military sources or, failing that, high-level decision-
makers of the Secretariats of National Defense and of the Interior, due to their 
continued structural dependence on the Party-State. The multitude of cases 
and individual complaints – which would make any journalistic investigation a 
simple matter – have been habitually relegated to the fringe networks of some 
 community-based, counter-information networks and to a few – albeit important – 
independent media such as La Jornada or Proceso, amid the clamorous and 
 critical situation of human rights in the country which even affects media pro-
fessionals themselves. Threats, impunity and the persecution of journalists are 
nowadays the norm in a country living under a permanent state of emergency:
‘In Mexico, threats, violence and persecution against information professionals 
are a daily constant and an effective tool to silence those who write about corrup-
tion or organised crime. According to several national and international organi-
zations, Mexico has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world 
to exercise journalism profession.’11 However, the international press has warned 
against the lack of freedom of expression in countries that have advocated for 
national communication policies for democratizing the digital radio spectrum. 
The book recently edited by Professor Bernardo Díaz Nosty, coordinator of the 
UNESCO Chair of Communication of Malaga University, underscores such con-
tradictions.12
A careful reading of its report on and diagnosis of the situation of journalists 
in the region ought to lead us to other conclusions very different from those 
that the official mouthpieces of the ‘free press’ would have us reach; though 
we should not expect the guardians of freedom to try to denounce the viola-
tion of human rights in pro-coup processes such as those experienced in the 
region. Rather, making the most of the leading role of institutions such as the 
OEA, this has been a systematic pattern or logic with the blessing of the major 
oligopolistic media groups.
Returning to the case of Mexico, the operability of the propaganda model 
is more than evident. Since the beginning of Peña Nieto’s six-year term, the 
Mexican government, far from meeting the social demands of the population, 
has attempted to conceal the most serious cases of corruption in alliance with 
Televisa, while diverting state resources to the country’s main media monopoly. 
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Moreover, since the beginning of Peña Nieto’s term in office government policy 
has been characterized by a substantial increase in militarization, a remarkable 
strengthening of the systems of law and order, an increase in counter-insur-
gency measures, the harassment of social leaders and human rights advocates, 
and systematic attacks against the main nascent opposition party MORENA 
and its leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
As shown by a content analysis of the main news programs of Televisa and 
TV Azteca, there is a clear predominance of the public agenda of the govern-
ment authorities, fostered as sources in the media overrepresentation to which 
the television duopoly has led. ‘Of these, the Federal Government emerges as 
the principal actor in journalistic reports, since 37% use some of its members 
as their main information source. The legislative power and the State Govern-
ment trail far behind with 17% and 14%, respectively. In addition, the politi-
cal origins of the people appearing in the content analysed also reinforces this 
situation. So it is that 72.2% are members of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party and barely 7% belong to the Democratic Revolution Party. This absence 
of diversity of opinions is underlined when the corresponding Gini Index is 
applied, whose result points to a clear deficiency of equity in content (0.58 in 
the case of political actors and 0.80 for political parties)’.13
Meanwhile, the political-military action of the government remains con-
cealed from public opinion, following the prescribed guidelines of low-
intensity warfare in order to terrorize the peasant population immersed in a 
widespread climate of general insecurity and repression, unprecedented in the 
history of Mexico, regarded today by some as a failed state.14 As a parody of the 
film The Perfect Dictatorship, the routine production of the mass media tends to 
focus the attention of audiences on other matters, supposedly of greater inter-
est. Thus, for example, in 2012 the monopolistic company Televisa undeniably 
played a leading role as the stage for constructing the figure of the PRI candi-
date. Peña Nieto and the country’s main television company sealed an alliance 
that still holds, albeit with some discrepancies. The 2014 massacre of young 
normalistas in Ayotzinapa was undoubtedly a hard blow for the image of the 
President: public opinion associated the lack of justice with his inaction. But, in 
essence, the limited coverage avoided drawing parallels between the causes and 
the terror policy implemented by the state against subaltern sectors.
Faithfully following the non-explicit manuals in use on counter-insurgency, 
the Mexican army, whose operations receive the benefit of the advice of the 
Pentagon and special operations units of the CIA, is proceeding in this way 
with the destruction and systematic harassment of civil populations, while any 
revealing knowledge of this rationale of creative devastation or destruction is 
discredited as an invention, typical of conspiracy theories, despite the evidence 
displayed, the continuities of the modus operandi of the country’s dominant 
media and the authentic ideological apparatuses of the process of accumulation 
endured by the country’s population, even to the extent of procedures infring-
ing upon the right to life.
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15.4 Conclusion
As Michel Collon has written:
‘[…] so at first the Cold War media portrayed a systematically exagger-
ated apocalyptic ‘Soviet threat’ (as has been shown in recent American 
studies), to justify the huge US military build-up. This was followed by 
the ‘yellow peril’ and in turn by Iraq and its ‘four global armies’: cur-
rently, the threat to the West comes from the Third World as a whole’.15
The threat to US hegemony posed by the processes of autonomy and regional 
unity taking place in Latin America, has been responded to with the expected 
denigration and criminalization of the progressive forces.
The process of concentration of media ownership has made globalization 
work in the interest of political and economic elites both in the US and Latin 
America. The capacity of governments, leaded by the United States, to direct 
media misinformation campaigns with the support of large corporations has 
naturally lead to an underreporting of the crimes committed by elite actors, 
who actually became the main sources of information. Attacks on alternative 
media and movements promoting change have gone together with a campaign 
of fear to demonise political and social change. As during Reagan’s era, the 
scarecrow of communism, together with discourses on national security, has 
provided the ideological basis to defend elite interests and attack those who are 
labelled as enemies.
In Venezuela, the coup and destabilizing actions put into action by an alli-
ance between the US government, the national political opposition, economic 
elites and media companies has resulted in a ferocious attack on the democratic 
leaders and the Bolivarian process, while the leaders promoting violence and 
coups d’état are enthroned as democratic heroes in the tradition of Dr King 
and presented as victims of totalitarianism. In contrast, the voice of indigenous 
communities, students and peasants who suffer from structural and direct 
violence in Mexico are systematically excluded from the public sphere, thus 
being rendered unworthy victims, as the priority of the oligopolistic media has 
been to side with the interests of the right-wing and violent forces that receive 
 fundamental support from the US government. These two case studies confirm 
for Latin America the powerful influence of the filters identified by Herman 
and Chomsky and supports a key hypothesis of the propaganda model that 
the mainstream media will follow double-standards when informing about ‘us’ 
and ‘our allies’ as compared to ‘them,’ ‘the enemies.’ The reason for the differ-
ence in treatment is the same one: the structural interconnection between the 
media, governments and economic powers that impose its will over the peoples 
of Latin America, who nevertheless continue to resist and engage in processes 
of social and political transformation.
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CHAPTER 16
‘Dynamic’ Obama Lectures ‘Bumbling’ 
 Castro on Race Relations in Cuba , While 
Wilfully Blind to Black Lives Matter 
Movement in the US1
James Winter
16.1 Introduction
A small and select but expanding group of scholars and investigators have 
exposed some of the historical biases, inaccuracies, and distortions in corporate 
media. The most well known of these is an American, Noam Chomsky, who has 
opposed and exposed the corporate-government-media-military nexus since 
the Vietnam War in the 1960s.2
Chomsky has been joined in more recent years by authors such as Wil-
liam Blum, a former US State Department employee who has uncovered CIA 
‘adventures’ around the globe.3 Somewhat similar work has been done by for-
mer New York Times bureau chief Stephen Kinzer, who documented the US 
government’s role in overthrowing leaders in countries ranging from Hawaii 
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and the Philippines, late in the twentieth century, to Iran in the 1950s and more 
recently Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq.4
Canadian journalist Naomi Klein has taken a different tack: focusing on how 
the unfettered free-market capitalism envisioned by Milton Friedman and his 
followers has exported violence and subservience around the world in the form 
of disaster economics.5
British academic Matthew Alford has exposed how Hollywood ‘entertainment’ 
films actually support the US national security state and the use of American 
violence overseas.6
It is within this broader body of knowledge that the current study may be 
located. The portrayal of Cuba in the Western press since the 1959 Revolution 
has bordered on the ridiculous to anyone who has visited there and talked to 
the Cuban people. However, as Americans have generally been prohibited by 
law from visiting Cuba, they normally do not have first-hand experience to 
compare to corporate media depictions. As a consequence, the demonisation of 
Cuba and the Castro brothers has been among the most successful propaganda 
campaigns in the world over the past sixty years.
In March, 2016, then-US president Barack Obama paid a visit to Cuba. This 
chapter studies press coverage of that trip. The study compares the clichés of 
Cuba in press coverage to academic studies of Cuban realities, from pre-revo-
lutionary days in the 1950s, to the present day.
Ironically, a media criticism show covered the clichés reported on the Obama 
trip, but failed to detect the significant clichés, only the superficial, such as how 
Cuba and the US are ‘a mere 90 miles, but worlds apart,’ and how Cuba is ‘fro-
zen in time,’ with ‘crumbling buildings,’ and ‘vintage cars,’ along with ‘cigars and 
music,’ elements admittedly present in much of the coverage.7 But the program 
failed to unearth the deeper and more significant clichés in coverage, which we 
will attempt to do here.
One standard cliché in coverage is that the Castro brothers have led a long, 
communist, one-party dictatorship, with Fidel at the helm for 42 years, and 
Raúl for the past nine years. To North American thinking, it is inconceivable 
that there are elections in Cuba, under a one-party regime. Another part of this 
is that while Fidel’s predecessor Batista was not the best leader, Cuba flourished 
under him, relative to what has happened since.8
In the 1950s, under the dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba was a playground 
for the US Mafia, as documented in books by T.J. English and Enrique Cirules. 
Mob leaders such as Meyer Lansky and Lucky Luciano owned Havana’s biggest 
luxury hotels and casinos. The ‘Pearl of the Antilles,’ as Cuba was known, was 
the Mob’s playground, with gambling, fabulous entertainment, international 
celebrities, sex, sun, and sand.
The Mobsters had always dreamed of controlling their own country, free from 
police and government interference. Thanks to Batista’s cooperation, in return 
for Mob payments in the millions of dollars, the Mafia effectively ran the country, 
with military and police enforcers, from the 1930s until the Revolution in 1959.
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The resulting role for Cubans was one of prostitution, repression, collabora-
tion, and servitude. According to Aviva Chomsky there were ‘two Cubas’ in the 
1950s, the 1.5 million jobless or rural poor who survived mostly on rice, a few 
beans and sugar water. At the other end were the 900,000 wealthiest Cubans 
who controlled 43 per cent of the country’s income. In between, another 3.5 
million struggled to make ends meet.9
One need only look to some of the reportage at the time. An AP story in 
the Globe and Mail said, ‘The rebels hated legalized gambling because it made 
Cubans poorer, rich US racketeers richer, and added millions to Batista’s vast 
fortune. That fortune has been estimated at $200,000,000 safely stowed in for-
eign banks.’10
As with other periods of reportage such as during the trip to Cuba by former 
US president Jimmy Carter in 2002,11 the media coverage of Obama’s trip was 
an opportunity to trot out well-worn clichés about Cuba and the Castro broth-
ers, revealing the corporate media’s deep-seated ideological biases. For exam-
ple, Patrick Luciani of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, writing in the 
Financial Post, noted that:
‘Canadians are saying, ‘Let’s get down there before Americans ruin the place.’ 
Too late; the ruin began with the 1959 revolution.’
Luciani praised Cuban life under Batista and belittled current Cuban accom-
plishments, for example in education, by saying, ‘One has to ask what edu-
cation means in a country that has little to read and what remains is filtered 
through Marxist ideology.’
The press coverage of Obama’s visit provided absolutely no indication of what 
Noam Chomsky has identified as the real reason for the embargo against Cuba: 
the pro-capitalist ‘rotten apple’ or virus theory. That is, if Cuba is allowed to 
flourish on its own, unimpeded, then the ‘virus’ of socialism could spread to 
other Central American countries, as indeed it finally has done in the past dec-
ade or so. This assessment by Chomsky may be readily seen as part of his and 
Edward Herman’s Propaganda Model of news media, relating to a number of 
the five filters, such as media ownership and profit orientation, the reliance on 
advertising and pursuant promotion of capitalism, and the anti-communism or 
ideology filter, which opposes nationalism anywhere other than the US.
16.2 It’s All About Obama
In the Canadian and US press, Obama’s visit to Cuba was—well—all about 
Obama. He was portrayed as a young 54-year-old man of mixed blood and 
‘fluid, lanky, youthful movement,’ who visited Cuba with his beautiful wife and 
daughters. Whereas Calvin Coolidge had taken three days to arrive on a battle-
ship in 1928, Superman Obama remarked, ‘It only took me three hours’.
Obama marvelled at the significance of his trip, which he said enabled him to 
‘engage directly with the Cuban people,’ forge ‘new agreements and commercial 
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deals,’ and ‘build new ties between our two peoples.’ Also, he would be able to 
‘lay out my vision for a future that’s brighter than our past.’12
The New York Times wrote, ‘All around the city on Sunday, Mr. Obama’s name 
could be heard.’ The spectators who watched Obama’s arrival were awe-struck, 
professing they never thought they’d live to see this. Others shouted greetings 
and his name and ‘USA.’ and ‘We like you,’ as his entourage passed on the street. 
A 17-year-old was quoted as saying ‘he had given her generation hope.’ Obama 
‘has long been admired by Cubans, first as a candidate, then as a president,’ we 
learned. When he announced restored relations with Cuba on 17 December 
2014, ‘that date is now recited often as a new national starting point, joining other 
historic dates, like July 26, 1953,’ when Fidel attacked the Moncada barracks and 
started the Revolution.13
Obama lectured Cubans about the extent of their racism, ironically, given the 
past and current state of race relations in the US. ‘We want our engagement to help 
lift up Cubans who are of African descent,’ he said. The New York Times noted sol-
emnly, ‘It was also an unusually direct engagement with race, a critical and unre-
solved issue in Cuban society that the revolution was supposed to have erased.’14
During a joint news briefing with Raúl Castro, Obama winked at the camera 
and took ‘a mini victory lap afterward.’ Obama smoothly handled the press 
questions, while the allegedly-bumbling and haughty 84-year-old Castro stum-
bled, with his ‘stiff military bearing.’
A New York Times article headlined, ‘Along With Obama, the 21st Century Visited 
Cuba,’ stated that ‘The 30 years between Mr. Obama, 54, and Mr. Castro, 84, help 
explain the vast gulf that separates the two leaders, on vivid display last week…’15
The article pointed to the lack of reliable internet access, oblivious to the role 
played in this by the US embargo. ‘The iconic image was Castro getting all huffy 
about some pretty anodyne critiques of the human rights situation in Cuba...The 
gestalt of the visit for Obama was very much “I know you’re on your way out, 
and I’m going to speak to the Cuban population about what the future looks like 
after you’’, ’ the paper quoted a political science professor as saying, seemingly 
unaware of the fact that it is Obama who was a lame duck, not Castro.
The International New York Times began its article dismissively. ‘The thing 
about dictators is they don’t have to answer any stinking questions from the 
press. We call it undemocratic; they call it job security,’16 their reporter wrote.
After the first question to Raúl Castro about political prisoners, the reporter 
wrote, ‘You could watch in real time as Mr. Castro came to terms with the idea 
that this was actually happening. He stammered and got himself into a muddle 
over how this whole news conference deal works, anyway. Was the question 
directed at him? It was only with prompting from President Obama that he 
finally answered Mr. [Jim] Acosta, though by demanding a list proving that any 
such prisoners even existed. (Happy to help you out with that, Sir.)’17
Almost all of the coverage portrayed Castro’s request as a joke, as above. An 
exception was one article in The Globe and Mail, which stated: ‘Cuba released 
dozens of prisoners as part of its deal to normalize relations with the United 
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States, and in a recent report, Amnesty International did not name any  current 
prisoners of conscience in Cuba.’18 The other media implied that Castro’s 
request was outlandish: their presupposition was that everyone knows Cuba 
has political prisoners.
It’s only when you go to a transcript of the session on Granma, that you learn 
how Raúl Castro answered questions. Instead of the bumbling fool portrayed 
in the press, we find his thoughtful analysis of the Cuban meaning of ‘Human 
Rights,’ and how it relates to other countries.
Raúl Castro: ‘Give me the list of political prisoners right now to be released. Just 
mention a list. What political prisoners? Give me a name or names. Or once 
this meeting is over, you can give me a list of prisoners and if we have those 
political prisoners, they will be released before tonight. Next  question.’
Jim Acosta (CNN): ’Donald Trump or Hill a ry Clinton, President Castro?’
Raúl Castro: ‘Well, I still cannot vote in the United States (Laughter).’
Afterwards, another question was directed to Raúl Castro.
Andrea Mitchell (NBC): ‘What is the future of our nations, given the different 
definitions and the different interpretations of issues such as democracy and 
human rights?’
Raúl Castro: ‘In the recognized institutions, there are 61 international instru-
ments on human rights. Andrea, do you know how many countries in the 
world comply with all these 61 human and civil rights included in these instru-
ments? What country complies with them all? I do. None. None, whatsoever. 
Some countries comply with some rights; others comply with others. And we 
are among these countries. Out of these 61 instruments, Cuba has complied 
with 47. There are countries that may comply with more, there are many that 
comply with less. The issues of human rights cannot be politicized, that is not 
correct.’19
Castro went on to mention just three of the human rights in Cuba, such as 
the right to quality, free healthcare, the right to free education, and the right of 
women ‘to get equal pay as men for equal work’.
I could only find one paper which briefly reported on these remarks by Cas-
tro: The Guardian of London.20 And yet, many newspapers jumped with glee on 
this simplistic notion of alleged human rights abuses in Cuba.21
The National Post ran an Associated Press story reporting on the press con-
ference. Here are the first two paragraphs:
HAVANA — Cubans were glued to their televisions on Monday, many 
watching in a state of shock as President Raul Castro faced tough questions 
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from American journalists who challenged him to defend Cuba’s record on 
human rights and political prisoners.
In a country where publicly questioning the authority of Castro and 
his brother and predecessor Fidel is unthinkable for most, and where 
the docile state-run media almost always toe the party line, the live 
broadcast was must-see TV. Some also marveled at tough questioning 
of President Barack Obama, simply unaccustomed to seeing any leader 
challenged in such a way.22
This account neatly fits into the usual narrative: Cubans are shocked by the 
open questioning of their dictator by the fearless American journalists.
16.3 Fidel Writes About Obama
For the most part, only fleeting references are made to Fidel, which may be 
plugged into the previously-formulated social construction of the man who 
has been demonised perhaps more than any other for more than a half century. 
Although Fidel did not meet with Obama, he did write a response to the speech 
Obama delivered to the Cuban people, afterwards. Fidel’s article was described 
the next day in the Washington Post as ‘scathing’ and ‘a long and somewhat 
rambling recounting’ of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and as ‘A little disorganized.’23 
The New York Times described Castro’s article as ‘a 1600-word missive,’ and an 
‘admonition,’ and said Fidel ‘chastised Mr. Obama, 54, for his youth and for fail-
ing to recognize’ the major accomplishments of the revolution.24
The notion that Fidel criticized Obama for his youth was fabricated. What 
Fidel wrote was: ‘Obama was born in August of 1961, as he himself explained. 
More than half a century has transpired since that time.’ Later on he said, ‘…
pensions and salaries for all Cubans were decreed by [the Revolution] before Mr. 
Barack Obama was 10 years old.’25 This is hardly chastising Obama for his youth.
What Fidel did was to respond to how Obama urged Cubans to ‘forget the past, 
leave the past behind, let us look to the future together…’ Indeed, it’s easy for the 
perpetrator to say, ‘forget the past,’ but less so for the country which has been the 
victim of an invasion, bombings, poisonings, chemical and biological weapons 
attacks, hundreds of assassination attempts, and a relentless economic embargo.
16.4 Lectures on ‘Democracy’
Another presupposition by the press, of course, is that Cuba is a one-party com-
munist dictatorship which compares unfavorably to western democracies such 
as Canada and the US. So well-engrained is this notion that it hardly bears men-
tioning, but some still do. For example, small daily and weekly writer Gwynne 
Dyer wrote that ‘… when Fidel Castro retired after 42 years and handed power 
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to his brother [Raúl Castro] in 2008, Western embassies in Havana (minus the 
United States, of course) arranged for various “experts” from their countries to 
visit Cuba and explain how things were done in a real democracy—which they 
fully expected that Cuba would shortly become.’26 He went on to mention ‘the 
long dictatorship of the Castro brothers,’ and said, ‘I now think the regime will 
probably survive until and unless the US Congress finally ends the embargo 
and exposes Cuba to the full force of international capitalism.’
This neatly sums up a number of presuppositions which require no evidence: 
the Castro brothers were and are dictators, who hand over power to their 
appointees; Canada is ‘a real democracy,’ and Cuba is not, etc.
Obama stated in a press conference with Raúl, ‘We continue, as President 
[Raúl Castro] indicated, to have some very serious differences, including on 
democracy and human rights.’
In an editorial, the Globe and Mail stated that: ‘If Mr. Castro truly wants to 
normalize relations with the US, he must begin by opening his fist and extend-
ing his hand to democracy.’27 This was in the context of discussing alleged 
human rights violations in Cuba. It’s an example of the more subtle accusations 
and assumptions.
In an otherwise somewhat exceptional guest column, which reviewed his-
torical Cuban-American relations fairly accurately, even academic Jeffery Sachs 
offered that, ‘Cuba can and should aim for Costa Rican-style social democ-
racy, rather than the cruder capitalism of the United States.’ Here, of course, 
Sachs confuses the albeit-related economic system (capitalism) with the elec-
toral system (social democracy). The US is a capitalist economic state, with 
an allegedly-democratic political system, although many would take issue with 
this latter notion.28
It’s abundantly clear to even the casual observer that our ‘western-style democ-
racies’ are anything but. What we have, in fact, more closely approximates an 
oligarchy or plutocracy (rule by the few and the rich, respectively) rather than a 
democracy. Even the basic requisite for a democracy—majority rule—is seldom 
attained, as a cursory examination of the popular vote in recent decades demon-
strates. Additionally, the unsavory characteristics of ‘western-style democracies’ 
are the very reason for their rejection by Cubans, who have ample knowledge of 
them, historically. For example, as Professor Isaac Saney notes,
While in other countries, economic wherewithal [wealth] is necessary 
for—and does lead to—political power, in Cuba this is not the case. 
Those who have the most money do not have political power, as they 
have no support among the masses and, thus, do not offer up candidates 
in the elections.29
What Cubans know is that so-called ‘multiparty elections’ are the Trojan horse 
of politics, or, the ‘democracy of exploiters,’ as Fidel Castro has put it, allowing 
the US government to bribe and buy its way into office through one power-
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hungry comprador or another. In Third World elections the US has openly or 
covertly run a favoured candidate, directed massive funding toward its pre-
ferred candidate, and threatened economic or military repercussions if its can-
didate is not elected. Once elected the candidate and his or her party run a 
client government at the beck-and-call of its American sponsors, just as the 
domestic equivalent is at the behest of his or her corporate backers. It’s patently 
ridiculous to debate this point, since it is a matter of open historical record 
throughout the Third World over much of the past century.
The presupposition of ‘capitalist democracies’ in the West does not stand up 
to scrutiny. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015 with 
a majority government, for example, while receiving only 39% of the popu-
lar vote, owing to the out-dated first-past-the-post electoral system in Canada. 
Hence, 61% of the population voted for other Parties. Trudeau promised in his 
electoral campaign that the 2015 election would be the last election under that 
model, but reneged on this promise 18 months into his term when it became 
clear that his Liberal Party most likely would not fare well under a more demo-
cratic system of Proportional Representation. As for the US, Hillary Clinton 
received almost three million more votes than Donald Trump in their 2016 
presidential race, and yet Trump was elected president. So much for majority 
rule in these two countries.
Relatively speaking, in comparison the Cuban political system is a model of 
democracy. As authors such as Arnold August and law professor Isaac Saney 
have described in intricate detail, contrary to conventional wisdom, Cubans 
have developed an elaborate, representative and inclusive democracy which has 
an exemplary level of voluntary participation.30 The media simply are not open 
to these points of view, choosing instead to parrot exclusively the views of the 
US Administration, with its distorted perspectives and Cold War caricatures. 
The fact that Obama went to Cuba to end the last vestiges of the Cold War just 
adds to the irony.
16.5 Lectures on the Economy
As regards the Cuban economy, one is left to conclude, as do the media, that the 
problem is Fidel Castro. No mention was made, for example, of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, which was Cuba’s largest (almost exclusive) trading partner, 
accounting for 85% of trade, up until 1989. the USSR provided 95% of Cuban 
oil imports, for example. Cuban per capita income dropped by 39% following 
the Soviet collapse.31
The media said the embargo isn’t working, it hasn’t accomplished what it was 
established for.
‘There’s been an evolution where most of the younger [Miami] Cubans now 
are much less attached to the embargo, and many are saying that it hasn’t 
worked and it would be easier if we just had normal relations with our cousin 
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and sister-in-law in Cuba. The great resentment among Cuban-Americans 
against the Cuban regime – and the notion that the embargo could bring it 
down – that was a strong factor in the 1960s and 1970s.’32
This was echoed in the New York Times: ‘while many members of older gen-
erations who remained on the island have a visceral connection to the revo-
lution and all that followed, their children and grandchildren may have little 
memory of the roots of resentment toward the United States.’33
Luciani, writing in the Financial Post, said: ‘Apologists blame the US embargo 
for Cuba’s wretchedness. But it is not a blockade. Other countries trade with 
Cuba. Washington’s Cuba policy is just a convenient excuse for a wrecked econ-
omy where most public resources are funnelled to an outsized military and 
bureaucracy.’
16.6 The Real Reason For the Embargo
The press reports that the reason for the embargo is to pressure Cuba to improve 
its Human Rights, or because of pressure from angry Miami Cubans, or, to 
pressure Cuba to democratize. The real reason for the embargo is so shocking, 
so unspeakable, that it must never be broached in the corporate media, except 
perhaps in a brief account or statement from someone who can be dismissed 
as a demented conspiracy theorist. The real reason the US continues its merci-
less punishment of Cuba is what Noam Chomsky calls, ‘the threat of a good 
example.’ It’s also called the ‘rotten apple theory,’ or in a distorted version for 
more popular consumption: ‘the Domino theory.’ William Blum has called it 
‘the unforgiveable revolution.’
When a leader tries to do something for the poor and downtrodden of his 
country, instead of serving Washington and the IMF and other powers that be, 
there will be demonising and economic squeezes and coup attempts.34 If all else 
fails, the US invades. It is worth quoting Chomsky at length on this because he 
cites US policymakers themselves, who are a trifle difficult to dismiss as mere 
conspiracy theorists.
No country is exempt from U.S. intervention, no matter how unim-
portant. In fact, it’s the weakest, poorest countries that often arouse the 
greatest hysteria...The weaker and poorer a country is, the more danger-
ous it is as an example. If a tiny, poor country like Grenada can succeed 
in bringing about a better life for its people, some other place that has 
more resources will ask, ‘why not us?’  ... If you want a global system 
that’s subordinated to the needs of US investors, you can’t let pieces of 
it wander off …. Take Chile under Allende … Why were we so con-
cerned about it? According to Kissinger, Chile was a ‘virus’ that would 
‘infect’ the region with effects all the way to Italy .... This ‘rotten apple 
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theory’ is called the domino theory for public consumption .... Some-
times the point is explained with great clarity. When the US was plan-
ning to overthrow Guatemalan democracy in 1954, a State Department 
official pointed out that ‘Guatemala has become an increasing threat to 
the stability of Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a pow-
erful propaganda weapon: its broad social program of aiding the work-
ers and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and 
large foreign enterprises has a strong appeal to the populations of Cen-
tral American neighbors where similar conditions prevail.’  ... In other 
words, what the US wants is ‘stability’, meaning security for the ‘upper 
classes and large foreign enterprises’.35
Thus, Chomsky replies to those who argue that the US only intervenes over 
access to natural resources, as it has openly done in the Middle East. He goes 
on to quote from members of the US administration who spoke more openly 
about their goals and objections in earlier times.
Arthur Schlesinger had transmitted to the incoming President Kennedy 
his Latin American Mission report, which warned of the susceptibility 
of Latin Americans to ‘the Castro idea of taking matters into one’s own 
hands.’ …. The dangers of the ‘Castro idea’ are particularly grave, Schles-
inger later elaborated, when ‘the distribution of land and other forms of 
national wealth greatly favors the propertied classes’ and ‘the poor and 
underprivileged, stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, 
are now demanding opportunities for a decent living’. In early 1964, 
the State Department Policy Planning Council expanded on these con-
cerns: ‘The primary danger we face in Castro is ... in the impact the very 
existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin 
American countries .... The simple fact is that Castro represents a suc-
cessful defiance of the US, a negation of our whole hemispheric policy 
of almost a century and a half ’36
One can see here explicitly that this concern and the Cuban example are cen-
tral to a Chomskian analysis of international affairs and specifically US foreign 
policy, whether or not one directly relates them specifically to the Propaganda 
Model, as I very briefly have done above. Little or nothing has changed in the 
intervening decades, since the Cuban Revolution ousted the US Mafia, which 
was stunningly portrayed by director Francis Ford Coppola in his film The 
Godfather, as the very epitome of capitalism. Similarly, these results comply 
with the findings of other contemporary writers such as Chris Hedges, Stephen 
Kinzer, William Blum, etc.
Clearly, Cuba under the Castro brothers’ leadership has not met any of the 
needs of American capitalism, other than functioning as Cold War bogeymen. 
Chomsky writes,
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[T]he assigned functions of Third World countries are to be markets for 
American business, sources of resources for American business, to pro-
vide cheap labor for American business, and so on…the main commit-
ment of the United States, internationally in the Third World, must be to 
prevent the rise of nationalist regimes which are responsive to pressures 
from the masses of the population for improvement in low living stand-
ards and diversification of production; the reason is, we have to main-
tain a climate that is conducive to investment, and to ensure conditions 
which allow for adequate repatriation of profits to the West.37
16.7 One-Party Rule
Obama, and the media that reported on him, repeatedly take advantage of a 
technique called presupposition, in Critical Discourse Analysis terms, in which 
their particular perspective is privileged and alternative views are precluded. 
We saw this above in the way Luciani categorized as ‘apologists’ someone who 
holds a different perspective on the Cuban Embargo. The ‘one party domina-
tion’ presupposition is another case in point. In fact, the Communist Party is 
prohibited from taking part in elections, under the Cuban Constitution,38 and 
opposition movements flourish within the dialectic of the revolution. Opposi-
tion and ‘disagreement with the government’ does not present a problem: it 
is those who are actively working in the hire of a foreign power to overthrow 
the Cuban government whose actions are—quite rationally and reasonably— 
prohibited and subjected to Cuban laws.
To provide some perspective, think of how all governments have laws pro-
hibiting treason, with jail sentences as a result of convictions. Think about the 
Canadian government’s reaction to the FLQ crisis in October 1970, for exam-
ple, when the War Measures Act was invoked nationally, and 400 Quebecois 
were jailed, in response to two kidnappings, one murder and some bombings 
by a few dozen people in Quebec.39
Finally, in terms of this brief chapter, I wish to point out these virtually unre-
ported words of US Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew, from March 2016. He 
is elaborating on how Obama has loosened restrictions on travel to Cuba by 
Americans. Here is what he said:
Individuals may now travel to Cuba without being attached to a US-based 
organization coordinating the trip, ‘provided that the traveler engages 
in a full-time schedule of educational exchange activities intended to 
enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, 
or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities 
and that will result in a meaningful interaction between the traveler and 
individuals in Cuba’.40
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The words, ‘support civil society in Cuba,’ are Newspeak or code words for 
opposing the Cuban government. The next words, ‘or promote the Cuban peo-
ple’s independence from Cuban authorities,’ make this explicit. In other words, 
Americans may now travel to Cuba if they engage in actions which are traitor-
ous to the Cuban government.41
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CHAPTER 17
Thinking the Unthinkable about the 
Unthinkable – The Use of Nuclear  
Weapons and the  Propaganda Model
Milan Rai
In January 2017, Britain’s leading liberal newspaper criticised a new, heavy-
handed, system of press regulation, brought in under the Crime and Courts 
Act (2013). The Guardian argued: ‘A press that is free to investigate and criti-
cise is essential for good governance.’1 Similarly, US Supreme Court Judge 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. once argued that, as no individual can obtain for them-
selves the information needed for the intelligent discharge of their politi-
cal responsibilities, the press performs a crucial function in ‘effecting the 
societal purpose of the First Amendment’ of the US Constitution. The media 
does this by enabling the public to exert ‘meaningful control over the politi-
cal process’.2
This reflects both the self-image of the mainstream media and the image that 
it projects.
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In contrast, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky and offer a Propaganda 
Model (PM) of the mainstream media, in which the ‘free press’ serves the soci-
etal purpose of ‘protecting privilege from the threat of public understanding 
and participation.’3 This purpose is achieved through what Herman and Chom-
sky describe as ‘brainwashing under freedom.’4 Herman and Chomsky accept 
that, in the US and UK, the state does not directly control the output of the 
media or academia or other channels of indoctrination. Thought control is not 
achieved through police action, torture, or terror. Chomsky explains:
A totalitarian state can be satisfied with lesser degrees of allegiance to 
required truths. It is sufficient that people obey; what they think is a 
secondary concern. But in a democratic political order, there is always 
the danger that independent thought might be translated into political 
action, so it is important to eliminate the threat at its root. Debate can-
not be stilled, and indeed, in a properly functioning system of propa-
ganda, it should not be, because it has a system-reinforcing character if 
constrained within proper bounds. What is essential is to set the bounds 
firmly. Controversy may rage as long as it adheres to the presuppositions 
that define the consensus of elites, and it should furthermore be encour-
aged within these bounds, thus helping to establish these doctrines as 
the very condition of thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that 
freedom reigns.5
The PM suggests that media and the intellectual culture within the capitalist 
democracies are impacted in a multiplicity of ways by power..
For example, during the Vietnam War, the mainstream debate was between 
those liberals like Arthur Schlesinger who opposed the war, and those hawks 
like Joseph Alsop who predicted victory. Schlesinger believed the US was 
headed for defeat, adding: ‘we all pray that Mr Alsop will be right.’6 Chomsky 
pointed out that Schlesinger’s opposition to the war was tactical, not moral or 
legal. Alsop and Schlesinger would have been united in supporting the war, if 
it could be brought to a successful conclusion. Given that they were at opposite 
ends of ‘responsible opinion,’ Chomsky suggested that it was of great impor-
tance ‘to note that each presents what can fairly be described as an apologia for 
American imperialism.’7 Both believed that the United States had the right to 
impose its will on others by force. In their debates, neither side questioned that 
presumption. Crucially, neither side stated that belief explicitly. It was assumed 
without argument. Questioning it became unthinkable.8
One possible test of the Propaganda Model is the ultimate national security 
issue: nuclear weapons. There has been fierce debate and controversy in Britain 
over many decades concerning Britain’s possession and retention of nuclear 
weapons. The PM predicts that the very fierceness of the mainstream debate 
will have had a ‘system-reinforcing character’ because it kept itself within 
‘proper bounds.’
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Chomsky has described the system of ideas that rules the propaganda 
machine as a ‘state religion,’ within which there are two basic principles. Prin-
ciple 1: The Holy State9 is Good. Policymakers may make errors, they may act 
out of ignorance or stupidity, and occasionally a ‘bad person’ may gain power, 
but the policymaking establishment as a whole has noble intentions. Principle 
2 follows from Principle 1: Any action taken by the Holy State, however violent, 
is defensive in nature.10
According to Principle 2, Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons must be 
defensive in nature, and British nuclear weapons policy must be defensive in 
nature – whatever the evidence.
Chomsky once wrote: ‘A useful rule of thumb is this: If you want to learn 
something about the propaganda system, have a close look at the critics and 
their tacit assumptions. These typically constitute the doctrines of the state 
religion.’11 Mainstream critics practice what Chomsky calls ‘feigned dissent,’ 
appearing to be critical of established power, but in fact reinforcing it.12
Let’s sample the outer edge of ‘responsible opinion’ in the recent nuclear 
weapons debate in Britain. In The Guardian in 2013, there was a harsh cri-
tique of the British nuclear weapons arsenal from perhaps the most anti-mil-
itarist of the paper’s columnists of the time, Simon Jenkins. On 25 September 
2013, Jenkins described the commitment to retaining British nuclear weap-
ons as ‘irrational, ‘mad,’ ‘hare-brained,’ ‘hypocritical,’ ‘absurd,’ and ‘nonsense.’ 
The former editor of The Times added that the British nuclear deterrent ‘made 
no sense.’ Jenkins explained the basis of his scorn: Britain’s nuclear weapons 
‘bear no reference to any plausible threat to Britain that could possibly merit 
their use.’
Jenkins argued that nuclear weapons were ‘an irrelevance’ in the face of 
the enemies that Britain was likely to be facing on the battlefield – ‘Enemies 
immune to nuclear weapons and heavy armour, enemies who hurl grenades 
and wield Kalashnikovs made in 1947.’ This was a tactical critique rather than a 
principled one.13 Jenkins would have supported the retention of nuclear weap-
ons if they had been ‘relevant’ in defeating the enemies Britain faced.
A few years earlier, the London Independent had staked out its position as the 
most critical voice in the British mainstream media on British nuclear weap-
ons. On 2 May 2005, an editorial argued that, during the Cold War, ‘nuclear 
weapons acted as a deterrent to aggression by other states,’ but the collapse of 
the Soviet Union had now ‘made the deterrence argument obsolete.’
A few days later, on 6 May 2005, one of the Independent’s most left-wing 
columnists, Johann Hari, continued the disarmament campaign, suggest-
ing that ‘Britain is extremely unlikely to ever use our nuclear warheads.’ The 
crucial question he posed was: if the al-Qa’eda terror network ever gained 
possession of nuclear weapons, ‘what good would our deterrent be? Who 
would we nuke in response?’ Deterrence is about nuclear retaliation against a 
nuclear weapon state. In the absence of a state actor, it loses meaning, accord-
ing to Hari.
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A few months later, on 6 November 2005, the Independent’s understanding 
of nuclear policy was spelled out in a briefing entitled ‘Nukes – do they still 
protect us?’ Cole Moreton wrote: ‘Trident is a deterrent... so that anyone who 
threatens this country knows they will suffer greatly in return.’
In these and other mainstream criticisms of the British nuclear arsenal, we find 
a coherent set of ideas:
•	Nuclear weapons are for ‘deterrence.’
•	Deterrence is about retaliation.
•	Nuclear retaliation is only rational or credible if it is against a hostile nuclear 
weapon state - to ward off invasion or nuclear attack by that state.
When we go back to the fierce debates about British nuclear weapons in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, and through much of the 1980s, we discover that 
mainstream critics back then also accepted these assumptions as the basis for 
the discussion. Among them were former military leaders such as Field Mar-
shal Lord Carver, who saw ‘no military logic’ in nuclear weapons.14 If we move 
from military figures to philosophers, we find a similarly disciplined discus-
sion in Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy, published in 
1983. Editors Nigel Black and Kay Pole, for example, contribute ‘A Sceptical 
Look at the Nuclear Debate’ that does not look, sceptically or otherwise, at the 
underpinning assumptions of the debate around nuclear weapons. In this they 
are typical of much of the mainstream critique of nuclear weapons at the time. 
Black and Pole write:
Deterrence rests on three expectations: that the enemy will behave 
rationally, that the threat which daunts him now will continue to be the 
most daunting he could face, and that he will not find technical means 
by which he could counter-deter that threat. Now taking these in reverse 
order, there are reasons to believe that the USSR is actually finding ways 
to deter the launching of medium-range weapons at her from Western 
Europe…15
In other words, deterrence is about enemies who are nuclear weapon states. 
Elsewhere in the book, there are a few glancing references to challenging mate-
rial (see below), but, taken as a whole, this volume reinforces the idea that 
deterrence is solely concerned with ‘threatening nuclear weapon states with 
nuclear retaliation in order to prevent a nuclear attack on oneself.’
We can restate the ideas about deterrence uncovered above in the following 
way:
1) The British government possesses nuclear weapons solely in order to 
defend the territory of Britain from nuclear attack.
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2) The British government possesses nuclear weapons solely in order to 
threaten that it can and will retaliate after a nuclear attack on the territory 
of the UK. In other words, British nuclear weapons are focused on hostile 
nuclear weapon states.
3) This credible threat of retaliation makes it much less likely that a hostile 
nuclear weapon state will launch a nuclear attack on the UK.
 There is an underlying assumption here:
4) Britain has not actually used its nuclear weapons. They have lain idle as 
rainy-day insurance against a worst-case superpower crisis.
These four assumptions have been accepted by and embedded in the main-
stream critique of British nuclear weapons. They make up the public idea of 
‘deterrence.’ They are fundamental assumptions held by all parties to the main-
stream debate about nuclear weapons in Britain. In this case, ‘feigned dissent’ 
involves making criticisms which still take these assumptions as the starting 
point for discussion, without ever even stating them explicitly, let alone testing 
them against the evidence.
When the critics hold the same unspoken bedrock judgements, they become 
the boundaries of thinkable thought.
When tested against the evidence, three of the four assumptions about deter-
rence are contradicted by the available facts.
This essay connects two kinds of ‘unthinkable.’ One is the kind of ‘unthinkable’ 
predicted by the Propaganda Model.
For the general public in Britain, the idea of using nuclear weapons is so 
deeply unacceptable, so taboo, that it is ‘unthinkable’ in a different way. Of 
course, two nuclear weapons were dropped by the United States on Japan in 
August 1945, killing somewhere in the region of 100,000 civilians, but the pop-
ular perception in Western societies is that, since Nagasaki, nuclear weapons 
have not been used.
This is a myth.
For some uncomfortable reality, we can turn to Daniel Ellsberg, once a high-
level US military analyst, who in 1969 leaked the ‘Pentagon Papers,’ the top 
secret internal history of the Vietnam War. Ellsberg wrote in 1981:
The notion common to nearly all Americans that ‘no nuclear weapons 
have been used since Nagasaki’ is mistaken. It is not the case that U.S. 
nuclear weapons have simply piled up over the years – we have over 
30,000 of them now, after dismantling many thousands of obsolete ones –  
unused and unusable, save for the single function of deterring their use 
against us by the Soviets. Again and again, generally in secret from the 
American public, U.S. nuclear weapons have been used, for quite different 
purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at some-
one’s head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.16
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Ellsberg detailed a number of US nuclear threats, writing that ‘in the thirty-
six years since Hiroshima, every president from Truman to Reagan, with the 
possible exception of Ford, has felt compelled to consider or direct serious 
preparations for possible imminent US initiation of tactical or strategic nuclear 
warfare, in the midst of an ongoing, intense, non-nuclear conflict or crisis.’17 
These included US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ secret offer to French 
Prime Minister Bidault of three tactical nuclear weapons in 1954 to relieve the 
French troops besieged by the Indochinese resistance at Dienbienphu, and US 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s secret directive to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
during the 1958 ‘Lebanon Crisis’ to prepare to use nuclear weapons, if neces-
sary, to prevent an Iraqi move into the oilfields of Kuwait.18
There is now a considerable literature documenting US threats to use nuclear 
weapons, or consideration of nuclear use as a live policy option, in a range of 
crises. The literature around ‘nuclear diplomacy’ is not restricted to those critical 
of the nuclear arms race.19 The website of the Office of the Historian of the US 
State Department contains this paragraph in its ‘Milestones in History’ series:
Atomic diplomacy refers to attempts to use the threat of nuclear warfare 
to achieve diplomatic goals. After the first successful test of the atomic 
bomb in 1945, officials immediately considered the potential non-mili-
tary benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monop-
oly. In the years that followed, there were several occasions in which 
government officials used or considered atomic diplomacy.20
Some of these ‘occasions’ are then spelled out involving actual US nuclear 
threats or serious presidential consideration of what is referred to as ‘nuclear 
coercion.’ The examples given are: the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49 (when B-29 
atomic bombers were deployed threateningly); the Korean War (there were 
several ‘occasions,’ including the deployment of nuclear B-29s); and the Viet-
nam War (when ‘President Nixon briefly considered using the threat of the 
bomb to help bring about an end to the war in Vietnam’).
So the use of nuclear weapons as a means of coercion, the threatened use of 
nuclear weapons, has not been ‘unthinkable’ for the US government.
It may be worth mentioning that all the examples mentioned by the State 
Department historians involved threatening non-nuclear weapon states: USSR 
in 1948–49; North Korea and China in 1950, 1951 and 1953; and North Viet-
nam in 1969. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949, 
three months after it abandoned the Berlin blockade. China’s first nuclear test 
was in October 1964, over a decade after the Korean War incidents. North 
Korea did not achieve nuclear weapon status until 2006. North Vietnam never 
developed or acquired a nuclear weapon.
If the use of nuclear weapons is generally ‘unthinkable,’ the use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states must be even more ‘unthinkable’ 
for the public.
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When we turn to the British record, we find that the British government has 
used its nuclear weapons repeatedly in just the ways described.
For example, Iraq has been threatened with British nuclear weapons on at 
least four occasions.
In 1961, Britain manufactured a crisis in the Persian Gulf to send the mes-
sage that it intended to remain a power in the region despite its military with-
drawal. As part of a huge military deployment aimed at threatening Iraq, 
nuclear- capable Scimitar aircraft were sent to the Gulf on board a British air-
craft carrier,21 and strategic nuclear bombers were placed on alert in Malta.22 
British intelligence insider Anthony Verrier later described the incident as an 
‘act of deterrence, in which the nuclear weapons system played a central, con-
cealed role… directed against [Egyptian president Gamal Abdel] Nasser and, 
by extension, Russian ambitions in Arabia.’23
Thirty years later, nuclear weapons formed part of the US and British military 
intervention against Iraq. On 10 August 1990, just eight days after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, and months before British forces deployed in strength for 
the assault in January, a British tabloid newspaper, the Daily Star, reported: 
‘Whitehall sources made it clear that the multinational forces would be ready to 
hit back with every means at their disposal... [including] using tactical nuclear 
weapons against [Iraqi] troops and tanks on the battlefield.’ On 30 Septem-
ber 1990, the Observer reported (on its front page) a warning from a senior 
British army officer with 7th Armoured Brigade: if there were Iraqi chemical 
attacks, British forces would ‘retaliate with battlefield nuclear forces.’ On 26 
October 1990, the Daily Mail reported: ‘One senior minister said, “If we were 
prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons against the Russians, I can’t see why 
we shouldn’t be prepared to use them against Iraq.”’ On 13 November 1990, the 
senior Guardian journalist, Hugo Young, wrote that he had heard a minister say 
that the war against Iraq might have to be ended with ‘tactical nukes.’
British nuclear threats were not restricted to anonymous leaks. On 15 Jan-
uary 1991, the British Prime Minister, John Major told the House of Com-
mons that he did not ‘envisage needing to use the sanction’ of nuclear weapons 
against Iraq.24 Major did not rule out the use of British nuclear weapons as 
unthinkable against a non-nuclear weapon state. His choice of words indicated 
that it was a live policy option. The Guardian carried this report of a statement 
by the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, on 4 February 1991: ‘Mr. Hurd 
said that if Iraq responded to an allied land assault by using chemical weapons, 
President Saddam [Hussein] would be certain to provoke a massive response – 
language the U.S. and Britain employ to leave open the option of using chemi-
cal or nuclear weapons.’
Those confrontations took place under Conservative governments.
In February 1998, in the context of a crisis over UN weapons inspections, a 
Labour Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, told the House of Commons that if the 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein were to use chemical or biological weapons in 
retaliation for a US-UK assault, ‘he should be in no doubt that, if he were to do 
270 The Propaganda Model Today
so, there would be a proportionate response.’25 In other words, Cook threatened 
that Britain or the US would use weapons of mass destruction, either nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons.
In the run-up to the 2003 attack on Iraq, there were more nuclear threats 
from the Labour administration. British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the 
House of Commons Defence Select Committee, on 20 March 2002, that states 
like Iraq ‘can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be 
willing to use our nuclear weapons.’26 On 24 March 2002, Hoon appeared on 
ITV’s Jonathan Dimbleby show and insisted that the government ‘reserved the 
right’ to use nuclear weapons if Britain or British troops were threatened by 
chemical or biological weapons.27 When asked about these nuclear threats in 
a House of Commons debate on 29 April 2002, Hoon said: ‘ultimately, and in 
conditions of extreme self-defence, nuclear weapons would have to be used.’28 
Hoon refused to clarify what he meant by these words.
Iraq is not the only country to have been menaced by British nuclear weap-
ons. Until 1969, the British strategic nuclear force was composed of ‘V-bomb-
ers’ (Valiant, Vulcan and Victor aircraft). In the 1950s and 1960s, V-bombers 
made hundreds of flights not just around the British Isles but around the British 
Empire. They were not restricted to defending the home territory from Soviet 
invasion. For example, in 1962, V-bombers attended independence ceremonies 
in Uganda and Jamaica.29 Three Victors were sent to Jamaica again in 1966 (by 
a Labour government this time). They were there for ‘more than decorative 
purposes,’ according to Andrew Brookes, historian of the V-bomber force and 
himself a former Vulcan pilot.30
According to Brookes, the strategic nuclear Vulcans at RAF Waddington were 
committed in 1963 to ‘dealing with conventional trouble in the Middle East,’ while 
their sister Victors in Cottesmore and Honington ‘looked after the Far East.’31
The deployment of V-bombers to the Middle East or to East Asia amounted 
to nuclear intimidation, whether or not they carried nuclear weapons on any 
particular mission, because they were strategic nuclear bombers. There is a par-
allel with the deployment of US nuclear B-29s during the Berlin Blockade or 
the Korean War.
To take another example, V-bombers from Bomber Command were sent out 
to Singapore in December 1963, after the ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia had 
begun. Brookes, the RAF historian, reports that the bombers were retained in 
the country beyond their normal term, ‘positioned to be seen as ready to elim-
inate Indonesia Air Force capabilities if they launched air attacks.’32 Brookes 
does not say whether this ‘elimination’ was to be conventional or nuclear in 
nature. British Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee later commented of the nuclear-
capable Victors: ‘Their potential was well known to Indonesia and their pres-
ence did not go unnoticed.’ Lee added: ‘the knowledge of RAF strength and 
competence created a wholesome respect among Indonesia’s leaders, and the 
deterrent effect of RAF air defence fighters, light bombers and V-bombers on 
detachment from Bomber Command was absolute.’33
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We now know that when the first V-bombers went out to RAF Tengah in 
Singapore at the end of 1963, there was a storage unit there for 48 Red Beard 
nuclear bombs, and the squadron soon began low-altitude nuclear bombing 
exercises, no doubt signalling British intentions to Indonesia.34
So we see that the British state has repeatedly used nuclear weapons (under 
both Labour and Conservative administrations) ‘in the precise way that a gun 
is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether 
or not the trigger is pulled.’
From the threats against Iraq, a non-nuclear weapon state in 1961, 1991, 1998 
and 2003; from the strategic nuclear bomber deployments right across the 
British Empire; from the V-bomber commitments to the Middle East and 
East Asia (all entirely non-nuclear weapon states in 1963); and from the 
intimidation of Indonesia in the mid-1960s, we learn the true meaning of 
‘deterrence.’
The true meaning of ‘deterrence’ is: creating a ‘wholesome respect’ among the 
natives in far-off lands that Britain wishes to dominate; preventing non-nuclear 
weapon states from using weapons or launching attacks that might even up the 
military odds; if necessary, finishing off a non-nuclear weapon state too tough 
to defeat by conventional means.
There is a remarkable consistency across the decades in the attitude that it 
is entirely acceptable to use British nuclear weapons to intimidate and coerce 
other states, particularly non-nuclear weapon states.
How is it that this material, all readily available as part of the public record, 
does not form part of the discussion around nuclear weapons? Somehow, these 
facts, and their implications, have not been expressed in the mainstream debate 
about nuclear weapons. In fact, they cannot be expressed, and they cannot be 
thought about. This history is ‘unthinkable.’
If we return to the four underlying assumptions of what ‘deterrence’ means, 
we discover from this self-censored history that:
1) British nuclear weapons have not been solely focused on defending the ter-
ritory of the UK. From the very beginning, they have not been just about 
defence, or just about the UK. From the 1950s, British nuclear weapons 
have been used to intimidate countries around the world.
2) British nuclear weapons have not just been a response to, and aimed at, 
nuclear weapon states. British nuclear weapons have often been used to 
menace non-nuclear weapon states. In other words, British nuclear weap-
ons have not just been about nuclear retaliation, they have also been about 
nuclear intimidation and coercion.
3) It is not true that Britain has not used its nuclear weapons, and that they 
have lain idle as rainy-day insurance against a superpower crisis. Britain 
has used its nuclear weapons. It has often used them to threaten other 
countries during direct confrontations.
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This has been part of British nuclear policy since the beginning.35 All of this is 
a matter of public record, and yet these important facts and statements did not 
enter or influence the fierce debates about British nuclear weapons possession 
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s, or in the period since the replacement of the 
Trident nuclear weapons system came onto the agenda. The evidence of British 
nuclear threats against non-nuclear weapon states did not disturb the very nar-
row notion of ‘deterrence’ that was debated so passionately.
Returning to Dangers of Deterrence, mentioned above, Jeff McMahan (then a 
member of CND) made a relevant contribution entitled ‘Nuclear Blackmail’ (today 
it might be called ‘Nuclear Extortion’ to avoid a racist undertone). McMahan 
ruled out the risk of nuclear coercion of a non-nuclear weapon state in peacetime 
as ‘largely unreal’. ‘Even in times of open military conflict,’ he went on, ‘nuclear 
threats against non-nuclear countries may not be a serious option for nuclear-
armed countries.’ McMahan’s ‘most realistic scenario’ would be one in which a 
nuclear weapon state begins an aggressive war against a non-nuclear weapon state 
and got ‘bogged down.’ The aggressor may then, ‘in desperation, resort to nuclear 
threats in an attempt to cut [her or] his losses and gain a favourable settlement.’36 
Quite similar to the October-November 1990 threats against Iraq.
One curious aspect of McMahan’s abstract and theoretical discussion of this 
topic is that, when writing his chapter, he was aware of Daniel Ellsberg’s list of 
actual nuclear threats. McMahan does not refer to Ellsberg’s list anywhere in 
the main body of the essay, but he does in three footnotes. One sentence refers 
vaguely to ‘the various nuclear threats which successive US governments have 
made since 1945.’ The reference (footnote 4) is to Ellsberg’s list of historical 
cases.37 McMahan does not discuss any of the history Ellsberg sets out, but he 
does consider two cases not listed by Ellsberg: the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bomb-
ings, and US nuclear threats against the USSR (a nuclear weapon state) during 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.
This is an excellent demonstration of the way the propaganda system 
works, according to the Propaganda Model. McMahan consciously sup-
pressed shocking information critical to the topic he had decided to address – 
nuclear coercion of non-nuclear weapon states. He did so, we can presume, not 
because he was ordered to do so by the state or some other authority, but because 
of an internalised sense of the ‘right’ way to discuss this topic. This is a case of 
 voluntary self-censorship rather than authoritarian censorship – ‘brainwashing 
under freedom.’ McMahan suppressed the information (Ellsberg’s list of US nuclear 
threats) not by pretending it did not exist, but by treating it as something unworthy, 
or barely worthy, of attention. This is part of a larger pattern in the mainstream 
media and academia. Chomsky explains that:
the enormous amount of material that is produced in the media and 
books makes it possible for a really assiduous and committed researcher 
to gain a fair picture of the real world by cutting through the mass of 
misrepresentation and fraud to the nuggets hidden within.38
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Herman and Chomsky expand:
That a careful reader, looking for a fact can sometimes find it, with 
diligence and a skeptical eye, tells us nothing about whether that fact 
received the attention and context it deserved, whether it was intelligible 
to most readers, or whether it was effectively distorted or suppressed.39
You may have noticed that in the section on the 1991 nuclear threats against 
Iraq, there were quotes from a number of British newspapers. Herman and 
Chomsky comment:
That the media provide some information about an issue... proves abso-
lutely nothing about the adequacy or accuracy of media coverage. The 
media do in fact suppress a great deal of information, but even more 
important is the way they present a particular fact – its placement, tone, 
and frequency of repetition – and the framework of analysis in which 
it is placed.40
Let’s take each of these four propaganda devices in turn, in relation to McMa-
han’s chapter: placement, tone, frequency of repetition, and framework of 
 analysis.
Placement: McMahan, in this case, knew of Daniel Ellsberg’s list of US 
nuclear threats and its relevance to his topic, but decided not to give any 
details of the list, and placed his direct references to Ellsberg’s list (which 
tended to contradict his argument) in the least-visible section of his essay, 
the footnotes.
Tone and frequency of repetition: there are, in total, three (plain, factual) 
sentences directly mentioning Ellsberg’s list - in three separate footnotes. In 
the main text, there are two indirect references to Ellsberg’s list,  separated 
by 23 pages. We have already noted the first (two-sentence) reference to the 
list, which is brief and offhand. The other (even more indirect)  reference 
to Ellsberg’s list comes in the final paragraph, which poses a number of 
 questions that need to be investigated regarding ‘those [unspecified] nuclear 
threats which have been made.’41 The tone is flat, academic, and questioning, 
 unexcited.
Framework of analysis: The overall picture within which these references 
appear is fairly summed up by the final words of the chapter: ‘the claim that the 
possibility of nuclear blackmail poses a serious threat to non-nuclear countries 
should be treated with scepticism.’42
When we examine the newspaper reports (some of them front-page stories) 
about the British nuclear threats against Iraq in 1990–1, the most common fea-
tures are: lack of repetition of the disturbing reports (almost immediately, it’s 
as if they never surfaced) and a consistent framework of analysis for report-
ing both Iraq and nuclear weapons in which British nuclear threats against a 
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non-nuclear weapon state are inconceivable and unthinkable. So the facts are 
sometimes reported, sometimes prominently, but they disappear as soon as 
they appear.
The PM’s predictions of media performance are borne out by the behaviour 
of recent mainstream critics of nuclear weapons, and by the way in which the 
long history of British nuclear threats has been edited out of history in the long, 
often intense debate about nuclear weapons. Mainstream criticisms of British 
nuclear weapons have colluded with the suppression of important relevant his-
tory and have created a narrow, irrelevant definition of ‘nuclear deterrence.’ By 
focusing on abstract questions raised by possible future retaliation, the main-
stream critics have helped to divert attention from the concrete reality of actual, 
often recent, nuclear intimidation by the British state.
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CHAPTER 18
Conclusion
Joan Pedro-Carañana, Daniel Broudy and Jeffery Klaehn
This book has tested the three main hypotheses that Edward S. Herman and 
Noam Chomsky propose for empirically validating the Propaganda Model 
(PM). Authors have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence based on 
case studies and comparative analyses, evaluated the influence of the five filters, 
identified propaganda tactics and strategies and proposed ways of extending 
and improving the model. We shall explain next how this volume has addressed 
each of the main hypotheses.
18.1 First Hypothesis
The analyses featured in this volume have confirmed the first hypothesis that 
predicts that when the interests of the economic and political elites are strong, 
when there is consensus among them and oppositional forces are weak and 
disorganized, the most influential media (both analog and digital) will strongly 
support such consensus and their projects for imperial, class and racial domi-
nation both nationally and internationally.
Contributors have presented evidence of such a propagandistic role in the 
online and offline mainstream news coverage of the so-called ‘war on terror’ 
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and ‘humanitarian interventions’, nuclear weapons and deterrence, the eco-
nomic crash, the policies of austerity, inequality and poverty and race relations 
in the United States and Cuba. Contributors have analysed the demonisation 
and defamation of emergent social movements and political forces, as well as 
the media support of the 2002 coup in Venezuela while criminalizing protest 
in Mexico. As predicted by the PM, comparable events are considered news-
worthy or not depending on the vested interests of powerful actors; there are 
worthy and unworthy victims, worthy and unworthy malefactors. Even the 
dramatic reporting on climate change in a crucial period for both the environ-
ment and humans meets the expectations of the PM. Concrete interests are not 
analysed with scrutiny. The need for a macro-transformation to move towards 
new socio-economic systems not based upon accelerated usage and consump-
tion of natural resources is similarly not highlighted.
We have also featured applications of the PM to forms of media and con-
tent not previously analysed within this theoretical framework, particularly the 
entertainment industry. Through the study of television, professional sports, 
videogames, online media platforms, social networks and search engines, and 
the Hollywood film industry, authors have argued that the PM with a broad-
ened analytical range of media remains to be a strong conceptual tool for 
explaining and predicting media performance.
The authors acknowledge a greater difficulty to measuring the PM hypotheses 
in entertainment media, but applied textual and political economy analyses to 
identify different types of entertainment products in relation to elite consensus. 
In order for their presence in the media, these types include: (a) Those which 
are overtly supportive of establishment goals; (b) Those that initially appear to 
criticize the political system but, on closer reading, provide it with fundamental 
support; (c) those that do genuinely challenge Western systems of hegemonic 
power but are explicitly marginalized by the corporate media mechanisms of 
control; (d) Those that are genuine cases of breaking through the filtration sys-
tem, which invariably occur for irregular reasons and/or with serious caveats 
and little promotion.
A Propaganda Model for Television contextualizes the PM and provides a 
critical evaluation of the programming that surrounds television news. It con-
siders the involvement of major corporations, the State, the military and other 
elite institutions and actors in TV shows and posits that most of the contents 
promote the basic tenets of neoliberalism: consumerism, selfish individualism, 
priority of the physical image, hierarchical organization of economic and social 
activities, entrepreneurial attitude, profit-making, jingoism, technocracy, war, 
the belief that everybody lies and that human nature is intrinsically bad, and 
the proposal of individual solutions to social problems.
A content analysis of both Google results and the New York Times has dem-
onstrated that stigmatizing terms are used far more often to disparage profes-
sional athletes, particularly NFL players, than to describe team owners; by con-
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trast, benevolent terms are used far more often to describe team owners than 
to describe players. It is worth noting that the New York Times was even slightly 
more favorable to NFL team owners than Google was.
Even though there is much more diversity on the internet than in a single 
newspaper (New York Times), the level of plurality is diminished by the media-
tion of Google search engine, as it operates as a power-law. Although there are 
possibilities for smaller media to compete and obtain visibility, the selection 
and ordering of the results respond to hierarchical criteria which tend to favor 
sites belonging to established, dominant institutions, at the expense of new and 
less well-established sites, and thus for innovation and diversity.
From the perspective of the first hypothesis of the PM, an important innova-
tion ought to be observed. Even though internet media are important channels 
for the dissemination of commercialism and right-wing propaganda, the ongo-
ing technological revolution also provides opportunities for critical citizens 
and social movements to spread their messages across geographical boundaries 
with unprecedented speed. Far from the one-sidedness of both techno-utopian 
and techno-dystopian views, contributors reflect dialectically on propaganda 
in the new digital communications systems. Authors apply the elements of the 
PM to corporate media as components of a larger System of social and ideolog-
ical influence and coercion, and examine responses through digital and physi-
cal activism carried out by actors against the prevailing political order.
In other words, digital technologies have allowed for both a tighter cultural con-
trol of citizens by elites as well as opportunities for social movements, new politi-
cal forces and individual citizens to create and distribute their communication. 
For the first time in history, most people have the possibility of creating contents 
and introducing more plurality into the public sphere. However, it is the tradi-
tional media that are now dominating the internet. Corporate and State actors 
have more economic resources and are better organized, but organized social 
movements have used collective intelligence to deliver creative and critical mes-
sages and achieve an important level of influence. Citizens can respond to a tweet 
from politicians, but they might as well be ignored. Celebrities are most widely 
followed, but new politicians and journalists in favor of change have more fol-
lowers than traditional politicians. Thus, the study of the internet requires further 
analysis of the relation between digital labour (users) and digital capital, the Left 
online and the Right online, everyday users and online celebrities and influencers.
Contributors have provided empirical and political economy analysis of the 
power relations affecting the internet and of the functioning and contents of 
online media. They discovered that the communication practices of alternative 
movements have a noteworthy impact on the cyber-sphere, although they are 
usually limited to ‘hot moments’ of protests and dissent. However, the fact is 
that a small elite of users usually dominates most online visibility and atten-
tion. In addition, social networks reproduce abundantly the contents of the 
mainstream media, while the mainstream media does not include so many of 
282 The Propaganda Model Today
the contents created by citizens and social movements (especially the critical-
transformative messages). Still, digital media are fundamental for social move-
ments to make powerful discursive interventions in moments of crisis. They 
can do so by exploring the contradictions, utilizing specific software, platforms 
and institutions, and using creativity and humour. The exceptions to the PM 
are, therefore, important in developing greater understanding for the possibili-
ties of change. The potential for contestation is acknowledged since power rela-
tions are contradictory and are affected by change.
The propaganda role of the media systems has been confirmed empirically in 
several geographical areas, including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Germany, Latin America, and Spain. We can, therefore, confirm the 
validity of the PM to explain news reporting in other countries different from 
the US where the original PM analysis was conducted.
18.2 Exceptions
The media in some countries have experienced overtures in which a wider diver-
sity of opinions enjoyed their space. This is consistent with the first hypothesis 
of the PM: when there is no elite consensus, the media will tend to portray all 
the sides of the elite conflict and even allow more voices. This is what happened 
in Spain where the new political party Podemos was given more time on air to 
criticize the government. By doing this, media companies were trying to force the 
government to resist pressure from global digital giants (such as Netflix, Google, 
and Amazon) and favor national industries. The media had strategies to disci-
pline and delegitimize Podemos, such as producing flak and accusing it members 
of being communists and receiving funds from Venezuela and Iran. However, 
their leaders did receive significant space when they were building the party.
Previously, the 15-M movement was often vilipended and misunderstood 
by the media, but it did also have space to express its views. In addition, the 
15-M (and Podemos to a certain extent) was able to shape the online environ-
ment for some time and achieve a lot of visibility by sharing a great number of 
discourses. As the PM holds, when the interests of the elites are divided, when 
the burden for the practices of a part of the elites (especially corruption) is not 
to be accepted by another part of the elite, and when strong social and politi-
cal movements with a communication strategy emerge, the media will tend 
to become more open and include more diverse views. The media frames still 
remain mainly within elite interests (reflecting the different sides), but there 
are more possibilities for journalistic autonomy, and this opens a window of 
opportunity for radical forces to develop strategies of critical intervention in 
the media. It is, thus, important to focus on national and local factors, which 
include the political tradition, the existence of strong social movements, the 
degree of hegemony exercised by neoliberalism, the State and global capitalism 
as well as the openness of the cultural and ideological context.
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Elite differences, social and political movements for change, national and 
local contexts, and the innovative and creative use of the digital media are 
important factors to understand the functioning of the traditional and new 
media and exploring the possibilities of meaningfully intervening in them. It is 
worth highlighting the capacity of human agency, especially collective action, 
to influence the media system and eventually transform it. Herman and Chom-
sky did not reflect thoroughly on the role of social movements and civil soci-
ety, but the underlying assumption is that even though propaganda tends to be 
effective, there are always resistance and movements for change. Chomsky has 
emphasized that polls show systematically that the general population in the 
US holds rather diverging views on important topics to those held by the elites. 
The System establishes determinations, but there are also degrees of freedom 
in which creative and transformative communication and action can have a 
meaningful impact.
18.3 Second Hypothesis
It has also been demonstrated that the five operative principles or ‘filters’ that 
comprise the model (ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and dominant ide-
ology) have a strong impact on media systems that are guided by market forces 
rather than by direct State control (second hypothesis).
It has been shown in accordance with the perspective of the PM that the 
main online and offline media outlets are controlled by large concentrations 
of corporate power that are interconnected with States and governments. Such 
corporations are characterized by their secrecy. Moreover, financial capital has 
further penetrated the media sector and is exercising increasing control over 
the editorial lines and the production of contents. It has been shown that inter-
net technologies have made it easier to commodify stories. Deregulation by 
policy-makers has been fundamental in the marketization of both the internet 
and traditional media.
Advertising also plays a key role since the most important social networks, 
search engines, and online media depend on advertising revenues. Native 
advertising, branded content, and product placement have become pervasive. 
Individualized ads based on Big Data contribute to the culture of commercial-
ism and its acceptance to the detriment of privacy. On television, about a quar-
ter of total broadcast time consists of commercials.
The sourcing filter may adopt different forms depending on the media prod-
uct. There is a preponderance of the traditional conventions and rules of pro-
duction that guide producers towards safe sources and predictability. Large 
corporations, entertainment industries, traditional news organizations, and 
State actors (including the military) are the main sources of influence in both 
the online and offline environments. In addition, bots are often used to manip-
ulate the cyber-sphere, especially in politics.
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Traditional forms of flak have reached a new level of presence on the internet 
and often appear as hate speech. Corporate organizations, politicians, parties, 
movements and individuals often attack people who hold different ideas. This 
influence on the cyber-sphere can be conducted overtly or covertly and is often 
done through bots. The capacity to deliver flak obviously depends on resources 
and organization. The persecution of Snowden and Assange as well as the pros-
ecution of Manning provides evidence on the severity of flak when important 
information affects the System negatively.
The fifth filter presents a variety of dimensions that are related to the domi-
nant ideologies. News reporting, entertainment, and the internet tend to be 
influenced by dominant ideologies and usually reproduce them. Neoliberal 
ideology, with its commercialism, entrepreneurialism, individualism, and 
cynicism are amplified by online algorithms, videogames, and TV shows. The 
Orwellian language of the ‘war on terror’, ‘humanitarian interventions’ and 
‘them vs. us’ also finds abundant space to generate fear, hatred, and unques-
tioning conformity. It is also important to note that this volume has included 
evidence on the renewed influence of anti-communism. In spite of the fall of 
the Soviet Union, the media continue to accuse social and political forces in 
favor of change of supporting communism and, specifically Bolivarian Castro-
communism in the case of Podemos.
When analyzing the media from a dialectical perspective, it is noticed that 
where there is commercialization there are also social actors that share technol-
ogies and communication without a profit motive. Internet users do sometimes 
block advertising and use their critical skills to search for alternative media 
products. Citizens sometimes defend themselves collectively against flak and 
promote new cultural frameworks and forms of sociability and systemic organ-
ization based on equality, freedom, and solidarity. Their influence is limited, 
but it cannot be underestimated. As Herman and Chomsky have emphasized, 
governments consider the general population their main enemy; one that has 
to be persuaded (or coerced) to accept the social order.
The five filters of the PM have a stronger influence in both the analog and the 
digital media than in the past. Thus, they are relevant for analyzing new media 
production. However, the question remains whether there are more important 
factors that come into play, especially in the functioning of the internet. It could 
be that the first hypothesis on media contents is validated, but that the explana-
tory principles are insufficient. Is the PM exhaustive? Some contributors have 
suggested extending the PM as follows:
18.4 The Propaganda and Security System
The propaganda and security system refers to the nexus of decision-making 
power. It involves the interconnection between State and corporate actors that 
makes investment and political decisions, setting the framework for public 
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policy. The System develops tactics and strategies to protect from critical forces 
and prevent change. It includes material actions as well as the management, 
dissemination, and control of information. Attention has been paid to the prac-
tices of distortion, omission, and misdirection of information put into practice 
by the System. It involves organisational and bureaucratic entities, government 
and corporation ‘spin doctors’ and ‘PR’ agents, think tanks, NGOs, co-opted 
elite journalists and even academia. It also involves surveillance and actors 
from within the so-called ‘deep state’ such as the intelligence services as well 
as online corporations based on Big Data. By taking into account the larger 
context, the PM considers the actors that produce propaganda in first place and 
who work to shape the media environments.
18.5 Agency: Social Movements, Journalists, Audiences-users
An exhaustive analysis of the media can be conducted by combining the struc-
tural approach of the PM with the topic of agency. In the relations between 
structure and agency, one can observe the degree of adjustment and contra-
diction between both dimensions of social reality. It is, thereby, possible to 
identify the forces in conflict and the disruptive factors that might be explored 
for promoting changes in the media systems. The historical agents of change 
can be identified and media strategies can be developed. Social and political 
movements and organizations are important, we have argued, because they can 
expand the limits of debate in the media. They often resist against the worsen-
ing of the state of affairs. When they errupt on the public stage during key 
moments of history, they can contribute to a democratization of mentalities 
and societies with lasting effects.
The PM views the role of journalists as overwhelmed by the constraints of 
the filters. It is held that journalists tend to internalize the editorial values of 
their employer. Our volume has provided evidence from sociological research 
of journalism that confirms this. This process of institutionalization of jour-
nalists does not follow a behaviourist pattern, but is instead instilled through 
socialisation and fear  – and resistance does take place. Many critical journalists 
have surely been fired and received other forms of flak, but journalists, espe-
cially when they are well-organized, do sometimes question the ownership 
and organisational structures, the influence of advertisers and the limitations 
and precariousness they experience. The power relation is asymmetrical, but 
unions of journalists and professional organizations can wield some influence. 
Journalists can also feel encouraged to exercise a critical autonomy if there are 
strong social currents that demand and defend such autonomy. The volume has 
also shown that some ‘journalist stars’ transmit alternative information that is 
widely demanded.
The existence of a strong demand for alternative information and for ‘jour-
nalist stars’ shows that audiences are important in media production. However, 
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citizens are more effective when organized to communicate in the media or to 
promote media reform through social movements.
The role of social movements, audiences-users, and journalists is under-
stood here in the framework of the power relations vis á vis the structures that 
constrain the possibilities of agency. There is a clear imbalance in the power 
relations, but the small and seemingly insignificant do sometimes bring about 
important changes.
18.6 Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis predicts that critical studies and commentary on media 
performance will tend to be ignored and marginalized. Our volume addresses 
this hypothesis and shows that Journalism Studies tend to avoid subjecting 
journalism to a critical analysis that highlights structural power inequalities. 
This is not achieved through censorship. Instead, the academic system orients 
human capacities and financial resources towards large-scale, data-intensive 
research projects. These projects avoid being critical of the media and the role 
of journalists and focus instead on minor and de-contextualized micro-prac-
tices. The academic system rewards these projects with funding and publica-
tions in monopolistic profit-driven publishers. In other words, academia also 
has a political economy.
18.7 Final Remarks
This volume has analysed both analog and digital media from the perspective of 
the PM. The three main hypotheses of the model have been confirmed in both 
news and entertainment products. Areas of extension and improvement have 
also been addressed and explanations for exceptions have been provided. The 
propaganda and security system as well as critical-transformative social move-
ments are relevant factors to include in media analysis. The role of media profes-
sionals and audiences-users is also to be taken into consideration. The interplay 
between structure and agency in the framework of the existing, unequal power 
relations can be seen as key to critical media studies.
We looked back through history to identify the continuities and the changes. 
We focused on the social totalities, their parts and their contradictions to 
understand the relations of and the possibilities for democratic change. The 
PM still provides a fundamental, critical analytical tool to explain the func-
tioning of hegemonic media systems in the twenty-first century. It aligns well 
with other theoretical and methodological approaches and is grounded in the 
perspective of providing a critical analysis that enables eventual transforma-
tion of both society and the media in a more egalitarian, free, democratic, and 
fraternal direction.
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THE PROPAGANDA MODEL TODAY 
While the individual elements of the propaganda system (or filters) identified by the Propaganda Model (PM) – ownership, advertising, sources, flak and anti-communism – have previously 
been the focus of much scholarly attention, their systematisation in a model, 
empirical corroboration and historicisation have made the PM a useful tool 
for media analysis across cultural and geographical boundaries.
 Despite the wealth of scholarly research Herman and Chomsky’s work has set 
into motion over the past decades, the PM has been subjected to marginalisation, 
poorly informed critiques and misrepresentations. Interestingly, while the PM 
enables researchers to form discerning predictions as regards corporate media 
performance, Herman and Chomsky had further predicted that the PM itself 
would meet with such marginalisation and contempt.
 In current theoretical and empirical studies of mass media performance, uses 
of the PM continue, nonetheless, to yield important insights into the workings 
of political and economic power in society, due in large measure to the model’s 
considerable explanatory power.
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